


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Theology of the Old
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THEOLOGY

OF

THE OLD TESTAMENT.

BY

DR. GUST. FR. OEHLER,

LATE PROFESSOR ORDINARIUS OF THEOLOGY IN TÜBINGEN.

VOLUME I.

TRANSLATED BY

ELLEN D. SMITH.

EDINBURGH:

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.



FIFTY-EIGHT years ago, my father expressed in his *Prolegomena zur Theologie des Alten Testaments* his intention to publish a handbook of Old Testament theology. Although thenceforth the appearance of this work was eagerly looked for on many sides, he was not permitted to carry out his plan, and it would seem that in the closing years of his life he had almost given it up. The numerous labours of his vocation, and in particular his laborious double duty after he was called to Tübingen in the year 1852, did not leave him the necessary leisure; and at the same time his conscientiousness did not permit him to let the work out of his hands without the last thorough revision to which he had intended to subject it. He published only detached though considerable portions of his Old Testament Theology, mainly in *Herzog's Realencyklopädie*.—Thus the present work is certainly marked by the defects of an *opus posthumum*, and with respect to these must claim the indulgence of critics; but on the other hand, it is safe to assume that a course of lectures which was so often delivered and revised from the summer of 1839 to the winter of 1870–71, gained during that long time a thoroughness and depth which make it worthy of publication.—The points of view which guided the author in the discussion of Old Testament theology now offered to the reader, as well as the value of this science in general, are set forth in the address prefixed to the work. In reference to the life and labours of my father, I point the reader to the *Worte der Erinnerung an G. Fr. Oehler*, Tübingen 1872, and the numerous obituary notices (e.g. in Luthardt's *Kirchenzeitung* of March 8; in the *Neue evangelische Kirchenzeitung* of June 8, 1872, etc.); and in particular, to the most complete of these, by Diakonus J. Knapp, in the *Württemberg Kirchen-*

und Schulblatt, from September 1872 onwards (not yet completed). It only remains for me to speak shortly of my own work as editor.

My father's manuscript, which was never fully written out, was on this account rather difficult to read; still, by the help of a number of students' note-books, it was possible to put into shape the text of the paragraphs, and to make this part very exact. The contents of a large part of the notes on the paragraphs were only indicated in the manuscript by a few words, and the author when delivering them was accustomed to allow himself considerable freedom. As, moreover, the delivery of this matter was quicker, the note-books on which I was thrown did not always give me these notes in the best form. As far as was possible, they were adopted in their latest form, but not seldom older note-books had to be consulted. Another part of the notes attached to the introduction to the work is taken from the above-named *Prolegomena*, and in the rest of the book many notes are derived from the numerous well-known articles of the author in Herzog's *Realencyklopädie*; some from Schmid's *pädagogische Encyklopädie*, mainly from the article, "Pädagogik des Alten Testaments." The heads of these articles were in many instances embodied in the manuscript, and then the explanatory details which were given in the lectures were put in brackets. Often, too, if there was an article on the subject, the author expressed himself more briefly, and referred to the details to be found there. Thus I was compelled to make extensive use of the articles for the notes, and was enabled to remove in this way the inequality of treatment which the form of the work would otherwise have displayed, owing to the circumstance that the author in many parts of the lectures was compelled by lack of time to abstain from fully discussing the contents of the paragraphs. Where literal quotations have been made from the *Prolegomena* or articles, this is expressly stated; it was only in rare cases that it seemed desirable to me to insert single sentences from those articles, even in the paragraphs themselves, and this I have generally done within brackets.

This volume contains about two-thirds of the whole work. I have also already begun to work on the second volume (Prophecy and Chochma). A complete register of names, matters treated, and quotations, will be given when the work is completed.

My father wished above all things that the result of his lectures might be to produce in his hearers an impression of the holy greatness of the Old Testament, which, as he assured them, had at one time affected himself in an overpowering way; and an impression of the grand connection of both Testaments, which appeared to him to be their strongest apology against objections drawn from many undeniable stumblingblocks, due to the servile form of revelation. He was therefore wont to address the request to his hearers, that whatever side, *pro* or *contra*, some might have already taken, all would approach the Old Testament with that desire for truth which is concerned only to understand the subject, and so gladly accepts every extension of knowledge. May this work, under the blessing of God, be thus received, and produce such results among many who, after the author's death, still trust themselves to his well-tried guidance in their study of the Old Testament.

HERMANN OEHLER,
Librarian to the Evangelical Seminary.

TÜBINGEN, July 1873.

The first volume of the German original (Tübingen, 1873), to which the *Editor's Preface* properly applies, contains the *Introduction* and the whole discussion of *Mosaism*. The volume now offered to the public does not go quite so far, about one-fourth of the theology of Mosaism being reserved for the second part of the translation. I have only to add that a few notes, consisting almost exclusively of references to literature subsequent in date to the late Professor Oehler's last revision of his lectures, have been added by my brother, Prof. W. R. Smith of Aberdeen, who kindly read my MS. before it went to press. These notes are generally distinguished by being enclosed in a brace {thus}.

E. D. SMITH.

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OPENING WORDS

*AT THE LAST DELIVERY OF THE LECTURES,
OCTOBER 21, 1870.*



ENTLEMEN, in resuming our academic activity after long interruption, we all doubtless feel emotions of mingled joy and sorrow. We thank God for the deeds of deliverance by which He hath glorified Himself in our nation, and for the gracious protection which makes it possible for us to pursue here the works of peace while the conflict still surges without; we trust that He will bring forth judgment to victory, and from the pangs of these days bring forth for our nation a felicity worthy of the sacrifices offered. But, on the other side, we may not doubt that the duration of the serious crisis of history in which we stand is still incalculable; that perhaps it bears in its lap many new sufferings, and will yet add many to the lamented sacrifices which already have fallen on the altar of our Fatherland. In such critical moments, in which man would gladly have leave to ask a question at fate, and in lieu of this is ready to cradle himself in sanguine dreams, the Christian is referred to the word of God, as the light by which we ever learn to read God's ways, as the source from which in all circumstances we are to draw doctrine and counsel, admonition and comfort. In this blessing, by the divine word, the Old Testament has its proper share, as a prophetic word unveiling the divine purposes and the goal of all God's ways, and displaying in every crisis of the fortunes of nations the coming of the God who judgeth and delivereth the world, perfecting His own kingdom;—as an historic word holding up to us a mirror in which we see the severity and goodness of God in the guiding of men: His severity against those who, revolting from Him, harden themselves in pride and lies; His goodness to those who, in repentance and humility, give Him honour and walk in His paths;—

finally, as a word of prayer which teaches us in every case to seek God's face, and to seek help from Him. In the course of recent years it has often been said, especially in ecclesiastical assemblies, that a special need of the age is a better recognition of the importance of the Old Testament for religious knowledge and life—that the treasures of this book, so little known, especially to so-called persons of culture, be more fully laid open to the body of the Church. To this end the first requisite is, that theologians shall form a more thorough acquaintance with the Old Testament, especially that they become more familiar with it as a whole. It is true of every intellectual product, that it cannot be rightly esteemed by those who concern themselves only with its outer features, or with individual fragments of it; and of the Bible this is peculiarly true. What is here unfolded is one great economy of salvation—*unum continuum systema*, as Bengel puts it—an organism of divine deeds and testimonies, which, beginning in Genesis with the creation, advances progressively to its completion in the person and work of Christ, and shall find its close in the new heaven and earth predicted in the Apocalypse; and only in connection with this whole can details be rightly estimated. He who cannot apprehend the Old Testament in its historical context may produce in detail much that is valuable and worth knowing, but he lacks the right key to its meaning, and therefore true joy in the study of it; then he easily stops short at the puzzles which lie everywhere on the surface of the Old Testament, and from them he condemns the whole. Now, to introduce to organic historical knowledge of the Old Testament, is the very business of the discipline to which these lectures are to be devoted. We must not think it below its dignity to serve the practical need just indicated; nay, in general, he is no true theologian who leaves an open breach between science and life. But we vindicate for Old Testament theology no small importance also for science, especially for systematic theology. It possesses this importance as a part of biblical theology, since, in virtue of the Protestant principle of the authority of Scripture, every question for which the Protestant theologian seeks an answer leads back directly or indirectly to Scripture, and the historical investigation of the divine revelation it contains.

In its development as an independent science, biblical theology is

one of the most recent branches of theology. We shall see by and by that the name and conception of biblical theology as a special historical science arose only in the course of last century, and the division of Old and New Testament theology was made still later. Older theologians did not separate dogmatic and biblical theology, and were still further from the idea of dividing Old and New Testament theology, ignoring the gradual progress of revelation, the constant connection of the revealing word with the advance of the revealing history, and treating the Old and New Testament as a sort of promptuarium which could be used alike in all its parts—proof-texts for every Christian doctrine being brought together from the various parts of the Bible. We are now far beyond such onesidedness, although some recent Old Testament theologians (Hengstenberg) still show a tendency to confuse the two Testaments after the fashion of the older orthodoxy. On the other hand, we are confronted in recent times by a view of the Old Testament which entirely cuts loose the Old Testament religion from specific connection with the New Testament, placing it on one line with the other pre-Christian religions, which also in their own way were a preparation for Christianity,—a view of the Old Testament which scarcely allows its theology to claim a higher significance for the theologic knowledge of the Christian, than could, for example, be ascribed to Homeric theology. This antipathy to the Old Testament in the spirit of Marcion and Schleiermacher is still prevalent among theologians, though far less so than it was twenty or thirty years ago. From this point of view the name Old Testament religion is as far as possible avoided, and Judaism and Jewish religion are spoken of by preference, although every one may learn from history that the Old Testament and Judaism are distinct—that Judaism begins when the Old Testament is about to end, viz. with Ezra and the wisdom of the scribes founded by him. This view consistently leads to the ignoring of the specific character as revelation of the New Testament also—of Christianity. On this point we must not allow ourselves to be deceived. The relation of the New Testament to the Old is such, that both stand or fall together. The New Testament has no other view than that Old Testament law and prophecy form its positive presupposition. According to the New Testament, God built up Christi-

anity out of other elements than those with which modern destructive criticism is accustomed to calculate. We cannot have the redeeming God of the new covenant, without the Creator and covenant God preached in the old; we cannot place the Redeemer out of connection with Old Testament predictions which He appeared to fulfil. No New Testament idea, indeed, is already fully set forth in the Old Testament, but the genesis of all the ideas of New Testament salvation lie in the Old Testament; and Schleiermacher himself was compelled to give a striking testimony to the organic connection of the two Testaments, which in principle he denies, when he reintroduced into dogmatic the treatment of the work of Christ on the type of the threefold office. Against the assertion that, to gain the true sense of Scripture, we must put aside everything that is Israelitish, or, as people say, everything that is Jewish, or, in Bunsen's words, must translate from Semitic into Japhetic, we must teach, with Hofmann (in his *Schriftbeweis*), that the history contained in Scripture being the history of Israel, is what makes it Holy Scripture; for Israel is the people whose vocation lies in the history of salvation. *Ἡ σωτηρία ἐκ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐστίν*, says our Lord to the woman of Samaria. Not to conceal God from the world, but to reveal Him to the world as the Holy One whom heathenism knows not, is the work for which Israel was chosen. In Israel were implanted such living forces, that only in this people could be born the God-man, the Redeemer of the world. The whole national figure of Israel; the election and the rejection; the curse that lies upon the nation, which Hitzig has compared to the oyster, which produces the pearl by its own destruction, —all these are revelations of God to the world.

Therefore Old Testament theology still retains its importance for Christian dogma, though not in the same way in which the older Protestant theology utilized the Old Testament in dogmatic. The old atomistic system of Scripture proof must be superseded by one that shows that the truths of salvation formulated in dogmas, arise as the result of the whole historical process through which Revelation has passed. The possibility of such a Scripture proof is demonstrated just by biblical theology, which presents the Bible revelation in its totality and in its gradual historical course, and so displays the genesis of the scriptural notions from which dogmatic propositions are to be

coined, and the context in which they appear in the divine economy of salvation. When dogmatic makes use of the structure of biblical theology, this not only serves continually to renew and deepen the former in regard to existing dogmas; but also those biblical doctrines which, in the dogmatic labours of former centuries, fell too much into the shade, will receive more justice. For Scripture is, as Oetinger has called it, the store-book of the world, the store-book of all times: it offers to the Church in every age just such instruction as it specially requires. Thus, to give a single example, recent times have directed to biblical eschatology an interest in which the older Protestant theology had no share.

In these remarks I think I have brought forward the principal points of view by which the importance of Old Testament theology is to be estimated, and which are my guides in dealing with the Old Testament. Of the greatness and difficulty of the task, no one can have a livelier conviction than I myself. There are good reasons why there are innumerable monographs on isolated portions of biblical theology, but only few discussions of the whole subject, and also few separate books on Old Testament theology, and that some of these are posthumous. If these lectures awake in one or other of you an inclination to labour at the solution of this problem independently, not through the glasses of a theological system or a critical school, but to devote to the Old Testament a thorough study, with a receptive sense of its holy grandeur, this will be the best result which I could wish for these lectures. So, then, let us begin the journey that lies before us with trust in God, that we may pass through it without disturbance to its goal, and, arrived thither, may thank Him for His help in the way.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1.

Summary.

The Introduction has—

1. To determine the notion of the theology of the Old Testament, and its relation to cognate biblical disciplines.
2. To lay down the conception of Old Testament religion presupposed in our statement, and the scientific standpoint of Old Testament theology which flows from it.

Thereupon follows—

3. A general glance at the history of the discipline, and
 4. The discussion of the method of Old Testament theology, and its divisions.
-

I.—NOTION OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

§ 2.

DEFINITION OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY. ITS EXTENSION OVER THE DELINEATION OF THE WHOLE DISPENSATION OF OLD TESTAMENT REVELATION.

The theology of the Old Testament, the first main division of biblical theology, is the historico-genetic delineation of the religion contained in the canonical writings of the Old Testament.

As a historical science, biblical theology is distinguished from the systematic statement of biblical doctrine by this, that while the latter seeks out the unity of divine saving truth, which flows from the whole course of revelation, and the sum of its manifestation, the former, on the other hand, has the task of delineating the biblical

religion according to its progressive development, and the multiplicity of the forms in which it appears. The theology of the Old Testament has therefore to follow the gradual progress by which Old Testament revelation advances to the completion of salvation in Christ; and it has to bring into view from all sides the forms in which, under the old covenant, the communion between God and man found its expression.

Now, since Old Testament revelation (cf. § 6) did not present itself simply as a divine doctrinal witness in words, but was realized in a connected line of divine deeds and institutions, and on the basis of these produced a peculiarly shaped religious life; and further, as all knowledge due to revelation is not given independently of the facts of the history of salvation and the divinely instituted rules of life, but develops itself in continual connection with them; so the theology of the Old Testament cannot limit itself to the directly didactic matter in the Old Testament. It has to take up the essential factors of the history of the divine kingdom in the old covenant: its task is, in short, the delineation of the whole dispensation of Old Testament revelation (1).

Even on this view of the subject the name Old Testament theology is still too wide (2), but at least is more suitable than other names which have been chosen for the delineation of the Old Testament revelation, particularly than the term Old Testament Dogmatic (3).

(1) The conception of the Old Testament here drawn out attaches to the conception of biblical theology represented mainly by Ch. Fr. Schmid (in a treatise *On the Interests and Position of the Biblical Theology of the New Testament in our Time*, Tüb. Zeitschr. f. Theol. 1838, H. 4, S. 125 ff.; and in his well-known *Handbook of New Testament Theology*). This conception has, however, met with much opposition. The common conception is, that this discipline should limit itself to the delineation of the specially didactic contents of both Testaments. But here arises in the Old Testament the great difficulty, that this contains proportionally very little directly didactic matter. A separate representation of Old Testament religious teaching is, to be sure, possible; but if it is not to prove quite incomplete, it will not be able to dispense with a reference at all points to the history of the covenant people and the institutions of the theocracy. This has also been urged, for instance, by Steudel (*Vorlesungen über*

die Theol. des A. T., 1840), although he limits our discipline to the delineation of the contents of Old Testament doctrine. He says with truth (p. 18 f.): "We should form for ourselves an incomplete representation of the substance of Old Testament religion, and of biblical religion in general, if we looked upon it only as doctrine. It is the most definite facts which are held before us as the source of the growth of religious conceptions and religious life. It was not on the basis of consciousness that objective views in religion established themselves. Consciousness did not create the thing held forth as fact; but, on the contrary, the consciousness was produced by the facts, and often the facts lie before us, from which only a later time deduced the religious element which they represented and offered as their lesson." Now, though this is recognised by biblical theologians, it is generally thought to be quite enough to give merely introductory surveys of the history of revelation, as has been done by Steudel, and also by Schultz, in the most recent Old Testament theology. But on this plan it is not possible to bring properly to light the internal connection of the doctrine of Revelation with the revealing history—the continual progress of the former in connection with the latter. We include, therefore, in Old Testament theology the chief features of the history of the divine kingdom in the old covenant.

(2) Properly speaking, all biblical sciences, *i.e.* biblical introduction, hermeneutics, etc., should fall under the name biblical theology, as has been done by Rosenkranz in his *Encyclopædia of Theological Science*, and by others.

(3) The designation dogmatic (which, for example, de Wette and Rosenkranz substitute), or even history of Old Testament dogma, is not suitable even for the statement of the doctrinal contents of the Old Testament, even if we extend the notion of dogmatic (*s.* Rothe, *zur Dogmatik*, p. 11) to the practical sphere, in the sense *δόγματα*, Eph. ii. 15, Col. ii. 14. Dogmas, the positive doctrines of faith and life which demand acknowledgment and obedience, are found in the Old Testament, for the most part only in the Pentateuch (as, for example, that doubly sacred word: "Hear, O Israel, Jehovah our God, Jehovah is one"—Deut. vi. 4). The further development of religious knowledge, which is found in the prophetic books, the Psalms, and the monuments of the Chochma, are inaccurately characterized by this expression. Even the prophetic announcement of the Messiah and His kingdom, of the resurrection of the dead, and the like, first became dogmatic propositions—essential parts of religious confession—on the standpoint of the New Testament fulfilment. Still

less does that wrestling of the Israelitish spirit with the problems of life, brought out in many psalms and in the book of Job, lead to a dogmatical conclusion. The theology of the Old Testament has to handle as such what is only in germ, and of the nature of presentiment; it has to show how the Old Testament, in the narrowness and unfinished state which attaches in many parts to its doctrinal contents, points from itself to something higher. The Old Testament is naturally considered in another way by the later Judaism. Judaism finds in the Old Testament the completion of dogma, as Mohammedanism does in the Koran. Compare the enumeration of the thirteen fundamental articles of Judaism in the treatise of Moses Maimonides *On Tract. Sanhedrin*, c. 10 (s. Pococke, *porta Mosis*, p. 164 ff.). They are as follows: 1. That God is the Creator; 2. The unity of God; 3. His incorporeal nature; 4. His eternity; 5. That this God is to be honoured; 6. That there is a prophecy; 7. That Moses was a prophet, and stood above all prophets; 8. That the law was revealed from heaven; 9. That this law shall not be abrogated—*lex perpetua*; 10. That God, as omniscient, knows all the dealings of men; 11. That God is a recompenser; 12. That the Messiah will come; 13. The resurrection of the dead. However, it is characteristic of the Jewish theology, that it always takes pains to prove from the Pentateuch even the doctrines primarily drawn from prophecy, such as that of the Messiah and the resurrection, in order to lend to them a dogmatical character.

§ 3.

RELATION OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY TO OTHER OLD TESTAMENT DISCIPLINES.

Among the other sciences that bear on the Old Testament, what is called Introduction to the Old Testament, or the history of the Old Testament writings, falls quite outside of the sphere of Old Testament theology; both stand, moreover, in a relation of mutual dependence on each other, in virtue of which the criticism of the Old Testament writings has also to have respect to the results of Old Testament theology (1). On the other hand, Old Testament theology has a part of its contents in common with biblical archæology, which has to represent the whole natural and social condition of the old Israelitish people; for, in fact, all the important relations of life in Israel are religiously laid down, and belong essentially to the mani-

festation of Old Testament religion, because the stamp of the communion of the people with the holy covenant God was to be imprinted upon them. Still, even such common constituents in the above-mentioned disciplines will demand in each case a treatment differing not merely in fulness, but in some measure also in point of form. With regard to the ordinances of worship, the theology of the Old Testament has to represent these in as far as the communion of God and the people is carried out in them, and they consequently present a system of religious symbols. On the contrary, the discussion of all purely technical questions is to be left over to archæology (2).

Finally, as to the relation of Old Testament theology to the Israelitish history, the former has certainly to represent the chief features in the facts of revelation which form the historical ground of Old Testament religion, and in the divine leading of Israel, but always does so only as this history lived in the spirit of the organs of revelation, and was the object of religious faith. It is bound to reproduce faithfully, and without admixture of modern ways of looking at history, the very view which the Holy Scriptures give of the design of salvation which is carried out in Israel. The history of Israel has, on the other hand, not only to represent the historical development of the people of Israel on all sides, even in purely worldly respects,—and in connection with this, particularly to enter upon chronological and such like questions,—but to sift and vindicate, by historico-critical research, the real historical facts which the theology of the Old Testament reproduces as the contents of faith (3).

(1) The prevalent manner of treatment places biblical theology in an entirely onesided dependent relationship to the criticism of the biblical writings. This process is represented, for instance, by Rothe (*zur Dogmatik*, p. 304 ff.) as follows: "In order to expiscate the actual facts of revelation from the Bible, the theologian ought beforehand, by critical methods, to make the Bible 'available' for his purpose. For only when he has completed his investigation of the circumstances of the origin of the biblical books, and has tested on this basis their value as historical sources, can he win from them, by correct interpretation, the true reflection of revelation." There would be nothing to object against this proposition of Rothe, were it not that the position towards the *contents* of the records of revelation, which the critic takes up beforehand, in many respects determines for him the way in

which he conceives of the origin of the biblical books. A critic shapes for himself a notion of revelation which is far from harmonious with the biblical one, and devises a scheme of elements, operative factors in the sacred history, which the history itself does not acknowledge; and from these presuppositions he must naturally judge of the time when these books originated, and of other things, quite differently from what they themselves lay down. For the rest, Rothe does not himself claim for the critic an absolute want of preconceived notions, when he says, p. 309: "The one important point here is, that to us revelation is in itself, apart from the Bible, actually a reality. He before whose eyes—just by means of the Bible as its record—revelation stands, in all its living majesty, as a powerful historical fact,—he can exercise with good heart the most stringent and impartial criticism on the Holy Scriptures—he takes up towards it a free position of faith, without any anxiety whatever."

On the point "that revelation in itself, without respect to the Bible, is something real," there can be no strife. The Bible is not revelation itself; it is the record of revelation. Just as little do we oppose the opinion, that he to whom the reality of the revelation is made certain by means of the Bible as its record, takes up towards the Scriptures "a free position of faith." But now, if it is only through the Bible that the theologian receives that impression of the majesty of revelation as a powerful historical fact, it should rather be expected of him that, before he criticises the Bible, he should first surrender himself to its contents without preconceived opinion,—let the revelation in its majesty work directly upon him, in order, as Rothe (p. 329) strikingly expresses it, "to make it a constant factor in the experiences of his personal life." He who has won in this way the conviction that Holy Scripture is the truly witnessing record of the divine council of salvation, and of the historical facts which serve to its realization, and that in it is contained the word of God which is the means to the appropriation of salvation by each,—him the joyful self-consciousness of his faith in revelation will certainly forbid to surrender himself to traditions of man about Holy Scripture, whether these originate with the Jewish scribes, or with the old Church, or with our older Protestant theology,—whatever the respect which he may feel due to them; but he will certainly as little surrender himself to a criticism in which we can everywhere mark that it has not for its basis that self-consciousness praised by Rothe. He knows then that a criticism, with whose results that meaning of the Bible is incompatible, cannot have found the truth, because it fails to explain that which the Bible in the Church

has proved itself to be, and so leaves unsolved the very problem of historical criticism—the explanation of the actual state of the facts. He simply makes the counter-calculation, What sort of a Bible would come out of the factors with which that criticism reckons? Would it be a Bible which presents to us this grand course of development of revelation, this grand system of facts and witnesses in word? which, moreover, finds its proof in men's hearts, as the Bible has done for two thousand years? Especially in regard to the Old Testament the believer in revelation recognises it as his task, before all things, to follow the gradual path of development presented therein, and at the same time to value the continuous connection in which the Old Testament Scriptures stand to the ever-advancing revelation. In this respect it is inexplicable, when, for example, Schultz in his new *Theology of the Old Testament*, which contains so much excellent matter, on the one hand sets Moses so high as an organ of revelation, but will permit this man, who lived in a time in which, as shown by the Egyptian antiquities, writing was quite a familiar art, to write absolutely only a few very scanty scraps. We must not forget that the Old Testament Scriptures stand in such essential connection with the history of the revelation, that the fulfiller of Old Testament revelation could at the same time represent himself as fulfiller of Old Testament Scripture.

As regards the mutual relations between Introduction and Old Testament theology, it will often be shown in the course of the delineation of Old Testament theology how the Old Testament, in reference to its didactic contents, does by no means represent a uniform whole, how it contains a regular progression even of religious knowledge. Moreover, it is not merely the general view which we have of the gradual scale of Old Testament revelation which influences the determination of the position which is due to any one book in the whole of the Old Testament, but the criticism of the Old Testament has also to fix its eyes on the path of development of the separate doctrines of the Old Testament. Now, for example, how can a genetic delineation of the Old Testament doctrine of the nature and attributes of God, of angelology, and of the doctrine of the condition of man after death, etc., be reached from the presupposition that the Pentateuch is a comparatively recent production? We shall see how manifestly in many cases the Pentateuch contains that which forms the basis for the development of the didactic matter in Prophecy and Chochma. This is a feature which the criticism of the Old Testament books, as a rule, either completely overlooks or handles in the most superficial manner. It gives, to be sure, no proof that the

Pentateuch in its present form is a production of Moses; but it does show the relative age of the Pentateuch, even in its construction, as compared with the prophetic books. {The importance of the history of religious ideas for Old Testament criticism is specially urged by Kuenen, *Theol. Tijdschrift*, vol. iv. p. 391 f.}

(2) The notion of archæology is, as is well known, variously defined in every province where a science of this name appears; so we also find biblical archæology taken up sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a narrower sense. If, with Hupfeld (*On the Notion and Method of so-called Biblical Introduction*, p. 8), its compass is so widely extended that it must embrace the whole knowledge of Bible lands and people,—that is, the geography, history, customs, and regulations of domestic, civil, and church life of the nations which act or appear in the Bible,—the largest part of its material falls, of course, quite outside of Old Testament theology. If, on the other hand, its task is limited to the delineation of the peculiar conditions, natural and social, of the people of Israel, in as far as that nation is the stage of the biblical religion (so de Wette, *Lehrbuch der hebr. jüd. Arch.* § 1 and 2), or more shortly expressed (with Keil, *Handb. der bibl. Arch.* § 1), to represent the shape taken by the life of Israel as the people elected as the bearers of revelation,—if this is so, it must have a considerable portion of its contents in common with Old Testament theology, as all the more notable relations and situations of Israel's life are religiously laid down. Still the two disciplines will not completely harmonize in any of their constituents. Much which is essential in bringing to view the natural and social condition of the people does not belong to the manifestation of religion as such, and therefore forms no constitutive feature of religious life, but belongs only to its presuppositions. Thus, for example, the religious position of the Israelites in the world, the whole character of their religious institutions which presuppose an agrarian life, particularly the regulations of festivals and of offerings, stand in close connection with the natural constitution of Canaan. But the natural relations of the land, as a thing merely presupposed for the religious life of the people, are not to be described in biblical theology, but in archæology, and the former has only to refer to them briefly. Thus, too, in matters of worship we have not to do with the activity of ancient Israel in art and trade, on which the forms of worship are naturally based in many ways, but to leave that to archæology, which has to represent these developments independently of their religious bearings.

(3) In reference to the relation of Old Testament theology to the history of Israel, I agree with Schmid (comp. § ii. 1), and differ most

from the general conception. Old Testament history contains a series of facts which form a basis for Old Testament religion. If we think away Israel's exodus from Egypt, and the giving of the law from Sinai, Old Testament religion hovers in the air. Such facts ought just as little to be separated from Old Testament religion, as the historical facts of Christ's person should be from Christianity. Hence Old Testament theology has to absorb the chief features of the history of the divine kingdom, inasmuch as it ought to present Old Testament religion not only as doctrine, but in the completeness of its manifestation. But because it ought to report what men believed in the Old Testament, in which faith they lived and died, it has to represent the history as Israel believed it. As it cannot be our task in an Old Testament theology to harmonize the Old Testament history of creation and other things of this kind with the propositions of the newer physical sciences, we have, in the statement of the history of revelation, only to reproduce the view which Holy Scripture itself has, and accordingly have absolutely nothing to do with such things as ethnological and geographical research. We thus conceive the relation of the theology of the Old Testament to the Israelitish history, in a similar way to that in which C. F. Nägelsbach, in his praiseworthy and well-known work, has defined the relationship of the Homeric theology to mythology, when he states, as the object of the former (Preface to first edition of the *Homerische Theol.* p. vi. ed. 2, p. xiv.), "the knowledge which Homer's people had of the Deity, and the effects produced by this knowledge in life and faith," and defines, on the other hand, as the work of the mythologist, "the criticism and deciphering of the historical development of mythological representations." That Old Testament theology has, as its critical sister science, a history, while Homeric theology has only a *mythology*, depends on the different character of the two religions. Here, indeed, there must be strife between those who—and I avow myself to belong to this party—acknowledge as such that which the Old Testament religion lays down as facts, and are consequently convinced that the thing believed was also a thing which happened; and between those who see in the contents of Old Testament faith mainly a production of religious imaginative conception, whose historical basis can be revealed only through a critical process which rests on rationalistic presuppositions. The latter party, who despise the key offered by the Old Testament itself for the comprehension of its history, have been so fortunate in their attempts at explanation, as to have turned the providential leading of Israel into a dark riddle. (Rosenkranz, in his biography of Hegel, p. 49, communicates to us

that the Jewish history repelled him (Hegel) just as violently as it captivated him, and troubled him like a dark riddle all his life.) But even he who in this connection occupies the historico-critical standpoint, should acknowledge the problem of endeavouring to get at the point of view of the Bible itself in its purity, without admixture of modern views. But in the common treatment of the theology of the Old Testament we find a peculiar fluctuation, where it is acknowledged that the Old Testament religion rests on facts; but then, what these facts are, is stated as indefinitely as possible. On the other hand, no criticism has as yet weakened the judgment which Herder (in his 12th letter on the study of theology—*das Studium der Theologie betr.*) passes on the history of the Old Testament: “A thing of that kind cannot be invented; such history, with all that depends on it, and all that is connected with it,—in short, such a people cannot be a fiction. Its yet uncompleted providential guidance is the greatest poem of the ages, and reaches on probably (we say *certainly*, on the ground of Rom. xi. 25 ff.) to the development of the great nodus of all the nations of the world, which is as yet untouched.”

§ 4.

THE LIMITATION OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY TO THE CANONICAL BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

The theology of the Old Testament has, for the notion laid down in § 2, to limit itself to the books of the Old Testament canon as established by the scribes in Palestine, and acknowledged by the Protestant Church, thus excluding the Apocrypha. For the canonical writings alone are a monument of the history of revelation, and a genuine production of the spirit which ruled as life-principle in the Old Testament economy. After the declarations of Christ in Luke xxiv. 44, Matt. xi. 13, etc., and from the whole apostolic doctrine, there can be no doubt about the limits of the Holy Scriptures of the old covenant (1). Looking from the biblical standpoint, a specific difference must be made between the *law*, which steps forward with divine authority, and the ordinances which spin it out further and fence it round,—between the prophecy which knows itself to be the organ of the Divine Spirit, and the scribes in their collective capacity, who lean only on human reputation, since, even for the highly celebrated Ezra, who stands at the head of the latter, the value of an

organ of revelation was claimed (2). The difference between the Hagiographa and their cognate Apocrypha might more readily appear incapable of precise determination (as also the composition of some of the Hagiographa falls later than the epoch which is marked by the silence of prophecy). Yet even in the better apocryphal books it is impossible to ignore a lack of the depth of meaning that is found in the Old Testament, and in many cases an admixture of foreign elements (3). At all events, as soon as the theology of the Old Testament goes beyond the canonical books, there is a want of a firm principle on which to fix its limits (4).

(1) In most statements of Old Testament theology the so-called Apocrypha are included (Schultz, i. p. 18 f., excludes them). In this way the significance of the Old Testament canon is mistaken. We take the following *lemmata* from the Introduction to the Old Testament (compare my article, "Kanon des A. T.," in Herzog's *Theol. Realencyklop.* vii. p. 244 ff.). The Hebrew writings in the Old Testament form one corpus, which falls into three parts: 1. תּוֹרָה, the Pentateuch; 2. נְבִיאִים, including (a) רִאשׁוֹנִים, *prophetae anteriores*, the historical books from Joshua to Kings,—(b) אַחֲרֵיכֵן, *prophetae posteriores*, the three greater and the twelve lesser prophets; 3. כְּתוּבִים, Hagiographa. From this comes the joint title of the Hebrew Bible, תּוֹרָה נְבִיאִים וְכְתוּבִים. With the books contained in the Hebrew Bible are united, in the Alexandrian translation, a number of writings of later origin, and thus a more extensive collection of Old Testament writings has been formed. In the question, what value is due to the writings added in the Greek Bible, in comparison with those in the Hebrew collection, the dispute has been chiefly as to the establishment of the Old Testament canon in the Christian Church. The Catholic Church sanctioned as canonical in the Tridentinum the books which are added in the Septuagint, called in the old Church Anagignoskomena or ecclesiastical lessons (wherefore a theology of the Old Testament drawn up from the standpoint of the Romish Church must of necessity take up along with it the theology of these books). But the Protestant Church, following the example of Hieronymus, gives the Anagignoskomena of the Romish Church the not quite suitable name Apocrypha, and rejects them. That the canon of the Evangelical Church is that of the Judaism of Palestine is not disputed. As certainly must it be maintained, that the canon of the Judaism of Palestine, as established in the last century before Christ, and then re-sanctioned after passing fluctuation at the Synedrium in

Jamnia towards the end of the first century of our era, or a few years later, did not, as has been maintained, rest upon an interest of simply literary nature, viz. to unite all the remains of Hebrew writings which were still to be had; for then it would be inconceivable why the book of the Son of Sirach, which existed long in the original Hebrew text, was not incorporated in it. The point in question in the collection of Old Testament writings was rather, as Josephus distinctly says in the well-known passage on the canon (*c. Ap. i. 8*), about the *δικαίως θεία πεπιστευμένα βιβλία*. In the same passage Josephus limits the Old Testament canon to the time of Artaxerxes, because from that time forward an exact succession of prophets is wanting. It may be said that this is a capricious limitation of the Palestinian scribes, and it has lately become the fashion (Ewald, Dillmann, Noeldeke) to efface this difference between canonical and non-canonical Scriptures. But if we look into the New Testament, no doubt can remain where the word of the old and new covenant is connected; since, in fact (compare Matt. xi. 13 f.), the New Testament history of revelation loops immediately on to the conclusion of Old Testament prophecy in Malachi.—A sharp controversy on the Apocrypha was carried on during the sixth decade of this century among the German theologians, for which, in especial, the prize essay prescribed by the Baden Council for Home Mission gave the signal. From the copious literature of this controversy are to be mentioned:—Against the Apocrypha, besides the smaller writings of Joh. Schiller, Kluge, and others, which are more in a popular style, the writings of Ph. Fr. Keerl, which enter thoroughly on all disputed points (*The Apocrypha of the Old Testament*, crowned prize essay, 1852; *The Word of God and the Apocrypha of the Old Testament*, 1853; *Epistles to the Friends of the pure Word of God*, 1854; and lastly, the most important, *The Apocrypha Question newly Illuminated*, 1855); next to these, Wild's paper, *There is an Accursed Thing in thee, Israel*, etc., 1854.—On the opposite side: Stier, *The Apocrypha, the Defence of its ancient Annexation to the Bible*, 1853; the discussion of Hengstenberg in the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, 1853, Nr. 54 ff., and 1854, Nr. 29 ff.; further, Bleek's essay on "The Position of the Apocrypha of the Old Testament in the Christian Canon" (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1853, ii.). On both sides weighty arguments were brought forward side by side with many exaggerations, in which polemic zeal finds utterance. The conclusion is, that that word of the Old Testament, which is so often brought forward in the New Testament as a fulfilled word, is found merely in the writings of the Hebrew canon; that even if we admit it as possible that there are allusions to passages out of the book of

the Son of Sirach and the book of Wisdom contained in some of the apostolic letters, particularly in the Epistle of James, "yet there is never more than a simple allusion, and never an exact quotation," as even Stier, who is particularly zealous in searching out such correspondences (*l. c.* p. 12), has candidly avowed.

(2) With Graf (*The Historical Books of the Old Testament*, 1866), the criticism of the Pentateuch has taken this turn, that many, declaring the legislation of Deuteronomy to be older than the law in the middle books, think the Pentateuch to have reached its final shape only in the time of Ezra by the labours of a supplementing editor; but it is historically certain that, in the time after the exile, the Pentateuch was regarded as an inviolable whole, because of which the fencing in (פְּסָק) of the Pentateuch then begins in those ordinances to which our Lord assumes an attitude quite different from His relation to the νόμος.

(3) This concerns mainly that celebrated book of the Son of Sirach, which, to bring forward only one point, takes over the Pentateuchal doctrine of retribution in the extremest shape, amounting to repugnant Eudæmonism, without any introduction of the features through which the Old Testament itself breaks through the externalism of the doctrine of retribution. (See my remarks on the theological character of the book in the article, "Pædagogik des A. T.," in Schmid's *pædagog. Encyklop.* v. p. 694 f.). The same thing is true of the book of Wisdom, the most beautiful and excellent of the books of the Apocrypha, in virtue of the way in which ideas of the Greek philosophy are here bound up with Old Testament doctrine, without any organic union of these elements being reached. A tendency to syncretism is altogether characteristic of the later Jewish theology; whereas, in the development of the Old Testament religion carried out in the canonical writings, the Old Testament principles have enough of energy to subdue and assimilate the strange elements which are taken up,—a judgment which can be verified especially in the traditions of Genesis and the institutions of the Mosaic cultus, but which can also be clearly justified in reference to doctrines of the later books, such as the doctrine of Satan and the Angels, if, as is the custom, we assume in these cases the presence of extraneous influence.

(4) No settled doctrinal types are found in the Old Testament Apocrypha; and a thorough statement of the system of the book of Wisdom leads over into the discussion of Jewish Alexandrinism. But if the historical influence which the forms of post-canonical Judaism exercised on the development of Christian teaching were

taken as our rule, we should have to take up, along with the history of the Jewish Alexandrian philosophy of religion, the not less interesting and weighty history of the Jewish Apocalyptic, with its products, the book of Enoch, the fourth book of Ezra, and the Psalter of Solomon; and besides this, the Jewish religious sects, and the pieces of older rabbinic theology handed down in the older Targums and Midraschim, as well as in the Mishna, etc., would fall to be represented, as is done in the text-books of De Wette and von Cölln. Instead of burdening the Old Testament with such ballast, it will be more proper to refer the delineation of post-canonical Judaism to a special theological discipline, which Schneckenburger (in the lectures published by Loehlein, 1862) sketches under the name of the History of the Times of the New Testament. {Since Schneckenburger, the same subject has been treated by several writers — by Holtzmann, Hausrath, and finally by Schürer, *Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Zeitgeschichte*, Leipzig 1874.}

II.—FULLER STATEMENT OF THE SCIENTIFIC STANDPOINT OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

§ 5.

THE VIEW OF THE OLD TESTAMENT RELIGION PROPER TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

The Christian theological standpoint for the theology of the Old Testament is already expressed in its name, by virtue of which it does not treat its subject as Jewish religion, but as the divine revelation of the old covenant, which on the one side stands to all heathen religion in an opposition of principle, and on the other side forms the preliminary stage to the revelation of the new covenant, which is with it comprehended in one divine economy of salvation (1). Since the notion of Old Testament revelation itself finds its exact discussion within Old Testament theology (comp. § 55 ff.), only the more general propositions are here to be advanced.

(1) That view of the Old Testament which now chiefly presents itself with the claim that it desires to understand the Old Testament historically, and yet at the same time to be just to its religious value,

amounts essentially to this : that Israel, by virtue of a certain religious genius rooted in the peculiarities of the nature of the Semitic stem, was happier in the pursuit of true religion than other nations of antiquity, and soared higher than the rest towards the purest divine thoughts and endeavours. As the Greeks were the people of art and philosophy, and the Romans were the people of law, to the old world, even so did the religious people *κατ' ἐξοχήν* arise by natural growth from the Semitic stem. Whilst it pleased the earlier rationalists to draw down the contents of the Old Testament as much as possible to things of little value, and then to condemn the whole as Jewish popular delusion, this newer view, whose principal representative is Ewald, yields full recognition to the depth of thought and moral loftiness of the Old Testament ; indeed, it finds there already, more or less distinctly expressed, the eternal truths which Christianity thereafter placed in full light.

Yet, although individual contributions made to the matter of Old Testament theology from this standpoint have very great value, the Old Testament can never be historically understood in this way. Does even one single leaf of the Old Testament agree with this view, by which Israel is represented as a people of such genius in the production of religious thoughts, and the Old Testament religion as a natural growth of the spirit of Israel ? The Bible only recognises the decided opposition in which the Old Testament religion stood from the very beginning to all that Israel had sought and found in the path of nature. Altogether does this view fail to recognise the weight of that divine pedagogic expressed in the words, Isa. xliii. 24 : "Thou hast made me labour with thy sins, thou hast wearied me with thine iniquities." In Jer. ii. 10 f. we find Israel's position towards revelation pointed out very characteristically. When it says there, "Pass over the isles of Chittim, and see ; and send unto Kedar, and consider diligently, and see if there be such a thing : Hath a nation changed their gods, which are yet no gods ? but my people have changed their glory for that which doth not profit," this fact becomes intelligible, if we remember that the gods of the heathens were a production of the natural national mind, but not so the God of Israel. And therefore the heathen nations do not exchange their gods, —as long, that is, as such a heathen principle of religion has power to develope organically ; but Israel required to exercise on itself a certain compulsion to raise itself to the sphere of spiritual Jehovah-worship, and grasps, therefore, at the gods of the heathen,—syncretism, in fact, being characteristic of Israel, in as far as it is not subject to the revelation.

The whole Old Testament remains a sealed book, if we shut our eyes to the knowledge that the subduing of the natural character of the people is the aim of the whole divine pedagogic; and because of this, the whole providential guidance of the nation moves in a dualism. {This section does not characterize the views of Ewald and his scholars quite accurately. Ewald's theory of revelation is most fully found in the first vol. of his recent *Lehre der Bibel von Gott*, Leipzig 1871. See also Dillmann, *Ursprung der A.Tlichen Religion*, Giessen 1865.}

§ 6.

THE BIBLICAL NOTION OF REVELATION.—I. GENERAL AND SPECIAL REVELATION.

The biblical notion of revelation is rooted in the notion of Creation. Revelation is just the development of the relation in which God placed Himself to the world in bringing it into existence. Whilst the world is called into existence by God's word, and is animated by His Spirit, the principles of revelation are already fixed. The production of different classes of beings advances teleologically, and reaches its goal only when God has created man in His own image. In this progression the foundation of revelation is laid. For revelation is, in general, just God's own testimony and communication of Himself to the world for the realization of the end implanted in the universe at its creation, and directed to the establishment of perfected communion of life of man with God. After the tearing asunder of the bond of the original communion of man with God through sin, God testifies, partly in nature and historical guidance of mankind, and partly in each one's conscience, of His power, goodness, and justice, and thus draws man to seek God; comp. how even the Old Testament points to this witness of God, which is perceptible even to the heathen, Isa. xl. 21-26; Jer. x.; Ps. xix. 2 ff., xciv. 8-10 (1). The outer and inner forms of this general revelation stand in a continual relation of reciprocity, as man's inward experience of the divine testimony awakens through the objective outward witness of God; but this outward witness is first understood by the inward (s. Acts xvii. 28, in its relation to ver. 27). Yet the personal communion in life of man with God, as demanded by the ideal constitution of man,

is not won again through this general revelation. The living God remains to the natural man, in all his searchings, a hidden God (comp. Isa. xlv. 15; Jer. xxiii. 18; John i. 18). The knowledge of His *ἀόδιος δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης* does not yet lead to the knowledge of the true living God, nor the knowledge that we are bound to Him in conscience to personal communion in life with Him. Indeed, conscience itself testifies to man of his separation from God, and that he has disowned the reality of God testified to him in nature and history; and because of this, the Old Testament calls the heathen such as forget God, Ps. ix. 18 (2). Only by God's stooping to man in personal testimony to Himself, and objective presentation of Himself, is actual communion in life established between Him and man. This is the special revelation (3), which first appears in the form of the founding of a covenant between God and a chosen race, and the founding of a kingdom of God among the latter, which reaches its climax in the manifestation of God in the flesh, advances from this point to the gathering of a people of God in all nations, and is completed in the formation of a new heaven and a new earth (Isa. lxv. 17, lxvi. 22; Rev. xxi. 1 ff.), where God shall be all in all (1 Cor. xv. 28). The relation between general and special revelation is such, that the former is the continual basis of the latter, the latter the aim and completion of the former, as, according to the Old Testament view, the covenant in the theocracy has its presupposition in the worldwide covenant with Noah. As in nature each realm has its own laws, and yet again the separate realms stand in inseparable connection, since they reciprocally condition each other,—the lower steps always forming a basis for the higher, and the higher a corroboration and completion of the lower,—even so the general and special revelation, the order of nature and salvation in the system of the world, are knit together in organic unity, as, according to the doctrine of the New Testament, the Logos is the Mediator of both (4).

(1) What we call the physico-theological, the moral evidence of God's existence, etc., is already several times indicated in the Old Testament in a popular form; it comes up in the polemic of prophecy against heathenism. Comp. Isa. xl. 21–26: "Do ye not know? do ye not hear? hath it not been told you from the beginning? have ye no understanding of the founding of the earth? He that sits enthroned over the circle of the earth . . . that stretcheth out the heavens

as a curtain . . . that bringeth the princes to nothing, and maketh the judges of the earth like a waste," etc. Ver. 26 points to the starry sky. Jer. x. brings to mind the God who rules and lives in the universe. Ps. xix. 2 ff. shows specially how God has revealed His splendour and order-establishing sway in the sun and its course. Ps. xciv. 9 makes this conclusion: "He who plants the ear, shall He not hear? He who formed the eye, shall not He see?" This verse is subject to no difference of exposition. The thought is this: the Creator of hearing and sight must Himself have an analogous knowledge—must be a living God, who sees all things, and hears prayer. Ver. 10, "He who chastises the nations, shall not He punish? He who teaches man knowledge?" is often explained thus: He who punishes the nations in general, shall not He also punish in the concrete occasion which is before us? To me, the exposition of Hupfeld and Hitzig appears to be more correct, according to which the *יִסַּר יְהוָה* refers to divine correction in man's conscience. Then we get a good parallelism to the second member. The verse is then a reference to the revelation of God in man's conscience and reason: He who has given conscience and reason, He who proclaims Himself in them to be a God of retribution, should He not also proclaim Himself so in reality, in His providences towards the nations?

(2) The expression *שָׁכַחְתָּ אֱלֹהִים*, Ps. ix. 18, is not, with Umbreit, to be connected directly with the forgetting of a purer ancient religion, but with the forgetting and denying of God's testimony, as it comes continually to the *נְפִלִים* themselves.

(3) In treating of the notion of special revelation, we are met chiefly in one point by a difference between the biblical notion of revelation, and that notion as it is wont to be developed in the so-called *Vermittelungstheologie* (comp. Schultz's *Old Testament Theol.*). This school limits the notion of revelation as much as possible to the inner sphere of man's life; revelation comes essentially to be viewed as a divine "self-communication in man inspired by God." Revelation operates by working in the heart of man "an immediate certainty of divine life" (s. Schultz, i. p. 66, and my review in *Zoeckler und Andreæ Allg. literar. Anzeiger*, Februarh. 1870, p. 104 f.). The objective fact is not entirely disowned; it is not denied that events did occur in the history of the Israelites to which that inward self-communication of God to the prophets (of whom Moses may be regarded as the first) attached itself. But the objective personal self-presentation of God which the Bible undoubtedly asserts is not admitted, for fear of too dangerous an approach to the sphere of the miraculous, or else it is spoken of in a

very indefinite way. But if revelation is at bottom only God's communication of Himself to inspired men, if it acts only to awaken in the mind of certain chosen men an immediate certainty of divine life, no specific difference between a prophet and a heathen sage can be made out; for even in the heathen an immediate certainty of divine life was generated. In order that such a relation of personal communion between God and man be accomplished as the idea of humanity involves, we must have that objective presentation of Himself by God which is pointed out in the word, "Here am I," Isa. lii. 6, lxx. 1.

Luther, for example, has with reason, in his commentary on Ps. xviii. (*Exegetica opera latina*, Erl. Ausg. xvi. p. 71), pointed out how, from the beginning, the divine government aimed at binding the revelation of God to a given object: "Voluit enim dominus et ab initio semper id curavit, ut esset aliquod monumentum et signum memoriale externum, quo alligaret fidem credentium in se, ne adducerentur variis et peregrinis fervoribus in spontaneas religiones seu potius idololatrias." Divine revelation must enter the world as a proclamation, in which the personality of God as such meets man, not as an inexpressible *numen* or Divinity, but as God Himself. When that is made clear to us, we discern the pedagogic character of the divine forms of revelation. To mankind in its childhood, God's existence must be brought to knowledge in theophany from without, and then from that point revelation advances towards the manifestation of the reality of this God in spirit (comp. § 55).

(4) Though an older supernatural view places revelation in the narrower sense exactly in opposition to the order of nature, and causes special revelation to enter into the world as a *Deus ex machina*, this is in no way the biblical view.

§ 7.

II. HISTORICAL CHARACTER AND GRADUAL PROGRESS OF REVELATION—ITS RELATION TO THE WHOLE OF MAN'S LIFE.


Its Supernatural Character.

According to this, the special revelation of God, as it enters the sphere of human life, becomes subject to the ordinances and laws of historical development which are grounded on the general divine system of the world. It does not all at once enter the world prepared and completed; but from a limited and relatively incomplete beginning, giving itself particularly to one separate people and race, it

advances to its completion in Christ in a gradual scale corresponding with the natural path of the development of mankind, and leading that development into the path of the divine order of salvation, and so completed, is able to communicate again to man, by an historical process, the fulness of God which Christ bears in Himself. And because revelation aims at the restoration of full communion between God and man, it is directed to the whole of man's life. It does not complete its work by operating either exclusively or mainly upon man's faculties of knowledge; but in constant advance it produces and shapes the communion of God and man, as well by divine witness in word as by objective facts,—manifestations of God in the objective world, institution of a commonwealth and its regulations,—and by revelations of God in the inner sphere of life, by the sending forth of the Spirit, and by awakenings into life; and all this so that a continual relation has place between the revealing history of salvation and the revealed word, inasmuch as each divine fact is preceded by the word which discloses the counsel of God (Amos iii. 7) now to be completed; and again, the word of God arises from the completed fact, and testifies thereto (1). In these operations revelation makes itself discernible in its difference from the natural self-revelation of the spirit of man, not only through the continuity and the organic connection of the facts which constitute the history of salvation, but also through its special character (miracle), which points backward in a definite manner to a divine causality, while it is recognised by the organs of revelation themselves through a special working of the Spirit, which comes to their consciousness as a divine infusion, and in conclusion recommends itself to all who in faith enter into the revelation by their living experience of salvation (2).

(1) The biblical notion of revelation, as here developed, is distinguished from that of the older Protestant theology in two respects. On the old view, revelation was essentially, and almost exclusively, regarded as the doctrine of revelation. In other words, what was urged was for the most part only God's working on man's knowledge,—a defect which appeared still more onesidedly in the older supernaturalism, which regarded revelation as concerned with the communication of a higher knowledge, which human reason either would not have found at all, or, as rationalistic supernaturalism teaches, at least not so soon nor so perfectly. But if this was all, it

would in fact have been better if it had pleased God to send directly from heaven a ready-made system of doctrine. This is, as is well known, the Mohammedan notion of revelation. And what need was there of this vast historical apparatus? Just in order to bring to the world a divine doctrine, which should then be accredited through the facts of revelation. The second point in which the older notion of revelation was unjust to the biblical one, is the denying of the steps of development which revelation passes through in the Scripture itself. The Bible, as the record of the doctrine of revelation, was supposed to attest uniformly, in the Old and New Testaments, the truths which the Church has stamped as dogmas;—the doctrine of the Trinity, for example, was found even in the Old Testament.

If we look into the Scriptures, we see that, without doubt, revelation involves an influence on man's knowledge, but not this exclusively, and never so as to make this stand in the foreground. A people of God is to be created from this sinful humanity; a community bearing in itself divine life is to be planted, and mankind thus to be transformed into a kingdom of God, a tabernacle of God among men (Rev. xxi.). Revelation, then, cannot possibly look only to the cognitive side of man. Biblical theology must be a theology of divine facts; not, indeed, in the limited view which has also found supporters (comp. Ad. Koehler's paper in Ullmann's *Stud. u. Krit.* 1852, Nr. 4, p. 875 ff.), as if the work of revelation simply rose in divine deeds, and then all knowledge originated merely through reflection on the facts of revelation;—on a similarly limited view of Hofmann, in his *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, comp. § 14. The matter stands thus, that between the line of facts of revelation, or between the history of revelation on one side and the divine word-witness on the other, a continual relation of interchange takes place: for example, the flood is announced as a divine judgment of God—the signal word precedes it; and again, after the fact has taken place, a further word of God grows from it. This goes down to the resurrection of our Lord.—Amos iii. 7: "The Lord Jehovah does nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." This passage points to the close connection of the divine words and deeds of revelation. 

(2) The notion of miracle and inspiration will be discussed further on.—The living experience of salvation is indeed first found complete on the ground of New Testament revelation. It is here the testimony of the new creation, by virtue of which he who bears it within him knows that what he owes to the word of God differs specifically from that which he could have found in the path of nature. But there lies also in the Old Testament a mighty witness in the word,

"Who is a God like unto Thee?" (Ex. xv. 11), as well as in the acknowledgment that Israel had a law such as no other people on earth had (Deut. iv. 6-8; Ps. cxlvii. 19 f., etc.).

§ 8.

III. THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS IN THEIR RELATION TO HEATHENISM AND TO EACH OTHER.

Revelation falls into two chief divisions, the Old and New Testaments, which stand to each other in the relation of preparation and fulfilment, and confront the religions outside of the Testaments as a connected dispensation of salvation; comp. specially Eph. ii. 12 (1). The law and the prophets are fulfilled in Christianity; while, on the contrary, the heathen religions are not fulfilled in Christianity, but dissolved. It is true that heathenism prepared for Christianity, not simply negatively in the exhaustion of the forms of religious life which it had produced, and the awakening of a need for salvation, but also, by bringing the intellectual and moral strength of man to a richer development, added to the gospel—which wants to make all the powers of man's nature serviceable to it—many conformable elements, thus opening to the truth many paths among men. But heathenism not only lacks the series of divine facts through which the completion of salvation in Christ was positively prepared, and lacks all knowledge about the divine counsel of salvation (comp. Isa. xli. 22, xliii. 9 ff., xliv. 7 ff., etc.) (2); but it has not so much as prepared the human basis from which the redemption of man could take its historical egress. For, on the one hand, all heathen culture, even if capable of being shaped by revelation, is yet no necessary condition for the redemptive operation of the gospel; and, on the other hand, heathenism, which has no knowledge of the holiness of God, and so no full notion of sin, but only a keen sense of injustice, lacks those conditions under which alone a sphere of life could be generated which presented fit soil for the founding of the work of redemption (cf. Rothe's *Theol. Ethik*, 1st ed. ii. p. 264 ff., 2d ed. ii. p. 120 ff.) (3).

But the unity of the Old and New Testaments must not be understood as sameness. The Old Testament itself, while it regards the decree of salvation revealed in it, and the kingdom of God founded thereupon, as eternal, as extending to all times and to all

races of man (from Gen. xii. 3 onwards, comp. also the parallel passages; further, Isa. xlv. 23 f., liv. 10, etc.), acknowledges that the manifestation of God's kingdom at that time was imperfect and perishable; for it points onwards to a new revelation, in which that which is demanded by the letter of the law and signified by its ordinances shall become a reality through divine communication of life (comp. already Deut. xxx. 6); indeed, exactly in the days in which the old form of the theocracy was brought to ruin, it predicted the new eternal covenant which God should conclude with His people (Jer. xxxi. 31 ff.) (4).—But still more distinctly does the New Testament emphasize the difference from the Old which subsists within the unity of the two covenants. The eternal counsel of salvation, although announced by the prophets, is nevertheless not completely revealed till after its actual realization (Rom. xvi. 25 f.; 1 Pet. i. 10 ff.; Eph. i. 9 f., iii. 5); the pedagogy of the law has reached its goal in the grace and truth of Christ (John i. 17; Rom. x. 4; Gal. iii. 24 f.); in the benefits of salvation of the new covenant, the shadow of the old dispensation is become reality (Col. ii. 17; Heb. x. 1 ff.): therefore the greatest man in the old covenant is less than the least in the kingdom of Christ (Matt. xi. 11); indeed, for him who takes away from the Old Testament productions and institutions their fulfilment in Christ, for him these sink down into poor, needy rudiments (Gal. iv. 9).

(1) According to Eph. ii. 12, the heathen, as ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, are also ξένοι τῶν διαθηκῶν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας. Israel has hope, the heathen are ἐλπίδα μὴ ἔχοντες; Israel has the living God, the heathen are ἄθεοι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ.

(2) What has heathenism transmitted to the coming generations after its bloom was dead, as the fruit of its seers or oracles, as a permanent knowledge for comfort and animation of hope in times of sadness? The answer to this can only be, that the Mantic art which searched heaven and earth to find signs of God's will, which even knocked questioningly at the gate of death's kingdom, which listened to the divine voice in the depth of the human breast, yet gained no knowledge of the counsel of the living God; so that the old heathenism at the close of its development stands helpless,—in spite of all its searching, possessing no key to the comprehension of God's ways, and no knowledge of the goal of history. Or did the knowledge of the

divine counsel take flight to poesy, philosophy, and political wisdom, when the spirit of man emancipated itself from the decaying power of the Mantic art? The notion of a providence, of a moral order of the world, doubtless appears on all hands as witness of the religious disposition of man's nature and the indestructible power of the conscience. But with this thought wrestles the belief in dark fate; and this, as is forcibly brought out by Wuttke (*Geschichte des Heidenthums*, i. p. 98), is "the evil conscience of heathenism continually admonishing and tormenting,—the consciousness of the guilt of the gods becoming evident that they are not what they ought to be; that they are of this world, whilst they ought to be a spiritual power over it, and therefore bear in themselves the germ of death."—Whether destiny or virtue determines the world, or how the operations of both are divided, is a riddle which always turns up again unsolved, although boldly answered now in this way, now in that. Observe, for example, to cite but a few proofs, how a Demosthenes in his early time testifies to the sway of divine justice in the history of nations; how he prophetically announces the fall of the power which was grounded on falsehood and perjury; how he concedes, indeed, that destiny determines the issue of all things, but holds its gifts of fortune possible only where there exists a moral claim on the favour of the gods (*Olynth.* ii. 10. 22); and how, in the evening of his life, he knows no better explanation of the misfortune of his people than that the destiny of all men, as it rules at present, is hard and dreadful, and that therefore Athens must also receive its share of the common human misfortune, in spite of its own good fortune (*de cor.* p. 311). Or see how a Plutarch, who, in his remarkable book on the late execution of divine punishment, shows a deeper understanding of the divine method of judgment, but acknowledges in his consolatory epistle to Apollonius, chap. vi. ff., no higher law for human things than the law of change,—see how he answers the above-mentioned question in his treatise on the fate of Rome; how he seeks to comprehend the course of the history of the world by the combination of the two principles, destiny and virtue. He teaches (chap. ii.), that as in the universe the earth has established itself gradually out of the conflict and tumult of elementary matter, and has lent to the other things a firm position, so also the history of man transacts itself. The largest dominions and kingdoms in the world were pulled about and knocked against each other by chance, and thus began a total confusion and destruction of all things. Then Time, which with the Godhead founded Rome, mixed fortune and virtue, that, taking from both what was their own, it might set up for all men a holy hearth, an abiding stay

and eternal foundation, an anchor for things driven about midst storm and waves. Thus in the Roman empire the weightiest matters have found stability and security; everything is in order, and has entered on an immoveable orbit of government. [*Programm ueber das Verhältniss der alttest. Prophetie zur heidnischen Mantik*, 1861.]

(3) In asserting on biblical grounds the essential connection of the Old and New Testaments, we stand in opposition specially to that view of the Old Testament which has been laid down by Schleiermacher in his *Glaubenslehre*. Schleiermacher's position (§ 12) runs thus: "Christianity stands, indeed, in a special historical connection with Judaism; but in the matter of its historical existence and aim, its relation is the same to Judaism and heathenism." This view of the Old Testament has become so prevalent, especially of late years, that it is the more necessary to look at it closely. When Schleiermacher, in the first place, bases his proposition on the assertion that Judaism required to be re-fashioned by means of non-Jewish elements before Christianity could proceed from it, this is an assertion in the highest degree contrary to history. To what, then, does Christ attach His gospel of the kingdom? Is it to Judaism, as re-shaped by Greek philosophy into Hellenism? or is it not rather to the law and promise of the old covenant? Even where the New Testament does stand in connection with ideas of Alexandrian Judaism, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, there is still an essential difference between that Alexandrian self-redemption and the Christian facts of redemption. This is so clear and certain, that it is not necessary to lose more words upon the subject. Rather we must say, conversely, that heathenism, before receiving Christianity, had to be prepared monotheistically; which in the Roman world was mainly effected by that mission of the Jewish Diaspora, which had so great an influence on the history of the world. Schleiermacher is right when he argues, in the second place, that it is possible to pass directly from heathenism to Christianity without passing through Judaism; but it must be remembered, that in heathenism the pedagogic influence of the law is partly supplied by conscience (Ep. to the Romans), and that also even the gospel includes the preaching of the law, when it commences with the word "Repent." To Schleiermacher's third objection, that though Christ sprang out of Judaism, yet many more heathens than Jews have gone over to Christianity, we have to say that Israel hardened its heart because it had originally a possession with which it was then content, whilst in heathenism a need of salvation and a seeking after God existed.

Naegelsbach has well pointed out (*Vorrede zur Homer. Theol.* 1st ed.

p. xii., 2d ed. p. xix.) how the "search after God was the living pulse in the whole religious development of antiquity." "But," he continues, "that this search advanced much further in the vague feeling of a want and longing for its supply, than in the capacity to satisfy it by its own power, appears as clearly as possible." The attempts "to get possession of the real and substantial Divinity" failed altogether. Schleiermacher's fourth argument is as follows: What is most valuable for the Christian use of the Old Testament is also to be found in "just as close and harmonious sympathy in the utterances of the more noble and purer heathens—for example, in the Greek philosophy (a view often expressed; comp. v. Lasaulx, *Socrates' Life, Teaching, and Death*, 1858); whilst, on the other hand, that is least valuable which is most distinctly Jewish. Now it is undoubtedly correct that much is abolished in the New Testament which belongs specifically to the Old Testament. But if we ask what is specific and essential to the Old and New Testaments in opposition to heathenism, the answer is not Monotheism; for there is a monotheistic heathenism as well, and heathenism wrestles to lay hold on the Deity as a unity; but for the Old and New Testament in opposition to heathenism, the common bond is, above all, the knowledge of God's holiness. But with this it follows, as shown in the text, that, because the heathens had not the knowledge of the divine holiness, they also had not a complete sense of sin (comp. the striking remarks of Carl Ludw. Roth in his critique of Naegelsbach's "homer. Theol.," *Erlanger Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, i. 1841, p. 387 ff.). But as regards those expressions harmonizing with Christianity which can be traced in heathenism, it must be noticed that all those dispersed rays of light do not make a sun,—that, with all these, the conditions were not given for the founding a community of salvation.

It remains undeniable that the community which was gathered out of Israel forms the true root of the Christian Church (comp. Rom. xi.). With good reason has Steudel (in his *Theologie des A. T.* p. 541) opposed Schleiermacher with the question where it could be said to the heathen in the same way as to the Jews: "He is there to whom all the men of God have pointed, and for whom they have waited." This is not simply an outward historical connection.

(4) It lies in the nature of the case, that the law in the time in which it was given did not present itself as a law again to be abrogated, for thereby the law would have weakened itself. Certainly the Mosaic regulations are given very positively, as everlasting regulations, from which Israël ought not to deviate; but that the position of the people towards the law shall in the future be different from

what it is in the present time, is stated in the Pentateuch very precisely, viz. Deut. xxx. 6, where it is pointed out, that in the last times God will circumcise the heart of the people, and so will not confront the people imperiously, but awaken in them susceptibility for the fulfilment of the law. Thus the germ of the prophecy of a new covenant of an essentially different character, as it was uttered by Jeremiah just in those days when the battlements of the old city of David sank in the dust, lies already in the Pentateuch.

(5) Since such a difference exists betwixt the Old and New Testaments,—a difference which is chiefly concentrated in the contrast of the law and the gospel,—it is to be expected from the outset that this practical difference must correspond with a theoretical one, and that we shall not find in the Old Testament the metaphysical dogmas of Christianity. This is the point in which the earlier theology erred.

III.—THE HISTORY OF THE CULTIVATION OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (1).

§ 9.

THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE OLD CHURCH AND IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

Old Testament theology, as an independent historical science, is, like biblical theology in general, a production of modern times. During the whole development of churchly dogmatic, up to the Reformation, and also under the old Protestant theology, there was no distinct difference made between the substantial contents of revelation as they are laid down in the Scriptures, and the dogma by which these are worked up; and still less was the difference of the steps of the revelation and the types of doctrine which are presented in Scripture acknowledged. Whilst, on the one side, the old Church happily overcame the heresy of Marcion, which completely separated Christianity from Old Testament revelation, it did not avoid the opposite error of confounding the two Testaments. The proposition, *Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet, Vetus Testamentum in Novo patet*, which is in itself correct, was so turned, that it was thought possible to show, in the Old Testament, almost the whole contents of the doctrine of Christian faith,—veiled, to be sure, but

already fully formed under the veil (2). Especially was this the case in the Alexandrian theology, which also changed the contrast of the law and the gospel into a mere difference of degree, and attributed to the prophets in general the same illumination as to the apostles (3). But even those doctors of the Church who, like Augustine, distinguished more exactly the relation of the law and the gospel, and the difference of grade between the revelation in the Old and in the New Testament, with respect to the benefits of salvation appertaining to each, overlooked, notwithstanding the same difference in the theoretical sphere, and, so far as the more enlightened men of the Old Testament are concerned, again almost completely did away with, the difference which was allowed in the former connection (4). Still Augustine's treatment of Old Testament history in his work *de Civitate Dei*, lib. xv.-xvii., is not without interest in its bearing on biblical theology (5). On the other hand, the chronicle of Sulpicius Severus (6), which, in the first book and the beginning of the second, discourses compendiously on the whole Old Testament history, is of no importance to biblical theology, though it is not wanting in interest in individual points (7).

Still less was the cultivation of biblical theology as an historical science possible under the government of the theology of the middle ages, or at all consistent with the tendencies of that period. Even the mystical tendency, which goes back more on the Bible, was wanting in healthy hermeneutical principles, so that it, no less than scholasticism, fathered all its speculations on the Scriptures. Even those who, like the theologians of St. Victor, had a presentiment of a more legitimate treatment of Scripture, were unable to carry their ideas out (8).

(1) The review of the history of our science will show how far the conception of the Old Testament which we have expressed in the preceding pages, has been carried out up to the present by those who have written on Old Testament theology. Comp. with this my *Prolegomena to the Theology of the Old Testament*, 1845 (also my article "Weissagung" in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* xvii.), and Diestel's *History of the Old Testament in the Christian Church*, Jena 1869. The very excellent work of Diestel not only gives a history of the way in which the Old Testament has been viewed and expounded in Christian theology, but seeks to portray at the same time the

influence which the Old Testament has exercised in the course of centuries on the life of the Church, on constitution, cultus, and doctrine, on the art and justicial regulations of Christian nations. This attempt has succeeded so well, that we find a tolerably complete material placed together in the most instructive manner. (See my review of the work in *Andree und Brachmann, Allg. litterar. Anzeiger*, April 1869, p. 245 ff.)

(2) The first impulse to a treatment of the Old Testament not simply practical, but theological, lies already in the New Testament; comp. especially the Epistles to the Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews. The strife between the young Christian body and the wisdom of the scribes soon led to biblico-theological questions, and this was continued between the orthodox Church teachers and the heretics. The questions which, as we see from Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Tryphon*, and Tertullian's treatise *adversus Judæos*, were chiefly discussed between rabbis and Christian theologians, were concentrated on Christology. On that topic we find already such questions of debate as the following: Does the Old Testament teach the divine dignity of the Messiah, and does it announce a *παθητὸς Χριστός*? In the Gnostic controversy, the whole position of Christianity towards the Old Testament became matter of discussion; in particular, in opposition to the Manicheans, a question arose, which remains yet unsettled, viz. how it stands with the Old Testament in relation to the knowledge of the immortality of the soul and eternal life (comp. on this subject my *Commentationes ad theologiam biblicam pertinentes*, 1846, p. 2 ff.). But these questions were not treated in the way that is followed by biblical theology in the strict sense of the word, in which the historical interest is dominant, but purely in the interests of dogma, so that the Church Fathers sought to point out the Christian dogma already in the Old Testament; and above all, the deficiency of their knowledge of the language hindered the doctors of the Church from studying the Old Testament thoroughly.

(3) On the position of the Alexandrine school to the Old Testament, and their confounding of the two Testaments, we refer especially to the account of Origen by Redepenning, *Origenes*, i. p. 273 ff. The allegorical interpretation, which he brought to its perfection, rendered Origen incapable of perceiving in the Old Testament a development of doctrine, and of representing the historical progress of revelation impartially.

(4) In proof of this, comp. Augustin. *c. Adim.* cap. iii. 4: "Certis quibusdam umbris et figuris . . . populus ille tenebatur, qui Testamentum Vetus accepit: tamen in eo tanta prædicatio et prænun-

ciatio Novi Testamenti est, *ut nulla* (in *Retract.* i. 22. 2 : *parce nulla*) *in evangelica atque apostolica disciplina reperiantur, quamvis ardua et divina precepta et promissa, quæ illis etiam libris veteribus desint.*"

(5) We may regard these three books in Augustin's great work as in a certain sense the first treatment of the theology of the Old Testament. Augustin (cf. *l.c.* xxii. 30 fin.; *c. Faust.* xii. 8) bases his statement on the thought that the history of the divine kingdom is transacted in seven periods, of which the week of creation forms the type. The first five periods fall in the Old Testament times bounded by Noah, Abraham, David, the Babylonian captivity, and the manifestation of Christ; the sixth is the present age of the Church; and the Sabbath of the world follows as the seventh. We shall see how, in the reformed theology at a later period, this thought was appropriated in what is called the system of periods (§ 11).

(6) In connection with the chronicle of Sulpicius Severus, which Diestel has singularly overlooked, the essay of Bernays deserves to be read: "*The Chronicle of Sulpicius Severus*; a contribution to the history of classical and biblical studies." 1861. The chronicle was written a little after 400. It is interesting to see how neatly Sulpicius Severus translates the Mosaic law into the Latin of a Roman jurist

(7) The treatment of the Old Testament in the old Church reaches its close with Gregory the Great; but his gigantic work, *Moralia in Jobum*, and his other works on the Old Testament, are particularly important only in so far as they make us more closely acquainted with the way of exegesis in the old Church.

(8) S. Liebner, "*Hugo von St. Viktor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit*," 1832, p. 128 ff.—True, much detached matter valuable for the Old Testament was brought to light in the middle ages, and especially on the Song of Solomon, in which the mysticism of the middle ages lives, and into which it is woven, as Bernard of Clairvaux's lectures on Canticles show; but this is not anything belonging to biblical theology. Nay, the simpler explanations of the Bible appeared so despicable to the ruling scholasticism, that the name biblical theologian came to mean the same as a narrow-minded person (s. Liebner, *l.c.* p. 166). The rabbis of the middle ages accomplished more, especially Moses Maimonides, who must often be consulted on Old Testament theology, especially as the collector of the institutions and expositions of the Mosaic law.

§ 10.

THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE AGE
OF THE REFORMATION.

The Reformation principle of the authority of Scripture directed theological activity to the Old Testament as well as to the New. A more lively interest in it had been already awakened by Johann Reuchlin; though in the case of Reuchlin himself this interest was directed less to the simple theological comprehension of the Old Testament, than to the old mysterious learning which was supposed to be laid down in it. Nevertheless *Hieronymus redivivus*, as Reuchlin was called because of his *trilinguis eruditio*, rendered great service to the "rise of the Holy Scriptures," not simply by opening a path for the study of Hebrew in Germany, but particularly by the firmness with which he lays it down as the duty of the expositor of Scripture to go back on the original text expounded according to its literal sense, and to refuse to be dependent on the Vulgate, and the traditional expositions of the Church which are connected with it. Thus Reuchlin became the father of Protestant Hermeneutic, little as he himself acknowledged the full range of his principles (1). The knowledge of the contrast of law and gospel drawn from Paul's epistles was the first thing that gave a key to the theological comprehension of the Old Testament to the Reformers, who sought in the Scriptures, not, like Reuchlin, theurgic wisdom, but the simple way of salvation. Scholasticism had substituted for the antithesis of law and gospel the difference of the *vetus* and *nova lex*; the former of which demands only a justice fixed by outward motives, and therefore incomplete, while the latter binds to the complete virtue which is supported by love. The Reformers, on the other hand, brought into a truer light the moral worth of the Old Testament law, and the corresponding pedagogic design of the Old Testament œconomy; and they also correctly recognised, that even in the old covenant a revelation of God's gracious will in the promise of salvation goes side by side with the revelation of the demands of the divine will in the law (2). For all that is connected with this practical sphere in the Old Testament, Luther especially shows a deep understanding, springing from a lively personal experience (3). But just because it is from the expe-

riences of a Christian, which even when analogous are not necessarily identical, that light is sought for the comprehension of the conditions of Old Testament life, the practico-theological exposition does not do full justice to the historical apprehension of the Old Testament. That moral and religious knowledge was gradually deepened under the pedagogic guidance of the law, which advanced from the outside to the inside; that the promise of salvation arises from germ-like beginnings, and advances step by step in connection with the providential guidance of the history of the people,—is all the less acknowledged, because in the sphere of dogma proper the two Testaments are so closely drawn together. In the view which the Reformers (and especially Melanchthon) were so fond of developing, that the Church began in Paradise and continues throughout all time, the whole emphasis is laid on the unity of the *doctrine* of revelation, existing under all change of outward forms (4). Grace is indeed *multiformis*, adjusting its revelation according to the need of different times, and the childhood of the human race¹ has special need of simple speech and story (5); but the faith of the Old Testament saints in the coming Saviour is nevertheless essentially one with our faith in the Saviour who has come (6). It is true that exegesis has become subject to the laws of the original language; the fourfold sense of the scholastics is set aside, and the simple *sensus literalis* is pressed; but the second principle of exegesis, the *analogia fidei*, though now in itself correctly understood as the *analogia scripture*,—the rule that Scripture must be expounded by Scripture,—is taken in the sense of full dogmatic conformity between the two Testaments (7). The reformed theology, which does not urge the opposition of the law and the gospel in the same way as the Lutherans, agrees with them entirely as to the dogmatic use of the Old Testament. Even Calvin, who has really laid a foundation for the historical exposition of the Old Testament, places the difference of the two Testaments mainly in the outward form, which changes according to the different powers of man's capacity (8).

(1) Most writers content themselves with praising the service which Reuchlin rendered in founding the study of the Hebrew language in Germany. But he is also worthy of notice in a theological respect; not, indeed, because of his cabalistic studies (*de verbo*

mirifico, 1494; *de doctrina cabalistica*, 1517), which were esteemed by himself as the crown of knowledge. The Reformers indulgently took no notice of his cabalisticism, though each one could easily draw for himself, from the sharp judgment to which Luther subjects the Jewish "Alfanzerei" in his book on the *Schem ham'phorasch*, his opinion on what Reuchlin taught about "the miraculous word." But Reuchlin's immortal service consists in this, that he was the first to claim with the greatest emphasis the independence of exegesis from the traditions of the Church, contained especially in the Vulgate and the commentaries of Hieronymus. From him sprang the well-known sentence: "*Quamquam Hieronymum sanctum veneror ut angelum et Lyram colo ut magistrum, tamen adoro veritatem ut Deum*" (Preface to the third book of the *rudimenta Hebraica*); and he utters this principle, "Is est plane verus et germanus scripturæ sensus, quem nativa verbi cujusque proprietas expedita solet aperire," in his book *de accentibus et orthographia lingue hebraicæ*, fol. iii. b. This important service of Reuchlin was also acknowledged by Luther, when he wrote to him, 1518 (*Illustrium virorum epistolæ hebraicæ, græcæ et latine ad Joannem Reuchlin, etc.*, 1514 and 1518, 3 b.): "Fuisti tu sane organum consilii divini, sicut tibi ipsi incognitum, ita omnibus puræ theologiæ studiosis expectatissimum." Reuchlin has also given his opinion on the duty of studying the Holy Scriptures independently in their original text, in his letters to Abbot Leonhard in Ottenbeuern (s. Schellhorn's *amœnitates hist. eccl. et literar.* ii. p. 593 ff.). Amongst other things, he writes: "Tantus mihi est erga linguarum idiomata et proprietates ardor, ut non valde laborare consueverim librum habere aliquem in alia lingua, quam in ea, in qua est conditus omnium primo, semper ipse timens de translatis, quæ me sæpe quondam errare fecerunt. Quare N. T. græce lego, Vetus hebraice, in cujus expositione malo confidere meo quam alterius ingenio." It is only too true that Reuchlin himself did not know the force of his own views; he was highly dissatisfied even with the Reformation. For the rest, comp. my biography of Reuchlin in *Schmid's Encyklop. des gesammten Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesens*, ii. p. 113 ff., and my review of Geiger's paper on Melanchthon's *oratio continens historiam Capnionis*, 1868, in the *Zeitschr. für luther. Theol.* 1869, iii. p. 505 ff.; and also of Geiger's book, *Johann Reuchlin, his Life and Works*, 1871, in the same *Zeitschr.* 1872, i. p. 145 ff. {See rather Geiger's book, which is indispensable to the student of Reuchlin.}

(2) On this subject compare the first ed. of Melanchthon's *Loci, in Corpus Reform.*, ed. Bretschneider und Bindseil, xxi. p. 139 ff.

(3) What the Old Testament testifies of the solemnity of the

divine law and divine judgment, of the curse of sin and the wretchedness of a life without God, and also of the desire for forgiveness of sins and the purifying of the heart, and of faith in divine promises, in doctrine and history, is set forth by Luther with much impressiveness, especially in his *Exposition of the Psalms*, in which, as in the *Pattern-book of all Saints*, the history of his own inward life met him.

(4) From Luther, compare especially, with regard to this, the exposition to Ps. xix. (xx.) in the *exegetica opp.*, Lat. ed., Erl., xvi. p. 190 f.: "Sicut alia persona, alia causa aliud tempus, alius locus in nova lege sunt, ita et aliud sacrificium, eadem tamen fides et idem spiritus per omnia sæcula, loca, opera, personas manent. *Externa variant, interna manent.*—Oportet enim ecclesiam ab initio mundi adstare Christo circumdatam varietate, et dispensatricem esse multiformis gratiæ Dei secundum diversitatem membrorum, temporum, locorum et causarum, quæ mutabilia sint et varia, ipsa tamen una semper eademque perseveret ecclesia." Grace has many forms, but the Church is *one*; and Luther would add, So is also Church *doctrine*. Luther finds the dogma of the *θεάνθρωπος* even in Gen. iv. 1. It is remarkable that, side by side with his free position towards some Old Testament writings, there is a very decided strictness in regard to the dogma which is supposed to lie in the Old Testament. From Melancthon, comp. *Loci, Corpus ref.* xxi. p. 800: "Una est perpetua ecclesia Dei inde usque a creatione hominis et edita promissione post lapsum Adæ; sed doctrinæ propagatio alia in aliis politiis fuit. Ac prodest considerare seriem historiæ," etc.;—p. 801: "Nam ut sciremus, doctrinam ecclesiæ solam, primam et veram esse, Deus singulari beneficio scribi perpetuam historiam ab initio voluit . . . et huic libro . . . addidit testimonia editis ingentibus miraculis, ut sciremus, unde et quomodo ab initio propagata sit ecclesiæ *doctrina*."

(5) See Luther's preface to the Old Testament of 1523, s. W. Erl. ed. lxiii. p. 8: "Here (in the Old Testament) shalt thou find the swaddling-clothes and the manger in which Christ lies.—Poor and of little value are the swaddling-clothes, but dear is Christ, the treasure that lies in them."

(6) Comp. Luther on Gal. iv. 2: "(Christus) patribus in V. T. in spiritu veniebat, antequam in carne appareret. Habebant illi in spiritu Christum, in quem revelandum, ut nos in jam revelatum, credebant, ac æquæ per eum salvati sunt ut nos, juxta illud: 'Jesus Christus heri et hodie idem est et in sæcula' (Heb. xiii. 8)."

(7) On the hermeneutic principles of the Reformation theology, we give the following additional details:—The principle that the true meaning of each scriptural passage is the literal meaning, was taken

from Reuchlin; Luther had spoken sharply against the making of allegories, and would tolerate allegories at best only as ornament and setting, as he expressed it. To this was added the properly theological principle of exposition by the *analogia fidei*. This Protestant principle of the *analogia fidei* is different from that of the old Church. In the latter, the sum of the tradition of doctrine in the apostolic churches formed the *regula fidei*; but the *analogia fidei* of the Reformers was to be drawn from Holy Scripture, and so becomes *analogia scripturæ*—Scripture ought to be explained by Scripture. This principle is in itself perfectly correct; and to have stated it, is one of the greatest merits of Protestant theology. But it was not properly turned to account; the unity of the Old and New Testaments was not conceived as brought about by a gradually advancing process of development, but as conformity of dogma. In order to justify this, and to be able to show the dogma as actually present, it was necessary to use a figurative exegesis. This, as every one knows, is the kind of exegesis which takes the place of allegorizing interpretations, especially in the treatment of prophecy. Compare Luther's preface to the Old Testament, Erl. ed. lxiii. p. 22: "Moses is the fountain of all wisdom and understanding, out of which welled all that was known, and told by all the prophets. The New Testament also flows from it, and is grounded therein.—If thou wilt interpret well and surely, take Christ for thee; for He is the man to whom alone all refers. So, then, in the high priest Aaron see no one, but Christ alone," etc.

(8) Calvin was so much an historical expositor in his exposition of the prophets, that he was reproached later by the Lutheran polemic as the Judaizing Calvin. But in the dogmatic treatment of the Old Testament he took up just as rigorous, or indeed a more rigorous, standpoint than Luther and Melancthon; compare as the principal passage, the *Institutiones* of 1559, ii. chap. 11, "de differentia unius testamenti ab altero," § 1 f.: There are indeed differences between the Old and New Testaments, but they rather refer *ad modum administrationis* than *ad substantiam*; the temporal promises of the Old Testament are a type of the heavenly inheritance. "Sub hac pædagogia illos continuit Dominus, ut spirituales promissiones non ita nudas et apertas illis daret, sed terrenis quodammodo adumbratas." Then it is said, § 13: "In eo elucet Dei constantia, quod *eandem omnibus sæculis doctrinam* tradidit; quem ab initio præcepit nominis sui cultum, in eo requirendo perseverat. Quod *externam formam et modum* mutavit in eo non se ostendit mutationi obnoxium: sed *hominum captui, qui varius ac mutabilis est, catenus se attemperavit.*"

§ 11.

THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE
OLDER PROTESTANT THEOLOGY.

The treatment of the Old Testament in the older Protestant theology was determined by the principles stated in last paragraph. Because the dogmatic of the Evangelical Church sought to support itself wholly on Bible doctrine, the distinction between biblical theology and church dogma was not carried out after the thread of œcumenico-catholic development of doctrine was again taken up. The contents of the Scriptures were set forth with strict regard to the systematic doctrines of the Church, not with regard to the historical multiplicity of the Scriptures themselves, and the Old Testament was applied in all its parts, just like the New Testament, for dogmatic demonstration. In opposition to the Romish theologians,—*e.g.* Bellarmin, who now distinguished the doctrine of the Old and New Testaments as *doctrina inchoata* and *perfecta*, and maintained that the mysteries of faith, and especially the doctrine of the Trinity, were only obscurely and imperfectly contained in the Old Testament,—it was taught on the side of the Protestants, that, in respect of fundamental doctrines, the Old Testament was in no way incomplete, and that these were only repeated more distinctly in the New Testament (comp. for Lutheran dogma, Gerhard's *Loci*, ed. Cotta, vi. p. 138 (1); on the reformed side, Schweizer, *reformirte Glaubenslehre*, i. p. 212 f.). The expressions grew sharper in the polemic against the Socinians; and the same point was also disputed in the syncretistic controversies. Among those points which raised Lutheran orthodoxy against Georg Calixtus, was the fact that Calixtus had denied the existence of the dogma of the Trinity in the Old Testament.—The first notable reaction against the scholastic treatment of the Old Testament proceeded from the reformed theology, which took a wider interest than Lutheranism in the Scriptures as a whole. What is called the system of periods, and still more, the Cocceian federal theology, here fall to be considered (2). The former was mainly grounded on the Apocalypse, which suggested the division of the history of the Christian Church into periods based on the number seven, which several times recurs in the book. In the Coccejian school this plan of division was extended to

the Old Testament. Cocceius (born 1603 in Bremen, placed as Professor in Leyden 1650, died 1669) proceeded in his views on biblical theology from the idea of a double covenant between God and man: the first, the covenant of nature and works, was made with Adam in his state of innocence; the second, the covenant of grace and faith, which came in after the fall, has three dispensations—before the law, under the law, and under the gospel. Cocceius has the undeniable merit of having energetically maintained the rights of the theologian in his study of the Scriptures, in opposition to the scholastic dogma and the exegetic tradition ruled by it, as well as in opposition to a onesided philological exegesis. His hermeneutic principles also deserve favourable recognition. The literal meaning must be reached as purely as possible, but at the same time with careful attention to the immediate context; but since the Scripture is an organism, the whole Scripture must always be kept before the eye in the theological explanation at each passage. The method of allegory was rejected by him on principle: he acknowledged the typical character of the Old Testament, in distinction from the reality of the atonement of the new covenant; and, indeed, it was one of the most contested doctrines of Cocceius, that (comp. Rom. iii. 25, Heb. ix. 15) the Old Testament granted only a *πάρεσις ἀμαρτιῶν*, *transmissio peccatorum*, but not a real *ἄφεσις*. But by the way in which Cocceius connected all the different dispensations, and confounded the thought meant by the Holy Spirit, with its application to analogous times and occurrences in the Church, arose that caprice of exegesis which made Coccejianism proverbial (3). How, on the ground of this view, the history of the divine kingdom is enclosed in an artificial scheme, can be seen in a singular way in Gürtler's *Systema theologiæ prophetiæ*, 2d ed. 1724. (Gürtler makes three great periods,—the first from Adam to Moses, the second extending to the death of Christ, and the third to the end of the world; each of these is divided into seven periods, and the numerically corresponding periods in each of the three rows of seven are supposed to have also corresponding characteristics.) Among the pupils of Cocceius, the following did special service to biblical theology:—Momma, *de varia conditione et statu ecclesiæ Dei sub triplici œconomia*; the excellent Witsius, "*de œconomia fœderum*" (*exercitationes sacræ, miscellanea sacræ*) (4);

Vitringa, the famous commentator on Isaiah ("de synagoga vetere," *Observationes sacre*; and in particular, his *Hypotyposis historiæ et chronologiæ sacre*). Among the opponents of Cocceius we name especially Melchior Leydecker (*de republica Hebræorum*, 1704). Among the Lutheran theologians, Joh. Heinrich Majus (Professor in Giessen) was specially influenced by the reformed biblical theology (*Œconomia temporum V. T.*, 1712; *Synopsis theologiæ judaicæ*, 1698); his *Theologia prophetica ex selectionibus V. T. oraculis*, 1710, claims particular notice, in which the *Theologia Davidis ex psalmis* appears as a distinct part, and along with it a *theologia Jesajana*, *theologia Jeremiana*, and a *theologia prophetica ex vaticis xii. minoribus*. The arrangement in these works, which are not without interest, is fixed by the local method (5).

(1) Gerhard brings forward the following propositions: Quod ad rem ipsam sive mysteria fidei attinet, doctrina veteris testamenti *nequaquam est imperfecta*, siquidem *eisdem fundamentales fidei articulos* tradit, quos Christus et apostoli in novo testamento *repetunt*. Quod ad docendi modum attinet, fatemur, quædam fidei mysteria clarius et dilucidius in novo testamento expressa esse, sed hoc perfectioni reali nihil quidquam derogat, cum ad perspicuitatem potius pertineat quam ad res ipsas cognoscendas.

(2) To see how the orthodox view of the Old Testament is confirmed in the struggle against the Socinians, compare Diestel, "über die socinianische Anschauung vom A. T.," *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1862, Nr. 4, p. 709 ff.; how, on the other side, a path was opened by the reformed theology for a theology of the Old Testament, may be read in Diestel's "Studien zur Fœderalthologie," in the same journal, 1865, Nr. 2, p. 219 ff.

(3) The main work by Cocceius on this topic is the beautiful little book, *Summa doctrinæ de fœdere et testamento Dei*, ed. 2, 1654, 68; note specially the preface to this book, in order to value its standpoint aright, as well as chapters eleventh and twelfth. There is nothing to be said against several of his hermeneutic principles; his hermeneutic theory is better than his practice. He has with great clearness charged exegesis with the task of freeing itself from the atomistic character which belongs to separate texts, and learning, on the other hand, to comprehend the Scriptures as an organism. But what was won on the one side was lost on the other by the artificial parallels drawn between the various stages of revelation, and by the typical exposition which Cocceius used. From this arose that plurality

of senses in interpretation which brought on him the reproach that he could make each passage mean everything; and from this came such Coccejian oddities as the notion that Isa. xxxiii. 7, "Behold, their valiant ones shall cry without; the ambassadors of peace shall weep bitterly," is a prophecy of the death of Gustavus Adolphus.—Among his pupils, Witsius and Vitringa in particular returned to more prudent paths.

(4) De Witsius' work, *de œconomia fœderum Dei cum hominibus, libri quatuor* (ed. 4, 1712), contains what may be called a theology of the Old Testament in the first and fourth volumes, and still deserves to be known and valued; in the treatment of the types, indeed (iv. 6), much irregular caprice prevails, although he seeks to find general rules of procedure. (The conscientiousness of the writer appears in such passages as *œc. fœd.* p. 639, where he says: in omnibus caute agendum est, *μετὰ φόβον καὶ τρόμον*, ne mysteria fingamus ex proprio corde nostro, horsumve obtorto collo trahamus, quæ alioversum spectant. Injuria Deo et ipsius verbo fit, quando nostris inventis deberi volumus, ut sapienter aliquid dixisse vel fecisse videatur.) [Prol.]

(5) The writings of Majus are interesting in the first place, because he proceeds to consider separate books of Scripture in their theological value. This, indeed, is carried out in an artificial way, for he simply takes the *loci* of the dogmatic system as his framework (Hengstenberg has done the same with the Psalms); but it is worth seeing what a fullness of theological matter is contained in many of the separate biblical books. Secondly, it is interesting to see how Majus, in his *Theologia prophetica*, places a *dictum classicum* at the head of each *locus*, which he treats as pertaining to the Old Testament theology, attaching to the interpretation of this leading passage his doctrinal matter; for example, the *locus* of the unity and trinity of God is headed by Deut. vi. 4, "Hear, O Israel, Jehovah our God is one Lord!" the *locus* of the creation by Gen. i. 1, "In the beginning God created," etc.; the *locus* of sin by Ps. xiv. 3, "They are all gone aside," etc.; the *locus* of Christ by Prov. viii. 22, the passage on pre-existent Wisdom; the *locus de ecclesia* by Ps. xlv. 5 f.

§ 12.

CONCEPTION AND TREATMENT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT FROM THE
END OF THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY.

In the Lutheran Church, *collegia biblica*, or topical lectures, became common from the end of the seventeenth century onwards (*e.g.*

Schmid, *Collegium biblicum*; Baier, *Analysis et vindicatio illustrium script. s. dictorum*). These lectures, which contained exegetico-dogmatical discussions of the biblical proof-texts most valuable for the doctrine of the Church, gave some impulse to the treatment of biblical theology apart from dogmatic, but one which is not to be highly estimated. The treatises on the Church history of the Old Testament, as they were called, which came out about the same time, are of more value for the theology of the Old Testament. The most important of these is the *Historia ecclesiastica veteris testamenti* of Buddeus, 3d ed. vol. ii. 1726-29 (1). The biblicism of Spener and his school had, indeed, influence in breaking the doctrinal rigorousness of the orthodox dogma; but since the tendency of pietism was directed predominantly to edifying expositions of Scripture, and the value of the separate portions of the Bible was measured by the degree of their adaptation to personal edification, pietism could not reach biblical theology as an historical science. This one circumstance which was valuable for prophetic theology was, that Spener did justice to the scriptural view of the completion in this world of the kingdom of God (2). It was Johann Albrecht Bengel who, upon the ground of his view of the divine kingdom as an *œconomia divina circa mundum universum, circa genus humanum*, insisted on an organic and historical conception of biblical revelation with strict regard to the difference of its stages. The Würtemberg school, which took its origin from him, regarded as its task not only practical edification from separate Bible texts, but especially the awakening of a knowledge of salvation resting on insight into the whole course of the divine kingdom (3). In this connection, Roos, Burk, Hiller (4), Oetinger, and others brought deep thoughts to light in a plain and simple form. The Leipzig theologian Christian August Crusius is akin to the school of Bengel: we name as his chief work the *Hypomnemata ad theologiam propheticam*, in three volumes (5). Still the seed scattered by Bengel and his school found little receptive ground amidst the revolution which passed in the course of the eighteenth century over German Protestant theology. The English deism had become powerful in Germany also, and a onesided subjectivism stepped into the place of the scholasticism of Church dogma, which, believing only in itself, admitted that alone to be truth which the

subject, alienated from the Christian experience of salvation, still felt able to produce from itself. What is given in the Bible as revelation was now to be explained as the arbitrary deed of human individuals who made bold to institute religions. The works of the apologists (Lardner, Warburton, Shuckford, Lilienthal *The Good Cause of Divine Revelation*, 16 parts) did indeed bring forward some materials available for the biblical branches of theology; but they could effect but little in opposition to their opponents, since they agreed with them in the subsumption of the biblical, and in particular of the Old Testament, institutions under the category of the commonest utility (6). This system of referring the plan of the Old Testament revelation to the standpoint of the most trivial shrewdness which Joh. Spencer (7) in his learned work, *de legibus Hebræorum ritualibus earumque rationibus*, 1686 (published again by Pfaff, 1732), and Clericus had prepared, became quite predominant in Germany through the works of the learned orientalist of Goettingen, Joh. David Michaelis, who, in his *Mosaic Law*, did the utmost for the theory of utility (8). Semler's tendency has a more ethical character. It is rooted in pietism, save that Semler regards that which is serviceable for moral improvement, not that which edifies the Christian, as the one thing of importance, and as that by which, therefore, in the Holy Scriptures, the divine and the human, the material and the immaterial, must be separated. He maintains none the less that the Bible and Church doctrine contradict each other,—a proposition which from his time onwards is shared equally by rationalists and supernaturalists. Thus was biblical theology completely freed from Church dogma.

(1) Comp. Hengstenberg's *Geschichte des Reiches Gottes unter dem A. Bunde*, Periode I. p. 92. (In Clark's For. Theol. Library.)

(2) Comp. on this point, and part of what follows, Delitzsch, *die biblisch-prophetische Theologie ihre Fortbildung durch Chr. A. Crusius und ihre neuste Entwicklung*, 1845.

(3) Bengel himself wrote nothing on the Old Testament, except that his *Ordo temporum* includes the Old Testament. We must observe, however, that disjointed suggestive hints in connection with the Old Testament are to be found scattered everywhere in his numerous writings, also in the *Gnomon to the New Testament*, etc. The propositions in opposition to the dogmatism of the period in the *Ordo temporum*, chap. 8, "de futuris in scriptura provisus ac revelatis,"

ought especially to be noticed. In the second of the hermeneutic rules there set up, Bengel states the proposition, which at that time was quite new (2d ed. p. 257): "*Gradatim* Deus in patefaciendis regni sui mysteriis progreditur, sive res ipsæ spectentur, sive tempora. *Opertum* tenetur initio, quod deinde *apertum* cernitur. *Quod quavis ætate datur*, id sancti debent amplecti, non plus sumere, non minus accipere."

(4) Magnus Friederich Roos is Bengel's most notable pupil. Among his works we have here to mention: *Fundamenta psychologiæ ex sacra scriptura collecta*, a work rich in fine remarks; *Eindeitung in die biblische Geschichte*, 1770 ff. (reprinted in Tübingen, 1835 ff., in three volumes), in a plain popular form, and likewise offering a wealth of subtle thought; *Exposition of the Prophecies of Daniel*, and others. The main works of Burk and Hiller are cited by Delitzsch, *l.c.* p. 10. Compare also the introduction to Auberlen's book, *Die Theosophie Friedr. Christ. Oetinger's*.

(5) On Crusius compare Delitzsch (*l.c.* p. 1 ff.), who gives his views in detail, but values him too highly.

(6) In this connection, the argument adopted by Warburton in his work, *The Divine Legation of Moses*, is best known. If Morgan had asserted, against the divinity of the Mosaic religion, the want of faith in immortality and retribution after death, Warburton argued, on the contrary, that just because, under a common providence, civil government cannot be kept up without the belief in future rewards and punishments, the Jewish state must have been ruled by a special providence, because the Mosaic religion was wanting in this faith.—Sam. Shuckford offers a quite similar example. The Deists had declared the Mosaic service of offerings to be unreasonable; now Shuckford argued that, because the worship of God by offerings could not have been arrived at by mere reason (for "I cannot see what sort of rational argument could have brought them to fancy that it was required of them to expiate their sins, and show their thankfulness for divine benefits, by an offering"), the Lord God must Himself have set up this service (*The Sacred and Profane History of the World Connected*, translated by Theodor Arnold, with a preface by Wolle, 1731, i. p. 27, comp. p. 57; the original appeared in 1727) [Prol.].—The chief work on the history of English Deism is by Lechler, 1847.

(7) Spencer's view on the Mosaic ritual law is expressed completely and concisely in his *dissertation de Urim*, sec. xii. (ed. Pfaff, p. 974), in the following sentences: "*Verisimile est rituum Mosaicorum partem multo maximam ex hoc triplici fonte manasse: (1) e moribus quibusdam religiosis, quibus patriarcharum exempla et antiquitatis*

supremæ canities reverentiam conciliarant.—(2) Quidam ritus et leges Mosaicæ e malis sæculi moribus, ut bonæ leges solent, nascebantur. Cum enim Israelitarum mores post curvitatem diuturnam in Ægypto contractam ad rectum duci, nisi in contrarium flectendo, non potuerint; leges ritusque multos cum moribus olim receptis e diametro pugnantes instituit Deus.—(3) Alii originem petiere e consuetudine aliqua, quæ apud Ægyptios et alios e vicino populos inveniavit; quam Deus integram pæne reservavit Israelitis, ut eorum animos sibi conciliaret, qui gentium moribus assueverant, et iis ingenia sua penitus immiscuissent.”—What is characteristic of Spencer’s conception of Mosaism lies principally in what is said in number 3. The subtilty which the century loves to ascribe to founders of religions is transferred to God Himself. (To this Witsins has replied well, in his *Ægyptiaca*, Amst. 1683, lib. iii. cap. xiv., which are directed against Marsham’s *Canon Chronicus*, and Spencer’s *diss. de Urim et Thumim*.) “God appears as a Jesuit, who makes use of a bad means for reaching a good aim” (Bähr, *Symbolik des mosaischen Kultus*, i. p. 41). [Prol.]

(8) Hengstenberg has given a thorough critique of the three last named in his *Contributions to the Introduction to the Old Testament*, ii. p. iv. ff.

(9) On Semler, compare Diestel’s essay in the *Jahrbuch für Deutsche Theol.* 1867, vol. iii. p. 471 ff., “Zur Würdigung Semler’s.” Semler’s merits lie more in the department of the history of dogma, not so much in the Old Testament.

§ 13.

RISE OF A BIBLICAL THEOLOGY DISTINCT FROM DOGMATIC. TREATMENT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT BY RATIONALISM, AND BY THE NEWER HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (1).

John Philip Gabler is regarded as the man who, in his academic oration, *de justo discrimine theologicæ biblicæ et dogmaticæ*, 1787, first clearly expressed the idea of biblical theology as an historical science. The name, indeed, is older, but was used to denote sometimes a collection of proof-texts for dogmatic, sometimes a popular system of doctrine and ethic, sometimes a systematic statement of biblical doctrine held apart from the dogmatic of the Church, or designed to serve in criticising the latter. The most important book

of the last-named class is Zachariae's *Biblical Theology*, 4 parts, 1772-75 (2).—Gabler, on the other hand, defined the work of biblical theology as the statement of "the religious ideas of Scripture as an historical fact, so as to distinguish the different times and subjects, and so also the different stages in the development of these ideas."—This necessarily demanded the separation of Old and New Testament theology. A separate discussion of each was soon given by Lorenz Bauer, Professor of the Doctrine of Reason and of Oriental Languages at Altorf (*Theology of the Old Testament*, 1796; Appendices to the work, 1801) (3). But with an interest in historical treatment of the subject was not united an equal effort to go really deep into the contents of the Old Testament. The "vulgar rationalism" of the period of which Lorenz Bauer is a representative, had neither received from the suggestions of Lessing (4) and Kant (5) an impulse to understand the pedagogic value of the Old Testament, nor learned from Herder to turn an open eye upon its human beauties. The main endeavour was to put aside everything which was called temporary form, orientalism, and so forth, and thus reduce the essential contents of the Bible to the thinnest possible series of a few very ordinary commonplaces. The superficiality of this standpoint is in great measure shared by the unfinished work of Gramberg, *Critical History of the Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*, 1829-30 (6). Baumgarten Crusius' *Outlines of Biblical Theology*, 1828 (which again gives up the separation of Old and New Testament theology), and Daniel v. Coelln's *Biblical Theology* (1836, 2 vols.), are the first works that mark the transition to a thorough treatment of our subject. The hints towards an organic historical apprehension of the Old Testament, which had been offered by Herder (7), mainly under stimulus from Hamann, were taken up by De Wette with discriminating sympathy. But in his *christ. Dogmatik*, which stands under the influence of the philosophy of Fries (3d ed. 1831), this view is not carried through (8). Of recent theologians, it is Umbreit who has most fully accepted the standpoint of Herder, developing it in a positive direction (*Practical Commentary on the Old Testament Prophets*, 1841 ff.; *Sin, a contribution to Old Testament Theology*, 1853; *The Epistle to the Romans expounded on the basis of the Old Testament*, 1856). Ewald, in his *History of the People of Israel* (four vols. of the seven

belong to the Old Testament, 3d ed. 1864 ff., and with these goes the volume on the Antiquities of Israel, 3d ed. 1866), has interwoven with his narrative a full account of the growth of the Old Testament religion, but his vague notion of revelation does not raise him essentially above the rationalistic method which he despises; yet this diffusely written work contains, along with much that is arbitrary, many individual details that are just and suggestive.¹

The new phase into which the study of the history of religion has entered in our century, mainly through the influence of Creuzer, has exerted a considerable influence on the treatment of the Old Testament. Many, especially, have been the attempts to throw light on the traditions of Genesis and the institutions of Moses, from the comparative history of religion; cf. Buttmann's *Mythologus*, and several essays of Baur in the *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie* (9). Kaiser, in his *Biblical Theology* (1813, 2 vols.), proposed to treat the whole biblical religion "in accordance with a free theological position, giving it its place in critico-comparative general history and in universal religion." But the comparative method is applied so wholly out of measure and rule, especially in the first volume, that the author himself subsequently gave sentence against his own book (10). The chief defect in this comparison of religions was a too great dependence on outward similarities, without sufficiently deep perception of the specific peculiarities of the religions compared. The characteristic idea of each religion was taken mainly from Schleiermacher and Hegel, both of whom had failed to do justice to the specific connection of the Old and New Testaments; while Schelling's philosophy of revelation, on the other hand, does recognise the specific relation of the old covenant to Christianity, in spite of the fact that the philosopher regards the basis and immediate presuppositions of the Old Testament as identical with those of heathenism, and represents the religion of the old covenant not as exempt from the mythological process, but as working through it (11). The Old Testament was constructed from the standpoint of Hegel, by Rust (*Philosophy and Christianity*, 2d ed. 1833), Vatke (*Religion of the Old Testament*, 1835.

¹ {Ewald's views on biblical theology are now in course of publication on a large scale, in his *Lehre der Bibel von Gott, oder Theologie des Alten und Neuen Bundes*, 1st vol., Leipzig 1871.}

Only the first part appeared. In point of form the work is very finished), and Bruno Bauer (*Religion of the Old Testament*, 2 vols. 1838); but from the same philosophical standpoint the two last named came to quite opposite results (12).

(1) Specially valuable for the history of biblical theology, since the end of last century, is the above-cited essay of Schmid, "on the interests and position of biblical theology of the New Testament in our time," *Tüb. Zeitschr. f. Theol.* 1838, H. 4, p. 125 ff.

(2) Zachariae discusses the doctrines of the Old Testament at length, but generally only in a subsidiary way. Only seldom (*e.g.* in § 81) are they taken up in a purely historical manner. [Prol.]

(3) Lorenz Bauer wrote on all the Old Testament disciplines (not only on biblical theology, but on—*Hermeneutica sacra V. T., Introduction to the Old Testament Antiquities, and History of the Hebrew Nation*), and wrote commentaries on some of the Old Testament books. The applause with which these writings of a theologian who made the Old Testament "readable" were greeted, appears from the reviews in the theological journal of Ammon and Haenlein (afterwards of Gabler). He may be viewed, therefore, as a leading representative of the rationalistic treatment of the Old Testament at that period. The historical process by which he gets at the successive development of religion is to distinguish the doctrine (1) of Genesis, (2) of the other books of the Pentateuch, (3) of the book of Joshua, (4) of Judges, and so on—14 divisions in all. (This is in his appendices, for he was afraid that in the book itself his method had been still too dogmatic.) This is enough to show how external is the apprehension of the historic development. The critical treatment consists in judging the contents of the Old Testament from the principles of the most commonplace intelligence, and sometimes in condemning them as superstitious or immoral; or at times "the less strong philosophy of the Hebrews" is treated with more indulgence, or we are told that this was "the extent of the religious enlightenment of the Hebrews." [Prol.]

(4) The writing of Lessing's which falls to be mentioned here is *The Education of the Human Race*. Some have said that Lessing was not in earnest with this book; but the right judgment on the author is that of Lotze in his *History of Aesthetic in Germany*, p. 24: "He touched no subject without casting much light on it; but the great intellectual agitator to whom the culture of his nation owes a debt that cannot be estimated, did not in any field of inquiry advance to the systematic connection of the fruitful threads of thought which he spun. We are put in mind of his own saying, that the endless

search for truth, even though it were without result, is better than the unlaborious possession of truth : we comprehend how this earnest joy in investigation, and deep reverence for truth, made him indisposed to come to a final conclusion, which is generally harder to retract than an error of detail."

(5) Kant's work, *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, which is regarded as the starting-point of recent philosophy of religion, takes notice, though but briefly, of the Old Testament. Kant asserted the relative necessity of a positive religion. The absolute demand of the moral law, that the radical evil *must* be overcome by what is good, can be accomplished in mankind as a whole only by the founding of an ethical society in which the moral law becomes the general principle. But such an ethical society can be founded only by a religion which, in order to the visible manifestation of the ethical commonwealth, must take statutory shape, as men always desire a sensible confirmation of rational truths. But a statutory law must be prescribed under divine authority : it is the vehicle of the religion of reason by which man must train himself to free morality.—One would suppose that these propositions opened the way in an unexpected manner for the philosophic apprehension of Mosaism ; but Kant made no such application of them. He had a strong antipathy to the Old Testament, saying that the law of Moses contains not moral, but mere political precepts—does not prescribe moral disposition as a motive ; and that the Old Testament has no doctrine of immortality, and is particularistic. [Prol.]

(6) Gramberg's 1st vol. contains hierarchy and cultus ; vol. 2, theocracy and prophecy.—Vols. 3 and 4 were to contain dogmatic and ethic, but the author died before they were complete. [Prol.]

(7) Special reference is due to Herder's *Letters respecting the Study of Theology* ; cf. e.g. the 18th letter in vol. ix. of his religious and theological works. The leading proposition which Herder there states is : " The whole Old Testament rests on an ever fuller development of certain primitive promises, images, results, and their whole combined sense—their ever wider and more spiritual purpose : the New Testament was therefore a fulfilling of the Old, as the kernel appears when all the shells and husks that hid it are stripped off. They were stripped off gradually, and with ever increasing delicacy, till Christ appeared ; and they shall yet be universally recognised as one purpose of God, when He shall come with His kingdom."

(8) Of De Wette's writings we have here specially to mention two ingenious essays,—his " Contribution to the Description of the Character of Hebraism," in Creuzer and Daub's *Studien* ; and a paper

on "The Symbolico-typical Method of the Doctrine of the Epistle to the Hebrews," in the theological *Zeitschrift*, edited by him in fellowship with Schleiermacher and Lücke. Here we find such statements as the following: "As every phenomenon in time is interwoven with the time that precedes and follows, so Christianity proceeded from Judaism.—The whole Old Testament is one great prophecy, one great type of that which was to come, and is come," etc. In De Wette's *Biblical Dogmatic* this view recurs only in general statements (particularly § 211). In the anthropological introduction to this book, the idea of religion is determined according to the philosophy of Fries. This idea is then applied to the religious material of the Old and New Testaments; and everything in them which does not square with the utterances and laws of the ideal rational faith, and of religious sentiment, is excluded or regarded as irrelevant disguise, while only what remains is taken as the true essence of the religion (§ 50, 51). In this process, Old and New Testament are to be accurately distinguished, but also again compared together (§ 58).—It appears from his essay on "the exposition of the Psalms for edification" (Basel, 1836), that De Wette regards the development of the notions expressed in the essays cited above as the proper work not of scientific theology, but of the practical treatment of the Old Testament for ends of edification. [Prol.]

(9) To this head belong especially Baur's essays "on the original meaning of Passover and Circumcision," and "the Hebrew Sabbath and the national festivals of the Mosaic cultus,"—both in *Tueb. Zeitschr. f. Theol.* 1832. In the former essay Baur thus defines the standpoint of his investigation: "Mosaism must be viewed as a great religious reform; the renewal and restoration of a purer religion periodically darkened and threatened by still greater darkness and decay. It contains so many elements accepted by tradition from primeval antiquity; and the further these elements lie beyond the strictly limited sphere of Mosaism, the more clearly do they point back to a freer and wider region of religion, in which later polytheism has also its proper share—to a common primeval religion, from which special forms of religion proceeded and gradually fell apart." [Prol.]

(10) On Kaiser's biblical theology, see the essay of Schmid cited above, p. 140.

(11) On Schleiermacher, cf. § 8, note 3; on Schelling, cf. Adolf Planck, *Schelling's Posthumous Works, and their Importance for Theology and Philosophy*, 1858.

(12) Hegel distinguishes three stages of religion: the religion of nature, the religion of spiritual individuality or subjectivity, and the

absolute religion. The Jewish religion belongs to the second stage, in which the religious consciousness is no longer determined by nature, but, on the contrary, the subject has grasped itself in its being-for-itself [*Fürsichseyn*], and is that which absolutely determines the natural. Divinity, therefore, is at this stage known as freely determining itself by itself, and acting for ends. This stage of religion is evolved in three forms. In the first, the Jewish religion, the spiritual being-for-itself comes forth as the spiritual God, one and self-consistent, to whom all that is natural and finite stands in a relation of absolute lack of independence. This God manifests Himself in nature, but so that He is higher than His manifestation in the natural world, and distinguishes Himself therefrom. Thus nature loses all divine quality—religion of loftiness. God is *Wisdom*, inasmuch as He is Himself the end to which all things are directed; and is the *Holy One*, because as the *one* God He unites in one end all the determining properties of the end. But since the end is not the determination of the infinite essence of God Himself (God does not create Himself in Himself), but rather the realizing of the end falls outside of Him, the one divine end is limited and particularized. “The two things correspond, infinite might and limitation of actual aim: on the one side loftiness, and on the other the opposite, infinite limitation and prejudice.” This contradiction between universality of aim and limitation of realization is what brings the religion of Israel to its fall.

In the second religion of this stage, the religion of Greece, the separation of the natural and the spiritual which is made in Jewish religion is again done away with in *corporeity*, in which the natural is the token of the spiritual (religion of beauty). This gives a certain reconciliation of the particular with the universal, the particular being raised into the life of the universal as an inner determination thereof, while the universal enters in a living personal manner into the sphere of the particular. The human form is recognised as an adequate form for the appearance of the Godhead, which thus presents itself as a plurality of divine-human individualities. Thus a unity of the divine and the human is reached, though (as Vatke modifies the statement, p. 113) only a superficial unity. But the oneness of these many particulars into which the Godhead is divided is external to the former, the undefined subjective might that stands above the gods—necessity—Hellenic fate. As in Jewish religion universality appears without true differentiation into particulars, so in the Greek religion we find the particular without its true universality.

This external relation of the general and the particular is sublated in the third religion of this stage—the religion of Rome. The

particular ends which fell apart in the Greek religion, and were swayed by blind necessity, are here elevated and made part of the supreme necessity, being comprehended in the one necessary end to the realization of which the gods act as means. The universality of this end raises it above the particularistic limitation of Judaism; but while the latter is directed to the one, the eternal, the supernatural, the aim of the religion of Rome is one that resides externally among men, possessing only empirical universality: it is the might of the Roman state, which by force of weapons, under the protection of its gods, subdues the limited minds of the nations, annihilates their political life and their gods, and so, by dashing the old world to pieces, paves the way for the absolute religion.

These are the outlines of Hegel's view. It does not deny, nay, expressly asserts, the organic relation of Judaism to Christianity. The pre-Christian forms of religion are only the individual integral parts of the notion of religion, which appears in its totality in the absolute religion, in Christianity. Judaism, like the other religions before Christ, is an essential presupposition of Christianity, and the Old Testament really contains a preparation for Christianity. But the connection of Judaism with Christianity is not on this theory specific, or at least not closer than that of Greek or Roman religion. Bruno Bauer, indeed (*Zeitschr. für Spekulat. Theol.* i. Nr. 2, p. 256), sought to deduce from Hegelian principles a closer positive connection of Judaism with Christianity; pointing to Hegel's statement (*Rel.-Phil.* ii. p. 222) that the alienation, the infinite pain, presupposed by the atonement offered in Christianity, can be felt only where "the good, or God, is known as one God, as a God purely spiritual," etc., which is the case only in the religion of the Old Testament. But the inference as to the relation of Judaism and heathenism which flows from this, is not drawn in Hegel's philosophy of religion. And to show how the Old Testament religion necessarily "led man to look deep into himself, and so displayed the negative element of alienation (wickedness)," would have required a much more accurate grasp of God's holiness and of sin than belongs to Hegel's statements.

We can here remark only in a general way on the relation in which Hegel places the religion of the Old Testament to the religions of heathenism.—First, as regards the relation of Judaism to Greek religion, which is said to be, that the separation of the natural and the spiritual, of the divine and the human, made in the former is sublated in the latter. It has justly been urged against this view, that the complete separation made in the religion of Israel is not a thing which the Greek religion has passed through and risen beyond, but a thing

which it has not yet attained to. The only stage of religion above which the Greek religion rises, is that in which subjectivity still lies captive in absolute dependence on the forces that rule in the natural universe; all that the Greek spirit got over was the unfree relation of man to the life of nature. But the way in which the Greek spirit lays hold of itself in free subjectivity over against nature is not by coming to a point where the spirit is torn loose from nature and alienated therefrom, but again *reconciled* by Hellenic religion. On the contrary, the subject remains harmoniously united to the life of nature, in which it only meets again its own free spiritual life. For the Greek view of nature, to borrow the words of Braniss (in the excellent sketch of the philosophy of religion in his *Survey of the Progress of Philosophy*, 1842, p. 83 ff.), is briefly this: "All things are subjects; and of all the endless variety of natural beings which the universe contains, the inner side is man;" and the first principle of the religious consciousness of the Greek is, that "everything natural is divine, only because and in so far as it is human."—Doubtless the Greek religion has a vague sense of alienation between the subjective spirit and the glad world of the Olympians, *e.g.* in the myth of Prometheus, and in the prophecy of the son of Metis (cf. Stühr, *The Religious Systems of the Hellenes*, etc., p. 79 f.). But this does not go the length of a real breach, much less of a reconciliation; for Prometheus submits to Zeus, and Metis, who menaces danger, is swallowed by Zeus. But when the son of Metis, who overthrew the gods of popular faith, was born in Greek philosophy, then indeed appeared an alienation between nature and spirit, for which neither Greek religion nor anything in heathenism could provide an atonement. For neither the new gods brought in from foreign worships to supply the proved insufficiency of the old deities, nor the philosophers' attempt to gather up the multiplicity of the world in the unity of the *ὄντως ὄν*, which Plutarch, for example, preaches as the true God with almost prophetic voice (see especially, *de Ei apud Delphos*, cap. 20, and Dr. C. L. Roth's review of Nägelsbach's *Homerie Theology*, in Harless' *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus*, new series, i. p. 382 ff.), satisfied the spirit which now sought a godhead standing above nature—a supernatural god. If, then, the Greek religion in its dissolution sought what the Old Testament always possessed, how can it be held to rise superior to the Old Testament faith?—Thus, too, it is not just to assert, with Vatke (p. 113), that the figures of the gods in the Greek religion approach on one side nearer to the idea of the God-man than the abstract infinitude of the Hebrew view and the symbolic or momentary interlinking of the infinite with the actual; for between the union of the holy supernatural God with man's nature, which is

sought in the Old Testament, and the human gods of Greece, which are only immanent principles of the natural world, there subsists no relation which makes it reasonable to speak of an approximation of the two views at all.

Further, as regards the relation of Judaism to the religion of Rome, Vatke thinks it quite impossible to draw a parallel between the two. But this is hardly what his master would have said. Hegel obviously means to ascribe to the religion of Rome a superiority over Judaism, insomuch as in the latter the divine aim is realized outside of God, and is limited to one family and nation; while the aim attained in the Roman system is universal, viz. the world-empire. But it is more correct to say, that the divine aim expressed in Israel's religion is particularistic only in its temporary manifestation. In itself it is universal, and expects universal realization, as the Old Testament certainly knows. That all nations shall be blessed in Abraham's seed is the beginning of the promise: the kingship of Jehovah over all the earth is proclaimed by prophecy as the end of the divine empire. In the history of the people of Israel, the Old Testament sees movement towards the realization of this universal aim. "But," objects B. Bauer (*Religion of the Old Testament*, i. Introd. p. lxxxviii.), "this universality of aim was a mere postulate, to the real execution of which Hebraism did nothing, and could do nothing, because the law as such stopped short with an 'ought.' The Hebrew nation as a community took not one step to diffuse the service of Jehovah, and bring about a universal manifestation of the divine aim in time to come. The actual carrying out of the divine end, as a practical matter of fact, first appears in the world history in the religion of Rome, and forms a factor in the history of the religious consciousness, which stands higher than the aim which appears in the religions of the Old Testament and of Greece" (p. lxxv.). "To have actually broken the national spirit of the ancient peoples, remains the boast of the Romans in the history of the world; and without this deed the predictions of the prophets could never have been fulfilled."—True! but after the national spirit of antiquity was broken, as B. Bauer says (and as the Old Testament itself predicts, Hag. ii. 21, 22, etc.), and after the Roman system had cleared the way, the prophetic predictions were verily fulfilled, and the execution of the holy purpose of God spoken in the Old Testament became practical matter of fact. When the Romans had realized *their* universal aim, it was made a means towards the aim revealed in Israel. The Capitol and Mount Zion confront one another with equal claims to send forth their commands over all the world. But it was the God of

Israel, not Jupiter Capitolinus, that swore by Himself : "To me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear, and say, In the Lord have I righteousness and strength." Not the *pax Romana* was the goal of the old world, but the kingdom of the Prince of peace, who comes forth from Israel, to whom, in the execution of the aim already revealed in the Old Testament, all the majesty of Roman was a mere servant. On which side, then, did the superiority lie?

There is no historical truth even in the assertion (Baner, p. lxxvi.) that the Old Testament religion stands in a relation of reciprocity with those of Greece and Rome, so that the one always gives the negation of the onesidedness and limitation of the others; while Christianity arises out of their inner dialectic. It was not by factors of the Greek and Roman religion that the limits of the Old Testament religion were broken, and her prophecies carried to fulfilment; and it is vain to accuse the Christian Church of a lie, in that it has from the first regarded the Hellenes as the ἐλλήδα μὴ ἔχοντες καὶ ἄθεοι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ in contrast with the πολυτεία τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, of which it considers itself the continuation and completion. To this knowledge of the early Church it is objected (Vatke, p. 115 f.; cf. Schleiermacher, *der christliche Glaube*, § 12), that "even the consideration of the manner in which Christianity found entrance among Jews and Gentiles is enough to teach us that, on the whole, it stood in a similar relation to both standpoints. For the heathen, most of whom, and especially those who were then bearers of the world-historical spirit, belonged to the Greek and Roman principles, accepted Christianity as willingly, or even more so, than the Jews. Nay more, they were purer organs of Christianity." But to this the answer of Nitzsch is adequate: "The very reason why the Jews hardened themselves in so great a measure against Christianity, was their consciousness of the absolute negation of heathenism in their religion, — a possession that they sought to retain as their exclusive pride; and the very reason why the heathens were so ready to accept Christ, is that they sighed after revelation, but had it not; though heathenism may have worked its way up to the hypothesis of a revelation." If the question is one of the purity with which Christianity was apprehended, the Jewish apostles of the Lord are likely, in spite of all modern Gnosticism, to retain the honour of having been the purest organs of the Christian spirit.

It will be seen from what precedes why Hegel's view of Judaism cannot suffice Christian theology, so long as the latter remains positively Christian at all. (Further details need not be gone into; but it would, for example, be easy to show, that what Hegel says of

God's holiness, the fear of the Lord, etc., is very applicable to Islam, but not to the Old Testament. The name "religion of loftiness" would better suit Islam. Cf. also the doctrine of God's holiness, *infra.*) [Prol.]

§ 14.

THEOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE OLD TESTAMENT IN THE EARLIER SUPERNATURALISM, AND IN THE MOST RECENT LITERATURE.

For a long time, supernaturalism had done comparatively little for Old Testament theology. Only in a few books is a living historical view of revelation found, as in the case of Hess, who is mainly concerned with the proof that revelation proceeds on a plan (1). More important is Menken, who in part carries forward the line of thought originated by Bengel (*Attempt at a Guide to Self-instruction in the Holy Scripture*, 3d ed. 1833—a kind of biblical dogmatic) (2). In general, the theological use of the Old Testament by the so-called rational supernaturalists was confined partly to the proof of the general doctrines of Christian religion from passages of the Old Testament, partly to the use of the Old Testament prophecies for apologetic. In the latter respect, the chief point taken up was the justification of the citations in the New Testament, which, however, was often done without fixed principles as to the relation of prophecy and fulfilment (3). From this side Steudel alone gave a complete discussion of Old Testament theology (4). Steudel acknowledges that it is requisite to apprehend the Old Testament word in its inner connection with the history of salvation, but his book itself proposes no more than a systematic statement of the religious notions of the Old Testament; and the progress of religious knowledge in the Old Testament is treated not as an organic development, but more from the outside, as the gradual filling up of a framework given from the first (5).

The first to exert a thoroughgoing influence on the theological treatment of the Old Testament was Hengstenberg, mainly by his *Christology of the Old Testament* (3 vols., 1st ed. 1829–35, 2d ed. re-written, 1854–57; translated in Foreign Theological Library, 4 vols.). With all its onesidedness, or partly just because of its strong onesidedness, this book made an epoch. The standpoint

which Hengstenberg first took up in treating the Old Testament, and from which he never quite freed himself, is essentially that of the old Protestant theology; for while not renewing all the tenets of the latter, he yet very distinctly aimed at finding all the fundamental New Testament doctrines in the Old Testament, not in a process of living growth, but ready made (6). With this naturally went a disposition to spiritualizing exegesis of the prophecies, which deprived the concrete historical side of part of its due (7). Hengstenberg retains the merit, however, of having been the first to revive in Germany a strong religious and theological interest in the Old Testament. After his death appeared the *History of the Kingdom of God in the Old Testament*, edited from his lectures, 1869-71 (translated in Foreign Theological Library). The standpoint of Hengstenberg's criticism is also that of F. R. Hasse in his *History of the Old Covenant* (published posthumously, Leipzig 1863), a book full of matter, but which does not go into details as to the Old Testament doctrine. In this respect Hävernicks lectures on Old Testament theology serve as a supplement to the book. These lectures (posthumously published by Hahn, 1848, and again, with notes and valuable additions by H. Schulz, in 1863), state only the doctrines of the Old Testament, and these not completely, but contain much that is very good.

It still remained an unaccomplished task to delineate the whole course of the Old Testament history of salvation in its organic continuity, and with due regard to the progressive reciprocity of the word of revelation with the events of history. This task was undertaken by J. Chr. K. Hofmann, *Prophecy and Fulfilment in the Old and New Testaments*, 2 parts, 1841-44. In opposition to Hengstenberg's obliteration of the differences of grade in the Old Testament, Hofmann wishes to cast light on the progressive connection of prophecy with history; but in doing so, onesidedly gives the revealing word a secondary relation to the revealing events, which often leads to evacuation of the former. The relation of the word and events of revelation was afterwards put more correctly in Hofmann's *Schriftbeweis*, which throughout gives many most valuable contributions to the theology of the Old Testament (8). The most recent handbook of Old Testament theology, and one of the most valuable scientific

works on this subject, is the *Old Testament Theology* of Hermann Schulz, 2 vols. 1869 (9).

(1) The chief writing of Hess here to be noticed is, "*On the Kingdom of God; an Attempt to sketch the Plan of the Divine Institutions and Revelations*," 2 vols. 1781. A later condensation of the book is, *Kernel of the Doctrine of the Kingdom of God*, 1819; well characterized by Hengstenberg in his *History of the Kingdom of God*, p. 99 f.

(2) Menken published the results of his biblical inquiries not in a form strictly scientific, but in a somewhat elevated popular shape. He may be said to have taken it as his life-task to investigate and elucidate the course of revelation; for in the demonstration of the way in which the history of God's kingdom forms a close harmonious whole, he correctly saw the best apology for the Bible. By his expositions, at once clear and deep, he alike opposed mystical fantasies and rationalistic or supernaturalistic superficiality. No doubt he was himself onesided, and in particular was led away by his opposition to the Church's doctrine of the atonement to a most violent exegesis of several passages (compare especially in his *Attempt*, etc., cap. vi., Appendix B, on the doctrine of the Atonement, and C on Isa. liii. 5); but it is not to be forgotten that Menken's view of God's holiness, and his connected theory of the atonement, contained an element of truth ignored in the theories he opposed. So, too, we may find reason to object in important points to the essays (bearing specially on Old Testament theology) upon the brazen serpent (Bremen, 1829), and on faith and the doctrine of eternal life in the Old Testament (Appendix to cap. v. of the *Attempt*); but we cannot deny to these investigations, as a whole, the praise of being thorough and well thought out. [Prol.]

(3) The text of the Old Testament was expounded now literally, now figuratively, just as the citation seemed to demand; a tortuous process, of which Schleiermacher was justified in saying, "The effort to prove Christ from the prophecies I can never regard as a profitable work" (2d letter to Luecke, in vol. ii. of his collected theological works, p. 620).

(4) *Lectures on Old Testament Theology*, delivered by Steudel, edited after his death by me, Berlin 1840 (cf. my notice of the book in Tholuck's *lit. Anzeiger*, 1843). The work is elucidated by several monographs by Steudel, among which the most valuable are the essays against the views of Hegel and Rust as to Judaism: "Glances at the Old Testament Revelation," in the *Tueb. Zeitschrift für Theol.* 1835, Nr. 1 and 2.

(5) A passage, specially characteristic of Steudel's standpoint, is found, *l.c.* p. 66: "In the very beginning, consciousness of God, and of man's relation to Him, presents itself in the most general way. We cannot expect here to find man otherwise than with a limited vision, as the child has a limited vision; but the framework, as it were, is already there, and ever as the vision grows more extended, religious knowledge becomes richer." To the same purpose is the admonition, p. 67, that from "the sum of divinely revealed truth" must be stripped off what is imperfect in the form, which is a consequence only of the imperfection of the nursling, not of the nurturer.—Although the principle of a divine pedagogic here set forth is perfectly legitimate, every one can see that the very feature by which the law was *παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν* has not justice done to it. But even apart from this, the whole idea that in the New Testament the cognitions of truth contained in the Old are only, as it were, stripped of certain imperfect forms, and on the other side increased by further knowledge, is utterly untenable. Such an idea ascribes to the Old Testament both too much and too little. *Too much*, for we are bold to assert that there is not one biblical doctrine which is fully unfolded in the Old Testament, and is therefore transferred to the New Testament without further development, as a complete thing by itself: and *too little*, since the New Testament gives no wholly new doctrine; but, on the contrary, the truth of the gospel has a corresponding preparation in the Old Testament for all its compass and all its parts. [Prol.] On Steudel, compare also my article "Steudel," in Herzog's *Realencyclopædie*, xv. p. 75 sqq.

(6) This was demanded of Hengstenberg by his strong faith in revelation, which repudiated every concession made to rationalism, and by the common-sense character of the man, which in all things pressed for firm final results. This peculiarity comes out most strongly in the first volume of the first edition of the *Christology*; especially in the sections on "The Godhead of the Messiah in the Old Testament," and "The Suffering Messiah in the Old Testament." In the former essay, the whole doctrine of the God-manhood of the Messiah and the inner distinctions of the divine essence (the difference between the revealed and hidden God) is transferred to the Old Testament. The difference between the Old and New Testaments in this point (*l.c.* p. 250) is supposed to be only that the latter doctrine is less prominent in the Old Testament, because before the Logos became flesh, the Revealer, and He whom He revealed, were, as it were, lost in one another.—But the true view is, that till the Logos became flesh, the real incarnation of God, and therefore also the inner dis-

inction in the divine essence, could not be manifest at all; for the acts of God and His testimony are not outside of, but in each other, conditioning each other reciprocally. The Old Testament reaches, on the one hand, to the transient descent of God into visibility in the Angel of the Lord; on the other side, it wrestles to grasp the Messiah in divine fulness of life and divine dignity. But the Angel of the Lord always returns into the divine essence; and though the Spirit of Jehovah rests on the Messiah, Jehovah Himself remains transcendent to Him. The real union of God and man is therefore *sought* in the Old Testament; but the Old Testament contains only the *movement* towards this union, and therefore does not contain an anticipation of the knowledge of it. (See my review of Haevernick's critical investigations on Daniel, in Tholuck's *lit. Anzeiger* for 1842.) In other words, in respect to this doctrine, Hengstenberg understands the unity of the two Testaments to mean, that the New Testament doctrine is already found in the Old Testament as a complete, finished prophecy, though perhaps "less prominent;" while the true meaning is rather that the New Testament *is growing* in the Old, and therefore *is* in the Old only in the sense in which the higher developments of every organism are contained in germ and type in its lower stages. [Prol.]—In later years, Hengstenberg partly drew back from this standpoint; compare also what is said by him in the introduction to his *History of the Kingdom of God*, etc., p. 22, in answer to the objections taken to him in the text.

(7 and 8) Compare my article "Weissagung" in Herzog's *Realencyclopædie*, xvii. p. 650 ff. Of recent books, the following may be still mentioned: Samuel Lutz, *Biblical Dogmatic*, posthumously edited by Rudolf Rüetschi, with a preface by Prof. Dr. Schneckenburger, Pforzheim 1847, especially in the second part; *Historico-dogmatical Discussion of the Biblical Statement of the Divine Dispensation of Grace in Israel*; Ed. Naegelsbach, *The God-man, the Fundamental Idea of Revelation in its Unity and Historic Development*, vol. i.; *The Man of Nature*, 1853, unfortunately carried no further than Noah. Important contributions to our subject are found in Kurtz, *History of the Old Covenant*, 2 vols., 2d ed. 1853–58; Auberlen, *Divine Revelation*, an Apologetical Essay, 2 vols. 1864; Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, 2d ed. 1862.¹ Hupfeld's *Commentary on the Psalms* contains notes valuable for the understanding of the Old Testament. Numerous monographs will be referred to in the course of the book.

(9) See my review of Schultz's book in Zöckler and Andreae's *Allg. lit. Anzeiger*, February 1870, p. 104 ff.

¹ These works are translated in Clark's Foreign Theological Library.

IV.—METHOD OF BIBLICAL THEOLOGY. DIVISION OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

§ 15.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HISTORICO-GENETIC METHOD.

According to the definition of § 2, the method of biblical theology is historico-genetic. As a historical science, it rests on the results of grammatico-historical exegesis, the business of which is to reproduce the contents of the biblical books according to the rules of the language, with due regard to the historical circumstances under which the books originated, and the individual circumstances of the sacred authors. In the last respect the grammatico-historical exegesis passes over into psychological exposition, which goes back to the inner state of the writer's life,—a species of exposition which, of course, is peculiarly indispensable in dealing with passages which, like the Psalms, the book of Job, and so forth, give immediate expression to inner experiences and frames of mind. But in this psychological exposition we already reach a point where success is necessarily proportional to the measure in which the Spirit which rules in the sacred writers witnesses of Himself to the interpreter, enabling him to understand by personal experience the inner experiences of the writers.—But as long as exegesis stops short at the exposition of individual passages, it gives only an imperfect preparation for biblical theology. Not the least important cause of the former defective condition of the latter was the usage of expositors to limit themselves mainly to glosses on isolated passages, which in their isolation might easily be turned in favour of any preconceived opinion. Exegesis, therefore, has to go on to grasp the sense of individual passages, first in its inner connection with the fundamental idea of the book in general, and with the system of thought characteristic of the author, and then in its wider connection with the circle of ideas proper to the special region of the dispensation of revelation to which the book belongs,—a process which Schleiermacher in his *Hermeneutik* still reckons as part of psychological exegesis. In this way, now, we reach the various forms in which revelation expresses its contents. But now biblical theology, which has to set forth revelation in its whole course and in the totality of its phenomena, has to comprehend these forms as members of an organic process of development. And since

every such process can be comprehended only from its climax, biblical theology will have to understand the Old Testament in the light of the completed revelation of God in Christ for which it formed the preparation,—will have to show how God's saving purpose, fulfilled in Christ, moved through the preliminary stages of this history of revelation. While the external historical method deals with the contents of the Old Testament according to the presumed chronological order of the books, and then at most shows how ever new religious knowledge was added to what was already in existence—how the earlier knowledge was completed, deepened, corrected; while the dogmatist forces the doctrinal contents of the Old Testament into a framework brought to it from the outside; and while the method of philosophical construction similarly deals with the Old Testament, by cutting it up critically until it suffers itself to be fitted into a presupposed scheme of logical categories,—the genetic method seeks to reproduce the living process of the growth of the thing itself. This method refuses, however, to find ripe fruit where only the bud exists; it wishes to show how the fruit grows from the bud; it sketches the earlier stages in a way that makes it clear how the higher stages could, and necessarily did, spring from the former (1).

(1) De Wette (in the essay *On the Exposition of the Psalms for Edification*, already cited) disputes the scientific objectivity of what we demand of theological exegesis. He says (p. 22) that everything that links the old covenant to the new, and forms the element of life in which the Old Testament grows up into the New, to the full realization in Christ of a life at once divine and human, is purely general, indefinite, floating, and cannot form part of theological science, but only of interpretation for edification. That it is of a general kind, is true; that it is also indefinite, floating in the air, is false. For example, no one will assert that, in the systems of Greek philosophy, the idea in which they are inwardly linked together, and which forms the element of life in which the development of the one moves on to the other, "is in its nature something indefinite and floating," and thus incapable of scientific expression. On the contrary, the scientific treatment of the history of philosophy is bound to find a sharply defined expression for the type which lies at the basis of the development of philosophical systems. Now certainly the individual philosopher, in proportion to his distance from the culminating point of the development, will be less conscious of the relation of his

own system to the development of the philosophical idea. Yet it is no violent process, but only what is due to the system, when the historian gives to it its right place in the context of philosophical development, and explains it from this connection.—Something analogous is demanded of biblical theology—not to add anything new to what the sacred writers knew, but to grasp what lay in their consciousness, in its connection with the whole organism of revelation and its relation to the completion of revelation, and so historically to comprehend it. This was an understanding of Old Testament revelation which its organs themselves could not possess, at least not in full measure (compare the well-known passages about the prophets, 1 Pet. i. 10–12; 2 Pet. i. 20), because in every process of development the lower stage does not fully understand itself. But Christian theology stands on the summit, from which it surveys the whole course of the preparation for Christianity; and it would be strange if Old Testament theology gave up this advantage. Theological exegesis, in the right sense of the word, is not affected by the fact that Stier (whom De Wette mainly attacks) and other writers have brought theological interpretation into bad repute, by their habit of finding a second, third, and fourth subordinate and secondary sense in the Old Testament besides the historico-grammatical sense. All that ought to be indicated is the relation to the completion of the divine kingdom which lies in the thought yielded by the grammatico-historical exegesis of a passage—the germinant character which gives us words full of futurity; the Spirit of revelation often speaking by His organs words that, in the fulness of their significance, were not quite comprehended by the latter.

§ 16.

DIVISIONS OF OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY STATED AND JUSTIFIED.

Since the historico-genetic method claims to reproduce the course of development of the thing itself, the divisions of Old Testament theology must correspond to the stages in which the development of Old Testament religion took place. De Wette and v. Coelln adopt, as their main divisions, Hebraism and Judaism, separated by the exile; but if Old Testament theology is limited to the Hebrew canon, this division is unsuitable, since most of what belongs to the head of Judaism is to be excluded from Old Testament theology altogether, while the portions of the canon that are later than the exile only show the beginnings of the characteristic features of later Judaism (1). The proper division is given by the following con-

siderations: The basis of the Old Testament religion is the covenant with the chosen folk, into which God entered for the accomplishment of His saving purpose. This covenant, for which the way is prepared in the first two ages of the world, is carried out in two stages: 1. The patriarchal covenant of promise; and, 2. The Mosaic covenant of the law, on the basis whereof the theocracy is founded. This whole sphere may be summed up in the name *Mosaism*; for the pre-Mosaic revelation is not only considered in the Pentateuch as forming the introduction to the establishment of the theocracy under Moses, but itself forms a component part of the religious belief of Mosaism (2). Whatever elements of post-Mosaic development of legal institutions are contained in the Pentateuch still rest on the principle of Mosaism; and so, too, the other theological elements contained in the Pentateuch form the presuppositions that lie at the foundation of prophetic theology.—On the basis of the legal covenant, the development of Old Testament religion is carried on in two ways: First, on the side of God, who continues to execute and proclaim His purposes, the former by guiding the people towards the purpose of the divine kingdom; the latter, in the testimony of prophecy which accompanies the history of the people, interprets it at each step in the light of the divine counsel of salvation, and points to the completion of God's kingdom. The second part of Old Testament theology, which we briefly call *Prophecy*, deals with those elements in the history of the people of Israel from their entrance into the promised land which are important for the development of God's kingdom, considering these as they appear in the light of prophecy, and also discusses the theology of prophecy itself.—Side by side with this objective development of Old Testament religion goes a subjective development in the Old Testament *Wisdom*, which equally with prophecy is rooted in the law, but develops itself apart from prophecy, and does not, like the latter, claim to be an objective word of God, but expresses itself in aphorisms (מִשְׁלֵי) as the result of meditation by sages whose intellectual instincts are roused by revelation. Nor does it busy itself with the spheres marked out by theocratic institutions and the prophetic word, but directs itself mainly to contemplation of cosmical ordinances and the general aspects of the ethical life. Thus our third division is the Old Testament Chochma {Hokma} (3).

(1) In Hebraism, De Wette (*Bib. Dogmatik*, § 75) distinguishes, 1. Pre-Mosaic Hebraism, or the religion of the Hebrew tribes, mixed perhaps with polytheism; 2. Mosaic Hebraism—theocratic and symbolic monotheism; 3. Degenerate polytheistico-Mosaic Hebraism; 4. The ideal unsymbolic Hebraism of the prophets and poets. But since we know little of the first and the third, there remain only the second and fourth, which differ only in form (?), and must therefore be treated not apart, but in their mutual relations.—To this we object that the third phase, though in reality it can be pretty well known from the Old Testament, of course, cannot be taken as a stage in the development of Old Testament religion,—as, in fact, polytheistic worships are not an original product of the nation of Israel, but borrowed from neighbouring heathen races. This phase of religion claims our attention only in so far as the religion of revelation grew in battle against it.

(2) Against our definition of Mosaism it has been urged, *e.g.* by Sack, in a review of my *Prolegomena* (*Monatsschr. für die evang. Kirche der Rheinprovinz*, etc., iv. 1845, p. 47 ff.), that it is quite necessary to treat the sphere of patriarchal revelation as a separate stage, introductory to Mosaism.—It is true that this sphere presents a relative difference from the later Mosaic revelation, as the Pentateuch itself indicates, by the difference in the names of God; and it is possible to treat the two apart, for Hengstenberg's latest work, cited above, proves that this preliminary stage may be extended to form a theological whole with rich contents. But such a course makes many repetitions inevitable in the part on Mosaism. I think it best myself to incorporate the whole preparatory stage in Mosaism.—K. I. Nitzsch, on the other hand, would make the whole Old Testament theology begin with Abraham, asserting at the same time, that there is no necessity to make a separate doctrinal chapter on the patriarchal age. But the primeval history of the first eleven chapters of Genesis gains its right place, according to Nitzsch, by being placed in the didactic section of Mosaism (article *Biblische Theologie*, in Herzog's *R. E.* ii. p. 224).—In general this is sound; Mosaism gives no theory of creation, sin, etc., but presents these dogmas in historical form. But though thus the contents of these chapters receive full elucidation only in the didactic section of Mosaism, we must follow Genesis in beginning with the creation, if we wish to place the connection of the narrative in the light in which the Old Testament itself unites the history of revelation, beginning with Abraham, to the primeval time.

(3) Among recent theologians, Vatke, in his *Religion of the Old Testament*, p. 716, recognises the possibility of dividing Old Testa-

ment religion into three leading forms: the prophetic, the Levitic or legal and symbolic, and the later form of reflection. He puts the three in this order, because, according to his theory, the relation of law and prophecy must be inverted,—the former proceeding from the latter, and giving objective shape to what the prophets reached in immediate self-consciousness. Vatke, however, thinks it unsuitable to treat the three forms apart, the differences between them affecting only individual factors of the manifestation of Old Testament religion, and no one form excluding the others and presenting the whole contents; against which it is to be observed, that the contents of the Old Testament idea were opened up in different directions by the various ways in which its leading elements appeared in prophecy and in the Chochma, and that thus what is common to both frequently appears under quite distinct points of view. The difference of Mosaism from both the other forms is so wide, that no justification is needed for separating it. [Prol.]

The very division of the Old Testament canon into Law, Prophets, and Hagiographa, though not quite congruent with the division we adopt, points at least towards it. Mosaism is contained in the Thora; only it is absolutely necessary to treat the book of Joshua as part of the first division of Old Testament theology, though it stands in the second division of the canon. The whole literary character of the book and its theological principles are essentially connected with the Pentateuch; though it is, perhaps, questionable whether in its present shape it ought really to be the sixth book. The two divisions of the *נביאים*, the prophetic books of history (former prophets) and the prophetic books of prophecy (latter prophets), correspond in the main with our two divisions of the second part of our subject, save that we take up in this part the historical books of the Hagiographa and the book of Daniel. In the *כתובים* the Psalms and the monuments of the Chochma contain what we call the subjective development of Old Testament religion; though a good part of the Psalms is cognate in subject to the section on prophecy, and is taken up there.—We may recognise this difference of parts in the Old Testament itself, if we look at the expressions by which it denotes its theological contents. It very definitely distinguishes divine commands and prerogatives, divine ways and guidances in the history of the people, divine visions and words of revelation to the prophets, and lastly, aphoristic utterances which are the fruit of the reflection of sages, and never introduce themselves in the form in which the prophets used to introduce their words.

PART I.—MOSAISM.

FIRST SECTION.

THE HISTORY OF REVELATION FROM THE CREATION TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE COVENANT PEOPLE IN THE HOLY LAND (1).

§ 17.

DIVISION OF THIS HISTORY.

The Pentateuch plainly distinguishes four periods in the history of revelation :—

1. The primeval age, with ten patriarchs, closing with the great flood.

2. Beginning with the world-covenant in Noah's time; the time of the division of the peoples, by which the separation of the race of revelation is prepared; again with ten generations.

3. The time of the three great patriarchs, beginning with Abraham's election, and the covenant of promise made with him; and ending with the sojourn of the chosen people in Egypt.

4. The fourth period opens with the redemption of Israel from Egyptian captivity; it includes the closing of the covenant of Sinai, and the establishment of the theocracy, with its regulations (2).

(1) On the literature of the history of the old covenant, see my article, "Volk Gottes," in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* xvii. p. 303 ff., and especially Kurtz, *History of the Old Covenant*, i. § 17 f.

(2) These four periods, or, as Ewald calls them, the four ages of the world, are so distinctly marked off in the Pentateuch, that there can be no doubt on the matter.—This quaternary number of historical periods in the Pentateuch has been connected by some—as, for instance,

by Ewald (*History of the People of Israel*, i. 3d ed. p. 368).—with the four ages of the world of the Indians, Persians, and Greeks. But this comparison cannot be carried out without the greatest caprice. (Hesiod's doctrine of the races of mankind—of which, however, he counts not four, but five; four races named after metals, with the race of heroes added to them, as third in order—does not at all rest on the same basis with the Indian doctrine of the four ages of the world; compare Rud. Roth's thorough discussion on the myth of the five races in Hesiod, and on the four Indian ages of the world, *Tuebingen Universitaetsprogr.* 1860.) Max Mueller also has recently, and with good reason, declared against this combination in his *Essays* (i. p. 137 f.); although we may still admit that the doctrine of the four ages is very old, especially among the Parsees. The main feature required to make a valid comparison is wanting in the *Pentateuch*,—namely, the idea “of a degradation of the times, and of man advancing exactly by four steps,” which lies at the basis of those views of heathen nations. At most, we might find in the shortening of the human lifetime a point of resemblance to those heathen notions; but in other points the *Pentateuch* is far from seeing an advancing decay in these four ages. On the contrary, the age of the patriarchs is to the *Pentateuch* the glorious yoretime of the people of Israel; and just in the same way, the time of Moses lays the foundation for the whole development of Old Testament religion.

I.—THE OLDEN TIMES.

§ 18.

THE ACCOUNT OF THE CREATION.

The Old Testament begins with the account of the creation of the world (1), which is the result of the Word and Spirit of God. Since God by His word calls all things into being, He is placed above the beginning of all time as the eternal and absolutely independent One; since He animates the universe by His Spirit, all dualistic separation of God and the world is excluded. On the earth, which is the centre of the creation, so that the other spheres are only dealt with in connection with it (Gen. i. 14 ff.), the production of beings advances continually towards higher organisms (2): each step of the creation is relatively complete in itself, and serves in its own way the divine aim of the creation, as is expressed in the oft-recurring word, “And, behold, it was

good." Still, the divine creative power is not satisfied till it reaches its ultimate end in the creation of man. Not till God has placed His image over against Him, does He rest content from creation. The creation Sabbath stands as a boundary between the creation and the history of the dealings between God and man, and through it we are at the same time pointed to the connection ordained to exist between the order of the world and the order of the theocratic covenant (compare also ver. 14). The paragraph Gen. ii. 4 ff. forms the introduction to the history of man; which paragraph is by no means a second record of creation, but shows, in supplement to the first chapter, how the earth was prepared for an habitation for man,—a sphere for his activity, and a place for the revelation of God to man (3).

(1) The naturalist Cuvier says, about the first words of Genesis: A sublimer passage than this from the first word to the last never can nor will come from a human pen, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."—On the meaning of the introductory chapter of Genesis, without which the whole history of revelation would hang in the air without a beginning, compare the thoughtful remarks of J. G. Staib, in a paper in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1852, Nr. 4, p. 822 f., "Die Schöpfungsthat und das Ebenbild, or Genesis chapters one and two." He says: "Whence do these chapters come? I do not know. There they stand, and ever continue to stand, however much it has been sought to explain them away; and there, doubtless, they will remain until the end of the world, until the conclusion of God's kingdom on earth joins hands with the beginning, and the light of the beginning can again be recognised in the light of the end, and the light of the end in the light of the beginning, that God may be all in all."

(2) We cannot fail to see a parallel between the first three and the last three days' work. The work of the first, second, fourth, and fifth day is single; the work of the third and sixth is twofold.—On the formula, "And evening was and morning was," Gen. i. 5, etc., compare the article, "Tag bei den Hebræern," in Herzog's *R.E.* xv. p. 410 f. Kurtz (*Bibel und Astronomie*, 3d ed. p. 85) first asserted, and Delitzsch (in the second ed. of his *Comm. on Gen. i. 5*) further demonstrated, that the formula does not rest on the Hebrew definition of the civil day from one evening to another (מערב עד-ערב, Lev. xxiii. 32), but on a measurement of the day from morning to morning, as among the Babylonians.

(3) On the disputed question, how the two sections, Gen. i. 1-2, 4, and that immediately following, are related, note the following: It is customary to speak of two accounts of the creation, which are said to stand irreconcilably side by side at the opening of Genesis. I certainly consider (with Tuch) that the present shape of Genesis arose by the re-editing of an Elohist narrative and the interpolation of Jehovistic passages. But, at the same time, it must appear most improbable that the author would be so silly as to place at the head of his work two contradictory accounts of the creation. The second account, in fact—if a second it were—would omit some of the most essential points. It presupposes that heaven and earth are created, but as yet no vegetation developed; and then it narrates the creation of man, relates how Paradise was planted, and tells of the animal world. There is wanting in this an infinite number of things for a complete account of creation. As to the point of division of the two passages, I am convinced that the words, ii. 4a, אֱלֹהִים תְּלֹמֶת, etc., belong to what goes before, not to what follows. The first section gives a complete account of the creation finished off within itself. Then follows a supplementary section, whose aim, as shown in the text, is not to give another account of creation. A difficulty arises here, simply because it is thought necessary to seek in the second account a strictly chronological division. Then, of course, the second section cannot but stand in contradiction to the first. On this view, we must conceive the succession of time thus: first, the earth is bare, and nothing grows upon it; after that a mist rises; then man is created, by the breathing of the Divine Spirit into the earthly form. Then God leaves the man for a time, and plants a garden, and causes trees to grow up in it; then He fetches the man, and puts him in it. But he must have other creatures about him; so God makes all sorts of beasts and birds, and brings them to the man; and only when among all these the man finds no companion, the last step is taken by the creation of woman. Much meditation could not, indeed, be presupposed on the part of any one who could imagine this to be the succession of the acts of creation. But the real state of the case is, that in the second section the arrangement is not in the order of time, but by similarity of matter, so that whatever is brought in in elucidation of the advance of the story is just inserted where it is required. If we are to urge the letter, it must be asked here, when it is said that man was placed in Paradise to keep it, Against whom should Paradise be watched? It must have been animals or other such like creatures against which the trees had to be protected. Indeed, the second section stands in this temporal relation to the first, that it starts from the time which begins at the end of the second day's work, and

commences here (with the words עֵינֶיךָ, etc., ver. 46) by treating the question, how the earth, upon which at the close of the second day's work no vegetation had begun, was formed into a dwelling-place for man. But it does not proceed in the same path as the first piece; but because the preparation of the earth for man is its main point, it begins with this. It might certainly be said that ver. 8 should have proceeded; but God had already also caused plants to spring, and now in this vegetable kingdom He caused all sorts of trees to sprout out of the ground, and thus planted Paradise. But who dare demand from the author such a detailed statement? It is the childlike style of story which we often meet with. Who gives any one a right thus to urge the *Waw consec. cum. impf.*, and from it to deduce a chronological contradiction? The redactor of the Pentateuch, who in so many cases shows his skill in fitting the different sources into each other, would not have placed at the beginning of the Pentateuch such round contradictions as would follow herefrom.—Comp. also Hölemann, *New Bible Studies*, 1866, i., "The Unity of the Accounts of the Creation in Gen. i.-ii.," with the critical views of which I indeed do not agree, but which nevertheless gives much matter that is good.—On the relation of the biblical account of creation to natural science, comp. F. W. Schultz, *The History of Creation according to Natural Science and the Bible*, 1865.—The fuller discussion of the Old Testament idea of creation will be found in the didactical section, § 50 f.

§ 19.

THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

The world as a divine creation is good (Gen. i. 31); every development of life in it is a divine blessing (i. 22, 28); there is no room here for a principle which, in its original nature, is wicked and inimical to God. It is scarcely possible to find in Gen. i. 2 (1) an indication of evil lying beyond the history of man; but it is otherwise with the description of the serpent in chap. iii. Man is called to free independence; therefore a command was given to him for self-decision (ii. 16), that he might pass from the condition of innocence to that of free obedience. Man falls under the temptation which came to him from without, through sin the bond of childlike communion with God is broken; and now man is in a sense independent, like God (iii. 22); but fear, resting in the feeling of guilt, dominates from this time forward his position towards God (iii.

8 ff.) (2). The life in Paradise with its peace is forfeited, and man sinks henceforth under the service of perishable things and of death (iii. 17 ff.). Nevertheless conscience, which testifies of guilt, shows also man's capability of being redeemed; and side by side with the curse a divine word points onwards (iii. 15) to a victorious end to the battle, which Adam's descendants shall keep up against the power of evil (3). The idea placed foremost in the Old Testament, that as all the evils which burden mankind are just the result of sin, so also the removal of these evils can only come by the defeat of the wicked one, is decisive for the ethic character of Old Testament religion.

(1) In Gen. i. 2 an indication has often been found of a fall of the spirit-world, through which terrestrial creation was ruined; and this is added between the account in vers. 1 and 2. The earth, it is said, as it was originally created by God, could not be *תהו ובהו*; in this it is seen that another creation preceded that of the present world, which was destroyed by the fall of the world of spirits,—a favourite idea of the theosophists. This view cannot be altogether confuted, but a definite indication does not lie in *תהו ובהו*. The expression is exactly suitable, though only a chaotic mass not yet developed is meant.

(2) Genesis gives no theory of creation, no thesis on the manner of sin, no theory of its origin; but it sets forth, in the form of a story, a sin from which each can easily for himself develop the theory, and the thoughts involved in the narrative—thoughts which are decisive for the whole path of revelation. A notion of religion is not given; but the way in which it came about that man feels a horror and a fear of God, and that his position towards God is ruled in the last instance by a feeling of guilt, is laid down in a statement of facts. With good reason has K. J. Nitzsch, in his *Academical Lectures on the Doctrine of Christian Faith*, 1858, p. 73, called Genesis the dogmatic of the law.

(3) Gen. iii. 15: "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, between thy seed and her seed; it shall crush thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel" (in the second occurrence of *שָׂרָף* an easy zeugma takes place). The older theology found in this place, as is well known, the *πρώτον εὐαγγέλιον*. The Roman Catholic exegesis, according to the reading of the Vulgate received in the Church, refers the words "*ipsa conteret caput*" to Mary. (See especially Bellarmin, *de verbo Dei*, ii. 12. This explanation was, in general, defended by the Jesuits with the greatest zeal; comp. the *disputatio de protevangelio* in Glass, *philol. sacr.* ed. 1743, p. 1395 ff., which is directed

against the Jesuit Gordon of Huntly.) As the older theology valued the passage, and glorified it, so, on the other hand, it is lowered by many of the newer theologians to the level of trivial truth. It is said to tell nothing, but that men and serpents shall continually make war on each other. Such a view overlooks the fact that the words occur in the sentence of punishment against the serpent, the difference between the crushing of the head and the wounding of the heel, and also the train of thoughts in the three divine sentences. The seed of the serpent, which by cunning overcame the woman, shall be vanquished in open combat by the seed of the woman. The woman, who by temptation subjected to herself the will of the man, shall be in subjection to man; but man, who in an unnatural way gave obedience to the woman, shall in future exercise his lordship at home only by being compelled to win from the ground by toilsome labour what serves to keep the house. The close of ver. 15 is related to ver. 16 in the way that the close of ver. 16 is to ver. 17. As ver. 16 closes with a declaration in favour of man, which is then turned to a punishment, so in ver. 15 a promise must be found for the woman, but which, according to ver. 16, is accomplished in such a way that the woman receives in it at the same time her punishment.—The older theology certainly erred when it sought to find here the Messiah, the great destroyer of the serpent, directly promised; but it did not err in the general conception of the thought in the passage. In the simple childlike form, that feud shall be between man and serpent, the idea is expressed that a combat arises between mankind and the principle of evil; and that man shall carry away from this combat wounds and injuries, while yet the victory cannot be doubtful. Thus, in a few words, the whole course of the development of salvation is here already set down in germ; this is the seed-corn from which the whole history of salvation grew.

§ 20.

THE FIRST OFFERING. CAINITES AND SETHITES. TRADITION OF THE FLOOD.

The position now taken up by the human race towards God is stamped in the first offering (Gen. iv.) (1). Although this is not to be regarded as a proper sin-offering, but rather as a thank-offering, by which the offerers acknowledge in fact that they look on the gains of their occupation as a gift and blessing from God, the feeling that

man has to begin by making himself sure (2) of divine favour is already expressed in these offerings,—a feeling of separation from God, by which the first offering proves to be also an offering of supplication, indeed even an offering of reconciliation, or, in a wider sense of the word, an offering of propitiation (3). That Abel's offering pleased God, and Cain's offering displeased Him, cannot be grounded in the fact that the former was a bloody and the latter a bloodless one; for the difference of the two offerings is distinctly dependent on the difference in their callings. The ground can only lie in the different sentiments of the two offerers, which in ver. 3 f. is shown in the fact that Cain offers his gift of the fruit of the ground without choice; while Abel, on the other hand, brings the best of the flock. Thus, in this narrative, the Old Testament places in its forefront its witness that offerings are rejected in as far as it is thought thereby to content God outwardly, and that only a pious sentiment makes the offering well-pleasing to God (comp. Heb. xi. 4).—In the difference between the two sons of the first human pair, the contrast is at once stamped in which the race of mankind was to run on, and already also begins the separation of a family for revelation. Whilst among Cain's descendants, the life of sin rises to insolent defiance (iv. 23 f.) (4), in Seth, who takes the place of the murdered Abel, is propagated the race of early fathers who seek the living God (iv. 26) (5), in which Enoch by his translation testifies of a path of life leading over the common lot of death (v. 24), and Lamech at the birth of Noah, before the close of the first period of the world, announces the hope of a Saviour of man from the evil weighing upon him (v. 29) (6).

After sinful corruption had reached its height by the mixing of the sons of God with the daughters of men, and the term granted for repentance had elapsed without result, the judgment of extermination breaks in in the Flood, from which Noah as the righteous one (vi. 9) was saved, along with his family. The tradition of the flood is the property of several religions of antiquity; but it is one of the best proofs how each religion expresses a distinct idea in the same tradition. For example, whilst the flood in the Indian myth is only a process of destruction, by which all finite being and life sinks back again into its primitive source in the divine substance, and the in-

exhaustible spirit of life is represented by the man who was saved from the flood, that spirit which overcomes the transient, and calls up a new cycle of life out of the ruin of what existed, the flood in Genesis, on the other hand, falls assuredly under the ethical point of view; it is the first judgment on the world executed by the holy God, who, according to Gen. vi. 3, will no longer permit His Spirit to be profaned by man's sin. But, for Noah and his family, the event has the meaning that the chosen ones shall be saved because of their faith on the word of threatening and promise; see Heb. xi. 7. By this also the typical application in 1 Pet. iii. 20 f. is to be explained (8).

(1) Gen. iv. makes the sons of the first pair offer to Jehovah, as a gift, a portion of the produce of the business of their life: Cain, from the fruits of the ground cultivated by him; Abel, from the firstlings of his flock, and from among the fattest of these (not of wool and milk, as O. v. Gerlach is inclined to interpret, according to Grotius' example). Abel's gift is received with favour, but Cain's gift with displeasure. To understand the word *עֹלָה*, with Hofmann (*Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1; 1st ed. p. 140; 2d ed. p. 220), of Jehovah's glance of fire, by which He took to Himself the gift in consuming it, does not agree well with the words, "Jehovah looked upon Abel and his gift," for we surely cannot suppose that Abel himself was struck by the divine gleam of fire. [Article, *Opferkultus des A.T.*]

(2) Cain himself feels this need, and hence his sullen rage on seeing his offering despised.

(3) See my article in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* x. p. 615 f., for a fuller discussion on the meaning of the first offering, and wrong views of it.

(4) The sense of the song of the sword, Gen. iv. 23 f., is: I will kill each one who lays hands on me; each injury to my person will I avenge tenfold. "In this is uttered," as Delitzsch says (*Commentary on Genesis*, iv. ed. p. 177), "that Titanian arrogance of which it is said, Hab. i. 11, that its strength is its God; and Job xii. 6, that he carries his God, namely his sword, in his fist."

(5) Gen. iv. 26 is to be explained: "Then men began to call on the name of Jehovah." Herein is implied that God's name *יהוה* goes back to primeval antiquity.

(6) The valueless exposition of Gen. v. 29, that Noah's father calls him a comforter, in view of the fact that he is to cultivate the vine, ought to be now a thing past and done with; but it is not so.

The passage is of importance, because it looks back to chap. iii. It runs thus: "He shall comfort us for our work and the labour of our hands from the earth, which Jehovah has cursed." The passage openly expresses a hope of redemption from the curse weighing on mankind as the consequence of sin. Now, if we may conclude backwards, it follows that also in chap. iii. there must certainly lie a promise, although a very indefinite one.

(7) In connection with the passage Gen. vi. 1-4, comp. the didactic section (§ 61, 65, 77), and the good essay of Dettinger: "Remarks on Gen. iv. 1-6, 8, its connection, and some of the more difficult passages in it," *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theol.* 1835, Nr. 1, p. 3 ff.

(8) The Egyptian references in Genesis do not begin with the tradition of the flood; they do not commence till a later period. The point of view under which the flood is placed in Genesis would not be applicable in Egypt, because the flooding of the land could there have only been looked on as a blessing.—With regard to the controversies on the relation of the Indian legend to the Old Testament, I agree with those who admit unconditionally that there are points of contact between the Indian myth and the tradition on which the Old Testament goes back, but who hold that the tradition, spreading from Central Asia, reached India, and was added at a later date to the Indian doctrine of the ages of the world.—The Old Testament meaning of the flood as laid down in the text is quite clear. If Ewald, in his treatment of the matter, *History of the People of Israel*, i. 3d ed. p. 387, proposes to take as the peculiar meaning of the flood, that it had to come "in order to wash clean the sin-stained earth, to flood away the first race of man, which was utterly degenerated in Titanic intoxication, and to produce on the renewed and cleansed earth a new race grown finer and wiser by the warning," this cannot perhaps be excluded, but is certainly not that to which Genesis points. At the first glance, we might appeal in favour of Ewald to 1 Pet. iii. 20 f., where the flood is treated as a type of Christian baptism: "In the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls, were saved by water; which now also saves us in the antitype as baptism, not as the putting off of the filth of the flesh, but as the inquiry of a good conscience towards God." However, this interpretation is hardly right, and the passage of Peter rather "contemplates the water of the flood only as bearing the ark, and so providing deliverance for Noah and his family" (so Fronmueller explains in Lange's *Bibelwerk*).

II.—THE SECOND AGE OF THE WORLD.

§ 21.

THE WORLD-COVENANT. NOAH'S SAYING. DIVISION OF MANKIND.

The second age of the world begins with the new shape taken by revelation, in presenting itself as God's covenant with man, and, in the first instance, as a world-covenant, in which God gives to creation a pledge of its preservation; for the order of salvation is to rise on the ground of the order of nature. God's faithfulness in this is security for His faithfulness in that. Isa. liv. 9; Jer. xxxiii. 20 f., 25 f. The sacrifice, Gen. viii. 20, precedes the institution of the covenant, and has its motive mainly in thanks for the deliverance experienced, while in it, at the same time, man approaches God, seeking grace in the future (1). The prerogative of man even in the state of sin, and his likeness to the divine image, is again expressed, ix. 4 ff., on which passage (in connection with others) rests the Jewish doctrine of the Noachic commandments, in which is sought a first basis for the law before the time of Abraham (2). In the passage ix. 25–27 is indicated the type for the development of the restored race of man. Shem's race, to whom Jehovah is God, is chosen as bearer of the divine revelation; also on Japheth the blessing is brought down through Shem; on Ham, and mainly on Canaan, the curse of slavery is to press (3). On the other side, the establishment of that worldly kingdom which is at enmity with God proceeds from the Hamites (x. 8 ff.), whose first seat appears to have been Babel. Here begins the contrast of the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world, which runs right through the Bible. The unity of the race of man divides into people and tongues; but whilst for heathen consciousness the diversity of peoples and castes is original, and universal brotherhood is to them monstrous, and in a sense a horror, while antiochthony is the highest pride of a nation, Mosaism in its list of the nations (Gen. x.) preserves the consciousness of the blood-relationship of all nations (comp. Acts xvii. 26), which are again to be united in time to come by one blessing of God (comp. xii. 3, xviii. 18, etc.) (4).

(1) More on Noah's offering in § 121, Note 1.

(2) The Noachic commandments have won an historical import-

ance, because it was these commandments the fulfilment of which was demanded of the so-called proselytes of the gate, whilst the proselytes of righteousness had to follow the whole ritual law. These seven commandments in their later form are a comparatively recent invention. According to the Babylonian Gemara, they were as follows: 1. The prohibition of idol-worship, על-עבודה זרה; 2. על-ברכת השם, relating to the blessing of the divine name, and the prohibition of desecrating or cursing the divine name; 3. The prohibition of bloodshed, על-הגזל; 4. The prohibition of incest, and fornication in general, על-גילוי ערוה; 5. Forbidding theft and robbery, על-הגנול; 6. על-הדינים, the command concerning the ordinances of judgment, fixing the divine authority of the magistracy, and forbidding opposition to it; 7. על-אבר מן החי, "concerning the piece of the living," that is, forbidding the use of blood (Gen. ix. 4). It is known that the demand for the fulfilment of these commands by the heathen who joined themselves to Israel was in no way based on the Old Testament itself.

(3) The verses put into Noah's mouth, Gen. ix. 25-27, are of the greatest importance for the conception of the general history of mankind proper to the Old Testament. It runs thus: "Cursed be Canaan; let him be a servant of servants to his brothers." "Praised be Jehovah the God of Shem; and let Canaan be his servant." "May Elohim give enlargement to Japheth, and let him (Japheth) dwell in the tents of Shem, and let Canaan be their servant." The old explanation, often repeated even in recent times, which takes אֱלֹהִים as subject to יִפְתָּח, is out of the question. According to our translation, the passage expresses that God is to Shem the God of revelation, whilst He is for Japheth's descendants only אֱלֹהִים, the *numen*, *θεῖον*, the transcendent Divinity, but at the same time (ver. 27b) points to a participation by Japheth in the blessing assigned to Shem: Japheth shall dwell in the tents of Shem. Quite untenable is also the ever-recurring explanation, which in ver. 27 makes שֵׁם an appellative. Finally, it is often explained that the vanquishing of the Shemites by Japheth is here foretold: God enlarges Japheth's dominion, so that he obtains dominion also over the realm marked out for Shem. On this view, too, the passage would be remarkable, for this has indeed come about. But this exposition of the words does not agree well with the context. I think it still necessary to interpret the words as speaking only of the Japhethites being at home in Shem's tents; that they were to gain domestic rights there also, which history has now fulfilled spiritually in the noblest way.

(4) In relation to the table of nations, note that it is not framed according to languages: it is more natural to find traces of a geogra-

phical arrangement of the three groups of nations in such a way that Shem spreads himself pretty much in the middle, Japheth northwards, and Ham more to the south. But the point of view is decidedly rather genealogical. It is clear that we are not exactly to find individuals in the names given. It often happens, even in the later genealogies, that races and peoples are personified and represented as individuals. What comes into notice for Old Testament theology in the register of nations is what is brought forward in the text. With this passage the story of Genesis takes leave as it were of mankind in general; revelation being henceforth particularized in one separate chosen stem. The register of nations is intended to keep in memory the original brotherhood of all the nations on the earth. This is a thought beyond the reach of all antiquity, with the exception of Israel. In the Greek civilisation, it was long ere, in the time of Alexander the Great, and chiefly through Stoicism, the idea of a common world-citizenship of man came to be first recognised; for the antithesis of Greeks and barbarians was invincible. When the Apostle Paul preached on the Areopagus, Acts xvii. 26, "He hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth," he attacked the very heart of heathenism and Athenian pride.

§ 22.

THE FOUNDATION OF A PEOPLE OF GOD.

In order to give an historical basis to the work of salvation, a people is to be chosen as bearer of revelation, to which coming people (comp. Deut. xxxii. 8) God already has regard in the dividing of the nations (1). The separation of a race of revelation is prepared in Shem's descendants, the line going through Arphaxad, that is—however we interpret the name in detail—through the Chaldean stem, and further through Heber, a name which certainly had originally a wider meaning (comp. Gen. x. 21, xiv. 13), on to Terah (2). Of manifestations of revelation nothing is as yet said; but a simple monotheism is preserved, which is easily seen to be the oldest foundation even of the religion of the heathen Semites. It is probably in connection with the mighty moving of the nations in that time that the Terahites leave the ancestral dwelling-place of the Chaldeans in Northern Assyria, and wander first to Haran in North Mesopotamia (xi. 31). Here, where (see Josh. xxiv. 2, comp. with Gen. xxxi. 19, xxx. 35) (2) idolatry, designated as the worship of Teraphim, begins to find

entrance in this family, the foundation of the Old Testament dispensation of revelation is laid by the calling of Abram (Gen. xii. 1), who closes the second decade of patriarchs. Whilst the nations of the earth walk in their own ways, in which they unfold their natural peculiarities, an everlasting people is to be founded in Abram's descendants (comp. Isa. xlv. 7), which, in its peculiar national figure, is not a product of natural development, but of the creative power and grace of God (Deut. xxxii. 6), and which forms, agreeably to this, a contrast to the mass of nations of the world (עַמִּים, *éthnē*), though in such a way that already the obliteration of this contrast is kept in view (comp. § 82). Only in this idea of the people of God is the key given to Old Testament history, which would otherwise remain an insoluble riddle. A natural predisposition for the religion of the Old Testament can be recognised in the Semites; but revelation does not come forward claiming only to have further developed an already existing natural disposition, or to have first filled a natural form with the contents of divine life (3). What belongs to the character of God's people is already prefigured in the history of their forefathers.

(1) Deut. xxxii. 8: "When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance, when He separated the children of men, so He set the boundaries of the nations according to the number of the children of Israel." This goes back on the division of the nations in Gen. xi. The rabbinical exegesis refers the passage to the fact that, as Israel went down into Egypt in number seventy souls, so also, according to the register of nations, seventy עַמִּים are to be counted on the earth. This view of the passage is certainly not what the Pentateuch intends, but we must take it thus: When God assigned to the peoples of the earth the territory where they were to develop themselves, He had already in view the place which His chosen people should afterwards win in order to fulfil its historical calling.

(2) With respect to the meaning of the word אֶרֶץ כְּשֵׁר, it is doubtful whether it means, as some take it, the boundary or territory of the Chaldeans, or the high land of the Chaldeans, or, as Ewald puts it, the Chaldean stronghold. At any rate, the name כְּשֵׁרִים is in it; and we have, according to this, to regard the Chaldean race as Abram's ancestors.—The descent from the Chaldeans is through עֵבֶר. The LXX. viewed this name as an appellative (Gen. xiv. 13, where they translate *περάτης*), and thus, I think, it is to be understood; it is the personification of the Chaldean races who cross the Euphrates, and

therefore are called in Canaan the people from the other side. {Whether the original seat of the Chaldees is really in the far north, and whether Ur is not rather identical with Mugheir, see in Keil.}

(3) Our time gives itself to the study of the natural peculiarities of nations (psychology of nations), and especially of the peoples of antiquity. Here the question arises, how the peculiarities of the people of Israel can be understood as a product of the national spirit of the Semites. To this subject belong a number of observations in Lassen's *Indian Antiquities*; in the works of Rénan, partly in his "Histoire générale et système comparé des langues Sémitiques," partly in the "Nouvelles considérations sur le caractère générale des peuples Sémitiques," etc., in the *Journ. Asiat.* 1859, iii.; Gustav Baur, in his *History of Old Testament Prophecy*, i. 1861; Diestel, on "The Idea of the People of Israel," in the *Monatsschrift für die evang. Kirche der Rheinprovinz*, 1851, 11th Nr.; also, in particular, Grau, *Semiten und Indogermanen*, 1864, and others. Now indeed it is no question that the peculiarities of the people of Israel proceeded from the common natural soil of the Semitic race. We find, to take a single example, the following explanation of the way in which the Semitic and Indogermanic character differs given by Gustav Baur: The contrast of the Indogermanic and Semitic peculiarity of mind is to be traced back to the difference of a predominant objective and a predominant subjective tendency. The characteristic trait of the Semitic character is the energetical concentration of the subjectivity in the inmost ground of the Ego, and just in this lies (*ut supra*, p. 134) a natural predisposition for the Old Testament religion.—This is hitherto the best statement of the case, and certainly does indicate a peculiarity of the Semitic race. The history of religion offers, in truth, interesting parallels to Old Testament religion, in the sphere of heathen religion, which confirm what Gustav Baur says. I would wish specially to point out, that likewise in the Semitic heathenism the view of the Divinity as a legislative power predominates; for the Stern-gods of the heathen Semites are not represented merely as life-giving powers, but also as powers that rule life. Further, the idea of the Divinity as a jealous power, to which on man's side corresponds the human defiance which rebels against God, is peculiar to Semitic heathenism. This haughty Semitic defiance of God is prominently seen in the character of Israel's neighbours in Edom and Moab (comp. the pictures in Obad. 3; Isa. xvi. 6); even in the way that Job is depicted we may find a genuine Semitic trait of character, and to this corresponds the tough, defiant natural force which lived in Israel: comp. Isa. xlvi. 4, "Thy neck is a sinew of iron, and thy brow is brass." The Old Testament points

out in a multitude of passages the natural character of the people of Israel as an obstinate self-will striving against the divine will. But it is quite a different question whether the Old Testament religion is to be regarded purely as a natural growth of this Semitic character, and whether monotheism is a trait of the whole Semitic race. On the latter question we have a thorough investigation by Diestel, "The Monotheism of the oldest Heathenism, specially of the Semites," in the *Jahrbuchern für Deutsche Theol.* 1860, Nr. 4, p. 669 ff. The result of this inquiry is negative, and this is no wonder; for on what data must we principally fall back?—on such as are very modern in comparison with the antiquity of the human race, or even with the time of the patriarchs. The Old Testament itself remains the best source; and here, undeniably, an original monotheism comes before us, although one of quite simple character. With this we also have to connect such features as the remarkable story of Melchizedek, presently to be spoken of. In special connection with Abraham's ancestors, we learn quite definitely from the Old Testament that false worship had already become familiar to them; but this does not exclude the continued existence of monotheistic religion. Strikingly does Hengstenberg (in the *History of God's Kingdom*, vol. i. p. 120, Eng. Trans.), in relation to the teraphim, refer to Gen. xxxi. 53, compared with vers. 19 and 30. In the first passage Laban swears by the "God of Abraham and the God of Nahor, the God of their fathers." Here is evidently presupposed a common God for Abraham's race, which had emigrated to Canaan, and for the branch of Terah's family which remained in Mesopotamia. But Laban designates the teraphim as *his* gods. By these inferior gods we must understand a sort of Penates. Thus a monotheistic worship may well be regarded as preceding the peculiar Old Testament religion, previous to Abraham. But now, is the Old Testament religion a further and natural development of the germ that already lay in the religion of the forefathers? This can be affirmed only under considerable limitations. The view that the Old Testament dispensation of revelation is a natural production of the religious genius of the people of Israel must be absolutely rejected. Against this the whole Old Testament lays down the most decided testimony, presenting to us in a multitude of traits in Israel's history that dualism between the divine principle of life and the natural constitution of the race of revelation, and developing the difficulties arising herefrom in the education of the people by God for His salvation.

III.—THE TIME OF THE THREE PATRIARCHS.

§ 23.

ABRAHAM (1).

Obedient to the divine call, Abram leaves Mesopotamia, accompanied by Lot, the ancestor of the Moabites and Ammonites, to go to Canaan, which is already (Gen. xii. 6) possessed by the tribes bearing this name. In solemn revelation God closes with him the covenant of promise (chap. xv.), in an act not exactly to be characterized as a sacrifice, but only meant to symbolize the gracious condescension of the covenant-instituting God (comp. § 80). On this follows, on the side of Abram, the taking upon himself of the obligations of the covenant through circumcision (chap. xvii.). Three articles are contained in the promises given to Abram (xii. 2 f., 7, xiii. 15 f., 18, xvii. 5-8, xviii. 18, xxii. 16-18) (2): 1. The land in which he himself continues all his life a stranger (xii. 6), and where he had actually to buy a place for his grave (xxiii. 4, comp. Acts vii. 5), is to be given for an eternal possession to his descendants (3). 2. He who remains childless till his old age shall have an innumerable posterity, which is guaranteed by the changing of his name into אַבְרָהָם; and not Ishmael, the son of Hagar, who was born after the counsel of man (chap. xvi.), but Isaac, born contrary to the ways of nature, according to God's counsel (Rom. ix. 8), is to be the bearer and inheritor of the promise (4). 3. Abraham's race shall be made a blessing for all races and all nations of the earth (5). Still the electing grace of the covenant God, who calls Himself El-Shaddai (xvii. 1) as a witness of His power, which leads nature into the way of His kingdom, is met on Abraham's side (xv. 6) by that faith which does not look on the ways of nature, but holds fast to God's word of promise (comp. Rom. iv. 18; Heb. xi. 8-19), and endures victoriously the severest test in his willingness to offer the son of the promise (Gen. xxii.). In this faith, which is reckoned to him for righteousness, is Abraham the friend of God (Isa. xli. 8; Jas. ii. 23), the prophet (Gen. xx. 7) to whom is granted insight into the divine counsel (xviii. 17: "Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do?") when Sodom reels onwards to judgment, and who has the right of free access to God in prayer (xviii. 23 ff., xx. 17). Nay, he becomes

the father of all the faithful (Rom. iv.; Gal. iii.), and his name stands at the head of the three monotheistic religions of the world, even when looked at in a purely historical way. But this knowledge of the divine way is to be accompanied by a life-walk in the divine way (Gen. xvii. 1). Besides, according to Gen. xviii. 19, Jehovah "acknowledged," that is, chose, Abraham, "that he might command his sons after him to keep Jehovah's ways, doing justice and right, that Jehovah might bring upon Abraham all that He has said of him" (6). According to this, the character of God's people is ethically determined from the first, and already the word (xviii. 19) shows that not all natural descendants belong to the true sons of Abraham and the heirs of the promise (7).—On the relation of the religion of the patriarchs to the surrounding heathenism, the narratives Gen. xiv. 18–22 and chap. xxii. throw the most valuable light. In the former passage, the story of Melchizedek, priest of Salem, the type of a priesthood not inherited by bodily descent, but resting in the dignity of the person (Ps. cx. 4; Heb. vii.), we find an acknowledgment of the identity of the God of Abraham and the Canaanite El-eljon (8). The second narrative has apparently an historical reference to the Canaanite offerings of children. We must note here, that while it was Elohim who, according to ver. 1, tempted Abraham to offer his son, it is Jehovah who (ver. 11 ff.) hinders the sacrifice, approves the devotion that is willing to offer up the most beloved one, and commands the substitution of the sacrificial animal (9).

(1) That the whole history of the patriarchs has a typical character, is generally acknowledged from the Apostle Paul onwards to our own time, and the question is only as to the theological and religious meaning of these Old Testament patterns. Philo, from his philosophical standpoint, interprets the symbolism and type of the patriarchal times as follows:—Abraham is the symbol of the human spirit who wandered out from Haran, the place of sensual desires, to Canaan, the home of the spirit. For the rest, Abraham is to him the type of acquired virtue, Isaac of innate virtue, and Jacob of virtue won by practice, etc. Side by side with this we place Ewald's very superficial explanation in his *History of the People of Israel*, i. 3d ed. p. 417 ff. According to him, a circle of twelve examples is here brought before us in seven fundamental relationships. 1. In the three patriarchs, the pattern of the father of a family is represented; 2. In Sarah, the pattern of the

mother, and in Hagar that of the concubine; 3. In Isaac, the pattern of the child; 4. In Isaac and Rebecca, the pattern of right betrothal and marriage (but Rebecca deceives her husband!); 5. In Leah and Rachel, the patterns of a wife beside one less loved; 6. In Deborah, the pattern of the name of a nurse of heroes; 7. In Eliezer, the pattern of the house-servant or house-steward.—If we follow out the traits which the noble delineation of patriarchal life presents to us, according to the guidance of the New Testament, the result seems to be what we have given in the text.

(2) In regard to the three articles of the promise given to Abraham, note, that if we divide Genesis into an original Elohist writing and a Jehovistic supplement, the verses which contain the third article of the promise belong to the Jehovistic sections. This has also an inner reason, in so far as God in this covenant promise has especially to approve Himself as יהוה, as faithful to His covenant.

(3) It is certainly not without meaning that the Old Testament throughout hinges the completion of the divine kingdom on the land which was granted to Abraham not by a right of nature, but by grace. Even prophecy knows no final fulfilment of the divine promise, in which this old promise of eternal possession of the Holy Land does not come true. Here, I am convinced, is a fundamental error of Hengstenberg's exegesis, when he absolutely will not admit in his spiritualizing interpretations that this is fixed as an essential enduring trait of the divine promise. However we may judge of this matter from the standpoint of the New Testament,—I do not enter on this dispute,—from the standpoint of the Old Testament it must be maintained that, from the beginning of the founding of the covenant people to the close, the fulfilment of the promise and the completion of the divine kingdom attaches to the holy land of Canaan.

(4) It is to be noticed how the Old Testament, from the first origin of the race of revelation, is careful to distinguish between a race of revelation *κατὰ σάρκα* and *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, to which the promise is given. We have already seen in the case of Abraham that the idea in Rom. ix. 8, *Οὐ τὰ τέκνα τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας λογίζεται εἰς σπέρμα*, is expressed in the clearest manner. That is seen when not Ishmael, the son begotten by human design, but Isaac, becomes the bearer of the promise, and again in the choice of Jacob and passing by of Esau; but it is seen also very distinctly in the conditions which are laid down for the attainment of the promises.

(5) The expression, "They shall bless themselves in Abraham's seed," can only mean, They shall wish for themselves the blessing of

revelation which Abraham has, and reach it through the mediation of Abraham's race. The passages are taken by modern exegesis to mean that they wish to be as happy as Abraham; but this is refuted by Jer. iv. 2, וְיִתְבַּרְכּוּ בּוֹ הָאֲנָשִׁים, where בּוֹ refers to Jehovah. What meaning would there be here, on the interpretation that they shall wish for themselves a happiness such as Jehovah has?

(6) Gen. xviii. 19 has often been wrongly explained. We must not translate, "For I *know of him*, that he will command," etc. The יָדַע can never have the meaning of the Greek ὄρε, which would necessarily be יָדָה; but the יָדַע stands in the pregnant sense which is to be discussed more fully in the didactic section (§ 81), according to which it is a mark of the divine πρόγνωσις.

(7) From the heathen side, Berosus, in the *Antiquities of Josephus*. i. 7, § 2, gives us information of Abraham. He says, in the tenth γενεά after the flood, a righteous and great man lived among the Chaldeans who was learned in astrology. By this man he means Abraham. Josephus gives also a notice of Abraham by the Damascene writer Nicolaus; and in Justinus, *Trogi Pompeii hist. phil. epitoma*, xxxvi. 2, there is an account probably drawn from a like Damascene source. In the last passage, Abraham and Israel are called kings of Damascus. Nicolaus reports that Abraham, king of Damascus, came thither from the land of the Chaldeans with an army.—Even in the freer criticism, the acknowledgment that we dare not treat the history of the patriarchs in Genesis so thoughtlessly as has been done is making way. We, however, have to do with the personality of Abraham only in as far as it is a type, in as far as essential characteristics of Old Testament religion meet us in the history of Abraham.

(8) Gen. xiv. 18-22.—Salem is without doubt Jerusalem, which is shortly called Salem in Ps. lxxvi. 3; it is not a Salim farther north, as some modern critics think. It is no proof that the original name was not Salem, that Jerusalem in the time of the judges appears under the name of Jebus, for it got the name Jebus from the Jebusites who were settled there; and here we may note that the king of Jerusalem who is met with in Josh. x. 1-3 is also called Adonizedek. It is a point of special importance, that an acknowledgment of the God whose priest Melchizedek is, evidently lies in the way in which Abraham does homage to Melchizedek. Melchizedek is called priest of אֱלֹהֵי עֵלִי, who appears later among the Phœnicians as Saturn. Abraham receives a blessing from this priest, and gives him the tenth of the booty. Certainly he distinguishes in a way (ver. 22) his God יְהוָה from the אֱלֹהֵי עֵלִי, but yet their identity is acknowledged. We have here there-

fore traces of an older, purer monotheism on Canaanite ground, which is at first sight remarkable, because otherwise the relation of the Old Testament God to the Canaanite worships is one of broadest contrast. But here Movers' researches, *Phœnicier*, ii. 1, p. 105, come in in the most interesting manner. It is there shown that the worship of El or Kronos goes back to another origin than that of the Phœnician Baal, to which the Phœnician polytheism is attached, and that the former worship belongs specially to the Giblites in Byblus and Berytus, who are always definitely distinguished from the Phœnicians. So we may maintain with the greatest probability, that we find here, in the midst of the Canaanite worships, a remnant of older and purer worship, which was perhaps preserved by a Semitic race dwelling among the Canaanites. For I at least am confident that the Old Testament, with its derivation of the Canaanites from Ham, is better informed than most newer critics.

(9) Gen. xxii.—Scarcely any part of the Old Testament has been so much used as a proof-text by those dreamers who think that human sacrifice was originally a characteristic of the Old Testament religion, whilst, nevertheless, the tendency of the story leads directly to the excluding of human sacrifice from Jehovah-worship. This has been well observed by Ewald. But this does not remove the difficulty, that the God who will not have human sacrifice, nevertheless, at first, tempts Abraham to offer his son. It was Schelling who, in his *Philosophy of Revelation*, ii. p. 122 ff., first definitely pointed to the significant change of the names of God in this history. The chapter is a forcible proof how little is settled by an artificial dissection of Genesis according to the names of God. The chapter is joined together like cast-iron, and we cannot cut anything out of it. It was customary in earlier times, before the importance of the change of the names of God was taken notice of, to have recourse to the cheap aid of interpolation. But how is this change to be understood? Schelling (*l.c.*) argues, that the God who, after the flood, uttered the words, "I will avenge the life of man at the hand of each man," cannot be the same who demanded from Abraham the life of his own son. The principle that tempted Abraham to that action was essentially the same as induced the nations of Canaan to sacrifice their children. In the Old Testament the true God is reached through the false, and, as it were, bound to Him.—But against this view it is quite conclusive that, in ver. 1, not the indefinite אֱלֹהִים without the article, but אֱלֹהֵי, is chosen for the tempting God.—Hengstenberg and others have adopted a different explanation. Lange, in his *Life of Christ*, vol. i. p. 139 (Eng. trans.), puts

the matter thus: "Jehovah commanded Abraham to offer up Isaac; he was ready to make this sacrifice, but understood the command in the same sense as if Moloch had said to him, 'Thou shalt sacrifice Isaac,' whereas the mode of offering was intentionally not more precisely fixed. The misunderstanding, although proceeding from Abraham and falling to his account, was nevertheless willed by God."—Kurtz, in particular, in his *History of the Old Covenant*, i. p. 263 (E. T.), seems to have given the right explanation. He says: Abraham must have been conscious that the way that led to the perfecting of his faith was the way of renunciation and self-denial. The sight of the Canaanite sacrifices of children must have led Abraham to self-examination, whether he would be strong enough in renunciation and self-denial to do what those heathen did, if his God desired it from him. But if this question was once made the subject of discussion in Abraham's heart, it had also to be brought to a definite and real decision. That was the substratum for the divine demand in Abraham's soul. Objectively, the following are the deductions from this point of view: The culminating point of worship in the religions of nature was human sacrifice. The covenant religion had to separate itself in this respect from heathenism; the truth in it had to be acknowledged, and the falsehood denied. In the command to offer up Isaac, the truth of the conviction that human life must be sacrificed as an unholy thing, is acknowledged; and by the arresting intervention of God, the hideous distortion of this truth which had arisen in heathenism is condemned and rejected.—If we look at Deut. xiii. 4, where it is said that God will tempt the people by false prophets, it is not necessary for us, in expounding xxii. 1, to suppose any misunderstanding on Abraham's part; but it seems to me that the matter is best explained by looking at it, with Kurtz, in the light of a pedagogic command.—Comp. also *On the Value of History for the Development of the Old Testament Idea of Sacrifice*, § 121. note 1.

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§ 24.

ISAAC AND JACOB.

Very little is recorded of the life of Isaac; he walked in the footprints of his father, and the divine promises given to the latter were renewed to him (Gen. xxvi. 2-5). Of his twin-sons was chosen, as bearer of the promise, not Esau, who had the advantage of birth-right, but *ἵνα ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις τοῦ Θεοῦ μένῃ* (Rom. ix. 11),

Jacob, the second-born son. The first thought which lies at the root of the divine guidance of Jacob's life is, that in spite of all human hindrances, the divine counsel reaches its goal, and that even human sins must serve to its realization, although they are punished not the less. By the sin of Jacob and his mother, Isaac's purpose, which was in opposition to the promise to Jacob (Gen. xxv. 23), is thwarted; yet Jacob's sin is visited on him (1) in the straits he experienced in his wanderings (xxvii. 42 f.), which were occasioned by his artifice against Esau, and particularly in the sorrows afterwards prepared for him by his sons, when he that had deceived, himself in like manner suffered deception. The covenant promise given to him at the beginning of his journey to Mesopotamia in the theophany at Bethel, in order to strengthen him for the years of exile (xxviii. 10 ff.), is confirmed at the same place on his return (xxxv. 9 ff.), after he has gained for himself and his race in the night-long wrestling at Jabbok, which forms the turning-point of his life, the new and holy name of Israel, characteristic of his divine calling (xxxii. 24 ff.). The main meaning of this story is, that Jacob, whose courage fails before his brother, and the reward of whose wiles threatens to be lost at one blow, is shown how man, despairing in his guilt, must wrestle out his cause with God, but that when he has gained the blessing from God, he has no more to be afraid of from any man. At the same time, Jacob's combat, when he first wrestles with bodily strength, is perhaps a picture of the perverseness of his former life, in which he believed himself to be able to force the fulfilment of the promise by the continual use of carnal means, and had made it difficult enough for the divine leadings to become master of him. His becoming lame is then meant to show that God does not permit Himself to be forced by natural strength. But then Jacob becomes victorious by the weapon of prayer (comp. Hos. xii. 4 f.). As the natural character of Jacob, the intriguing holder of the heel,—the tough, shrewd man,—prefigures the natural character of the nation that descended from him, so the spiritual character of God's people is prefigured (2) in יִשְׂרָאֵל, the wrestler with God.

(1) It is a great error, particularly of popular handbooks, that it is thought necessary to canonize the wily intrigues of Jacob and his mother related in Genesis. The attempt to justify such conduct goes

against the conscience of a child. But such a treatment of the history of Jacob rests on a gross misunderstanding of that which Genesis itself teaches us as to the divine leading of Jacob. The text shows wherein lies the doctrinal value of this history.

(2) Gen. xxxii. 24 ff.—The insipid mockery which the despisers of the Bible are so inclined to pour out on this story does not touch us here. The story was properly valued from a free point of view by Herder, and afterwards in particular by Umbreit ("Der Busskampf Jacob's," *Studien und Kritiken*, 1848, Nr. 1, p. 113 ff.). Paulus Cassel has a beautiful essay, entitled "Das Ringervolk," in his *Lectures on the World's History*, 1st Division, 1860; he strikingly represents here, in the two types of Heracles and Jacob, the contrast between Hellenism and Israel. It is common, especially in the practical use of the passage, to limit oneself to seeing in Jacob's struggle a symbol of wrestling in prayer, which does not become wearied until it wins the blessing. So also Auberlen in the article "Jacob," in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* vi. p. 376 f. I cannot share this view, and agree with Kurtz's conception (*History of the Old Covenant*, i. 331, E. T.), according to which a double wrestling must be distinguished in the manner given in the text.—Hengstenberg turns the story into a visionary event.

§ 25.

THE TWELVE PATRIARCHS.

In the twelve sons of Jacob is given the basis of the covenant people destined to possess the land of Canaan (1). Nevertheless, a long period of expectation in exile and slavery is first prescribed (comp. Gen. xv. 13 ff.) to Jacob's descendants. The completion of the divine decree is introduced by the providential history of Joseph, who is raised to the helm of the Egyptian state to be the deliverer of his people, after long proof of his faith, in which his earlier vain mind was to be humbled (comp., for the religious value of the history, especially xlv. 5–8, l. 20). A second time Israel must turn his back on the promised land, still with renewal of the promises received (xlv. 2 ff.) (2). Jacob dies in Egypt, after having predicted the future of the tribes descending from his sons, in his prophetic blessing (chap. xlix.), which looks far beyond the time in which his descendants continue strangers. The twelve tribes are here portrayed, partly according to their place in theocratic history, and partly according to their geographical rela-

tionship, while, at the same time, Jacob's words rest on ethical and psychological considerations. But, according to the Old Testament view, the blessing and curse of parents are not magic spells possessing in themselves the power, ascribed to them in heathenism, to set in motion forces of blessing or vengeance; they have reality just in as far as they serve the divine decrees, which may be fulfilled, according to circumstances, in a quite different sense from that intended by him who blesses or curses (this is shown at once in Isaac's blessing, chap. xxvii.). Among the twelve Joseph is especially prominent, who (comp. xlviii. 5) is to grow to a mighty double tribe in his two sons Manasseh and Ephraim, of whom the latter is preferred, although he is the youngest (xlvi. 14 ff.). Nevertheless it is not to him that the sovereignty is promised; nor to Reuben, the first-born son, who is declared to have forfeited his birthright by the deed of shame which he had formerly committed; nor to Levi, who was afterwards highly glorified (comp. in particular Deut. xxxiii. 8 ff.),—rather, because of his crime committed along with Simeon, that dispersion through Israel which was subsequently connected with his high calling is uttered as a curse (Gen. xlix. 7) (3). On the other hand, it is Judah who is specially chosen as bearer of the promise, and who is characterized as he upon whom that dominion over nations shall rest, to which xxvii. 29 already pointed. Compare 1 Chron. v. 2, according to which passage the birthright, the בְּכוֹרָה, is Joseph's portion in the shape of double inheritance (comp. § 106); but out of Judah is to come the מֶלֶךְ, the prince of Israel (4). By fixing their graves (xlvii. 29 ff., comp. l. 4 ff.), Jacob, and afterwards Joseph (l. 25 f.; comp. Heb. xi. 22), seek to testify their faith in the divine promise.—In the three covenants of promise made with the three patriarchs rests, for the consciousness of the people of Israel, the guarantee of the whole gracious and holy leading of the people (comp. Ex. ii. 24; Deut. iv. 37, vii. 8, viii. 8, 18, etc.). Therefore, in the Old Testament stage of revelation, God is called the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Ex. iii. 6, 15; comp. 1 Kings xviii. 36, Ps. xlvii. 10).

(1) That there are twelve tribes is explained by the Old Testament from the number of the sons of Jacob, since to him were born, Gen. xxix. ff., six sons—Reuben, Simeon, Levi, Judah, Issachar, Zebulun—by his wife Leah; two by her maid Zilpah—Gad and Asher;

other two — Joseph and Benjamin — by his younger wife Rachel ; and lastly, two — Dan and Naphtali — by Bilhah, the handmaid of the last named. There are other cases in Genesis of nations divided into twelve tribes in the circle of peoples to which Israel belongs : for xxii. 20–24, twelve sons are ascribed to Nahor also, eight by his wife and four by his concubine ; and in xvii. 20, xxv. 13–16, the Ishmaelites are divided into twelve branches. Also in the tribes descending from Esau (xxxvi. 9 ff.) we have the number twelve, if we regard Amalek simply as an extra tribe.—As the division into twelve (see Uhlemann, *Thoth.* p. 107) is connected in the case of the Egyptians and other ancient people with the twelve signs of the zodiac and the twelve months of the year, the tribal division of Israel and the cognate races has often been explained in the same way ; and even Diodor. Sic., *Fragment.* lib. xl., connects the twelve tribes of Israel with the twelve months. In the Old Testament itself there is no trace of any other derivation than the genealogical one ; and if we examine more exactly the ethnographical accounts in Genesis, we shall rather arrive at the supposition that it was for the sake of analogy with the number of the tribes of Israel that the descendants of Nahor, Ishmael, and Esau were also grouped so as to give the number twelve (see Knobel on Gen. xxii. 20 ; comp. also § 92 with note 2). [Article, “Stämme Israels.”]

(2) In connection with the references to Egypt, Eber's work, *Egypt and the Books of Moses*, of which as yet only the first volume is published, 1868 (on Genesis), is worthy of all praise. It contains very important information on archæological and historical matters. Comp. also Hengstenberg, *The Books of Moses and Egypt*, 1841.

(3) Gen. xlix. 7 : “Cursed be their wrath, because it was so fierce ; and their fury, because it was grievous : I will divide them in Jacob, and disperse them in Israel.” Compare Kurtz, *History of the Old Covenant*, i. 2d ed., p. 265 f., in elucidation of the treacherous and bloody act of vengeance executed by Levi, for the dishonour of his sister Dinah, on the Shechemites, who were first made defenceless.

(4) Gen. xlix. is a *crux interpretum*. In respect to the passage as a whole, I share neither the view of some who see here a testament written down with the exactness of a notary, nor the widespread view which believes it necessary to see in the piece the production of a later poet.—For this poet, in whatever age we place him, comes into conflict with some parts of his poem. Particularly what is said about Levi, whose race was highly exalted from the time of Moses, neither agrees with the time of the judges, nor with the time of David or Solomon. But in ver. 10 there is thought to be a clear

indication that the chapter was written in the time of the judges. Shiloh is there taken to mean the town in Ephraim, and the passage is rendered: "until he comes to Shiloh," where the sanctuary, the centre of the theocracy, was. But if the poem is of this age, the principate which is assigned to Judah is irreconcilable with historical data in the time of the judges. It is necessary to extend and urge in an unjustifiable manner the circumstance that Judah went at the head of the people in the war of conquest, in order to justify what is said of him. If we are to speak of a principate of any tribe in the time of the judges, we should rather name the tribe of Ephraim, in whose midst at one time actually a kingdom was set up in Shechem. —Any one who really goes deeper into the intellectual habits not only of Israel, but of eastern, and indeed of all antiquity, will not be content with the view that a later poet sits down and writes a poem which he puts in the mouth of the father of the nation; on the contrary, we certainly find in the old world a real tradition of such words of blessing and cursing, uttered by the fathers about their descendants, and such utterances influence the fortunes of the latter in a very intelligible way. I cannot, therefore, take any other view of Jacob's sayings, than that the father of the tribes divides the inheritance and characterizes each of the sons, and that this testament of the father continues to live in the mouth of the tribes. The antique character of the sayings is shown by the peculiar animal symbols: Dan, the serpent; Naphtali, the gazelle, etc.; sayings which cannot have been called forth by the later poetical art, but only by the simple pastoral life of the patriarchs.—With regard to the theological value of these sayings, it is shown also by this blessing, that in the divine kingdom things do not run in the way of nature, but according to divine choice. Neither he who should take the lead by right of birth, nor yet the father's darling, is called to be the peculiar vehicle of the kingdom of God. Since ethical and psychological motives appear in many points of what is said about the several tribes,—when, as Herder has said so beautifully, Jacob's "mind is strengthened from heaven to note the slumbering destiny in the soul of his sons, and to open this hidden book in their separate traits of character and action,"—we may ask if there is not also something of the same kind in the case of Judah, the fourth son according to age, but now placed first. In the text it is not expressly brought forward. In the designation of Judah as a lion we may perhaps find a reference to the noble nature of his personality. But the passage Gen. xlv. 32 f. may specially be cited, where Judah presents himself as surety, to go to prison or to bondage for his brother Benjamin that he may be free.

It is hardly to be regarded as an intentional coincidence, though there is a divine fitness in it, that Judah was destined to be the ancestor of Him who presented Himself as surety for all.—The much discussed passage about Shiloh will be treated of on a subsequent page.

IV.—FOURTH AGE, THE TIME OF MOSES AND JOSHUA.

I. THE DELIVERANCE OF ISRAEL FROM EGYPTIAN BONDAGE.

§ 26.

Condition of the People of Israel in Egypt.

At the close of the time of the patriarchs, the biblical account passes silently over a long period, in which Israel grows up into a people. For that quiet process of increase by which the families grew to a people offered nothing of importance which could establish itself in the historical memory of the people (1). The Old Testament itself gives the following indications of the condition of the people in Egypt. In part they seem to have kept to the pastoral life of their fathers in Goshen; they may have wandered from there into the stretch of land on the eastern boundary, as in fact the obscure passage 1 Chron. vii. 21 is probably to be connected with an occurrence taking place during the stay of Israel in Egypt (2). From Num. xxxii. we conclude that especially the two tribes of Reuben and Gad gave themselves to cattle-breeding. But speaking generally, the people who were settled in fixed residences, and partly even in towns, must have already begun an agricultural life (comp. Ex. i. 14, Num. xi. 5, Dent. xi. 10). As the Egyptians and Israelites lived together (Ex. iii. 22, xii. 33 ff.), the people could not have remained untouched by the Egyptian culture, which was at that time already very far advanced (3). The political organization of the people had developed itself in a genealogical way, which corresponds to the natural character of the Semites, who are characterized by strong family and tribal attachment. The people (according to iii. 16) is represented by the elders (זְקֵנִים), who were probably taken from the chief families. Besides this, the people were under שְׂטָרִים, who in like manner were taken from their midst, but were themselves subordinate to Egyptian overseers (v. 6 ff.) (comp. § 98). With regard to the religious con-

dition of the nation, we find that among the mass of the people the remembrance of the God of their fathers, and of the promises given to them, had to be reawakened. The purer worship of God which we find among the patriarchs had been displaced by idol-worship, as may be concluded partly from express testimony (Josh. xxiv. 14; Ezek. xx. 7 ff., xxiii. 8, 19), and partly from the idol-worship to which the people gave themselves during their wanderings in the wilderness. The worship of the calf at Sinai, Ex. xxxii., is to be explained as an imitation of the Egyptian worship of Apis or Mnevis; the service of he-goats (שְׂעִירִים) mentioned in Lev. xvii. 7 points to the service of Mendes (the Egyptian Pan; Herodotus, ii. 46). But also the service of the fire-god Moloch or Milcom, which was spread in the lands bounding Egypt on the east, must, as is shown by the rigid prohibition, Lev. xviii. 21, xx. 2, have even at that time penetrated among the people. As this idol, who is essentially the jealous power of nature, forms the heathen caricature of the Holy One of Israel, of the אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, the mixing of his worship with the service of Jehovah, mentioned in Amos v. 26, is more easy to understand (4). All this shows that during the stay in Egypt the foundation was laid of the religious syncretism which came up in different forms in the following centuries, and which was in general characteristic of Israel, which never was independently productive in polytheistic forms of worship.

(1) It may seem strange that we have so considerable a blank in the history between Genesis and Exodus, and that the long period of time from Jacob's going down into Egypt and his death, and until Moses' birth, is passed silently over. But simple tribal life, such as we must suppose Israel's to have been in those centuries, forms no history. What sort of a history had the Arabians in the thousand years previous to Mohammed? But beside this, Israel has throughout no history except in as far as it is the organ of revelation. How full of blanks is the historical account of the centuries in the time of the judges, on account of the broken state of the theocratic life! and how little do we know of the exile, which yet belongs entirely to the historical time! or of the centuries from Ezra to the Maccabees, and beyond them! It is the peculiarity of Israel to possess history and historical literature in the full sense of the words only in proportion as it realizes its vocation in the history of the world.

(2) In 1 Chron. vii. 21, according to the most likely explanation

of the ambiguous passage, an incursion of the Ephraimites on Gath is recounted, starting, it is supposed, from the southern highlands of Canaan. The older view, that an occurrence in the time of the stay in Egypt is spoken of, and not, as Bertheau and others think (understanding Ephraim, ver. 22, as the whole body of the tribe), an occurrence belonging to the post-Mosaic time, has at least the wording of the passage in its favour. Comp. also Kurtz, *The History of the Old Covenant*, ii. p. 178 (translation).

(3) It is a mistake to seek to regard the Israelites on their exodus from Egypt as a barbarous crowd of shepherds, in whom we may not presuppose even the smallest beginnings of culture. They appear in the Pentateuch as an unmanageable, but not as an uncultivated people. Whilst, for example, just to give one proof of this, the Pentateuch does not produce any trace of the practice of the art of writing in the time of the patriarchs, this is presupposed as existing among the people when they went out of Egypt, as the name of their functionaries which were taken from the people shows,—they were שֹׁטְרִים, that is, writers. In Egypt, indeed, as is shown by the monuments, writing was at that time a thing long established.

(4) It is not long since it was the fashion to think that the original cultus of Israel was the worship of Saturn, or, as Saturn was identified with Milcom, the service of Moloch (comp. Vatke, Ghillany, Daumer, and others).—It certainly cannot be denied that this idolatrous worship belongs to that ancient period; it belongs to the oldest time and to the youngest, and after disappearing for centuries, becomes prominent again after the time of Ahaz; and, as is stated in the text, there is a certain connection between Moloch and אֵל קָנָא, as the Holy One of Israel is called, only with the difference that this is an ethical power, that a consuming natural power, which must be reconciled by human sacrifice. But to represent what the Old Testament condemns as the true foundation of the worship of Jehovah, is a piece of caprice such as has often defaced the treatment of the Old Testament.—The much discussed passage, Amos v. 26, must not be understood as foretelling something future, as Ewald explains it: “So then ye shall lift up the pale of your king, and the scaffold of your images,” referring to the carrying of the idols into captivity. Against this is the fact that this kind of worship is not mentioned as existing in the kingdom of the ten tribes. The proper explanation is: “Ye bore the tabernacle of your king and the pillar of your images,” etc., that is, during the wandering in the wilderness. {This interpretation is certainly wrong. See, besides older authorities, Graf in Merx’s *Archiv*, vol. i., and Schrader in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1874, p. 324 ff.}

§ 27.

The Course of the Deliverance from Egypt.

The deliverance from Egypt is thus related in Exodus. To prevent the extraordinary increase of the people which excited their apprehensions, the Egyptians burdened the people with unbearable tasks, and at last the royal decree went forth that all the new-born boys should be killed. In this deepest humiliation, in which the people (comp. Ezek. xvi. 5) were comparable to a helpless infant cast away in its blood, the fulfilment of the promises given to the fathers was to come about; and, in accordance with this, El-shaddai was to show Himself as Jehovah. The divine instrument for this was Moses. After he had been providentially saved from death as a child (Ex. ii. 1 ff.), and had been brought up at the royal court (*πάση σοφίᾳ Αἰγυπτίων*, Acts vii. 22), he appears in manhood (in the fortieth year of his life, according to tradition; see Acts vii. 23) in the midst of his oppressed people, kills an Egyptian who is maltreating an Israelite, and flees, when this deed becomes known, into the Arabian wilderness (1). What he failed to accomplish when trying in his own might, he was to bring to a completion forty years after as an instrument in God's hand (2). When Moses had accredited himself to the people as a divine messenger, he first demanded of Pharaoh liberty for Israel to go into the wilderness, and there to celebrate a sacrificial festival to Jehovah. As Pharaoh repels the request with scorn, and increases to the uttermost the oppression of the people, there follows the divine declaration that Israel shall now be brought out of Egypt by great judgments, and that thus the reality of Jehovah as the Lord of the world shall be manifested indeed to Israel as well as to the Egyptians (comp. Ex. vi. 6 f., viii. 18, ix. 16). The ten plagues which are sent on the Egyptians (Ex. vii.-xii., comp. with Ps. lxxviii. 43 ff., cvi. 26 ff.) are mostly connected with natural events and conditions which frequently recur in Egypt. The order of their succession stands in close connection with the natural progress of the Egyptian year from the time of the first swelling of the Nile, which generally happens in June, to the spring of the following year (3). But partly the severity which the plagues reached, and partly their connection with the word of Moses (comp. especially viii. 5 f.), make them signs of Jehovah's

power. In them the battle of the true God is victoriously waged against the gods of the land (xii. 12; Num. xxxiii. 4), and thus they serve as a pledge of the triumph of the divine kingdom over heathenism (comp. Ex. xv. 11, xviii. 11). Even in heathen accounts of the departure of Israel from Egypt by Manetho (Josephus, *c. Ap.* i. 26) and Diodorus (*Biblioth.* lib. xl. fragm.), it comes unmistakeably out that here strong religious differences met in combat (4). The plagues rise from step to step until, after the tenth plague, viz. the killing of the first-born of the Egyptians, which takes places in the same night with the institution of the passover in Israel, the Egyptians, full of fear, drive the people from the land (5).—Because the people are not yet matured for war with the nations of Canaan, Moses does not lead them to Canaan by the nearest road, but chooses the roundabout way through the wilderness of the peninsula of Sinai. But scarcely have the people turned in this direction, and encamped exactly by the Red Sea, probably in the plain of the modern Suez, when Pharaoh draws near. Closed in by the enemy's forces, and by mountains and the waves of the sea, the people receive the direction to go forward in faith. A storm drives back the water, Israel passes happily through the sea in the tumult of the elements, led by God like a flock of sheep (Ps. lxxvii. 17–21; Isa. lxiii. 11 ff.); but the Egyptian army which follows is buried by the waves. “And the people feared Jehovah, and believed in Jehovah and His servant Moses” (Ex. xiv. 31) (6). In this form the act of divine deliverance was handed down in Israel (comp. Ps. lxxviii. 12 ff., cvi. 8 ff., cxiv.), a type of future redemption, ever again revived in their memory by the yearly anniversary (Isa. xi. 15 f.).—The duration of Israel's stay in Egypt is fixed as 430 years, according to Ex. xii. 40, comp. Gen. xv. 13, against which the LXX. in the first passage reckon as part of the number 430 the stay of the patriarchs in Canaan, and thus reduce the time of the stay in Egypt by one-half (7).

(1) Comp. the explanation of this narrative, Acts vii. 24 f.: “Ἐνόμιζε δὲ συνιέναι τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς διὰ χειρὸς αὐτοῦ δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς σωτηρίαν οἱ δὲ οὐ συνῆκαν.”

(2) If we compare the view of this narrative taken by Ewald, *History of Israel*, ii. 3d ed. p. 77, 101 ff., he places Israel under an entirely different historical point from the book of Exodus. Essen-

tially he understands the matter thus: In the time before the leading out of the people, a powerful movement went through them, "the most extraordinary exertions and most noble activities of the spirit wrestling for freedom." Then Moses lifted himself up among them, who was one of the greatest heroes who have ever been,—a spirit, indeed, of unmatched greatness, who must have worked with wonderful powers and effects. Now ensues a religious combat between Israel and the Egyptians, the result of which is just the departure from Egypt. Then "the confidence of spirit once excited in the people must have remained unweakened in the now coming crisis at the Red Sea," as happens when "at the right time a favourable wind brings to the light the deposited germs." Thus the march through the Red Sea now gains fundamental significance for the theocracy.—This is all very well; but in the Old Testament the honour is not given to the people, but the whole history tends to show what divine discipline can make out of a sunken people. The Old Testament shows us nothing of a mighty spiritual movement among the people in Egypt (comp. also the conception in Acts vii. 25 ff.). Ezekiel compares it to a helpless infant cast away without mercy, lying in its blood; and, in regard to Moses, the story certainly indicates a preparation for his future calling; but if tradition (Acts vii. 22) supposes him to be educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, even Ewald himself remarks that "certainly the influence of Egyptian education was in the end more negative than positive" (*History of Israel*, i. 3d ed. p. 81). The point brought forward in the text is here of especial significance: how Moses' first appearance when he slew the Egyptian, which is taken by Stephen (Acts vii. 25) as a signal for the people,—how this arbitrary deed led first to a long exile for Moses, and how only at a later period, when he no longer counted himself a capable person, he was to reach success (comp. also Auberlen, *The Divine Revelation*, i. p. 101 ff.).

(3) Eichhorn first sought to show, in his *De Ægypti anno Mirabili*, how the whole course of the plagues is connected with the course of the Egyptian year. The ample treatment of this topic by Hengstenberg, *The Books of Moses and Egypt*, p. 93 ff., is particularly interesting.

(4) According to a remark in § 3, the Old Testament theology has, in distinction from the history of Israel, to reproduce the facts just as they continued to live in the spirit of the organs of revelation, and formed the basis of religion, whilst researches like those on the Hyksos are relegated to the history of the Israelites. The question of the Hyksos has been in dispute till the most recent time. Manetho, as is

well known, speaks, as quoted by Josephus (*c. Ap. i. 14*), of a shepherd people that held rule in Egypt for five hundred years.—Hengstenberg hands over the whole tradition of the Hyksos to the sphere of fable, and it cannot be denied that hitherto no definite indications of this period of five hundred years have been found in the investigation of the monuments. This remarkable want has indeed been explained by the supposition that the later Egyptians have done their utmost to efface the remembrance of that hated shepherd people; and recently, too, it is thought that really definite indications of the Hyksos have been found on the monuments. Compare Eber's *Egypt and the Books of Moses*, i.; and for the opposite view, Hengstenberg, *The Books of Moses and Egypt*. Ewald and most modern critics treat the matter as history; Hengstenberg appears to have here gone too far in scepticism. Now Josephus, on his part, identifies the Israelites with the Hyksos; but besides this, he has given (*c. Ap. i. 26 f.*) another heathen account of the Israelites, which he condemns as a lying heathenish jeer, and in one sense with good reason. The essence of this account is as follows:—After 518 years were passed since the expulsion of the Hyksos under King Tethmosis, a King Amenophis became desirous of seeing the gods. Then the revelation is communicated to him, by a sage of the same name, that the land must first be cleansed from all lepers and other unclean men. So the king removed these people to the number of 80,000, and among them several leprous priests, into the quarry-pit on the east of the Nile. But now a great fear seizes the prophet, that if these priests be kept at servile work, the wrath of the divinity may be brought on Egypt. The king then brings the unclean rabble into the town Avaris, once inhabited by the Hyksos. There they set over them priest Osarsiph from Heliopolis. This priest gives them a law which stands at variance with the Egyptian religion. They league themselves with the expelled Hyksos in Jerusalem. War is threatened between the lepers and the Egyptians. Amenophis king of the Egyptians approaches with 300,000 men; he does not, however, dare to give battle, but withdraws again to Egypt, from anxiety lest the battle might be a strife against the gods. After this, the Hyksos from Jerusalem and the lepers rule in Egypt for thirteen years in the most cruel manner. But after thirteen years Amenophis returns from Ethiopia with his son Ramses, conquers the shepherds and lepers, and drives them back to Syria.—It is not probable that all this should only be an intentional perversion of the account in the Old Testament. With good reason we may see here an old heathenish tradition, which just shows that, according to the conception of the Egyptians themselves, the battle was a religious one,

and, indeed, a combat in which Egypt itself got the worst.—The treatment of this point in Ewald's *History of Israel*, ii. 1st ed. p. 57 ff., 3d ed. p. 110 ff., is one of the best parts of his book.

(5) Of the various passages in the chapters that treat of the exodus, Ex. xii. 35 f., compared with xi. 2 f., may be discussed more at large on account of its celebrity. Already, iii. 22, it is said, "Each woman shall ask from her neighbour vessels of silver and gold, and clothes;" and ver. 21, "I will give this people favour in the eyes of the Egyptians, that when they go they may not go empty." Now it is said, xii. 35 f., "The children of Israel did according to the word of Moses, and asked of the Egyptians silver and golden vessels, and clothes; and Jehovah gave the people favour in the eyes of the Egyptians." On Luther's {and E. V.'s} interpretation of the following words: וַיִּשְׁאַלֻּם וַיִּצְּלוּ אֶת־מִצְרַיִם, "so that they *lent* to them, and they *spoiled* the Egyptians," the difficulty arises, how an actual theft can be here commanded—a point which has been often made use of in a pitiful way. It is not necessary to show that theft is in decided opposition to the moral spirit of Mosaism. The solution which Ewald comes to in his *History of Israel*, ii. 3d ed. p. 95, is, that the spoiling is, in the sense of the story, no theft, because the following breach of faith on Pharaoh's part made it impossible to give back the borrowed property, and that this turn of affairs contained at the same time a sort of divine retribution in favour of Israel, in as far as it appears, when looked at from the ultimate issue, simply as the equalizing act of a higher providence standing over human inequalities, that they who were long oppressed by the Egyptians are in this manner compensated for the long oppression. This solution may be right so far, but it is not at all necessary. Winer, in his *Lexicon*, has with good reason left out the meaning "lend" which is given to the word וַיִּצְּלוּ. The word appears in the Hiphil only once more in the Old Testament, 1 Sam. i. 28, and there it is quite incorrect to translate that Hannah lends her son Samuel to the Lord. She wishes to *give* him to God in giving him to the sanctuary. The word rather signifies *dedit alicui quod petierat*, according to Winer. In the וַיִּצְּלוּ, xii. 36, compared with iii. 22, no robbery is implied, but just a simple taking away; in what sense, the connection must decide. Accordingly the sense of the passage is, that the Egyptians are glad to get rid of the Israelites at this price; so that Ewald's view, that we have here an act of remuneration, that the children of Israel might thus receive a compensation, is still applicable. But when Ewald (*l.c.* p. 96) and others see in the matter also the quite different meaning that Israel took from the Egyptians the true religion, the right utensils of sacrifice, and along with them the true holy things

and sacrifices, nothing of this lies in the story, and this construction is very far-fetched.

(6) In regard to the *place where Israel passed through the Red Sea*, there has always been a dispute. The view of the well-known naturalist Schleiden, ingeniously defended in a separate publication (*The Isthmus of Suez*, 1858), that Israel's path did not at all lie across the Red Sea, but led much farther north along the Mediterranean Sea to the Arabian wilderness, is quite untenable, and cannot properly be regarded as anything but an oddity. We can only think of three localities. 1. Most modern critics suppose the passage to have been at the modern Suez, where now the breadth of the sea is 3450 feet, and there are two fords whose shallows could even now be laid dry for a time by an east or north-east wind (Ex. xiv. 21); but we must here note that in that ancient time the Red Sea undoubtedly stretched a good way farther north, so that we must suppose that at that time it was considerably broader beside Suez. Comp. also Kurtz, *History of the Old Covenant*, ii. p. 325 (F.T.L.). 2. The crossing might also possibly have taken place farther north, at the old basin of the sea, beside the present Ajrud; see Stickel's essay, "The Israelites' March out of Egypt to the Red Sea," *Studien und Kritiken*, 1850, Nr. 2, p. 328 ff. 3. Karl v. Raumer, *The March of the Israelites from Egypt to Canaan*, 1837, has transferred the place where the entrance into the Red Sea took place pretty much to the south, at the southern slope of the mountains of Attaka, where the Red Sea is the breadth of six hours' journey. I have never been convinced by this view, and it is utterly improbable.

(7) Certainly in the genealogy, Ex. vi. 16–20, Moses and Aaron form the fourth generation from Levi; but it follows from other genealogies that links are left out in this genealogy. That in Num. xxvi. 29 ff. has six generations; that in 1 Chron. ii. 3 ff., seven; that in 1 Chron. vii. 22 ff., as many as ten for the same period. The enormous increase of the population of Israel can only be explained by accepting a longer period.

II. THE CONCLUSION OF THE COVENANT OF THE LAW, AND THE MARCH THROUGH THE WILDERNESS.

§ 28.

Pedagogic Aim of the March through the Wilderness. The Covenant of the Law established.

In God's great deed by the Red Sea a pledge was already given to the people for the happy completion of the newly commenced march,

for the victorious subjugation of all their enemies, and for their introduction to the promised land, as foretold in Moses' song of praise, Ex. xv. 13 ff. But first the people, scarcely escaped from the rod of correction, from the flesh-pots and the idols of Egypt, must be educated, sifted, and purified for its calling; and this pedagogic aim is served by the march in the wilderness, where the people are thrown entirely on their God, where they become aware of their need of help through want and privation, and are to be exercised in obedience and trust; but to prove at the same time, in the experience of the divine leading and help, what they have in their God (Deut. viii. 2-5, 14-18; comp. also the typical application, Hos. ii. 16) (1). In the third month, Ex. xix. 1 (according to the probable signification of the date in this passage, which is indeed indistinct), on the first of the month, the people reached Sinai, where Jehovah, as the Holy One, in which attribute He has already manifested Himself in the redemption of the people (xv. 11, comp. Ps. lxxvii. 14-16), desires to found the theocracy and enter on His kingship (comp. Ex. xv. 18). After the people have been told that they have been chosen before all nations as the divine property, and have been prepared by consecration for the solemn act, there follows the promulgation of the fundamental law by which Jehovah binds Israel's race to a holy constitution, and thus "He became King in Jeshurun" (Deut. xxxiii. 5). By the covenant offering, Ex. xxiv., the entrance of the people into communion with the holy God is sealed. Both the electing love of God, who here betrothes Himself to His people (Ezek. xvi. 8, "then becomest thou mine"), and the menacing severity of the Holy One of Israel and His law (comp. Heb. xii. 18 ff.), appear in the whole ceremonies of the conclusion of the covenant of law. With regard to grace and judgment, Israel is from this time forward the privileged people of God (2).

(1) On the significance of the march through the wilderness, compare Auberlen's book, *The Divine Revelation*, i. p. 136 Tr.: "That they might be cast on Him alone, and not become immediately re-entangled in the world's affairs, Israel is not led directly from Egypt to Canaan, but by a great round through the wilderness, where the temporal life of nature and history stands still, and the people are alone with their God. Since the wilderness is without nourishment,

and without so much as a path, the simplest sign of human culture, He undertakes to feed them with manna; He undertakes their guidance in the pillar of cloud and fire, that herein too the people may be directly pointed to Him, and accustomed to the thought of Him."—It is this pedagogic meaning of the wilderness-wandering of Israel which makes it so weighty, not simply historically, but also in religious praxis; and in this we do not read something into the Old Testament history which only occurs to ourselves as we meditate on it; but this is the point of view under which the Old Testament itself—the Pentateuch, and especially Deuteronomy, from which a few chief passages have been brought forward in the text, as well as prophecy—presents the history of the Israelites.—In Hos. ii. 16, the future restoration of Israel is represented as a new leading through the wilderness. In the preceding passage it is foretold that God will remove Israel into a position of separation, where it can no more have intercourse with the idols to which it has given itself. This is the first stage. And now, ver. 16: "Behold, I will entice her, and lead her into the wilderness, and will speak to her heart;" the people shall be placed in a position where they are thrown entirely on God, as Israel was once in the Arabian wilderness, to learn by experience what it has in its God.

(2) On the establishment of the covenant at Sinai, compare the words of Karl Ritter, the geographer, in his beautiful essay, "The Peninsula of Sinai, and the Path of the Children of Israel to Sinai," in Piper's *Evangelical Calendar*, 1852, p. 35: "A strange astonishment seizes us when contemplating this great mysterious miracle of miracles, that the first germ of a purer and higher religious development of the human race, sunk in this horrible mountainous wilderness, was to be fructified by such patriarchal simplicity, and further unfolded and handed down from generation to generation, by a people so sunk in slavery, which had become so lustful, and continued to be so often a covenant-breaking people, as the people of Israel then was, and that by them it was to be guarded as the most holy jewel for the whole future of the nations. Yet the divine similes of the sower, of the mustard seed, and of the leaven, find here their earliest application."

29.

The First Breach of the Covenant. Order of the Camp. Departure from Sinai. Sentence on the People.

In consequence of the closing of the covenant, Jehovah is to make His dwelling among His people, because of which the laws touching the

arrangement of the tabernacle are next given in Ex. xxv. ff. (1). But before this is carried out the people have already broken the covenant, by falling into idolatry in the absence of Moses. Moses executes judgment on the idolaters; and on this occasion the tribe of Levi—whose zeal now takes fire, not, as their father's (Gen. xxxiv.), for the wounded family honour, but for God's honour—obtains its consecration (Ex. xxxii. 26–29; comp. also Num. xv. 11, Deut. xxxiii. 9 f.) (2). And then Moses goes before Jehovah, offering himself for the people as the victim of the curse, and conjures by repeated entreaties the divine mercy till he has obtained pardon. Thus the first breach of the covenant leads to a further disclosure of the divine essence; and to God's former names are added the new ones: merciful, gracious, long-suffering God (Ex. xxxiv. 6). But in Moses' offer to resign his personal salvation, if only his people may be delivered, the idea of a reconciling mediation coming in for a sinful people appears for the first time (comp. Rom. ix. 3) (3).—During the stay at Sinai, which was for about a year, the holy tabernacle is set up and dedicated, the ordinances of worship are regulated, and a number of other laws are given, in which all points are fixed with particular exactness, by which in the regulation of the people's life their difference from the Egyptians and from the Canaanite tribes is to be marked (comp., in particular, passages like Lev. xviii. 2 f., 24, xx. 23 f.). Hereupon the number of the people is taken, the tribe of Levi is introduced into the position ordained for it, and, lastly, the order of encampment is fixed, by which (Num. ii. and iii., comp. x. 13 ff.) the relationship of Jehovah to the people as His army (as they are called, Ex. vii. 4), and at the same time their relationship to each other, is distinctly stamped. In the middle is the holy tabernacle; next to it, on the east, the priests encamp; and on the three other sides the three families of the Levites (4); then come the twelve tribes, arranged on the political division which separates Joseph into two tribes, in four triads (5), facing the four quarters of the heavens, each of which had a leading tribe with a banner at its head. Judah, Reuben, Ephraim, and Dan are the leading tribes; and Judah, the first of them, encamping on the east, leads the whole procession.—In the second year, on the twentieth of the month, the removal from Sinai takes place. The people are to pass in a direct

way through the wilderness of Paran to the promised land. They succeed—under repeated outbreaks of their stiffneckedness, and chastisements suffered on this account—in reaching Kadesh-Barnea, the southern boundary of Canaan. In the catalogue of the resting-places (Num. xxxiii.), the station Rithma (ver. 18) is probably to be looked for beside Kadesh. From this point Moses causes the land to be searched by twelve spies. The accounts which these bring back raise a general insurrection. Now is the measure of the divine patience exhausted. A wandering of forty years long in the wilderness is decreed against the people, during which time all those who have passed their twentieth year—that is, the whole body of men who were capable of war—are to be swept away, except Oshea, or Joshua as Moses calls him (Num. xiii. 16), and Caleb, who had no share in that offence (Num. xiv., comp. xxxii. 13, Josh. v. 6). Therefore the history of the march through the wilderness is treated as a type of warning for all times (Ps. lxxviii., xc. 8 ff.; in the New Testament, 1 Cor. x. 1–12, Heb. iii. 7 ff.).

(1) The plan of the legislative sections of the Pentateuch falls to be treated of in the Old Testament introduction. I only remark here, that the succession of the laws is not fixed by the systematic considerations of a formal code, but merely by each law being put in the place in which its publication proves to be necessary. If this is taken into consideration, some inconsistencies which will have been found in these sections vanish.

(2) It has already been shown in § 25, that in Jacob's prophetic utterances Levi receives a curse rather than a blessing, on account of his passionate zeal manifested in the treacherous deed of blood (Gen. xxxiv.). Now the turning of the curse into a blessing is seen in Ex. xxxii. 26–29, when Moses returns from the mountain, and sees the sin of the people with the golden calf. On his cry, "Hither to me, all ye who belong to the Lord!" the tribe of Levi gathers at once round him, sword in hand, and executes, without mercy, punishment on the idolaters. (Kurtz, *History of the Old Covenant*, ii. p. 313: "If the forefather broke truth, fidelity, and right by vengeance on the Shechemites, his descendants, by avenging Jehovah on their blood-relations, saved truth, right, and covenant.") Deut. xxxiii. 9 f. refers to this history: "He who says of his father and his mother, I see him not, and knoweth not his brothers, nor acknowledgeth his sons, . . . they shall teach thee thy laws, O Jacob," etc. Num. xxv. 6–13, the

story of the zeal of Phinehas, is another explanatory parallel in the Pentateuch, in which this characteristic trait, which qualifies Levi for the priesthood, is pointed out.

(3) One of the most beautiful sections of the Pentateuch, in which Moses appears at his best, is the story of Moses offering himself as *ἀνάθεμα*, if God will only forgive the people,—a word which has been spoken by only one other than Moses, namely Paul, Rom. ix. 3: *ἡὺχόμην γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου*, etc. Comp., in particular, Bengel's *Gnomon* on this passage: *Verba humana non sunt plane apta, quibus includantur motus animarum sanctarum: neque semper iidem sunt motus illi, neque in earum potestate est, tale semper votum ex sese elicere. Non capit hoc anima non valde provecta. De mensura amoris in Mose et Paulo non facile est existimare. Eum enim modulus ratiocinationum nostrarum non capit: sicut heronum bellicorum animos non capit parvulus. Apud ipsos illos duumviros intervalla illa, quæ bono sensu ecstastica dici possunt, subitum quiddam et extraordinarium fuere. Ne in ipsorum quidem potestate erat, tales actus ex sese quovis tempore elicere, etc.* In Genesis we have already a mediatorial intervention, when Abraham wishes to intervene for Sodom and Gomorrah; but more remarkable is the intervention of Moses, who wishes to be blotted out of the book of life. K. Lechler rightly points out, in his treatise, "*Bemerkungen zum Begriffe der Religion*," in Ullmann's *Studien und Kritiken*, 1851, Nr. 4, p. 782, that such highly elevated points of the religious life could not be understood from Schleiermacher's notion of religion.

(4) The family of Gershon, westward; Kohath, southward; and Merari, northward (comp. also § 93).

(5) The triads are formed with consideration of the descent on the mother's side (comp. § 25, note 1): 1. Judah, Issachar, Zebulun; 2. Reuben, Simeon, Gad; 3. Ephraim, Manasseh, Benjamin; 4. Dan, Asher, Naphtali. [Article, "Stämme Israels."]

§ 30.

L

The Wandering during Thirty-seven Years in the Wilderness, and the Events up to the Occupation of the Land on the East Side of Jordan.

The history of the Pentateuch passes over the following seven-and-thirty years almost in perfect silence. According to Deut. i. 46, a longer stay of the people in Kadesh must be presupposed (1). From

this point the return march of the people into the wilderness took place by the stages registered in Num. xxxiii. 19 ff., in which wandering for thirty-seven years the march round Mount Seir, mentioned in Deut. ii. 1, is included. In the first month of the fortieth year, the people are again in Kadesh-Barnea. This second encampment is meant in Num. xx. 1. The new-grown race shows the same stubbornness as the earlier one; they contend with Moses and Aaron; and as this time even the faith of these two swerves, to them also entrance into the land of rest is denied (Num. xx. 10, 12, comp. Ps. cvi. 32 f.). In Deut. i. 37 (comp. iii. 26), Moses and Aaron do not seek to be acquitted from their own guilt (see xxxii. 51); but the conscience of the people has to be touched, because their sin gave occasion to the guilt of the two (2). Since the Edomites denied their brother-people the passage through their lands, Israel had to turn back a second time from the border of Canaan, and go round the mountains of Edom, in order to penetrate from the eastern side (Num. xx. 14 ff.). A new outbreak of the people's stubbornness draws upon them another chastisement, but at the same time supplies the occasion for a revelation of the saving power of faith (xxi. 4 ff.). The brazen serpent (a sort of serpent) which was set up, is a symbol of the doing away of evil through the power and grace of God. To this the typical use in John iii. 14 attaches itself (3). Then follow, in the land on the east of Jordan, successful combats, as a testimony to Jehovah's faithfulness and a pledge of future victory. The Amorites and Og king of Bashan are conquered, and Israel sets up its camp in the plains of Moab, opposite to Jericho, and separated from the Holy Land only by the Jordan. King Balak of Moab wishes to conjure the danger by means of Balaam, the seer from Mesopotamia, and to arrest the path of the victorious people by means of his curse; but the seer, overpowered by the Spirit of Jehovah, is compelled to bless Israel, and make known to the people its future splendour, and the brilliant and victorious dominion which is to arise out of it (xxiv. 17-19), while he declares the fall of the heathen world, and also the subjugation of the world-power of Asia, destined to make a prey of the people dwelling round them, by a power coming from the west (vers. 20-24) (4).—More successful were the Moabites and Midianites, when, at Balaam's advice (xxxii. 16), they enticed the people to the service of Baal-Peor,

and the lewdness connected therewith. After vengeance has been taken on the Midianites for this (chap. xxxi.), the land which was conquered on the east of Jordan, and which was especially adapted for the continuation of a pastoral life, is divided to the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half of Manasseh (chap. xxxii.). This stretch of land does not belong to the promised land proper, the property of Jehovah (Josh. xxii. 19). It is limited to the territory on the west of Jordan, according to the boundaries given (Num. xxxiv. 1 ff.). But a sphere of dominion of much wider extension was promised to the people (Gen. xv. 18) between the rivers Nile and Euphrates, or, according to the more precise statement (Ex. xxiii. 31), between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, the Arabian wilderness, and the Euphrates (comp. also Deut. i. 7, xi. 24, Josh. i. 4).—The new numbering of the people, which was accomplished (Num. xxvi.) in the plains of Moab, shows the new-grown race in strength of number almost the same as the former (601,730 men fit for war, against 603,550); but, on the other hand, the differences of number among the individual tribes are considerable, especially in Simeon (comp. xxvi. 14 with i. 23), which has diminished to almost a third part of its former size, and, according to this, seems to have shared especially in the last visitation of punishment, as indeed, according to xxv. 14, the guilty prince Zimri was a Simeonite.

(1) In Deut. i. 46 it is said: "Ye remained in Kadesh many days." According to the view of Fries, in his essay "On the Position of Kadesh, and the Portion of Israel's History in the Wilderness which is connected therewith" (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1854, Nr. 1, p. 50 ff.), and of Schultz, in his Commentary to Deuteronomy, this would refer to the full forty years. If so, we must assume that part of the people remained through the whole forty years in Kadesh, probably out of defiance, whilst Moses with another part made the farther march, whereupon in the end the whole people united again in Kadesh. For this view the change of person may be pleaded, when in i. 46 the second person is used, whereas it is said in ii. 1, "and *we* turned us," etc. Keil's view (comp. his Commentary), which I have accepted in the text, seems to me to be the more probable one. In these thirty-seven years, out of which only a few subordinate events are told us in the Pentateuch, seems to fall the defection of the people indicated by Amos v. 26 {?}, when the people mixed the service of

Milcom with Jehovah-worship, and followed their idolatrous lust (comp. § 26, note 4).

(2) In Num. xx. 10, Moses says to the people: "Hear, ye rebels; shall we indeed bring water to you out of the rock?" Upon this, Jehovah says to Moses and Aaron, ver. 12: "Because ye have not believed on me, to sanctify me before the people of Israel, ye shall not bring this congregation into the land which I give them."—Dent. i. 37: "Also against me was Jehovah wroth for your sakes, and said, Also thou shalt not enter." Ps. cvi. 32 f.: "They made (God) angry at the water of strife, and it went ill with Moses because of them; for they made his spirit bitter, so that he spoke inconsiderate words with his lips" (יִבְטֵא בְּיַפְתָּי). It is an old question of dispute, "*qua in re peccaverit Moses*." Comp. Buddeus, *Historia ecclesiastica V. T.* i. p. 527 f., for the older views. More modern writers have often maintained that there is at least one contradiction between the passages in the book of Numbers and those in Deuteronomy, but the solution is easily found in the way indicated in the text. That in the unbelief of the whole race no excuse is found for the weak faith of the chosen instruments of God; that unbroken obedience was demanded from the organs of revelation, and that these are most sharply punished just as a pattern of warning,—is the idea of the narrative.

(3) Numerous mistakes have been made by taking the brazen serpent, Num. xxi. 8 f., as a symbol of the healing power, which the serpent certainly often is in heathenism; while besides this, in the Phœnician and Egyptian religions, the wounded serpent appears as a symbol of eternity and immortality. But this does not suit here. Though Wisd. xvi. 5 ff. names that brazen ἡψύ σύμβολον σωτηρίας, this is not as if the serpent itself, as in heathenism, were the symbol of the healing power; but (comp. Schmid, *Biblische Theol. des N. T.* i. p. 215 Tr.; Ewald, *History of Israel*, ii. 3d ed. p. 249), as indicated in the text, the matter stands thus:—The serpent is a symbol of the evil which has now come upon Israel on account of its sins, and the serpent set up as a standard is a symbol of the overcoming and doing away of evil for every believer by means of Jehovah's might and grace. "Now he who looks on this sign ordained by God is master of the poison that has penetrated into him" (Baumgarten, *Theological Commentary to the Pentateuch*, i. 2). To this attaches the typical interpretation in Christ's saying, John iii. 14 f.: καθὼς Μωϋσῆς ὑψώσε τὸν ὄφιν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ, οὕτως ὑψωθῆναι δεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· ἵνα πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν μὴ ἀπόληται, ἀλλ' ἔχῃ ζωὴν αἰώνιον. Therein lies the thought, that he who looks in faith to Him whom God, as Paul expresses it, 2 Cor. v. 21, has made to be sin for us, thus becomes

free from the poison and guilt of sin which has entered into him.—A connection with the Egyptian serpent-worship is the less to be thought of in the story, that, according to Herodotus, ii. 74, the sacred serpents of the Egyptians were harmless. But Phœnician and Egyptian serpent-worship may very well have become at a later time the occasion of the idolatrous misuse of the image of the serpent which is spoken of in 2 Kings xviii. 4.

(4) Num. xxiv. 17-19 is the well-known prophetic word about the star and sceptre arising out of Israel. It portrays the splendid dominion of victory proceeding from Israel, which shall overcome Moab and Edom. We may admit our assent to the position, that in the first instance only a *sovereignty* arising out of Jacob is here spoken of (as also Hengstenberg thinks). But this cannot, nevertheless, be thought of without a personal representative of the sovereignty. The passage is certainly a Messianic one. I understand vers. 20-24 thus : The ancient people of Amalek shall not be protected by their age, nor the people of the Kenites by the security of their dwelling. The seer, after he has foretold the fall of Israel's chief enemies, means to say that each and every heathen people, even those who appear to be most firmly founded, must perish. They fall, in the first instance, a sacrifice to the Asiatic world-power, which has its seat on the farther side of the Euphrates; but his power is also overcome by a power coming from the side of the Hittites, that is, from the west, from the Mediterranean Sea. When this also is doomed to destruction, the whole heathen world becomes a great Calvary before the eyes of the seer, over which God's people lifts itself victorious. It is a perfectly miserable explanation, which loves to call itself historical (Hitzig), according to which the arrival of the fleet from the side of the Hittites is made to refer to an unimportant inroad of sea-robbers on the Asiatic coast in the eighth century. The passage is rather parallel to that in the close of Gen. ix. Here also the path of the history is pointed out in grand outlines: first, Asia, represented by Asshur, arises as a world-empire; Asia falls before a European power, and Israel rises out of both.

§ 31.

Deuteronomy. Moses' End. His Position among the Organs of Revelation.

The people's wandering is completed, and Moses is to place the staff of leadership in Joshua's hands. The last testament of the departing leader to his people is given in Deuteronomy (1). In its

legislative sections it forms the proper law-book of the people, the decisions of which presuppose at the same time the settlement of the people in the Holy Land. An essential peculiarity of the book is, that it also presents the subjective side of the law, which had been brought forward in the earlier books in strict objectivity; wherefore the tone of speech is here more that of paternal warning, which, by pointing to Jehovah's electing and long-suffering patient love, endeavours to awaken love to Him in return. In the section which carries out further the thoughts in Lev. xxvi. (Deut. xxviii.—xxx. comp. with chap. iv.), and in the farewell song of Moses, chap. xxxii., lie the fundamental conceptions of prophecy: God's grace and faithfulness in choosing and leading Israel; the people's thanklessness and rebelliousness; the divine judgment breaking in, and God's pity turning again to the people after the judgment, and bringing the counsel of salvation to its goal in their restoration. In Moses' blessing, chap. xxxiii., Judah, Levi, and Joseph are especially prominent; Simeon is wanting, which may be explained from what is noted at the close of § 30 (2). In Josh. xix. the tribe appears again, but receives a very small inheritance. When Moses has finished blessing his people, he mounts to the top of Pisgah in order to cast yet one look on the longed-for land, and appears no more on earth. His end is related in a mysterious way, but is indicated, Deut. xxxiv. 5, 7, comp. xxxii. 50, by the same expressions as the common end of man's life (3). Standing in one line with other organs of revelation by the name prophet, Deut. xviii. 18, Hos. xii. 14, and the name of honour, "Jehovah's servant," Deut. xxxiv. 5, he was nevertheless placed over them, in that to him was granted (Ex. xxxiii. 11; Num. xii. 6–8; Deut. xxxiv. 10) a higher form of revelation than to the others, which is called a gazing upon God (comp. § 66, 3). His position, in virtue of which he was the divinely ordained organ for the whole powers of the theocracy, is a unique one, which did not descend to Joshua, who had only to execute inherited commands, and represent an already given law (4).

(1) Deuteronomy is one of the most disputed books in the Old Testament, but it is one of the most beautiful. To be sure, it does not place at its commencement a testimony that the book as it lies before us was written entirely by Moses; for מֹשֶׁה, i. 5, does not mean "he

engraved, wrote," but "he explained, expounded this law." This word, therefore, might have been used, even although the reporter of the speeches of Moses was another than Moses himself. But "this law" itself (הַחֹרֶף הַזֶּה), under which is to be understood in particular the main legislative portion of the book, which is supplied with a special title, iv. 44-49, and with a subscription, xxviii. 69, is characterized most definitely as written by Moses by xxxi. 9 ("and Moses wrote this law"), and ver. 24 ("when Moses had finished writing the words of this law in a book, to the end"); and it is also, without doubt, the legislation herein contained which was to be written, xxvii. 3-8, on the stones to be erected on Ebal. It is pure caprice to refer xxxi. 9, 24 to the Pentateuch, and yet to maintain that xxvii. 3-8, in spite of the most definite explanation in ver. 8, "all the words of this law," only speaks of a quintessence of the law, because Hengstenberg and Keil have not ventured to assert the whole Pentateuch to have been written on those stones.—Now those legislative parts of Deuteronomy admittedly show a remarkable agreement with the book of the covenant in Exodus, which *claims to be* written by Moses.—The view of many modern critics, that the finding of the book of the law at the repairing of the temple under Josiah, in the year 624 B.C. (2 Kings xxii.), was in truth the publication of Deuteronomy, which was only written a short time before, is contrary to the fact that even the oldest prophets presuppose Deuteronomy, its legislative provisions, and also its speeches; though, indeed, many modern critics turn the matter round, and say, for example, that Isa. i. does not rest on Deuteronomy, but Deuteronomy has copied Isa. i., etc.—A closer examination of the critical question of Deuteronomy must be left to Old Testament introduction.

(2) In Moses' blessing, his silence on Simeon is eloquent. Some codd. of the LXX. Deut. xxxiii. 6 have Simeon in the second half-verse beside Reuben: καὶ Συμεὼν ἔστω πολὺς ἐν ἀριθμῷ; but this is undoubtedly a later insertion.

(3) In speaking of the close of Moses' life, the phrases, "to die," and "to be gathered to his people," are used xxxiv. 5, 7, xxxii. 50, which last denote in the Old Testament common death and removal into Sheol, into the kingdom of the dead (comp. § 78). There are two men in the Old Testament of whom these expressions are not used, viz. Enoch and Elijah. The Jewish legends sought to give Moses, that highly elevated organ of revelation, a place beside these two persons. Josephus, *Ant.* iv. 8, § 48, represents him as suddenly snatched away in the way Elijah was, and adds that Moses has indeed written in the sacred books that he died for fear that it might be said

afterwards, on account of his superabundant virtue, that he was gone to the Divinity; and Philo, *Vita Mosis*, iii. § 39, says he was buried, μηδενὸς παρόντος, δηλονότι χερσὶν οὐ θνηταῖς, ἀλλ' ἀθανάτοις δυνάμεσιν. The rabbis sought to read something strange into Deut. xxxiv. 5, and explained the מִן-פִּי: "Moses the servant of the Lord died there in the land of Moab, at the *mouth of Jehovah*." From this arose the rabbinical doctrine of the death by a kiss; the *mors osculi*, which implies deliverance from death. It means rather: "according to the mouth of the Lord," according to the divine word or command. The expression refers to the earlier divine word, that Moses shall not be allowed to see the promised land, but must die before that time. The position of the New Testament to the death of Moses is peculiar. Whilst Heb. xi. 40 says of the old covenant fathers, that they "are not perfected without us," making their τελείωσις dependent on the completion of the New Testament work of redemption; the New Testament history of the transfiguration, where Moses appears with Elijah, Matt. xvii. 3, Luke ix. 30 f. (in which latter passage the ὀφθέντες ἐν δόξῃ, is particularly significant), presupposes Moses as perfected for the heavenly life. If justice is done to all the passages, we must say, with Stier (*Words of the Lord Jesus* (Trans.), in Matt. xvii.): "A wonderful exception is made with the bodies of these two from the common lot of death; although the lawgiver actually died on account of sin, and the prophet was raised to meet more nearly the victory over death."—The passage Jude 9 attaches to a legend which, according to Origen, περὶ ἀρχῶν, iii. 2, is taken out of the apocryphal *Ascensio Mosis*, and which has also found entrance into the Targum of Jonathan to Deut. xxxiv. 6. According to it, Satan, referring to the murder of the Egyptian, Ex. ii. 12, is said to have opposed the archangel Michael, to whom Moses' burial was given in charge by God.—The Jewish fables on the life and death of Moses are collected in the rabbinical treatise "de Vita Mosis," translated into Latin by Gilbert Gaulmyn, and published again by Gfrörer, in the work, *Prophetæ veteres pseudepigraphi*, 1840, p. 303 ff.

(4) The unique importance of Moses is especially recognised when we compare the position of Joshua with that of Moses. Joshua is simply a leader, he has no other theocratic power; in particular, he never performs priestly functions, and is subordinate in rank to the high priest. In the latter connection, Cassel (on Judg. i. 1, in Lange's *Bibelwerk*) has well remarked, that whilst Moses is always named before Aaron, when Joshua is named along with the priest Eleazar, the name of the priest always stands first (comp. Num. xxxiv. 17, Josh. xiv. 1, xvii. 4, xix. 51, xxi. 1).

III. THE SETTLEMENT OF ISRAEL IN THE HOLY LAND.

§ 32.

Occupation of Canaan. Extermination of the Canaanites.

After Joshua had been confirmed in his office of leader by Jehovah (Josh. i. 1-9), the passage of the Jordan ensued in a miraculous way, as a witness and pledge to the people that the same divine power which was with Moses would reveal Himself also under the new leader (iv. 14, 22-24), and therefore this event is expressly placed side by side with the march through the Red Sea (iv. 23; Ps. cxiv. 3 ff.). The people encamped in the plain of Jericho (Josh. iv. 13), and here first the circumcision of those born during the march through the wilderness was completed, and the people entered on participation in the good things of the Holy Land with the first passover festival (v. 2-12). The key to the land was won by the conquest of Jericho (chap. vi.) ; on this followed the taking of Ai, the second fortified place of central Canaan (Josh. viii.), after the curse was expiated which came on the people by Achan's disobedience (chap. vii. ; comp. Hos. ii. 17) (1). Now the promulgation of the law from Gerizim and Ebal, ordained in Deut. xxvii., could take place (viii. 30-35) ; and in accordance with the decree given in Deut. xxvii. 4-8, the law was written on stones plastered with lime (2). By a new victorious campaign against the southern (chap. x.), and another against the northern tribes of Canaan, the conquest of the land in a general sense was completed. The בָּרָחָה (ban, devotion as a curse), enjoined in Deut. vii. 2, xx. 16-18, comp. Ex. xxiii. 32 f., xxxiv. 12 ff., was executed on a number of Canaanitish towns. Vain attempts have been made to interpret in a milder form this command to exterminate the Canaanites, mainly by supposing that peace was first to be offered to the Canaanite towns, and if they refused this offer they were to be exterminated ; but in Deut. xx. 10 ff., to which passage this view appeals, this course of action (comp. ver. 15) is only prescribed in reference to foreign enemies not Canaanites. Or we are referred to Josh. xi. 20, according to which the Canaanites themselves, by hardening their hearts, became responsible for the execution of the judgment ;—a perfectly correct proposition, but one which

does not prevent us from understanding the decree of extermination in a perfectly general sense. It is no less erroneous to seek to justify the extermination of the Canaanites by an older claim to Canaan, inherited by Israel from the time of the patriarchs. Passages like Gen. xii. 6, xiii. 7, oppose this in the most definite manner. The Old Testament knows no other ground for the assignment of the land to Israel than the free grace of Jehovah, to whom it belonged; and no other ground for the blotting out of the Canaanite tribes than the divine justice, which, after these tribes have filled up the measure of their sins in unnatural abominations (comp. Lev. xviii. 27 f., Deut. xii. 31), breaks in at last in vengeance, after long waiting (comp. Gen. xv. 16). But Israel is threatened with exactly the same judgment (comp. also Deut. viii. 19 f., xiii. 12 ff., Josh. xxiii. 15 f.) in case of its becoming participant in the sins of the tribes on whom it executes the divine judgment with the sword.

(1) Hos. ii. 17.—After it has been said in ver. 16 that God, in the future restoration of His people, will lead them into the wilderness and speak to their hearts (comp. § 28, note 1), the prophet goes on to say, “and I will give her her vineyards from thence,”—that is, immediately on her leaving the wilderness, ensues the introduction to the promised land, with its vine-clad hills,—“and the valley of Achor for the door of hope.” This points back to Josh. vii. Jericho had fallen, and all seemed prosperous for Israel. There a part of the army was defeated by the inhabitants of Ai. It was revealed to Joshua that a curse was on the army; for Achan had kept to himself something from the booty of Jericho, contrary to the strict command of God. Then Joshua said to Achan: “As thou hast troubled us, so let Jehovah trouble thee to-day;” and from this comes the name of the valley of *עֵבֹר*. Achan was stoned, and thereby the curse taken from the people; Ai was conquered, and thus the key to the land was won. So the valley of sorrow became the gate of hope. It is easy to recognise the prophet’s meaning: when God redeems His people, everything must work for its good.

(2) Josh. viii. 30–35; Deut. xxvii. 4–8.—Here, if anywhere, it is a true saying, that against many assumptions of recent criticism the very stones speak out. Investigation in the classical sphere presents no example of such impertinence as that which relegates the whole history of the transaction at Gerizim and Ebal without more ado to the realm of myths. The investigation of the Egyptian monuments

has shown that it was an ancient Egyptian custom first to plaster the stone walls of buildings, and also monumental stones that were to be painted with figures and hieroglyphics, with a plaster of lime and gypsum, into which the figures were worked; thus it was possible in Egypt to engrave on the walls the most extensive pieces of writing. And in this manner Deut. xxvii. 4-8 must be understood, and in this manner it was accomplished by Joshua. It is not to be explained, as formerly was often done, by saying that the law was engraved in the stones, and then the lime was to serve either to make the writing stand out more clearly, or to prevent it from being destroyed by the atmosphere. In the last case it is not conceivable that any large or comprehensive law could have been transferred to these stones. For the rest, that we are not here to think of the whole Pentateuch *in quali et quanto*, compare § 31, note 1.

(3) The extermination of the Canaanites has, as is well known, been a very special topic of discussion, and much doubtful apologetic has been produced on the subject. Hengstenberg, in his *Contributions to Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 471 ff., has treated the matter best. On the first glance, the attempt seems most plausible which seeks to render the extermination of the Canaanites somewhat less inhuman, by pointing to an old claim of Israel on Palestine. But this is out of the question, if we look at the passages of the Old Testament in which the relation of the people to the ground allotted to them is brought into closer view. Certainly Deut. xxxii. 8 contains the thought, that when spheres were allotted to the people of the earth by Divine Providence, regard was had to the place where in later ages the people of revelation was to have its historical development (comp. § 22, note 1). But how did they get this place? In Genesis the distinct impression is conveyed that the fathers of the race were strangers in Canaan. Because of this, in Gen. xii. 6 and xiii. 7 it is expressly brought forward that at that time even, there were Canaanites and Perizzites in the land. Stephen, Acts vii. 5, urges the same thing with the greatest emphasis: "He gave him no inheritance in it, not even a foot-breadth, and promised that He would give it him," etc. The point of view which is laid down in our text is alone in accordance with the Old Testament. Now it is certainly true that this Old Testament God is a dreadful God, as we are always told. But we must make it clear to ourselves, that the God who rules in the history of the universe is really this dreadful God. The fact stands sure, that already many nations have been swept away, and have experienced a like fate. Who has ordained this? The difference between the view of the Old Testament and of

other histories lies just in this, that where the latter perhaps see nothing but tragical crises of history, the former vindicates the ethical principle with all energy, according to which nothing happens without ground, and this ground just lies in the divine justice. It is quite unnecessary to add to this any artificial apologetical considerations. It is, moreover, to be noticed here, that beyond doubt a part of those Canaanites emigrated, mainly towards Phœnicia, but also to North Africa. Procopius (*de bello Vandalico*, ii. 10) found an inscription beside Tingitana in North Africa: "We are they who fled before the robber Jesu" (Joshua). The Berbers, who by descent are distinguished from the Arabians, are still regarded by the Arabians as descended from these fugitives.

§ 33.

Division of the Land. Character of the Promised Land. Israel at the Close of this Period.

Since the power of the Canaanites in general was broken, they now, in the seventh year after their entrance, as is to be concluded from Josh. xiv. 10, began to divide the land, which, indeed, was not yet in all parts completely vanquished (s. xiii. 2 ff.) (1). Eleazar the priest, and Joshua, with the chiefs of the tribes, managed the business of division (2). First, the most powerful tribes were provided for: Judah receiving the southern portion of the land; Joseph, that is, Ephraim and the other half of Manasseh, being settled in the middle. But a mistake had been made in the first calculation, so that afterwards, in the allotting of dominions to the seven remaining tribes, Benjamin, Dan, and Simeon had to be put into the land already apportioned. The sanctuary was removed from Gilgal to Shiloh (xviii. 1), which is situated pretty nearly in the middle of the land on this side Jordan, in the dominion of the tribe of Ephraim, to which Joshua himself belonged, and it remained there till towards the end of the time of the judges. The division of the land was carried out, so that not merely the limits of the tribal territories were fixed, but inside these also the districts of the families (3). Thus the life of tribe and family remained the basis of civil society. This certainly promoted a disposition to maintain the interests of the tribes at the cost of the national cause, in times when there was no powerful central authority, and every one did what seemed right to him; but

it also ensured the propagation of the faith and customs of the fathers inside the family circle (4), when declensions began to grow frequent.—So the “good land” (Ex. iii. 8; Deut. iii. 25, viii. 7–9), “the ornament of all lands” (Ezek. xx. 6, comp. with Jer. iii. 19, Dan. viii. 9, xi. 16), was won, where, on the basis of a life of husbandry requiring regular industry, the people should be matured for the fulfilment of their destiny in quiet and retirement (Num. xxiii. 9; Deut. xxiii. 28; comp. with Mic. vii. 14). The separation from other peoples commanded in the law (see specially Lev. xx. 24, 26) was made easier by the secluded position of the land, which was enclosed on the south and west by great wildernesses, on the north by the high mountains of Lebanon, and which even on the west was unfavourably situated for maritime intercourse, since the coast has few landing-places or inlets. On the other hand, by the situation of the land in the midst of the cultivated nations which form the scene of ancient history (comp. Ezek. v. 5, xxxviii. 12), as well as by the great highways of the old world which led past its borders, the future theocratic calling of the people was made possible (5). “The union of the greatest contrasts in this position in the world, the most isolated retirement combined with everything that can favour wide connections on all sides with the main civilised regions of the old world by intercourse of commerce and language, by sea as well as by land, with the Arabians, Indians, Egyptians, Syrians, Armenians, with the Greek and Roman world of culture, in their common centre of space and history, is a characteristic peculiarity of this promised land which was destined from the beginning to be the home of the chosen people” (Ritter, *Erdkunde*, xv. 1, p. 11) (6).—Two parts of the promise given to the patriarchs are fulfilled by the entrance of Israel into their rest in the promised land, and by the increase of the people like the stars of heaven (Deut. x. 22). But the empire over nations (Gen. xxvii. 29, xlix. 10) is not yet obtained, the blessing of Abraham is not yet come on the heathen; nay, a new cycle of history must arise, in which centuries of contest for mere existence are ordained for the people.—Since the possession of the land was always in danger from the numerous remnants of the Canaanites, part of whom were dispersed, and part not yet touched by the march of conquest, as well as from the Philistine Pentapolis

(Josh. xiii. 2 f.), which had arisen in the low country on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and from the neighbourhood of hostile peoples on the east, a faithful union of the tribes in firm connection with the theocratic centre would have been proper. And at first, on the occasion related in Josh. xxii., the consciousness of the theocratic unity of the people showed itself still in full strength, and Joshua exerted himself at two gatherings of the people which he held towards the close of his life (chap. xxiii. and xxiv.) to reanimate this feeling, and to repress the idolatry that was coming up again among the people (xxiv. 23, comp. with ver. 15). Also the people were willing to renew the covenant with Jehovah, and remained, on the whole, true to it as long as the race lived that had seen God's great deeds (xxiv. 31; Judg. ii. 7).

(1) One of the contradictions which are said to have been found in the book of Joshua is this: On the one side the book ascribes the vanquishing the Canaanites and the conquest of the land to Joshua (xi. 16-23, xii. 7 ff., comp. xxi. 41 ff., xxii. 4); and yet, on the other side (chap. xiii.), an account of unconquered lands is given, and the necessity is expressed of making still more extensive conquests. The matter stands thus. When it is said, xi. 23, "So Joshua took the whole land," this means: the conquest of the land *in general* was finished. This does not exclude the fact that in detail, as is explained in chap. xiii., there was still very much to be done. That the conquest was looked upon as on the whole complete, is shown in the second part of the book (chap. xiii.-xxii.), by the fact that he causes the parts which were not conquered to be divided.—The second part of the book is of enormous value for biblical geography. If we compare these sections with the parallels, 1 Chron. iv. 28-32, vi. 39-66, we see how difficult it would have been in a later time to write down and represent everything for the first time, as those must suppose who make the book much more modern.

(2) To aid in this assignment of territory, a sort of map had been sketched. I think Ritter is right in thus understanding Josh. xviii. 4-9; see his *History of Geography and Discovery*, edited by Daniel, p. 7 f., where we are reminded that the knowledge necessary for this might have been brought from Egypt, where land measurement was a very ancient thing, as the division of fields required to be newly adjusted each year after the overflow of the Nile.

(3) Hence the regularly returning לְמִשְׁפַּחֹתָם in the charter of

division, Josh. xviii. f.—The name מְלָכִים (Mic. v. 1) was conferred metaphorically on the more notable towns which were the chief places of the tribes. From this we can understand how the towns themselves were then further personified and inserted in the tribal registers, in which local dependence is represented as genealogical descent (see specially 1 Chron. ii. 42 ff., and Bertheau on the passage, iv. 4 ff., etc. etc.). [Art: “Stämme Israels.”]

(4) Thus various callings readily became hereditary, and there were families which, according to 1 Chron. iv. 14, xxi. 23, formed themselves directly into trade guilds. Similarly, in 1 Chron. ii. 55, families of Sopherim (scribes) are mentioned. Also in the names, ii. 53, names of occupations are probably contained, as already conjectured by Jerome.

(5) One of these old highways led from Central Asia in the north, past Damascus to the Mediterranean Sea; the other in the south, by Idumea to Egypt (comp. the “Remarks on Gen. xiv.” by Tuch in the *Zeitschr. der deutschen morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, i. 1847, p. 161 ff.¹).—A first consequence of the position of Israel in the midst of the nations was, that it courted the powers of the world, and was chastised by all, so that all became instruments of judgment on Israel. But on the other side, it is this central position which makes this land fit for the starting-point of the religion of the world.

(6) Comp. further how Ritter expresses himself in the same book, p. 7: “It seems impossible to us to imagine the development of the people of Israel as taking place in any other part of our planet than just on the soil of Palestine;” comp. also p. 10 f.

¹ {Reprinted in the second edition of Tuch's *Genesis*.}

SECOND SECTION.

THE DOCTRINES AND ORDINANCES OF MOSAISM.

§ 34.

Survey.

This section falls into the following members:—

1. The doctrine of God and His relation to the world, which doctrine is to be treated so that it may appear how God's theocratic and revealed relationship is rooted in the Mosaic idea of God.

2. The doctrine of man and his relation to God, which is again to be put so that it may appear how the presupposition of the covenant relationship in which God is to stand to him is given in the idea of man.

3. The covenant of law and the theocracy, in which is completed the Mosaic stage of communion between God and man.

FIRST DIVISION.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND HIS RELATION TO THE WORLD.

FIRST CHAPTER.

THE MOSAIC IDEA OF GOD.

§ 35.

Survey.

The fundamental points in the Mosaic idea of God are the following:—

1. The most general characters of the Divine Being are expressed

in the characters אֵל, אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, אֱלֹהִים, which are also made use of outside the sphere of testamentary religion.

2. The divine name אֱלֹהֵי שֵׁר is the first that leads into the sphere of revelation.

3. But the divine name which is properly suited to Old Testament revelation is יְהוָה, Jehovah.

4. The idea of Jehovah is more exactly defined since the founding of the theocracy as that of the holy God, in which essential definition the attributes of divine justice and of the jealous God are rooted, as well as the attributes of the gracious (חַנּוּן) and merciful God (רַחוּם).

In these stages the idea of God is so unfolded, that the higher stages do not sublate the lower, but subsumes them in itself (1).

(1) It is wrong to bring the arrangement of the later dogmatic into biblical theology, and to treat God's attributes according to a preconceived scheme. Biblical theology pursues the religion of revelation in its living rise, and finds a gradually advancing series of statements on the divine essence available for the definition of the idea of God. Genesis only knows the general characteristics of the divine nature under No. 1, the אֱלֹהֵי שֵׁר under No. 2, and the name Jehovah by anticipation. The divine essence conceived as Jehovah unfolds itself from Ex. iii. onwards, and at the founding of the theocracy the divine holiness first appears. We seek in vain through the whole of Genesis for a passage characterizing God as the Holy One. After the first breach of the covenant, which called forth the divine קִנְיָה, the energy of the divine sanctity, the designation of God as the gracious, merciful, long-suffering God, appears also for the first time. Prophetic theology adds the definition of Jehovah as the Lord of hosts; this notion is wanting in the whole of the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua (also in Judges). The designation of God as the Wise One is also wanting in the Pentateuch, although certainly the wisdom of the artists working at the sanctuary is traced back to divine communication. It was reserved for more developed reflection (especially in the books of Chochma) to fix wisdom as an attribute of God, and to acknowledge in it the principle of the ordering of the world.

I. THE MOST GENERAL DESIGNATIONS OF THE DIVINE BEING,
EL, ELOAH, ELOHIM, EL-ELJON (1).

§ 36.

The most common designation of the Divine Being in the Old Testament is אֱלֹהִים, the plural of אֱלֹה, which is met with in the Old Testament almost exclusively in poetical language, with the exception of the more modern books that are under Aramaic influence. But אֱל is to be counted the oldest Semitic name of God, which already appears in a number of the oldest names (Gen. iv. 18, קַתְוִשָּׁאֵל, קַתְוִשָּׁאֵל; and also in Ismaelitish and Edomitish names, xxv. 13, אֶדְרִיֵּאֵל, a son of Ishmael; xxxvi. 43, מִנְדִּיאֵל). This name also passed to the Phœnicians as a name of Saturn, their highest god. אֱל, as a name of the true God, is no longer frequent in the Old Testament in prose, hardly appearing, except with the article הָאֱל, or determined by a following genitive, or an attribute annexed in some other way. That אֱל stands lower than אֱלֹהִים is seen by the climactic formula Josh. xxii. 22 (2), (Ps. l. 1). The meaning of the root אָל (to be strong, powerful) shows that the original sense of אֱל is "the powerful, strong."—Two different views exist as to the etymological explanation of אֱלֹה. According to the one, אֱל and אֱלֹה are to be regarded as related primitive substantives, whose original sense, as shown by the verb אָל, is that of *power* (3). According to this, the verb אָלָה (Arab. 'aliha) would be to be looked at as a denominative. According to the other view, אֱל and אֱלֹה are etymologically distinct, and the latter is to be traced back to the root 'aliha, which means *stupuit, pavore percussus fuit* (as also restless, disconnected movement lies in the related root *waliha*), in distinction from 'alaha, to honour, the denominative character of which is not to be doubted (4). אֱלֹה, as an abstract verbal noun, would originally denote *horror*, and then further the object of horror, and thus corresponds with the divine name פֶּהַר (Gen. xxxi. 42, 53), and the Greek σέβας. The latter view is probably the more correct, since at least the noun אֱלֹה has not the character of a primitive. If power and strength are indicated by the noun אֱל, this is, on the other hand, turned subjectively in the name אֱלֹה, which expresses the impression of power. Eloah is, according to this, the power which awakens horror. That the natural man finds himself, when con-

fronted by the Divinity, chiefly moved by a feeling of fear, is expressed in this designation of God (5).

The plural **אלהים** is peculiar to the Old Testament; it appears as a name of God only in old Hebrew, and in none of the other Semitic languages; even in the biblical Chaldee, **אלהין** only means gods. The meaning of this plural is not numerical, neither in the sense in which some older theologians understand it, who seek the secret of the Trinity in the name (6), nor in the sense that the expression had originally a polytheistical meaning, and only later acquired a singular sense (7); for the Old Testament monotheism was not developed on a polytheistic basis (comp. § 43, 1).—A third view, that originally in the plural the one God was taken together with the higher spirits forming His surrounding, has against it the general argument, that in the older times the notion of the angels is not prominent. On Gen. i. 26 ("Let us make man") the view cannot be based, since the whole of this record of creation shows no trace of a co-operation of the angels, and ver. 27 continues in the singular (8). It would be more natural to interpret Gen. xxxv. 7 ("The Elohim revealed themselves to him") as indicating by the plural that Jehovah is taken along with the angels according to the manifestation in the vision (chap. xxviii.) (9).—Elohim is much rather to be explained from the quantitative plural (10), which is used to denote unlimited greatness in **שמים**, heaven, and **מים**, water. The plural paints the endless fulness of the might and power which lies in the Divine Being, and thus passes over into the intensive plural, as Delitzsch has named it. The old view of a plural of majesty was right in so far, only it was wrong to derive this use from the *consuetudo honoris* (11).—As in **אלהים**, so also the plural contained in **אֱלֹהֵי** is to be explained; indeed, this plural of majesty has also passed to other titles of God: **קדושים**, Hos. xii. 1, Prov. ix. 10, to which the expression **אֱלֹהִים קדושים**, Josh. xxiv. 19, forms the transition; comp. further the **עֲשִׂים** in Isa. liv. 5, Job xxxv. 10, and the **בְּרָאִים** in Eccles. xii. 1; also the passage Gen. i. 26 is to be explained thus.

Now, since the fulness of might lying in the divine nature is quite generally in **אלהים**, a certain indefiniteness clings to the word, as to the Latin *numen* (12). The expression in its indefinite width does not exclude the more concrete determinations of the idea of

God; it remains all through the Old Testament the general name of God; in fact, it is used with special emphasis in the Elohist psalms. But on account of the uncertainty of its meaning, אֱלֹהִים can also be used to designate heathen gods; indeed, it is once used (1 Sam. xxviii. 13, in the mouth of the enchantress) to designate a supernatural manifestation exciting horror.

As a name of the true God, אֱלֹהִים is always joined with the singular. The exceptions are rare, and explicable from the context of the passages. In Gen. xx. 13 a heathen is addressed; in Ex. xxxii. 4, 8, 1 Sam. iv. 8, 1 Kings xii. 28, the God of Israel is spoken of from the lower standpoint of heathen conceptions; and in 2 Sam. vii. 23 the general notion of duty lies in the plural אֱלֹהִים (13).

The divine name אֱלֹהִים (LXX. ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ὑψιστος), or simply אֱלֹהִים (LXX. ὑψιστος), is also used outside the sphere of revelation. The name appears as a designation of God, the Lord of heaven and earth, in the mouth of Melchizedek, the Canaanite priest-king (Gen. xiv. 18); it is the name of the highest god, Saturn, in the Phœnician religion, and even serves in the Pœnulus of Plautus as a title of the gods and goddesses (14). It is characteristic that it appears also in the mouth of the king of Babylon (Isa. xiv. 14), probably to designate Bel. The Old Testament makes use of the name from the Israelite standpoint only in poetical style (Num. xxiv. 16, etc.; Deut. xxxii. 8; Ps. lvii. 3, etc.), sometimes in conjunction with יהוה. It is remarkable that the book of Daniel uses אֱלֹהִים in the plural of majesty (Dan. vii. 18, 22, 25) in a Chaldee section, whereas it has not the plural of majesty אֱלֹהִים.

(1) Compare my article "Elohim" in Herzog's *Realenzyklop.* xix. p. 476 ff.

(2) In Josh. xxii. 22 occurs the oath, אֱלֹהִים יְהוָה הוּא יָדַע. It is radically false to explain, "Jehovah the God of gods knows;" the Masoretic text rightly has Pesik. It is a climax which is meant.

(3) See Gesenius, *Thesaurus*, i. p. 49; Ewald, *Jahrb. der bibl. Wissenschaft*, x. p. 11.—Ewald sees an abbreviation of אֱלֹהִים in אֱלֹהִים, and maintains that the former, as shown by the similar form of both words, is the antithesis of אֱלֹהִים, in which God is designated as the absolutely powerful in contrast to man, the absolutely weak. Comp. also Ewald's *History of the People of Israel*, i. 3d ed. p. 378 [art. "Elohim"].

(4) See the argument at large by Fleischer in Delitzsch's *Comment. on Genesis*, 4th ed. p. 57 f.

(5) If the Epicureans say *timor fecit Deos*, this name of God turns the matter thus: The reflection cast by the idea of God into the human consciousness is just that of fear, of horror; and this is characteristic of the primitive form of religion among sinful men.

(6) See the historical notices on the Trinitarian interpretation in the above-cited art., p. 477. At present this view requires no further refutation; still we may say, with Hengstenberg (*Contrib. to Old Testament Introduction*, ii. p. 255), that even this erroneous view has some truth at its foundation, since the plural form, indicating the inexhaustible fulness of the Divinity, serves to combat the most dangerous enemy of the doctrine of the Trinity, viz. abstract Monotheism [above-cited art.].

(7) The word *אֱלֹהִים* is adduced as an analogous example (comp. for example Naegelsbach, *Hebrew Grammar*, 3d ed. p. 140 f.), which appears in the Old Testament, as is well known, in speaking of an individual household god [*ibid.*].

(8) From this would flow the quite insignificant thought that God at first called out the angels to take part in the creation of man, but completed the work alone, according to ver. 27 (comp. § 43, and Keil on the passage) [*ibid.*].

(9) Not only the angel of the Lord *κ. ἐξ.*, but also the subordinate angels, are bearers of divine powers, and authorities and representatives of God [*ibid.*].

(10) To have directed theologians to this correct conception of the plural Elohim is mainly the merit of Dietrich (*Abhandlung. zur hebr. Gramm.* 1846, p. 44 ff., comp. with p. 16 ff.) [*ibid.*].

(11) Akin to the quantitative use of the plural is that of the plural of abstraction, in which a plurality is grasped in higher unity; comp. examples in Ewald's *Larger Grammar of the Hebrew Language*, 8th ed. § 179. But it is hardly right directly to understand the plural Elohim as an abstract, as Hofmann does (*Schriftbeweis*, i. 2d ed. p. 77). The abstract form of expression for names of dignity (for example *קִהְלָה*), which often appears in Aramaic (see Ewald, *l.c.* § 177 f.), seems to be rather the product of a later phase of the language, which must not be confounded with the archaic use of the plural discussed above (*ibid.*).

(12) Yet we cannot say, with Hengstenberg (*Contributions*, ii. p. 261), that the plural Elohim is also humiliating. Steudel says more correctly (*Theol. of the Old Testament*, p. 143), that there is in the name something that can be developed [*ibid.*].

(13) The meaning of the passage 2 Sam. vii. 23 is: "Where is there a people on the earth to save whom a god (even one of the heathen gods) has gone?" hence אֱלֹהֵי הָאֲדָמָה (*ibid.*).—On Ex. xxii. 8 comp. § 96.—After what has been remarked above, it could not be extraordinary if the name אֱלֹהִים occurred for the angels, who as *θείας φύσεως κοινωνοί* are often called sons of God. Still this use of the word is nowhere authenticated; admittedly not in Ps. viii. 6, xcvi. 7, cxxxviii. 1, where the LXX. have translated it by ἄγγελοι; also not in Ps. lxxxii., where, in spite of Hupfeld's opposite assertion, אֱלֹהִים does not designate angels, but the bearers of the judicial power in the theocracy [*ibid.*].

(14) The name אֶלְיָן occurs also in Phœnician and Punic proper names: Abdalonimus, that is, the servant of the Highest.

II. EL-SHADDAL.

§ 37.

The notion of God enters the sphere of the revelation in the name אֱלֹהֵי, which is peculiar to the patriarchal religion; see Ex. vi. 3. The word אֱלֹהֵי should not be understood as a *nomen compositum* (from אֱ = אֱלֹהֵי and אֵל, *qui sufficiens est*, as characteristic of the divine aseity) (1); but it is to be traced back to the root אֵל, the fundamental meaning of which is "to be strong, to show oneself superior," from whence is formed, in the Arabic *shadda*, the meaning *ligavit*, Conj. VIII. *vehemens fuit*, and in the Hebrew אֵל, the meaning "to force, to lay waste," whence the play of words in Joel i. 15, Isa. xiii. 6 (אֵל מִשְׁפָּחָהּ). Again, the name is either to be traced from a stem אֵל, with Ewald (*Ausf. Lehrb.* 8th ed. § 155, c), according to which it would be an intensive form on the measure אֵלֵל, or, what is more probable, from the stem אֵל with the formative syllable אֵל, which occurs also in other proper names (as אֵלֵל, אֵלֵל). It is quite wrong to understand אֵל as a suffix-form of the first person plural, as in אֵלֵל; for whilst this occurs in the older language only in addressing God, God Himself says, Gen. xvii. 1, xxxv. 11, "I am El-shaddai" (2). The name characterizes God as revealing Himself violently in His might; the LXX. do not understand the expression in the Pentateuch, but it is correctly rendered by παντοκράτωρ in most passages of Job. It is no longer the powerful Divinity ruling in the world in general that is El-shaddai, but the God who testifies of Himself in special deeds of

power, by which He subdues nature to the ways of His kingdom, making the childless Abraham the father of many nations (Gen. xvii. 1, xxviii. 3, comp. xxxv. 11), and who causes that race with which He has entered into covenant to experience His powerful presence in protection and blessing, Gen. xliii. 14, xlviii. 3, xlix. 25 (3). But as soon as the name Jehovah unfolds its meaning, the name El-shaddai falls back on the one side into the list of the more general names of God; thus in Balaam's parable it appears, Num. xxiv. 4, 16, in the same line with אֱלֹהִים and עֲלִיֹן; in the book of Job, in the same line with אֱלֹהִים and אֱלֹהִים. But, on the other hand, it is still used at times alternately with the name Jehovah where God's omnipotence is to be made prominent in contrast to human weakness, as in the beautiful passage Ruth i. 20 f., or in speaking of the revelation of God's subjugating judgments, Joel i. 15, Isa. xiii. 6, Ps. lxviii. 15, Ezek. x. 5; also in speaking of the Omnipotent Protector of His people, Ps. xci. 1, etc.

The word שֹׁרֵי, which in Deut. xxxii. 17, Ps. cvi. 37, serves to designate the gods of the heathen, is scarcely connected with שֹׁרֵי, as some suppose. It is probably not to be traced to שֹׁרֵר, as some earlier theologians wish, as if it denoted destructive beings, but is rather to be understood as a participle of שָׁרַר (Arabic *sāda*), *dominatus fuit*, according to which it means "Lords" or "Rulers."

(1) Thus for example Maimonides, *More-Nebochim*, ed. Buxtorff, p. 144 ff., and Calvin.

(2) Deyling has protested against deriving שֹׁרֵי from שֹׁרֵר, *Observationes sacre*, i. p. 46 f.: "שֹׁרֵר noxiam potentiam, omniaque desolantem in scriptura denotat, et de *vastatione, per solos hostes facta*, non per pestem, aut grandinem, aut aquarum eluviones usurpatum reperitur. —Ergo nomen שֹׁרֵי a שֹׁרֵר deductum, ne *Deum* quidem deceret, sed Diabolum potius, qui nomen שֹׁרֵר inde etiam revera sortitus est."—But here Deyling proceeds from the meaning "to lay waste," which we may regard as the only derivative.

(3) On Gen. xvii. 1 Delitzsch says forcibly: "אלהים is the God who creates nature so that it is, and supports it that it may stand; אל שֹׁרֵי, the God who compels nature to do what is contrary to itself, and subdues it to bow and minister to grace."

III. THE NAME JEHOVAH (1).

§ 38.

1. *Pronunciation and Grammatical Explanation of the Name.*

The real name of God in the Old Testament is the tetragrammaton יהוה, which is hence characterized by the Jews as הַשֵּׁם κ. ἐξ. (comp. Lev. xxiv. 11, Deut. xxviii. 58), שְׁמֵי רַבָּא the great name, שֵׁם הַמְּיוֹחָד *nomem unicum*, the unique name, but in particular as שֵׁם הַמְּפֹרָשׁ, which latter expression, however, is itself interpreted in different ways (2).

The word יהוה in the Masoretic text of the Old Testament has, in virtue of a *K'ri perpetuum*, the points of אֶרְרִי (3). Where אֶרְרִי already occurs in the connection of the sentence (as Isa. xxii. 12, 14, etc.), the pronunciation of אֱלֹהִים is substituted (4).—The command forbidding the utterance of the name is drawn by the Jews from Lev. xxiv. 16, in virtue of an untenable exposition of the passage already given by the LXX. (ὀνομάζων τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου) (5).—How old the dread of uttering the name is, cannot be accurately fixed. The use of אֱלֹהִים in a number of psalms is not to be derived from this. The dread in question sprang from the efforts of the later Judaism to thrust back Divinity to an unapproachable distance, and everywhere to put something between the Divinity and man (6). The name ceases to be prominent in some of the latest Old Testament writings, and is regularly replaced by κύριος by the LXX. (so also in the New Testament) (7). Josephus, *Ant.* xii. 5. 5, tells us of the Samaritans, that the sanctuary which they founded in Gerizim was ἀνώνυμον ἱερόν. Josephus himself declares, *Ant.* ii. 12. 4, that he was not permitted to speak about the name. With this, Philo's assertion, *de mut. nom.* § 2 (ed. Mang. i. 580), and *vit. Mos.* iii. 25 (ii. 166), is to be compared; yet it is remarked in the last book, § 11 (152), that consecrated persons in the sanctuary were allowed to hear and to pronounce the name. According to the tradition in Maimonides, *More-Neb.* i. 61, *Jad chazaka* xiv. 10, which agrees with *Thamid* vii. 2 (8), the name was still uttered in the first times of the second temple in the sanctuary at the pronouncement of the blessing, and by the high priest on the day of atonement; but since the death of Simon the Just, that is, since the first half of the third century B.C., it was exchanged here also for Adonai (9), as had

been long the practice outside the temple. The Jews maintain that the knowledge of the true pronunciation of the name has been quite lost since the destruction of the temple. On the other hand, since the sixteenth century, it became more and more the custom among Christian theologians to pronounce the name Jehovah by reading together the K'ri points with the consonants יהוה; but this pronunciation is not yet used by Reuchlin (10). Some later theologians, as Joh. Friedr. v. Meyer, Stier, and in particular Hoelemann (in a treatise "On the Meaning and Pronunciation of יהוה," in his *Bible Studies*, 1st division, 1859, ii.), think they are compelled to see in Jehovah the real pronunciation. According to this, the word would be formed, by a quite unparalleled construction, from יְהִי = הָיָה, and הָיָה = הָיָה (comp. Stier, *Lehrgebaude der hebr. Sprache*, p. 327), and would be meant to comprehend the three tenses. The unprecedented formation of the word corresponds, we are to believe, with the uniqueness of the divine nature. For this view we are referred principally to the *ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος* in Rev. i. 4, iv. 8; but it is erroneous to seek an explanation of the word in this paraphrase of the meaning of the name (in fact, the succession of the tenses in the passages in the Apocalypse would not agree with the above explanation). Also *ἐρχόμενος* is decidedly not the same as *ἐσόμενος* (11); it only means the coming one; and therefore, as soon as the advent of the Lord has become present, Rev. xi. 17 (according to the true reading) and xvi. 5, *ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν* only is written (12). The abbreviation יהי appearing at the end of many personal names (e.g. אֱלִיָּהוּ, יִרְמְיָהוּ) cannot be satisfactorily explained on the reading Jehovah (Hoelemann's explanation is artificial), while the abbreviation יהו or יי at the beginning of names can be justified also by the pronunciation to be mentioned below.

Ex. iii. 13–15 is the decisive passage for the pronunciation and grammatical explanation of the name. When Moses asks for the name of the God who sends him forth, He, God, says: אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה. "Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel, Ehjeh has sent me unto you." Now when it goes on to say, ver. 15, "Thus shalt thou say, יהוה, the God of your fathers, has sent me unto you," it is clear that the word יהוה is to be regarded as a noun formed from the third person of the imperfect of הָיָה (the older form of הָיָה), and we must read either יהִיָּה (יְהִיָּה), or what is also not impossible, since such forms do occur,

יְהוָה (יְהוֹה). The first form is more probable (13). From the pronunciation Jahve we obtain the abbreviation יְה (which is just to be explained through apocope for יְהוֹ), and by contraction from this, יְה or י when it is placed at the beginning of the word. יְה followed from a still further abbreviation of יְה; it appears first in Moses' song, Ex. xv. 2, and afterwards particularly in the יְה לְלִי. In tradition, the pronunciation Jahve has this testimony, that, according to Theodoret (*quest. 15 in Ex.*), the Samaritans pronounced the name 'Iaβé (Theodoret ascribes to the Jews the pronunciation 'Aíd, which might give evidence of the pronunciation Jahve); compare with this Epiphanius, *adv. hær.* i. 3. 20 (40) (κατὰ 'Αρχοντικῶν), which likewise reads 'Iaβé. Origen, *c. Cels.*, gives the name as 'Iaωia. Side by side with this there are, to be sure, other accounts. According to Diodorus, i. 94, the Jews spoke the name 'Iaω, also Origen in the Commentary to John i. 1; and Theodoret (*quest. in 1 Chron.*) mentions this pronunciation. On the other hand, Sanchuniathon, in Eusebius, *præp. ev.* i. 9, pronounces the name 'Τεωά; and Clemens of Alexandria, *Strom.* v. 6, 'Iaού (14). Jerome on Ps. viii. 2 says: Legi potest Jaho; but a form יְהוֹה would be quite contrary to the analogy of the Hebrew language (15).

(1) Comp. my article "Jehovah" in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* vi. p. 455 ff.

(2) The explanation of the expression Schem-ham'phorasch is uncertain (Luther wrote a book on this designation). Comp. the remarks of Munk (on i. 61), in his edition of the *More-Nebochim* of Maimonides (*le guide des égarés par Mose ben Maimun*, Paris 1856). Munk himself, referring to the use of בְּרַשׁ by Onkelos and Ibn Ezra on Lev. xxiv. 11, 16, decides in favour of the explanation: le nom de Dieu *distinctement prononcé*. The expression is generally explained: nomen *explicitum*, that is, either the name which is replaced by other names of God (s. Buxtorff, *lex. chald.* p. 2433), or the name by which the nature of God is distinctly characterized. Others explain: nomen *separatum*, namely, either *sc.* a cognitione hominum, or what is best = the incommunicable name of God, which (comp. Maimonides, *l.c.*) instructs us about God's essence, whilst the other names express attributes which God has in common with others [above art.].

(3) The substitution of the simple Sch'wa instead of Chateph-Pathlach is, I think, only to be regarded as an abbreviation in writing.

(4) But the pronunciation of אֱלֹהִים is not substituted if the יהוה and אֲדָרִי standing beside each other belong to different clauses, as in Ps. xvi. 2 [*ibid.*].

(5) The connection of Lev. xxiv. 16 is: one had blasphemed (קָלַל) the holy name of God, whereupon Moses receives the direction: "Bring the blasphemer outside the camp, and the whole community shall stone him. But thou shalt say to the sons of Israel, Each who curses his God shall bear his sin." The following words in ver. 16, וַיִּקָּבֵץ שֵׁם יְהוָה מוֹת יִמָּוֶה, are explained by the Jewish exegesis: "He who names the name יהוה shall be killed."—Even if, as Hengstenberg still thinks (*Contrib. to the Introd. to the Old Testament*, ii. p. 223), קָבַח (root-meaning, to bore, to prick) might be taken in the meaning *to pronounce*,—but in the passages, Gen. xxx. 28, Num. i. 17, Isa. lxii. 2, advanced to prove this, it has rather the meaning, to characterize, to define,—the connection with vers. 11 and 15 would still lead us to understand a blaspheming utterance. But probably the word is to be taken as exactly = קָבַח, comp. Num. xxiii. 8 [*ibid.*].—On the rabbinical application of Ex. iii. 15 to the prohibition, see the above article, p. 455.

(6) It is the same awe which caused His *word*, and such like, to be substituted where Jehovah in the Old Testament touches on the external world.

(7) But Sir. xxiii. 9, ὀνομασίᾳ τοῦ ἁγίου μὴ συνεθισθῆς, only intends to say that the name of God ought not to be unnecessarily taken upon the lips [*ibid.*].—Another resource of the Jews was to place הַשֵּׁם instead of the name.

(8) The *Mischna* contains various accounts of the matter. *Berachoth* ix. 5 says with reference to Ruth ii. 4, Judg. ii. 16, that the use of the divine name was allowed in greeting. This definition is said to be directed against the Samaritan Dositheic, who abstained altogether from using the name (see the notes on this subject by Geiger, *Lessons from the Mischna*, p. 3), whilst the other Samaritans pronounced the name at least in swearing. On the other hand, according to *Sanhedrin* x. 1, Abba Schaul teaches that those who do pronounce the name of God by its letters belong to those who have no part in the future world. According to *Thamid* vii. 2, the priests בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ uttered God's name as it is written, and on the other hand בַּמִּדְבָּר they used the secondary name. We are without doubt to understand by the former the temple, and by the latter town and land; but according to another exposition (s. Surenhusius on the passage), Jerusalem is to be reckoned as Mikdash. Geiger (*l.c.* p. 45 f.) shows how the two last-named passages were modified by the Gemara [*ibid.*].

(9) For a closer discussion on this, see Jac. Alting, "exercitatio grammatica de punctis ac pronuntiatione tetragrammati יהוה, in Reland's *decas exercitationum philologicarum de vera pronuntiatione nominis Jehova*, 1707, p. 423 ff.

(10) The older treatises on these disputed questions have been gathered by Reland, *lib. cit.*—According to Böttcher's account, in his *Ausf. Lehrbuch der hebr. Sprache*, i. p. 49, the first trace of the pronuntiation Jehovah was in the anti-Jewish book *Pugio fidei*; but he who gave it currency was Peter Galatinus, a friend of Reuchlin (*de arcanis cathol. veritatis*, ii. 10), since 1518. It is often used by Luther.

(11) Buxtorff, *dissertatio de nomine יהוה*, in Reland, *l.c.* p. 386.

(12) See Hengstenberg, *l.c.* p. 263 ff.—On the comparison of the Latin Jupiter, Jovis, cited in favour of the reading Jehovah (see Fuller in Reland, p. 448; Gataker, *ibid.* p. 494),—a comparison that overlooks the more complete forms, Diespiter, Diovis,—and further on the hypothesis according to which a supposed Egyptian name of God, formed from the seven vowels *ι ε η ω ο υ α*, is said to be preserved in the utterance Jehovah, see likewise Hengstenberg, *l.c.* p. 204 ff.; Tholuck, *Miscell. Writings*, i. p. 394 ff. [*ibid.*].

(13) The name יהוה, as third person, corresponds to אֱהִיָּה in Ex. iii. 11. The *a* sound under the preformative was in general, I think, the older form, as we still see in the Arabic.—The nominal formation deduced from the imperfect is very common in the Hebrew in appellatives (s. Delitzsch, *Jesurun*, p. 208 f.), but particularly in proper names (comp. יִצְחָק, יִשְׂרָאֵל, etc.). The names thus formed, corresponding to the fundamental meaning of the imperfect, characterize a person by a peculiarity which is continually manifested in him, and so is specially characteristic [*ibid.*]. The formation is perfectly analogous to the Latin ending *tor*, which is connected with *turnus*.—Delitzsch, in his *Commentary on the Psalms* (1859 and 1860), reads Jahawah, but he has now given up this view.

(14) Nevertheless 'Iaové should probably be read; s. Hengstenberg, *l.c.* p. 226 f.

(15) Probably these forms of pronuntiation are in imitation of the mystical name of Dionysos, which appears among the Greeks in the form *Ἰακχος*, but seems in the Semitic form to have sounded יהו (from היה, to live). On this and the confounding of the Old Testament God with Dionysos, which was peculiar to later religious syncretism, see Movers, *The Phœnicians*, i. p. 539 ff., in particular pp. 545 and 548 [*ibid.*].—The traditions of the Church Fathers have been most completely gathered by Hoelemann, *lib. cit.* p. 69 ff. (he has overlooked the passage from Clement).

§ 39.

2. *The Signification of the Name.*

The name signifies, *He who is*, according to Ex. iii. 14; more particularly, *He who is what He is*. But as it is not the notion of a lasting being which lies in the verb *היה* or *היה*, but that of a moving existence, of becoming and occurring (comp. Delitzsch, *Genesis*, 3d ed. p. 31 {4th ed. p. 26}), so also the form of the name derived from the imperfect leads us to understand in it the existence of God, not as an existence at rest, but as one always becoming, always making itself known in a process of becoming. Hence it is wrong to find in the name the abstract notion of *ὄντως ὄν*. God is rather Jahve in as far as He has entered into historical relationship to mankind, and in particular to the chosen people Israel, and shows Himself continually in this historical relationship as He who is, and who is what He is. While heathenism rests almost exclusively on the past revelations of its divinities, this name testifies, on the other hand, that the relationship of God to the world is in a state of continual living activity; it testifies, especially in reference to the people who address their God by this name, that they have in their God a future. But more particularly the notion of Jehovah (1) divides into two factors:

1. Inasmuch as God is just what He is, and so determines Himself in the historical manifestation of His existence, instead of being determined by anything outside of Him (compare Hofmann, *der Schriftbeweis*, i. p. 81 f.), the name carries us into the sphere of God's freedom (2). There lies in it quite generally the absolute independence of God in His dominion. Through this factor of its meaning the name Jehovah is connected with El-shaddai.

2. When, in virtue of His absolute independence, God in all His dominion asserts Himself as that which He is, the name further contains the notion of the absolute *persistency* of God, in virtue whereof He in all things, in words as in deeds, is essentially in agreement with Himself, and remains self-consistent (3). Where this second factor is put in special relation to the divine decree of election, and the promises that flow therefrom, as is the case in Ex. iii. 13 ff., vi. 2 ff., the name implies the invariable *faithfulness* of God, which side of the notion of Jehovah (against Hofmann, *l.c.*) is specially emphasized in

the Old Testament, to awake confidence on God; cf. passages like Deut. vii. 9, Hos. xii. 6, in connection with ver. 7, Isa. xxvi. 4 (4). That, as Jehovah, God is the *immutable*, is brought out in Mal. iii. 6 (5). In passages like Isa. xli. 4, xlv. 6, etc., the name is applied both to God's absolute independence and to His absolute persistence (6).

(1) From this point onwards I use the word Jehovah, not because I consider this pronunciation correct, but because, as matter of fact, this name has now become naturalized in our vocabulary, and cannot be supplanted, any more than it would be possible for the more correct Jarden to displace the usual form Jordan.

(2) Only that the name cannot be interpreted in the sense of absolute arbitrariness; as, for example, Drechsler (*The Unity and Genuineness of Genesis*, p. 11 f.) has expounded the passage Ex. iii. 14, "I am He, and what it pleases me to be," and, "I always reveal myself in all deeds and commands as what I please," according to which the name is supposed to express the "free grace" or the "groundless mercy" of God (Drechsler, p. 10).

(3) Also in Ex. xxxiii. 19, which passage has correctly been advanced to explain iii. 14, the words, "I am gracious to whom I am gracious," express, 1st, that God shows him grace to whom He will be gracious, and to no other, or the absolute freedom of God's grace; and, 2d, that He really shows him grace to whom He is gracious, that is, He is self-consistent in showing mercy, in reference to His grace agreeing with Himself. [Above-cited article.]

(4) Hos. xii. 6 f.: "And Jehovah, the God of hosts, Jehovah is His memorial name. And thou—shalt turn again to thy God; keep godliness and right, and wait continually on thy God." Because Israel calls his God יהוה, therefore should he turn to Him trustfully. Isa. xxvi. 4: "Trust on Jehovah for ever, for in Jah Jehovah is an everlasting rock."

(5) Mal. iii. 6: "I am Jehovah, I have not changed, and ye sons of Jacob perish not;" that is, in God's unchangeableness, expressed by His name Jehovah, the eternal duration of His covenant people is pledged.—See on this passage, Hengstenberg, *Christologie*, 1st ed. p. 419; 2d ed. iii. 1, p. 627 (translated in For. Theol. Lib.).

(6) If we proceed from the name alone without regard to Ex. iii., it appears at first sight that only absolute being lies in it. Luther in particular has carried this further in the article on Schem-ham'phorasch (Erl. ed. of the German works, xxxii. p. 306). He explains the sense of the name thus: "He has His being from none, has neither begin-

ning nor end, but is from eternity in and of Himself, so that His being cannot be called *been* or to *become*, for He has never begun, and cannot begin to be; He has also never had an end, nor can cease to be; but with Him it is always a pure *is* or *existence*, that is, Jehovah. When the creature was created, His existence was already there, and He is there with His being for all that shall still arise. In this way Christ speaks of His divinity in John viii. 58: Before Abraham was, I am. He does not say, Then I was, as if after that He had been no more, but I am, that is, my being is eternal, it has not been, will not be, but simply is." But here the name is taken up too abstractly; its essential signification is much rather in reference to the history of revelation. This will be clearly shown in the comparison with Elohim.

{The explanation of Ex. iii. 14 given above, and the deduced signification of Jehovah, are far from incontrovertible; but it must here suffice to refer to the two most recent discussions of the passage, in Ewald's *Biblical Theology*, ii. p. 338, and Lagarde's *Corollarium* to his *Psalterium Hieronymi*.}

§ 40.

3. Age and Origin of the Name Jehovah.

From what has been said on the signification of the name, it is clear that it is so interwoven with the Old Testament revelation, that its origin can only be sought for in this sphere (1). Every attempt to derive the name from heathenism rests on capricious hypotheses or on strange misunderstandings; as, for example, the hypothesis which derives the name from a pretended Egyptian name of God, formed by the seven Greek vowels *ι ε η ω ο υ α*, although these letters are only intended to indicate the musical scale. Ex. v. 2 (2) speaks decidedly against a derivation from Egypt. That Necho, 2 Kings xxiii. 34, changes the name of the conquered Eliakim to Jehoiakim, is no evidence for the Egyptian character of the name Jehovah; it is meant to indicate that the Egyptian king acts thus just with the help of the national god (also Nebuchadnezzar, 2 Kings xxiv. 17, in changing Mattaniah's name to Zedekiah, gives him again a name compounded from Jehovah. Rabshakeh's speech, Isa. xxxvi. 10, is particularly instructive).—But the more exact definition of the Old Testament origin depends on the explanation of the passage Ex. vi. 3.

According to one exposition, the meaning of it is, that the name Jehovah was still quite unknown to the patriarchs, and that we have here the first revelation of the name; compare Josephus, *Ant.* ii. 12. 4 (3). In this case, since the frequent use of the name in Genesis certainly cannot simply be referred to prolepsis, there would be a double tradition of the origin of the name in the Pentateuch. According to the first, Gen. iv. 26, xii. 8, etc., it would reach back to primeval antiquity; and according to the second, it was first introduced by Moses (4). Against this, the other exposition makes Ex. vi. 3 say that the name Jehovah had not yet been understood by the patriarchs, and that they had not the full experience of that which lies in the name (5). Then the meaning of the passage corresponds exactly to that in Ex. iii. 15, and is analogous to the passage Ex. xxxiii. 19; comp. with xxxiv. 6, in which also the announcement of a name of God has only the force of an unveiling to human knowledge of a quality of the divine nature, without our being able to say that that name did not exist previously. For יְהוָה לֹא נִרְעָתִי, compare also Ex. viii. 18, Ps. lxxvi. 2, etc. For the sake of the connection with ver. 7, the first explanation must at least include the second (6). Against the first explanation, however, we have, 1st, The sporadic occurrence of the name Jehovah even in those parts of Genesis which belong to the Elohist record, where the expedient of assuming an interpolation is altogether worthless. 2d, The occurrence of the name in the name of Moses' mother יוֹכָבֵד (that is, *cujus gloria est Jehovah*), Ex. vi. 20,—a circumstance which has led even Ewald to the view that the name Jehovah was common at least among the maternal ancestors of Moses. There are also some other names from that ancient time which occur in the genealogies in Chronicles, 1 Chron. ii. 25, vii. 8, iv. 18: Ahijah, Abiah, Bithiah (7). 3d and lastly, It is most improbable that Moses, when he had to bring to the people a revelation of the God of their fathers, should have done so under a name of God quite unknown to the people. Hence the assertion of the pre-Mosaic origin of the name is right.

(1) Compare the remarks in Hävernick's *Special Introduction to the Pentateuch*, 2d ed. by Keil, 1856, p. 75.—It is a fancy of Ewald, when he thinks it right to start from the expression in Gen. xix. 24, and concludes that the name according to this passage originally had

the meaning of heaven, the God of heaven. This exposition is as preposterous as possible.

(2) Ex. v. 2, Pharaoh says: "Who is Jehovah, whose voice I am to obey to let Israel go? I know not Jehovah." In reference to all those hypotheses, on which I cannot enter, which seek to derive the name from Egypt, Phœnicia, or India, I may refer still to the dissertation by Tholuck in the *Literar. Anzeiger*, 1832, Nos. 27-30, and reprinted in his *Miscell. Writings*, i. 1839, p. 376 ff. Tholuck discovered the deception performed by Voltaire in his derivation of the name Jehovah from the Egyptian mysteries,—a deception gross enough, but so successful that this hypothesis was confidently adopted by Schiller himself in the *Mission of Moses*. More recently Roeth (*The Egyptian and Zoroastrian Theology*, Ann. 175, p. 146) has again maintained the Egyptian origin of the name, placing it in connection with the name of the Egyptian moon-god *Joh* [in the cited art.]. {Cf. also the views of Brugsch referred to in Delitzsch's *Genesis*, 4th ed. p. 59.}

(3) Josephus says, *l.c.*: ὁ Θεὸς αὐτῷ σημαίνει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προσηγορίαν, οὐ πρότερον εἰς ἀνθρώπους παρελθούσαν περὶ ἧς οὐ μοι θεμιτὸν εἰπεῖν.

(4) Ebrard ("The Age of the Name Jehovah," in the *histor.-theol. Zeitschrift* of Niedner, 1849, iv.) seeks to get over the difficulty by assuming a proleptic use of the name Jehovah in Genesis. He makes it clear in this way: "We speak, for example, of Antistes Bullinger, because Bullinger's office was identical with the present office of a Zürich Antistes, and do not consider that the title 'Antistes' was first used in Zürich in the seventeenth century." But this assumption can only be carried out by the most capricious treatment of many passages. When it is said, Gen. iv. 26, "Then men began to call on the name of Jehovah," prolepsis is out of the question.

(5) See specially Kurtz, *Hist. of the Old Covenant*, i. 2d ed. p. 345 f., comp. with ii. p. 67 (translated in *For. Theol. Lib.*).

(6) Schultz, in his *Old Testament Theology* (i. p. 293), wonders that I also am here found on the side of the expositors who twist the meaning, which shows that he has not valued my reasons properly. The passage Ex. vi. 2 ff. runs thus: "Elohim spoke to Moses, and said: I am יהוה; I appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as El-shaddai, but by my יהוה name לא נודעתי להם. . . . I have heard the sighs of the sons of Israel . . . Therefore say to the sons of Israel: I am יהוה, and will lead you out from under the burdens of Egypt . . . So I am God to you, and ye acknowledge that I, יהוה, am your God." It is quite clear that the נודעתי להם in ver. 7 refers back to the יהוה

in ver. 3; but this **וַיִּדְעָהֶם**, of course, does not mean: then shall my title Jehovah become known to you, but: then acknowledge ye what is in my nature.

(7) Schultz, *l.c.* p. 294, thinks that words only occurring in Chronicles are absolutely useless as testimony. He is inclined to suppose a later change in the name of Moses' mother.

§ 41.

Comparison of the Name Jehovah with Elohim and El.

If we compare God's names **אֱלֹהִים** and **אֵל** with **יְהוָה**, in reference to their meaning, the following difference is found to result from the already given definitions (1). In general, all universally cosmical action of God, going out towards the heathen as well as towards Israel in the creation and maintenance of the world, is traced to El and Elohim; to Jehovah, on the other hand, is traced every divine activity which is connected with the theocratic revelation and guidance, and which bears on the heathen only in as far as their history stands in relation to the aim of the divine kingdom. It follows from this, that the historical display of the divine essence lies essentially in the notion of Jehovah; whereas, on the contrary, Elohim, as such, is subject to no historical process. By this, Oetinger's explanation, "*Deus est omnium rerum Elohim, omnium actionum Jehovah*," is to be more exactly defined (2). Elohim, as such, remains transcendent to the world of phenomena; Jehovah, on the contrary, enters into the phenomena of space and time in order to manifest Himself to mankind; a difference which comes forward at once in the relation of Gen. i. 1 ff. to ii. 4 ff. It is indeed natural and necessary that this difference is not strictly kept up everywhere in the Old Testament in the use of the names of God. Since Elohim is only known in Israel as Jehovah, what is Elohist is often traced back to Jehovah; less often Elohim stands where we might expect Jehovah, particularly in the Elohist psalms, the peculiarity of which in the pregnant ceremonious use of Elohim is probably to be explained by the theory that they were designed to counteract liturgically any tendency to a particularizing conception of the idea of God (3). But still it is shown partly by certain general ways of expression which run through the whole Old

Testament, and partly by separate passages, that the Old Testament writers had a very definite consciousness of the marked difference. In reference to the first head, we must remember that all expressions which refer to revelation occur almost only in connection with יהוה; thus, with quite rare exceptions, דָּבַר יְהוָה, נִאֲמָה, מִצְוֹת, בְּרַחֲמֵי, and such like, further, because God is acknowledged and addressed in Israel only as Jehovah, also יְיָ, with the exception only of two passages in Elohistic psalms, Ps. lxi. 31, lxxv. 2; even the preponderatingly Elohistic section, 2 Sam. vi., places in ver. 2 יְיָ יְהוָה. Where no definite reason exists for writing מַלְאָכֵי אֱלֹהִים, the Mal'ach is always the angel of Jehovah. Theophany in general is a thing of Jehovah, who, and not Elohim, holds intercourse with man in the manner of men. The change of expressions in Gen. vii. 16 is specially noteworthy (4). Hence it comes that anthropomorphisms are almost always applied to Jehovah, not to Elohim. Thus יְיָ יְהוָה even in the Elohistic Psalm lxxv. ver. 9 (5); thus always בְּיָהוָה, never בְּאֱלֹהִים; often even קוֹל, עֲיִנֵי יְהוָה, only a few times קוֹל, עֲיִנֵי אֱלֹהִים, etc., of leading individual passages. Those particularly to be mentioned are Gen. ix. 26 f., according to which God is for Japheth mainly only Elohim; on the contrary, for Shem He is Jehovah. Num. xvi. 22, compared with xxvii. 16; in the first passage (the story of Korah's company), although Jehovah is predominant through the whole section, אֱלֹהִים is called upon as God of the spirits of all flesh, as He from whom all natural life proceeds, and who as preserver of the world is entreated, not to sweep away a multitude of men because of one man who sinned (6). In the second passage, on the contrary (where the appointment of a successor to Moses is treated of), Jehovah is addressed as God of the spirits of all flesh, who divides the gifts of His Spirit for the service of His kingdom, and is therefore entreated to appoint and equip a new leader of His people. With this compare Ps. xix., where, in reference to the manifestation of God in nature, ver. 2, El stands; and in reference to the revelation in the law, Jehovah stands from ver. 8 onwards throughout, etc.

(1) Here, of course, those passages are meant where the expressions אֱלֹהִים and אֱל stand by themselves, without an article or closer definition, by means of an adjective or a dependent genitive (as, Jacob's God).

(2) In a certain sense we may say, with Delitzsch, Jehovah is a God who “becomes” {*γίγνεται*}. But the expression is liable to be misunderstood; Hengstenberg rightly reminds us, on the other hand, that “God comes indeed, but He does not become.”

(3) It is known that the first Psalm book {Ps. i.—xli.} is Jehovistic, the second Elohist {Ps. xlii.—lxxii.}. The assumption of Hitzig and others, that the later fear of using the name Jehovah is already seen in the Elohist psalms, is utterly untenable, not simply because among these Elohist hymns there are without doubt pieces of great age, but also because they do not absolutely exclude the name Jehovah. {The peculiar phenomena in the second book are beyond doubt due to a redactor.}

(4) Gen. vii. 16: “And those that went in, went in male and female of all flesh (into the ark to Noah), as Elohim had commanded; and Jehovah shut the door behind him.”

(5) יְיָ אֱלֹהִים is only in a few places, where definite reasons exist.

(6) Num. xvi. 22: “And they fell on their faces, and said: אֱלֹהֵי הָרַחוּת לְכָל־בָּשָׂר, wilt Thou be wroth with the whole congregation because one man has sinned?”

§ 42.

Attributes or Names of God which are derived immediately from the notion of Jehovah.

From the notion of Jehovah flow the following further properties of the Divine Being:—

1. Jehovah is an eternal God, אֵל עוֹלָם, as Abraham addresses Him in Gen. xxi. 33; comp. Deut. xxxii. 40, where Jehovah is introduced as Himself saying, “I live to eternity.” God’s eternity is involved in His absolute independence, in virtue whereof God is not conditioned by anything which originates or decays in time, but is the first and the last (Isa. xlv. 6, xlviii. 12). The longest human measurement of time vanishes when put against His eternal duration, Ps. xc. 4. Still it is not this abstract conception of eternity as an everlasting duration of time which the Old Testament chiefly brings forward; but whilst God as יְהוָה is the eternal, God’s eternity is defined as the unchangeableness of His being, persisting throughout every change of time, and thus it becomes the basis of human confidence. Therefore Moses, in the midst of the dying away of his people, addresses God as the Eternal One, Ps. xc. 1 f. (1); therefore, Deut.

xxxii. 40, the idea that God is eternal forms the transition to the announcement that He will again save His rejected people; therefore Israel, when sighing in misery, is comforted, Isa. xl. 28: "Knowest thou not, and hast thou not heard, that Jehovah is an eternal God?" Compare also Ps. cii. 28.

2. It is involved in the notion of Jehovah that He is a living God: Gen. xvi. 14 (according to the probable explanation of the passage), Deut. v. 23 (26), אֱלֹהִים חַיִּים; Josh. iii. 10, אֱלֹהֵי חַי. He swears by His life, Num. xiv. 21, 28, compare Deut. xxxii. 40. In the following books the expression is much more common; and here the form of oath, which does not occur in the Pentateuch, הִי יְהוָה, as true as Jehovah lives, appears often, never אֱלֹהִים חַיִּים. The latter circumstance is sufficient to indicate that God is not called the living God in the sense of His bearing within Him the powers of physical life, although in every respect the words in Ps. xxxvi. 10, "with Thee is the fountain of life," are applicable to Him; but He is called the Living One, as the God of revelation, in as far as He entrenches Himself in historical attestations in the sphere of mankind, and causes Himself to be here known to men by the operations of His power. His first appearance as the God who, ruling in free activity, causes nature to serve His aims, and is therefore called the living God, is to the forsaken Hagar, Gen. xvi. 13 f. (according to the most probable explanation): "She called the name of Jehovah who spoke to her, Thou art a God of seeing," that is, who sees (whose care does not even overlook a rejected helpless one in the desert); for she said, "Have I then here looked after God, who sees me? Therefore the name of the well (where Hagar had this manifestation) is the well of the Living One, who seeth me" (2). Jehovah's speech from out of the fire on Sinai is called the voice of the living God, Deut. v. 23; He is acknowledged as the living God in the midst of the congregation by His deeds of revelation, Josh. iii. 10, and by His words of revelation, Jer. xxiii. 36. As a living God, He also enters with man into a relation of fellowship which is experienced by him inwardly, especially as a God who hears prayer, and hence the longing of the godly for the living God (Ps. xlii. 3, lxxxiv. 3). As the Living One, Jehovah is placed in contrast to the gods of the heathen, which can reveal nothing, perform nothing, grant no requests, and send no help, Deut. xxxii. 37-39; which are nothings,

אלילים, Lev. xix. 4, xxvi. 1, etc.; and dead, מתים, Ps. cvi. 28 (3). Hence the idea of the living God is specially carried out in the polemic of the prophets and the psalms against the heathen; for example, Jer. x. 10 ff., comp. 1 Sam. xvii. 36, Isa. xxxvii. 4, 17, etc. Terror for those of guilty conscience, and comfort for those seeking help, both lie in the idea of the divine vitality, and hence in Israel there is no higher oath than the utterance, Jehovah lives (יהוה חי).

3. Jehovah is the Lord, יהוה; my Lord, אֲדֹנָי. That the notion of אֲדֹנָי is immediately connected with the notion of Jehovah is already clear from the fact that the two names are frequently associated, and that אֲדֹנָי could in later times be substituted in reading for יהוה. The word אֲדֹנָי is the plural of אֲדֹנִי, which is derived from דָּן, to direct, to rule. The plural is to be explained as in אֱלֹהִים (§ 36); but the ending י is not (as many have assumed) a plural ending, for the existence of such a termination is more than doubtful, but it is the suffix of the first person, which is pointed with Kametz to distinguish God's name from the common use of אֲדֹנִי (= my lords, comp. e.g. Gen. xix. 2) (4). In the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua, in which אֲדֹנָי only occurs in *addressing* God, the suffix still has its meaning; compare such passages as Gen. xv. 2, 8, xviii. 3, 27, 30 ff., in Jehovistic context, and in Elohist context, Gen. xx. 4 (in the mouth of Abimelech); and further, passages like Ex. xxxiv. 9, Num. xiv. 17, Deut. iii. 24, ix. 26; especially אֲדֹנָי is connected with the particle of request בִּי, Ex. iv. 10, 13, Josh. vii. 8, in addresses of supplication. In the Pentateuch and the book of Joshua, where Jehovah is not directly addressed as the Lord, we find not אֲדֹנָי, but יהוה, Ex. xxxiv. 23, or אֲדֹנִי יהוה, Deut. x. 17, or אֲדֹנִי כֹל־יהוה, Josh. iii. 13. Later, however, the meaning of the suffix got blunted, so that the expression is frequently found even when God is spoken of in the third person. But when God Himself speaks, He never makes use of the word; the passages Job xxviii. 28, Isa. viii. 7, form only an apparent exception (5). According to the original meaning of the expression ("my Lord"), there lies in it, as shown by the above-cited passages, not simply the acknowledgment of the divine sovereignty in general, but in particular the consciousness of specially belonging to God, as is the case with the organs of revelation among the covenant people, the consciousness of standing under His immediate guidance and protection.

Thus far it was quite wrong to stamp the Old Testament religion as a religion of fear on account of the frequent use of “Lord,” since *אֲדֹנָי* is more the expression of trust in its original meaning. On the contrary, the notion of the powerful Ruler over all lies in the later use of the expression, after the sense of the suffix had ceased to be felt, Isa. viii. 7, xl. 10, etc. (6).

(1) Ps. xc. 4: “A thousand years are before Thine eyes like yesterday as it passed, like a watch in the night.”—Ver. 1 f.: “Lord, Thou art our refuge from generation to generation; before the mountains were formed, and Thou hadst brought forth the earth and the world, and from eternity to eternity Thou art God.”

(2) Thus Delitzsch (among others) explains the difficult passage Gen. xvi. 13 f. Side by side with this explanation there is another, according to which our passage would not belong to this topic. Keil reads *רָאִי* as the pausal-form of *רָאָה* instead of *רָאִי*, and translates, “Have I here also seen after this seeing? Therefore the well was called the Well of the Living-seeing” (as compound noun); that is, the well where a man remains in life when he sees God. Hagar was astonished that she still saw after having seen the *בְּלֹאֵךְ* of God; that is, that she still remained in life, since it was impossible to remain alive after having had a manifestation of God. Against the first explanation, Keil says that it would require *רָאִי*; but in Job vii. 8 *רָאִי* similarly stands.

(3) The word *אֵלִיל* means “nothing,” from *אֵלֵל*; but it is manifest that by this word, a sort of diminutive of *אֵל*, little God, was also intended.

(4) It is peculiar that, when *אֲדֹנָי* is the name of God, it stands with prefixes *אֲדֹנָי*, *אֲדֹנָי*, although otherwise it is punctuated, *e.g.* *אֲדֹנָיִךְ*.

(5) Job xxviii. 28 should be read, according to most manuscripts and the oldest editions, *יְהוָה*; in Isa. viii. 7 a change of subject must be presumed, with a transition to the prophet as speaker. Amos vi. 8 does not belong to this head at all.

(6) The word *אֲדֹנָי* occurs 134 times in the text.—*אֲדֹנָי* has been compared with the Phœnician Adonis, against which it is enough to remark that the two have nothing in common except the name.

§ 43.

The Unity of God.

Jehovah is one. The multiplicity of divine powers broken up in polytheism is already summed up into unity in Elohim, but it is as Jehovah that God is first fully recognised as one; and thus monotheism forms one of the cardinal doctrines of Mosaism, and therefore Ex. xx. 3, "Thou shalt have no other God beside me" (עַל־פָּנַי, above me, or in addition to me), is placed foremost in the decalogue. Nevertheless, thoroughgoing monotheism has often been denied to the Pentateuch; and it has been maintained, either, 1st, that the unity of God unwound itself gradually from a polytheistic religion, or, 2^d, that even the Mosaic Jehovah does not exclude the existence of other gods. These two views are to be more closely considered (1).

1. Passages like Gen. i. 26, xi. 7 (where Jehovah says, "We will go down and confound their language"), also iii. 22, are cited in support of the first view. But even if we (comp. § 36) refuse to admit in the two first-named passages the conception of the plural as the plural of majesty,—though this view is quite admissible,—the plural would still on no account be referable to other gods, but at most to higher spiritual beings, as the angels; so that for xi. 7, in reference to the expression Isa. vi. 8 would be to be compared, and in reference to the matter Zech. xiv. 5 (2). But in regard to the third passage, in which Jehovah says, "Man is become כְּפָנֵינוּ כְּאֶחָד מֵאֵמָּנוּ, like one of us" (and where the plural is, I think, decidedly not to be understood as a plural of majesty, as Keil still understands it), the words convey the meaning, Man has become like a being of my species; and thus the expression does not suppose other gods, but only the existence of a plurality of spiritual beings. But in general, the following is to be noted in opposition to the view just indicated: If the Mosaic monotheism was the result of such a process, this process must certainly be transferred to a time prior to the consciousness of the Old Testament. The whole delineation Gen. i.-x. includes most definitely the universality of the idea of God; and also after revelation has confined itself to one tribe, the divine training aims continually at awaking the consciousness of this universality; comp. Gen. xxviii. 15 f., a passage which is instructive in this respect (3). But if the Old Testament monotheism has been developed from polytheism, the other gods from

whose midst Jehovah had raised Himself as the highest God must still exist somehow in consciousness; perhaps lowered to angels, but still as beings endued with a certain independence of action. But, as we shall see, Old Testament angelology follows the opposite path; at its close those angels first appear who are endowed with definite personal attributes. Certainly in heathen religions the tendency to monotheism does not merely assert itself by the elevation of a supreme God over the other gods, but also in the attempt to find a unity in an abstract power standing over the world of gods,—as, for example, in the Indian Brahma conceived as a neuter, and in the *ὄντως ὄν* of the later Greek theology, *e.g.* by Plutarch. But an idea of Jehovah is nowhere developed from the polytheistic process, and nowhere are the many gods condensed into an absolute subject (4).

2. If, by the assertion that the Jehovah of the Old Testament does not exclude the existence of other gods, it is only meant that many of the Israelites regarded Jehovah only as a God beside other gods of the people, this cannot be disputed. In Jephthah's words, Judg. xi. 24 (5), which are specially cited as evidence to the point, it may fairly be asked whether the argument does not proceed on Moabite ideas, without these being declared correct; on the contrary, it is historically certain that even a Solomon at a later time could come to have doubts about this point. But it is just as certain that this view is always combated by the organs of the revelation as a perversion of the idea of God.—In reference to the separate passages to which the assertion appeals, Ex. xviii. 11, "Jehovah is greater than all gods," does not come into consideration, being the word of a heathen (of Jethro). But when it is said, xx. 3, "Thou shalt have no other gods beside me;" xii. 12, "I will execute judgments on all the gods of Egypt, I am Jehovah;" xv. 11, "Who among the gods is like Thee, Jehovah?" such passages are to be explained with reference to others in the same book; such as ix. 29, "the earth is Jehovah's;" further, xx. 11, xxxi. 17, "in six days Jehovah made the heaven and the earth," etc.,—passages which most decidedly exclude the opinion that other gods rule side by side with Jehovah inside the boundaries of their own people and land. How little the expression אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים is to be taken in the sense in which the heathen speak of *Dii novi*, *advenæ*, *peregrini*, is shown by the frequent occurrence of this expression in the

prophets, whose strict monotheism is certainly beyond all doubt; *e.g.* comp. Isa. xix. 1 with Ex. xii. 12. The passages referred to in Deuteronomy show just as little as those cited from Exodus. If it is said, chap. xxxii. 12, "Jehovah led Israel alone, no strange god was with Him," the strange gods are called, ver. 21, לֹא־אֱלֹהִים and הֵבֵלִים—breaths, nothings (which correspond fully with אֱלִילִים, Lev. xix. 4, and תְּהוּ, 1 Sam. xi. 21). For elucidation, compare Ps. xvi., where it is said, ver. 4, "Jehovah is fearful above all the gods," but in ver. 5 is immediately added, "for all the gods of the people are nothings." Hence we gather the meaning of Deut. xxxii. 39: "See ye now that I am He, and there is no god with me; I kill and give life." Further, if we regard also x. 14, "Behold the heaven and the heaven of heavens, the earth and all that is upon it, are Jehovah thy God's,"—there can be no doubt that the proper *dicta probantia* must be understood as for the unity of God in the strictest sense. These are: chap. iv. 35, "Jehovah is *the* God (הָאֱלֹהִים), and none but He;" again in ver. 39, "Jehovah is God in the heavens above, and in the earth beneath; there is none but He;" and lastly the sacrosanct word, vi. 4: שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֶחָד. This cannot mean (as many have explained it), "Jehovah is our God, Jehovah alone," that is, Israel has only Jehovah for his God; for in that case we must have had לְבַדּוֹ instead of אֶחָד. There are only two admissible explanations: either, "Hear, O Israel, Jehovah our God, Jehovah is one" (אֶחָד as predicate to the second Jehovah); or יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ is predicate to יְהוָה אֶחָד, "Jehovah our God is one (a unique) Jehovah." On the latter explanation the meaning is not (as Schultz has conceived in his commentary to Deuteronomy): Our God has not sometimes this and sometimes that manner of manifestation, but only one single one as Jehovah (which introduces an entirely foreign thought into the passage); this second construction is rather to be explained, with Keil: Jehovah our God is the one absolute independent abiding one, and so He to whom alone divine reality belongs. Still the first explanation seems to me to be the more correct. The demand, ver. 5, to dedicate to Him the whole heart and undivided love, and, ver. 14, not to go after heathen gods (6), is based on Jehovah being absolutely one. From the later books, comp. in elucidation such passages as Isa. xliii. 10, xlv. 6, xlv. 5, xiv. 18, etc.

But another question is, whether the heathen gods did not exist according to the Old Testament, if not as gods, at least as living beings, perhaps as demons. But for this also proofs are wanting; for the expression אֱלֹהִים, Deut. xxxii. 17, discussed in § 37, and specially cited in this connection, though it is translated by the LXX. by *δαίμονια*, gives us in its meaning "lords" nothing but the heathen conception (7). It is rather characteristic of the polemic of the Old Testament against heathen worship, that the images are identified with the gods themselves, and thereby the nullity of the latter is shown; compare passages like Isa. xlv. 9 ff., Jer. x. 3 ff. In Isa. xlv. 1 f., compared with xli. 29, the distinction between the gods and their images is simply apparent for the sake of vividness. Note also the practical demonstration of the nullity of Baal, 1 Kings xviii. 21 ff. (at the scene on Carmel).

(1) Schultz, in his *Old Testament Theology*, i. p. 260 ff., treats the question on the whole very well, and in a peculiar way.

(2) In Isa. vi. 8, the seraphim are comprehended in the אֲנָשִׁים; Zech. xiv. 5 speaks of the descent of Jehovah with all the holy ones.

(3) In Gen. xxviii. 15 f., the promise is given to Jacob that God will lead him wherever he goes; Jacob says on awaking: I did not know that God is also in this place. Thus the particularizing view is here corrected.

(4) Vatke's remarks on this in his *Religion of the Old Testament*, pp. 705-707, are very sound; compare also, on the tendency to monotheism in the Greek religion, Roth's criticism of Nägelsbach's "Homeric Theology," *Erl. Zeitschr.* 1841.

(5) Judg. xi. 24. Jephthah, in negotiating with Moab, says: "Is it not so, what thy god Chemosh gives thee to inherit, that thou inheritest?"

(6) Judaism is certainly right in continually proclaiming the passage Deut. vi. 4 (called the שְׁמַיָּה, from its first word) as the most holy word, which includes the cardinal doctrine of monotheism.

(7) The designation of the heathen gods as אֱלֹהִים (§ 42) speaks also against this notion. It is indeed probable that in 1 Cor. viii. 4 ff., x. 19 f., Paul, when he uses the word *δαίμονια* in speaking of the Greek gods, takes it from the LXX. Deut. xxxii. 17; but Paul there maintains, in my opinion, not that the individual heathen gods were demons, but only that a demonic element prevailed in the service of the heathen gods.

IV. GOD AS THE HOLY ONE.

§ 44.

Formal Definition of the Notion.

God is קדוש, the Holy One (1). Etymologically, the root-meaning of קדוש cannot be exactly defined. According to the most likely view, the stem קדש is related to חדש (as קצב with חצב, קצה with חצה, קצר with חצר, etc.), and is to be traced back to the root דש (from which דש also comes), as the root-meaning of which, “*enituit*, splendid breaking forth,” is to be accepted (2). Thus the notion of the breaking forth of brilliant light would lie in the word; compare specially Isa. x. 17, where the epithet “Light of Israel” corresponds to the Holy One of Israel. According to this, we might define the divine holiness, with Quenstedt (comp. also Thomasius, *Dogmatik*, i. 2d ed. p. 141), as the *summa in Deo puritas*. Certainly this lies in the notion; but in order to get the full meaning of the word, we must follow the historical development of the notion.

The designation of God as the Holy One appears first in the Old Testament at the redemption of Israel and the founding of the theocracy. The first declaration of the divine holiness is found in Moses’ song of praise, Ex. xv. 11, where it is said, in reference to God’s great deeds in leading Israel out of Egypt: “Who is like Thee among the gods, glorious in holiness, to be praised with awe, doing wonders?” To this it corresponds that also Israel, when received into the covenant of God, receives the predicate of the holy people, xix. 6. The stamp of holiness is so imprinted on the events at the founding of the theocracy, that, as Achelis strikingly reminds us (in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1847, p. 192), in Ex. xix. 10, 14 the expression “sanctify” is used for the same action which is called in Gen. xxxv. 2 “cleanse yourselves.” All covenant regulations rest on the principle: I am holy, and ye must also be holy (Lev. xi. 44 f., and passages like xix. 2, xx. 8, xxi. 8).

When holiness is predicated of the covenant people and covenant ordinances, two things are implied: 1st, being taken out of worldliness; 2d, being appropriated by God,—a relationship of special appropriation to Him. If this character of holiness clings to anything, this never rests on a natural quality. Nothing created is in itself

holy. The notion of natural purity and impurity does not coincide with that of holiness and unholiness. The holiness of the creature always goes back to an act of the divine will, to divine election and institution (3). In other words: It is always a state in which the creature is bound to God by the appointment of God Himself, which is expressed by קדש, קדוּשָׁה, קִדְּשׁ, קִדְּשׁוּ; whereas the opposite expressions חל, חלל, etc. (comp. Lev. x. 10, xxii. 9, Ezek. xxii. 26, xxxvi. 21, xxxix. 7, etc.), designate the profane as set loose, freed, and abandoned (4).

Where קדוּשָׁה is a designation of a divine attribute, there evidently lies in it primarily a negative element, by which it designates a state of apartness, God raising Himself up above others. So Jehovah, as the Holy One, stands first in opposition to the other, imaginary gods, Ex. xv. 11: "Who is like Thee among the gods? who is like Thee, glorious in holiness!" And then also in opposition to all that is of the creature, or, more generally expressed, to all that is not He Himself, Isa. xl. 25: "To whom will ye compare me that I may be like? saith the Holy One." In other words: As the Holy One, God is He who is raised absolutely above the world; compare Ps. xcix. 2-5, where God's elevation over all people is connected with His holiness; Isa. v. 16, in which the truth that the holy God sanctifies Himself in justice corresponds to His being elevated by judgment (comp. ii. 17). Accordingly this divine elevation is God's absolute uniqueness, 1 Sam. ii. 2: "There is none holy like Jehovah, for there is none but Thee." The positive expression for God's absolute elevation and uniqueness would be, that in His transcendence above the world, and in His apartness from the creature, God is He who ever preserves His own proper character, maintaining Himself in that being which is withdrawn from creation (5).

This element of the divine holiness was held fast, though certainly in a very superficial manner, by those who defined holiness as the incomparableness and exclusive adorableness of God. Thus Zachariä in his *Biblical Theology*, and more minutely Storr in his *Doctrina Christiana*, § 30 (6).—Menken and his school especially stood up against this conception of the divine holiness (7). They set up, in opposition to the ruling conception, the opinion that the divine holiness does not so much designate God's unparalleled splendour, as God's condescending grace, His self-abasing love, and thus did not express the divine retire-

ment from the creature, but rather God's communication of Himself to the creature; according to this, the expression קדוש had a meaning similar to הסיד. For this Menken referred to the following main passages:—Ps. ciii., which proclaims itself in ver. 1 as the praise of the divine holiness, and praises God as the gracious One, He who forgives sin and frees from all evil (compare also Ps. cv. 3); Hos. xi. 8 f., where the divine holiness is placed in connection with divine mercy: "My mercies are kindled together. I will not execute the fierceness of my fury, I will not destroy Ephraim again: for I am God, and not man, holy in thy midst;" compare further, Ps. xxii. 4, xxxiii. 21, and other texts.—It was not difficult to show that this conception of Menken does not do justice to the biblical notion. It cannot be denied that, when God reveals Himself in His holiness, the main feeling awakened in man is the feeling of timidity before the severity and fearfulness of the Divine Being; thus from Ex. iii. 5 onwards, and (not to look in the first instance at the Pentateuch) compare further *e.g.* 1 Sam. vi. 20, in which, after a dreadful visitation, it is said: "Who can stand before Jehovah, this holy God?" Isa. vi., where the prophet, on hearing the Trisagion of the seraphim, cries out, ver. 5, "Woe is me! I am undone, for I am a man of unclean lips;" v. 16, where, in reference to the approaching judgment, it is said, "The holy God is sanctified in justice." The Alexandrian translators had a correct feeling for this element. They translated the word קדוש by ἅγιος, an expression derived from ἄζομαι, which just points to that revering dread which the holy thing demands for itself (8). But still, on the other side, it is clear from the above-cited passages that the conception of Menken must contain an element of truth (9). This element is found in the fact that the divine holiness contains not only the divine self-preservation, but also the divine self-disclosure, since God as the Holy One does not remain in Himself, but gives effect to His holiness on the outward world, by taking in hand a separation within the world, for His own aims, electing a people out of the mass of the nations of the world, accepting them as His property, and imprinting on the ordinances which He gives to this people, and on the historical providence by which they are guided, the stamp of this separation from worldliness, and of this specific relation to Himself. See, as principal passage, Lev. xx. 26: "I am holy, and so I have separated you from

among the nations to be mine." Therefore the Holy One of Israel (10) is Israel's Maker (Isa. xlv. 11) (compare § 82), Israel's Redeemer (xlix. 7) (11); therefore God, as the holy God, is the doer of miracles, *עֹשֶׂה פִּלְאֵי*, properly He that doeth "things apart," Ex. xv. 11. On the connection of the notion of miracle with the divine holiness, compare also Ps. lxxvii. 14 f., xcvi. 1 (and § 64) (12). The way in which, according to what has been just developed, two things lie in the divine holiness,—that He stands in opposition to the world, and again, that He removes this opposition by choosing in the world some whom he places in communion with Himself, or, to make use of Schmieder's expression, the way in which God's holiness is the interpenetration of God's self-preservation and self-disclosure,—is very beautifully expressed in Isa. lvii. 15: "Thus saith the high and lofty One, who dwells eternally, the Holy One is His name; I dwell in the heights and in the holy place, and with those who are broken and humble in spirit."—The passages urged by Menken are also explicable from what has been noted. All demonstrations of the divine covenant of grace are the issues of the divine holiness. Outside of the theocratic relations it is closed to the world; but as soon as the world comes into connection with the divine kingdom, it receives manifestations of the divine holiness (13).

(1) In virtue of its pregnancy, the notion of the divine holiness—J. A. Bengel calls it *vere inexhaustæ significationis*—is one of the most difficult biblical notions, on which views quite contrary to one another have been brought forward. Of the literature, compare Achelis, "Attempt to decide the Meaning of the Word קדש from the History of the Divine Revelation," in Ullmann's *Studien und Kritiken*, 1847, p. 187 ff.; Rupprecht, "On the notion of God's Holiness," in the same, 1849, p. 684 ff.; Bähr, *Symbolik des mosaischen Kultus*, i. p. 37, ii. p. 27 ff.; Hofmann, *der Schriftbeweis*, 2d ed. i. p. 81 ff.; Lutz, *bibl. Dogmatik*, p. 89 ff., etc.; also my article, "Heiligkeit Gottes," in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* xix. p. 618 ff. Diestel gives the most comprehensive examination of the matter, "die Heiligkeit Gottes," *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theol.* 1859, p. 3 ff.

(2) Compare on the etymology, Delitzsch, *Jesurun*, p. 155.

(3) On the holiness of the covenant people, comp. § 82, 2.—In the same way, the character of holiness attaches to localities which, since the God who revealed Himself in Israel manifests His presence in them, have become appropriated in an especial manner by Him.

First, in Ex. iii. 5, the place of the theophany is called holy ground; whilst in Gen. xxviii. 17, on a similar occasion, it was said, "How dreadful (נורא) is this place!" Then the tabernacle is sanctified by being filled with the splendour of God, and because He holds intercourse with His people from this place (Ex. xxix. 43 f.); the camp is holy, according to Deut. xxiii. 15, because Jehovah walks in the midst of it. And further, holiness is predicated of the times set apart for divine worship (as early as Gen. ii. 3, in speaking of the seventh day of the week, because there already the writer looks forward to the theocratic regulation to which the institution of the Sabbath really belongs [see later]); lastly, of the actions in which the people give effect to their devotion to God, and of the things which they dedicate to Him, and which thus pass into His ownership.—Diestel, *l.c.*, has said very rightly, p. 7: "Inside Mosaism the whole sphere of the holy owes its origin to the will of Jehovah, who is reckoned throughout as an absolutely free and powerful personality. Therefore, in the most rigorous sense of the word, nothing is holy in and for itself till the will of Jehovah declares it to be His property" [in the article cited above].—See the details under the head of ordinances of worship.

(4) On the latter, see Hofmann, *der Schriftbeweis*, i. 2d ed. p. 82. But we cannot agree with Hofmann, that in קדוש the relation to God is not immediately thought of, and that it means, generally speaking, "what stands outside the common course, the common regulation of things." That the religious value of קדוש is inseparable from the word, is shown also by the expressions קדוש קדוש and קדושה, which are only employed in the sphere of heathenism, and which in like manner characterize persons dedicated to the Deity.—It is quite wrong to explain the term קדוש מלחמה by saying that war "breaks through the common daily course of life." Nay, in all those passages where the expression occurs, the point in question is a war for the divine cause, whether this is the real design (Joel iv. 9) or only the assertion (Mic. iii. 5) of the combatants, or whether the notion is, that the combat is ordained to execute the divine counsel [*ibid.*].

(5) Upon this element of divine self-preservation, compare especially Schmieder, *Betrachtungen über das hohepriesterliche Gebet*, 1848, a book which is not known so well as it deserves to be. He rightly says, p. 125: "God's holiness is God's self-preservation, by virtue of which He remains like Himself in all relations which either are in Him or on which He enters in any way, and neither gives up any part of His divinity nor accepts anything ungodly."

(6) Zachariä, *l.c.* p. 242: I am holy, means: "None may be honoured as God, as Jehovah is honoured in Israel." Storr, *l.c.*:

"Divina natura vocatur sancta, h. e. sejuncta ab omnibus aliis et incomparabilis."

(7) Menken's *Versuch einer Anleitung zum eigenen Unterricht in den Wahrheiten der heiligen Schrift* (a sort of popular dogmatic), 3d ed. 1833, p. 58 ff. (complete edition of his writings, vi. p. 46 ff.), is especially to be named; compare also Achelis, in the above-cited essay, p. 198 f.

(8) See on this point the subtle remarks by Zezschwitz, *Profan-gräcität und bibl. Sprachgeist*, 1859, p. 15.

(9) "Holiness," says Schmieder (*l.c.* 125) correctly, "would not be holiness, but exclusiveness, if it did not presuppose God's entrance into multifarious relations, and thereby revelation and communication of Himself."

(10) Upon the title. "The Holy One of Israel," see Caspari, in the *Zeitschr. für luther. Theol.* 1844, iii. p. 92 ff.

(11) The restoration of Israel is also an issue of the divine holiness, since God, in virtue of this attribute, effaces the antithesis in which the rejection of Israel stands to His purpose of election (Ezek. xxxvi. 16 ff., xxxvii. 26-28) [*ibid.*].

(12) Diestel errs most decidedly when he (*l.c.* p. 11) says: "Jehovah is holy, inasmuch as He belongs to the people of Israel, inasmuch as He is Israel's property."

(13) Compare also the doctrine of the kingdom of God in the theology of prophecy.

§ 45.

Material Definition of the Notion.

But the notion of the divine holiness has been only formally defined by what we have said hitherto. If, in order to come at the concrete side of the matter, we proceed from the question, What is the purport of God's sanctifying a people to Himself?—generally speaking, the answer is, that the point in question is the restoration of a perfection of life both inwardly and outwardly (1). Now, if we argue from this to the purport of the divine holiness, it falls to be defined concretely as an absolute perfection of life, but with the understanding that this definition must essentially be understood in an ethical sense. Many, indeed, have gone further, among whom are J. A. Bengel (2) and Rupprecht; the view of the latter (*l.c.* p. 691) comes to this, that the holiness of God designates the whole divine perfection, majesty, and blessedness, "the whole complex of that

which we, in our human imperfection and shortsightedness, are wont to look at and represent singly in the individual attributes of God."—It is indeed true that the notions of divine holiness and glory are related. We may say, with Oetinger, holiness is hidden glory, and glory disclosed holiness. The tabernacle and the temple, for example, are sanctified, because Jehovah filled them with His glory, and made His dwelling-place in them (Ex. xl. 34; 1 Kings viii. 11). In the same way, in Isa. vi. 3, the praise of God as the Holy One corresponds to the proclamation, The earth is full of His glory. But the divine glory reaches beyond the spheres in which the divine holiness operates. When it is said in Gen. viii. 2, "How glorious is Thy name in all the earth!" it could not be said in the same sense, "How holy is Thy name," etc. God's glory extends over nature, and is given back to Him by all His creatures (Ps. civ. 31); on the other hand, the course of nature serves the divine holiness only in as far as God encroaches on it for the purposes of His kingdom, and makes use of the powers of nature for them. Thus, also, the divine spirit is not the Holy Spirit inasmuch as it is the cosmical principle of life, but only inasmuch as it rules in the theocracy (Isa. lxiii. 10 f.; Ps. li. 13).

From this it is sufficiently clear that the unlimited extension of the notion of the divine holiness above cited cannot be correct. But let us consider, further, what sort of fear it is that seizes man when God is revealed as the Holy One. It is evidently not simply the feeling of creature weakness which asserts itself here, but predominantly and specifically the feeling of human sinfulness and impurity (Isa. vi. 5 and others). Hence it follows that the divine holiness, even if, as absolute perfection of life, it involves the negation of all bonds of creature finitude (from which passages like Isa. xl. 25 are explained), is nevertheless mainly seclusion from the impurity and sinfulness of the creature, or, expressed positively, the clearness and purity of the divine nature, which excludes all communion with what is wicked. In this sense the symbolical designation of the divine holiness is, that God is light (comp. Isa. x. 17) (3).—Now it answers to this, that the divine holiness, in as far as it operates as an attribute of revelation, is not an abstract power, which merely pronounces over the finite, as such, the judgment of nothingness, but is the divine self-representation and self-testimony for the purpose of giving to the world a participation

in the perfection of the divine life (4).—By means of this ethical conception of divine holiness, the Old Testament is distinguished from Islam, in which the designation of God as the Holy King shows merely the divine elevation and majesty, and therefore in Islam the divine justice is also conceived as the pure manifestation of the power of the omniscient Omnipotent (5).

(1) See Diestel, *l.c.* p. 12 ff.

(2) On this subject Bengel expresses himself in a letter to Kasp. Neumann (see Bengel's *Literary Correspondence*, published by Burk, 1836, p. 52 ff.): "De Deo ubi scriptura nomen illud קדש enunciat, statuo non denotare solam puritatem voluntatis, sed quicquid de Deo cognoscitur, et quicquid insuper de Illo, si se uberius revelare velit, cognosci possit," etc., on which he seeks to prove that all the divine attributes, also the divine aseity, eternity, omnipotence, etc., are contained in holiness. (The letter written in 1712 is, however, to be recognised as a rather immature and youthful work in the whole style of treatment.) [*Ibid.*]

(3) Compare Thomasius, *l.c.* p. 137; Godet, *la Sainteté de Dieu*, Neuch. 1864, p. 8.

(4) In antithesis to the heathen gods, who more or less foster wickedness and are its patrons, it is said of Israel's God, Ps. v. 5 ff., "Thou art not a God whom crime delighteth, neither shall a wicked person dwell with Thee; the insolent shall not appear before Thine eyes; Thou hatest all that do evil; Thou blottest out those who speak lies; Jehovah abhors the man of lying and blood." In reference to this ethical meaning of the divine holiness, compare also Hos. xii. 1, where God is called "the Faithful and Holy One;" Hab. i. 12, in connection with ver. 13; Job vi. 10.

(5) See on this, Dettinger, "Beiträge zu einer Theologie des Korans," in the *Tübinger Zeitschr. für Theol.* 1834, i. p. 25.

§ 46.

Characteristics connected with the Divine Holiness. 1. Impossibility of picturing God, Omnipresence, Spirituality.

A number of other characteristics of the Divine Being are connected with the idea of the divine holiness, and have still to be developed.

Inasmuch as the divine holiness is the withdrawal of the Divine Being from all finiteness of the creature, it contains the impossibility of forming an image of the Divine Being. For the connection of the two

notions compare the passage Isa. xl. 25, already quoted (§ 44). On this is grounded the prohibition to represent God by an image. Certainly no more would follow directly from the passages Ex. xx. 4, Deut. v. 8, than that God is not to be represented by the image of one of the existing creatures. But Deut. iv. 15 ff. shows that the want of figure and form of the Divine Being is to be taken generally. And, indeed, not only is the contemplation of the Divine Being by an image made by the hand of man excluded, but also the honouring of the divine in the constellations, ver. 19 compared with xxix. 25 (1). Now if, on the other hand, a *הוֹמָה יְהוָה* is spoken of in Num. xii. 8, we are to understand here, as in the theophanies spoken of in Genesis, that there is a distinction between the sinking of God's being into visibility, and that being in itself (2). Just as little can any argument contradictory to the clear utterances of the Old Testament as to the idea of God be drawn from anthropomorphisms—if that is the word used in the more limited sense, in distinction from anthropopathies, to denote those expressions in which parts of the human body, or more generally human sense faculties, are transferred to God, so that eyes, ears, nose, etc., and from that seeing, hearing, smelling, and the like, are used in speaking of Him. No religion can dispense with such anthropomorphic expression when it enters into the sphere of representative thought, and everything depends just on this, that the incongruity of such expressions is corrected by the whole conception of the idea of God (3). It is also to be noted, that in the later books of the Old Testament, in which are found the strongest utterances on the freedom of the Divine Being from creature forms (as Ps. l. 12 f., etc.), the anthropomorphisms are not the less frequent.—Still the question remains to be answered, whether and in how far, according to the Old Testament, the Divine Being is freed from the limitations of space. It is self-evident that the Pentateuch regards God, to whom, Deut. x. 14, the heaven and the heavens of heaven, the earth and all that is upon it, belong, as the Omnipresent One, even when such express delineations of omnipresence as in Ps. cxxxix. are not found in the Pentateuch. But still it is urged in different passages, that wherever man is, God gives him to experience His protecting nearness, or more generally expressed, His communion. Compare passages like Gen. xvi. 13, xxviii. 15 ff., xlvi. 4, etc. For the rest, the Pentateuch has

mainly to do with the special presence which God gives by living among His people, when He localizes His face, His name, His glory—the so-called Shekhina (comp. § 63).—The positive expression that God is spirit is not so expressly found in the Old Testament, which is rather accustomed to say that God has the spirit, and causes it to go out from Him; by which, however, the spirit is indicated as the element of God's life; compare Isa. xl. 13, Ps. cxxxix. 7, and further the contrast, Isa. xxxi. 3 (4). That God is the absolute personality, is pregnantly expressed in the word אני ה', "I am He," Deut. xxxii. 39, Isa. xliii. 10.

(1) Deut. iv. 15 ff.: "Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner of figure (כְּלִמְדָּה) when Jehovah spake to you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire," etc. Ver. 19: "Thou shalt not lift up thine eyes unto heaven; and when thou seest the sun and the moon and the stars, all the host of heaven, thou shalt not suffer thyself to be seduced to worship them, and to serve them, which Jehovah thy God hath divided unto all nations under heaven." That the sense of the latter words is not that Jehovah has divided the stars as lights and measurements of time to all the nations under heaven, cannot, according to xxix. 25, be doubted. It is impossible to find another meaning in the words than that, whilst Israel has the revelation of the true God, the worship of the constellations is left over to the nations of the earth.

(2) On this, see the doctrine of revelation.

(3) Luther says once in his commentary on Genesis, in reference to this: "Qui extra ista involucra Deum attingere volunt, isti sine scalis nituntur ad cœlum ascendere.—Necesse enim est, ut Deus cum se nobis revelat, id faciat per velamen et involucrum quoddam, et dicat: ecce sub hoc involucro me certe apprehendes."

(4) Isa. xxxi. 3: "The Egyptians are men, and not God; and their horses are flesh, and not spirit." Here אִנָּה corresponds to אֵל.

§ 47.

2. The Divine Justice, Faithfulness, and Truthfulness.

The attributes of divine justice and divine faithfulness and truth are connected with the divine holiness in its ethical value. These attributes are conjoined in the main passage, Deut. xxxii. 4. The passage characterizes Jehovah as the rock, that is, as the immoveable basis of confidence; and gives the reason for this by pointing to the

perfection and unblameableness of the Divine Being and government, in virtue of which God is designated the Truthful and Righteous One (1). Here we have first to enter on the notion of divine justice (צִדְקָה) (2).

God is צַדִּיק. The root-meaning of צִדְק is (after the Arabic) “to be straight;” and so, according to its original meaning, the expression corresponds most nearly with יָשָׁר, with which it is conjoined in the above passage. The word צַדִּיק expresses what is straight and right, in the way that God in His government always does what is suitable: namely, first, what answers fully to His aim; and secondly, what answers to the constitution of the object of the divine action. Specially, but not exclusively, the sphere in which the צִדְקָה finds utterance is the judicial activity of God. But divine justice, notwithstanding its close connection with divine holiness, has the peculiarity that its sphere of action extends outside of the theocracy and theocratic relations; nay, in one passage in the Old Testament, even the animals are subsumed under the government of the divine צִדְקָה, Ps. xxxvi. 7 (3); a declaration to which John iv. 11 offers an elucidation. Still the proper sphere of God’s just government is mankind, and this without limit, even where humanity is out of all relation to the divine kingdom. According to Gen. xviii. 25, Jehovah is judge of all the earth, and as such He will exercise right, and not permit the lot of the godless to fall on the righteous (4). In this connection, in which God gives to every one his due, צַדִּיק appears also in Ex. ix. 27, where Pharaoh says, in giving honour to God’s justice: “Jehovah is the Just One (הַצֶּדִּיק), I and my people are the offenders (הַחֹשְׁעִים).” This passage and that of Deut. xxxii. 4, from which we started, are the only ones in the Pentateuch in which the justice of God is expressed. Holiness is indeed the principle of the theocratic regulation. To be sure, what is said in Isa. v. 16, in reference to the judgment, “The holy God is sanctified by justice,” must apply generally to the government of God in His kingdom (as presented already in the Pentateuch); all God’s deeds which constitute the divine guidance of the kingdom, and bring about the right, the כִּשְׁפוֹתֵי which the Pentateuch sets forth, are thus manifestations of His צִדְקָה. But it was the work of prophecy to fix the צִדְקָה as the attribute which acts in the ways of the divine kingdom for the

realization of the holy aim, as on the other side the general ethical relations of the divine justice are discussed in the Psalms and in the Hebrew Chochma. As in the idea of Jehovah who is the absolutely persistent One (comp. § 39), so also in the idea of the holy One in virtue of its ethical contents, the attribute of truth and faith is given; compare Isa. xlix. 7, יהוה אֱשֶׁר נֶאֱמָן; Hos. xii. 1, קְדוֹשִׁים נֶאֱמָן = the faithful All-holy One. From this God is called אֱלֹהֵי אֱמוּנָה in the above-cited passage in Deut. xxxii. 4, and in Ps. xxxi. 6 אֱלֹהֵי אֱמֶת; and the denomination of God as צִיּוֹר, rock, safe retreat, in the passage in Deuteronomy just refers to this. The antiquity of this last name is especially indicated by its frequent occurrence in personal names in the Pentateuch: אֱלֵי צִיּוֹר (my God is a rock), Num. i. 5; צִיּוֹרֵי אֱלֹהִים (my rock is God), iii. 35; צִיּוֹרֵי שָׁמַיִם (my rock is the Almighty), i. 6; פֶּדְהָצִיּוֹר (the rock redeems), i. 10 (comp. § 88, note 8). In the Old Testament this attribute is specially fixed in reference to the divine word of promise, and the agreement of the divine action therewith. One of the chief passages in the Pentateuch is Num. xxiii. 19; compare 1 Sam. xv. 29, Ps. xxxvi. 6 (5).

(1) Deut. xxxii. 4: "The Rock, His doing is blameless, for all His ways are right: a faithful God, and without fault, just and upright is He."

(2) Compare Diestel, "die Idee der Gerechtigkeit, vorzüglich im A. T., biblisch-theologisch dargestellt," *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1860, p. 173 ff.

(3) Ps. xxxvi. 3: "Thy justice is like the mountains of God; Thou, Jehovah, helpest man and beast."

(4) In this lies an element which is quite essential to the צִדְקָה, namely, that it is always action by rule and measure.

(5) Num. xxiii. 19: "God is not a man, that He should lie; nor a son of man, that He should repent of anything: shall He speak, and not do? shall He talk, and not accomplish?"—Ps. xxxvi. 6: "Thy righteousness reacheth to the clouds," that is, it has neither measurement nor end, like human faithfulness.

§ 48.

3. The Jealous God.

Lastly, there lies in the idea of divine holiness the characteristic jealous God, אֱלֹהֵי קִנְיָן (or אֱלֹהֵי קִנְיָן), Ex. xxxiv. 14 (1); Deut. vi. 15.

The divine zeal is just the energy of divine holiness; this notion stands in the same relation to that of holiness as the notion of **אֵל ה'** to the idea of Jehovah; hence it is said in Josh. xxiv. 19: "The All-holy God, that is, the **אֵל קָדֹשׁ**." The divine **קָדֹשׁ** has a double form:

1. It turns itself avengingly against every violation of the divine will. In virtue of His **קָדֹשׁ**, the holy God extirpates all that rises in opposition to Him. God's jealousy turns especially against idolatry, by which the divine uniqueness is attacked, see *e.g.* Deut. xxxii. 21 (2), but generally against all sin by which God's holy name is desecrated; the El-kanna is **פִּקְדֹן עֵץ**, Ex. xx. 5, compared with Josh. xxiv. 19. Thus the divine **קָדֹשׁ** manifests itself as divine wrath, **קֶזֶף, עֲבָרָה, זַעַר**, and such like expressions (3). For wrath (as Ullmann has strikingly defined it) is the powerful excitement of the voluntative (*wollenden*) spirit which arises in opposition to restraint, and thus the wrath of God is the highest strained energy of the holy will of God, the zeal of His wounded love. Compare, on the connection of the two notions, jealousy and wrath, Deut. vi. 15, xxxii. 21 f., Ps. lxxviii. 58 f. The consuming power of wrath is symbolized by fire; hence in Deut. iv. 24 it is said, "A consuming fire is the **אֵל קָדֹשׁ**," a fire which burns down to the world of Hades; comp. xxxii. 21 f. The inner essential connection of wrathful jealousy with the divine holiness is made especially clear by the passage Isa. x. 17: "The Light of Israel becomes a fire, and his Holy One a flame, which burn and consume his thorns and briers." Just because the wrath is a manifestation of divine holiness, the occasion of its outburst (as Ritschl and Diestel have rightly urged) does not lie in a capricious divine humour or natural malignity, as the gods of the heathen fall into a passion, but wholly in the person smitten by it. Because man disowns and casts away the witness of the holy God which was given to him, justice must be done upon him in his resistance to God's will, which alone is in the right, by his being reduced to his nothingness. Breach of the covenant, and the malignant interruption of the aim of the covenant, are the offences that chiefly kindle the divine wrath; comp. Ex. xxxii. 10, Num. xxv. 3, Deut. xxxi. 17 in connection with ver. 16. The contrast to the divine wrath is what the Old Testament expresses by means of **נָחַם, הִתְנַחֵם**, which literally mean breathing in, fetching one's breath. But the manifestation of wrath also receives its measure

from divine holiness, which measure is ordained by the divine aim of salvation, and hence it is not the sway of blind passion; comp. passages like Hos. xi. 9, Jer. x. 24, and the parable Isa. xxviii. 23 ff. (4).

2. Jehovah is not jealous for Himself alone, but also for His holy people, in so far as they are in a position of grace, or are taken into favour again by Him. From this side the קנא is the zeal of love, as an energetic vindication of the unmatched relationship in which God has placed His people to Himself. The thing is found in Deut. xxxii. 36 ff.; but the expression לִקְנֹא , “to be jealous for,” is not found till the prophets, Joel ii. 18, Zech. i. 14, viii. 2. On this side also the קנא is a kindling, but a kindling in pity; comp. Hos. xi. 8, קנא בְּחַסְדִּי . According to this, God’s sparing mercy, חַסֵּד , Joel ii. 18, is developed from קנא . The connection of these notions stands out with special distinctness in Ex. xxxii. ff. When the divine wrath goes out against the people, xxxii. 10, after the first breach of the covenant at Sinai, Moses appeases it, ver. 11 f., by awakening the other side of the divine zeal, inasmuch as it is a point of honour with God as against Egypt to complete the work of redemption begun upon the people; and so the manifestation of wrath turns round and makes room for the divine mercy, xxxiv. 6.—The anthropopathies of the Old Testament fall for the most part under what is here discussed; that is, those utterances about God in which human emotions and the change of these emotions are attributed to Him. These, in the sense of the Old Testament, are not, like the anthropomorphisms, to be regarded purely as figurative expressions. They actually express real relations of God to the world, and are only designated after the analogy of human conditions. If a change of such conditions is spoken of, this means only a change of the relation in which the divine holiness, which is in itself changeless, enters to changeable man. Thus it may be said, Ps. xviii. 26 f.: “Towards the pious Thou showest Thyself pious; to the upright man Thou showest Thyself upright; towards the pure Thou showest Thyself pure; and to the perverse Thou showest Thyself perverse.” The same God whose guidance approves itself to the pious as pure and good, must appear like a malicious power to the perverse whose path He crosses. Especially 1 Sam. xv. shows that the Old Testament does not suppose a change in the divine nature

itself. Samuel says, ver. 29: "The Rock of Israel does not deceive, and does not repent of anything; for He is not a man, that He should repent of anything;" and immediately after it is said, ver. 35: "Jehovah repented that He had made Saul king." The anthropopathies serve to keep wakeful and strong the consciousness of the living holy God, the idea of whom man so willingly volatilizes into abstractions.

(1) Ex. xxxiv. 14: "Jehovah, the jealous One, is His name; He is a jealous God."

(2) Deut. xxxii. 21: "They provoked my zeal, *קנאתי*, by their idols."

(3) The wrath of God has of late years been discussed in several monographs. Comp. Ritschl, *de ira Dei*, 1859; Weber, *vom Zorne Gottes*, 1862; Bartholomäi, "vom Zorne Gottes," in the *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theol.* 1861, p. 256 ff.

(4) Hos. xi. 9: "I will not execute my wrath's fury, nor destroy Ephraim again; for I am God and not man, holy in the midst of thee."—Compare further the prophetic part of the book.

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD.

§ 49.

General Survey.

The knowledge that the existence of the world is absolutely due to the divine causality is completed in three doctrines:—

1. When reflection is directed on the existence of the world, both as to its beginning and as to its subsistence, we reach the doctrine of the creation and maintenance of the world.

2. When we consider how the world is so, and not otherwise, we get the doctrine of the aim of the world and of divine providence, with which is connected the question of the relation of the divine causality to the wickedness and evil in the world.

3. God enters on a peculiar relation to the world for the realization of His aim; the means by which God brings about this His special relation to the world is delineated in the doctrine of revelation.

FIRST DOCTRINE.—ON THE CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE WORLD.

I. ON THE CREATION.

§ 50.

1. *Creation by the Word.*

The Mosaic doctrine of creation rests on the two points, that the production of the world follows by the *Word* and by the *Spirit of God*..

The form of the creation of the world is the speaking of God's word; God says that the things shall be, and they are, Gen. i. 3, 6, 9, etc. Herein it lies that the world originated through a conscious, free divine deed, for the word is just an utterance of conscious and free will. Therefore, in Ps. xxxiii. 9, כִּי יִפְתָּח corresponds to וַיֵּבֶר; compare ver. 6, cxlviii. 5, Isa. xlviii. 13, Ps. cxxxv. 6 (1). This excludes, first, every theory of the origin of the world by which the divine being itself is drawn down into the genesis of the world; and secondly, also the theory according to which the divine productive activity was conditioned at least by something existing originally outside of God, and thereby limited. In the former respect the Old Testament doctrine stands in decided opposition to the theories of emanation in the oriental cosmogonies, in which the creation of the world is made subject to a necessity of nature. That conception of the account of the creation, Gen. i., which seeks to find in it a doctrine of emanation, is quite untenable; namely, that originally there was nothing but emptiness and voidness, that is, the original substance swallowed up in darkness, and that God, who bore in Himself the seed of the creature, appears first in ver. 3, and causes it to proceed from Him (2). This view mistakes the connection of ver. 2 with ver. 1, and the Old Testament meaning of בְּרֵא. That there is also no notion of the nature of emanation in Ps. xc. 2, in case וַיִּתְּנֵהוּ as second person refers to God (which is certainly the most probable explanation), is shown by the use of the word in Deut. xxxii. 18, Prov. xxv. 23. The view of the divine creation as generation is purely poetical; comp. also Job xxxviii. 28 f. The divine creation is not a dreamy weaving of the original substance in which it produces the world from itself of necessity, but a waking, free production (3). It is a fairer subject of discussion whether, in Genesis, chap. i. does not assume an eternal elementary matter (*ἄμορφος*

וְלֹאֵלֹהִים, Wisd. xi. 18) independent of God, and so teach not so much a creator of the world as a shaper of the world—a Demiurge. But even, according to the conception of vers. 1–3 now beginning to find currency, “In the beginning” (רֵאשִׁית as *status constr.*), “when God created heaven and earth;” then ver. 2 as parenthesis, “But the earth was a waste;” ver. 3, “God said, Let there be light;”—the passage does not teach that the creative formation of the cosmos followed on the presupposition of a chaos, but does not say anything at all about this chaos, whether it proceeded from God or whether it was eternal. For the rest, the construction adopted by this explanation is decidedly contradictory to the thoroughly simple formation of the sentences in the first chapter. But if ver. 1 is understood, according to another view, as a title, a summary abridgment of the contents of the chapter, still (as Delitzsch remarks) the הָיָה וְכֵן does not appear as a state without beginning lying behind the work of creation, but the בְּרֵאשִׁית בְּרָא stands at the head of all. The third exposition seems, however, to be the simplest, that ver. 1 is not meant to be a title of the whole, but just the declaration how a first creation of heaven and earth as *prima materia* preceded the process portrayed from the second verse onwards; compare how Job, xxxviii. 4–7, supposes a *prius* preceding the creation of the earth. By the absolute בְּרֵאשִׁית the divine creation is fixed as an absolute beginning, not as a working on something which already existed, and heaven and earth is wholly subjected to the lapse of time, which God transcends; compare Ps. xc. 2, cii. 26. The expression בָּרָא, in agreement with the meaning of its root, which is (בָּרַךְ, בָּרַר, compare בָּרַח, בָּרַק, בָּרַע, בָּרַר, בָּרַח, בָּרַשׁ, etc.) “to cleave, divide, separate,” might certainly favour the view that only a shaping of the world is spoken of; but the constant use of בָּרָא in the Old Testament is against this (4), the word being always used to express the production of something new which has not a previous existence, as in Ps. civ. 30 בָּרָא stands parallel to הָדַשׁ, to make new. Thus the fact is explained that בָּרָא never appears in speaking of human working, and is never joined with the accusative of the matter out of which anything is created, as is the case with יָצַר (compare Gen. i. 27 with ii. 7), with עָשָׂה, and other words of this class. It is clear from this discussion that Mosaism places itself over all natural religions by the saying, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” Hence in

Ps. cxxi. 2 Jehovah is called *יְהוָה שֹׁמֵר יִצְרָאֵל*; Isa. xlv. 18 says, *יְהוָה בּוֹרֵא*; *הַשָּׁמַיִם הוּא הַאֲלֹהִים יִצְרָאֵל*; He is as such in Gen. xiv. 22, *קָנָה שָׁמַיִם*; *וְאָרֶץ*, in which is implied both preparer and possessor of heaven and earth (for the former meaning of *קָנָה*, compare Deut. xxxii. 6, Ps. cxxxix. 6). The idea of creation out of nothing, that is, that God did not produce the world out of anything outside of Himself, is in accordance with the doctrine of Mosaism, and does not, as Ewald curiously supposes, become Old Testament doctrine about the time of Amos (5). How later reflection laid hold of the simple utterances of the record of creation, and carried out further the thoughts contained in them, is especially shown in Ps. civ. (which is really a commentary on Gen. i.).

(1) Ps. xxxiii. 9, *הוּא אָמַר וַיְהִי הוּא צָוָה וַיַּעֲמֵד*; ver. 6: "The heavens were made by the word of Jehovah."—Ps. cxlviii. 5: "He commanded, and they were created."—According to Isa. xlviii. 13, heaven and earth stand there at His call.—Ps. cxxxv. 6: "All that pleased Jehovah (*כָּל אֲשֶׁר הִצִּיף*) He has made in heaven and on earth, in the seas and all deeps."

(2) Johannsen especially takes this view in his book, *The Cosmogonies of the Indians and Hebrews discussed by comparing the Cosmogony of Manu and Moses*, 1833.

(3) In so far, Ewald has handled the matter very well in his treatise, "*Erklärung der biblischen Urgeschichte*," in his first *Jahrb. der bibl. Wissensch.* 1848. He says, p. 80: "The free creating God of the Old Testament—how different from the heathen god, who has much ado to create, and so at length free himself completely from matter, who has to exercise himself in creating, who also creates evil, and has no idea that the creature, as a thing divine and true, must in the last issue be purely good! The Bible God does not first approach, as it were by chance, the matter already there, or lazily make one substance merely proceed from another; He is a purely original active Creator, who comprehends everything strictly, and firmly advances forwards."

(4) As is acknowledged also by Gesenius in the *Thesaurus*, i. p. 235 f.

(5) Ewald thinks, *l.c.* p. 85, that when God is represented as former of the mountains (Amos iv. 13 compared with Ps. xc. 2), the old chaos is hereby abolished, and the activity of the Creator extended as far as possible.

§ 51.

2. *The Divine Spirit in the Creation.*

When the world is posited outside of God, it still originates and subsists only by the life imparted to it from His Spirit; thus it is not separated from Him, although distinct from Him.

Because the world is called into being by a free divine act, and so is other than God, its life is not a life of God in it, but yet is a life imparted to it out of the divine fulness of life. This lies in the doctrine of the divine רִיחַ (1). The life of the creature, according to the record of creation, does not proceed from the chaotic mass; but life comes from the God who, in Ps. xxxvi. 10, is quite generally called the spring of life (מְקוֹר חַיִּים) to the matter created by Him. According to Gen. i. 2, the Spirit of God acts on the *prima materia*, on the chaotic earth; it moves (מְרַחֶפֶת) over the earth. The meaning "to brood," which is here given to רִיחַ by many expositors, cannot be proved from Deut. xxxii. 11, as there the word stands rather in the meaning of a hovering flight; but it appears in the Syriac, and certainly a reference to the mother's life-giving activity may be found in רִחַף, which is connected with רָחַם. But that the Spirit of God, as the principle of animation, is not merely a physical power, is not separated from the word as a declaration of the will, but is only effective in the creative word, and that thus the letter is itself endued with the power of life, is indicated by the expression in Ps. xxxiii. 6, where the Spirit is characterized as the Spirit of the divine mouth; it lies also in Isa. xl. 13 (2), that the Divine Spirit acting in the creation is a consciously working, an intelligent power, as, according to Ps. cxxxix. 7, the divine omnipresence in the world acts by means of the all-penetrating Spirit of God. It is this Divine Spirit (comp. § 70) which, as נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים, as the breath of life, is breathed into man by a particular act (Gen. ii. 7; comp. Job. xxvii. 3), and from which all creature-life continually proceeds (Ps. civ. 29 f.; comp. Job xii. 10) (3). The doctrine of the creative word prevents this derivation of creature life from the divine source from being understood as a doctrine of emanation; as also do the expressions, יָצַר רוּח־אֱדָם בְּקֶרְבוֹ, Zech. xii. 1; רוּח־אֱלֹהִים עִשְׂתִּי, Job xxxiii. 4.

The creature life proceeds from God, but it does not flow from God, but is imparted freely by God to the creature; comp. Isa. xlii. 5 (“He who giveth the רִיחַ”). It is not a life which God lives in the creature, but a relatively independent life of the creature from God, which is taught by these passages.

(1) On this subject we have a thorough monograph by Kleinert, “zur alttest. Lehre vom Geiste Gottes,” *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 1867, p. 3 ff.

(2) Isa. xl. 13: “Who hath weighed (fathomed) Jehovah’s Spirit (in which resteth His counsel, His thoughts)? and who was His adviser, who instructed Him?”

(3) Thus originate the רִחוּת לְקַלְבִּיָּךְ (Num. xvi. 22), in which just the one Spirit of God is immanent in the creatures. Because the Old Testament does not pause at the multiplicity of the רִחוּת, but refers them back to the One Spirit, the doctrine of the Spirit of God is, as Kleinert (*l.c.* p. 8 ff.) says, the most powerful vehicle of the Old Testament monotheistic contemplation of the world.

II. ON THE MAINTENANCE OF THE WORLD.

§ 52.

The maintenance of the world is, on the one hand, distinguished in the Old Testament from the creation; while, on the other hand, the divine activity taking place in it is placed under the same determining principles as constitute the notion of creation.

1. The maintenance is distinguished from the creation of the world even in the account of the creation, inasmuch as, according to Gen. ii. 2, the production of the classes of creatures has a conclusion which is formed by the Sabbath of creation (1). A relative independence is conferred on the living beings called into existence by the creation by the faculty of reproduction, Gen. i. 11, xxii. 28; the continuance of the system of the world is pledged by the covenant with Noah, Gen. viii. 21. On this world-covenant rest the חֻקֹת שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ, Jer. xxxiii. 25, compared with vers. 20 and 21, 36, to which “ordinances of heaven and earth” the course of the world is bound, Ps. cxlviii. 6 (2). In connection with the laws by which the duration of each sphere of existence is ordained, compare also such passages as Jer. v. 22, Ps. civ. 9, Job xxxviii. 10, xiv. 5.

2. The duration of this system of the world is established at each moment by the divine omnipotence; the relative independence of the creature remains an independence lent to it. The maintenance of the world rests continually on the same principles as the creation, on God's word of command, which He utters continually, or, as it is also expressed, *sends forth* (compare, besides the passages already cited above, which also bear on this point, Ps. cxlviii. 5, xxxiii. 9, and in particular Ps. cxlvii. 15-18) (3); and it rests just as continually on the Divine Spirit, which He causes ever to go forth. The main passage for this divine communication of the Spirit which continues in the maintenance of the world is again Ps. civ. 29 f.: "Thou takest away their (the creatures') spirit, and they die, and turn again to their dust; Thou sendest forth Thy Spirit, and they are created; and Thou renewest the form of the earth." This passage shows how the very maintenance of the creature can be again looked at from the point of view of a *creatio continua*; and this thought, that a creative working of God goes on in the maintenance of the creatures, is in general imprinted in various forms on the Old Testament phraseology; compare, for example, Ex. iv. 11, Isa. xlii. 5. The psalm of creation also (Ps. civ.), by using participles in ver. 2, seeks to characterize the creative activity of God as an activity which continues to work in the maintenance of the world (4).—On this side, and as far as the creature is conditioned and supported in each moment of its existence by the divine activity, it is in itself empty and perishable,—a character which is specially marked by designating flesh *בָּשָׂר*, applied to animate creation in contrast to the divine spirit of life; comp. Gen. vi. 3, 13, Isa. xl. 6; and for the contrast of *בָּשָׂר* and *רוּחַ* in general, the passage Isa. xxxi. 3. Even the heaven and earth, although their duration is pledged to them, are not eternal in the sense in which God is eternal, but are subject to change: "They shall decay, and Thou endurest; they all wax old like a garment; as a vesture Thou changest them, and they are changed. But Thou art the same, and Thy years have no end." Ps. cii. 27 f. (5).

(1) Gen. ii. 3: "And God completed on the seventh day His work which He had made." This seemed strange to the Alexandrians, because man, the last creature, was called into being on the sixth day, and so they altered it boldly to *ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ἑκτῇ*. But in doing

this they showed that they did not understand what is said of the meaning of the seventh day. It is the seventh day *qui finem imponit*, which puts as it were the conclusion to the creation.

(2) Ps. cxlviii. 6: "He set them firmly to eternity and eternity; He gave laws, and they (the heavenly bodies) do not overstep them."

(3) In Ps. cxlvii. 15-18, snow, hoar frost, ice, etc., are referred to the divine word of command sent forth on the earth.

(4) Ex. iv. 11: "Who made man's mouth? or who maketh dumb, or deaf, or seeing, or blind?" The change to the imperfect עָשָׂה expresses that the divine activity is a continuous one.—Isa. xlii. 5: "He who createth the heaven (participle בָּרָא) and spreadeth it out, who extendeth the earth and its offspring, who giveth breath to the people upon it."—Ps. civ. 2: "He covereth Himself with light as a garment, and spreadeth out the heaven as a covering."

(5) The Old Testament Chochma gives a further development of these *theologumena*. There, in distinction from the Pentateuch, the divine wisdom is looked at as the principle of the formation of the world. The later books of the Old Testament are here taken into account only in as far as the doctrine of Mosaism is not surpassed, but only illustrated.

SECOND DOCTRINE.—THE DIVINE AIM OF THE WORLD. DIVINE PROVIDENCE.

§ 53.

The Aim of the World, and its Realization through Providence.

The account of the creation shows that a divine aim is to realize itself in the world, and that the divine creation is therefore a teleological act, partly and in general in the systematic progress of the work of creation, and partly in particular because the divine sanction, "and God saw that it was good," follows each step of creation, and because the divine blessing is laid on every animated being. Each class of beings in the world in particular, and then, Gen. i. 31, the world as a whole, is the object of divine approval, because correspondent to the divine aim. In all creation God completes acts of self-satisfaction, but still the creating God does not reach the goal of His creation until He has set over against Him His image in man. From this last point it is to be gathered that the self-delineation of God, the unveiling of His essence, is the final aim of the creation of

the world; or, as it is more commonly expressed, that the whole world serves the revelation of the divine glory (רִיבּוֹן), and is thereby the object of divine joy, Ps. civ. 31. The Old Testament contemplation of nature rests on this fundamental conception; but the Pentateuch, of course, is not the place for a fuller statement of this. From this point of view, the creature, which in itself is nothing, wins in its relation to God a high value as the object of His imparted goodness, and as the place for the revelation of His glory (comp. Ps. civ. 28, cxlv. 9, 15 f.). But in mankind the aim of the world, the glorifying of God, was disturbed by sin; and therefore in the song of praise on the glory of the creation, Ps. civ., the wish comes in in ver. 35: "May sinners have an end on the earth, and the godless be no more." By sin the sway of the divine spirit of life is repressed, Gen. vi. 3; and through man's sin the curse falls on the other creatures of the earth that are set in dependence on him, v. 29, and the world becomes the object of divine judgment. But in spite of this, the continuance of the terrestrial order is assured in the world-covenant, viii. 21, ix. 11, which shows that, in spite of the dominion of sin in the world of man, the divine aim in the world shall come to its realization, as, Num. xiv. 21, Jehovah swears in the midst of His people's revolt: "As truly as I live, the whole earth shall be filled with the glory of Jehovah." The choosing of the race through which God's blessing shall come on all races of the earth, Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18, serves this divine aim. The whole pentateuchal history of revelation, as brought out in our first section, is nothing but the activity of that divine providence which, in order to the realization of the divine aim, is at once directed to the whole, Dent. xxxii. 8 (comp. § 22 with note 1), and at the same time proves itself efficacious in the direction of the life of separate men, and in the guiding of all circumstances, especially in regard to all human helplessness (comp. in particular passages from Genesis, such as xxi. 17, xxviii. 15, xxxii. 11, xlv. 5-7, l. 20) (1). There was no special occasion in the Pentateuch to speak of the operation of the divine providence outside the sphere of the history of revelation. But it is known that the Old Testament teaches a providence which embraces everything, since it subsumes everything under the divine teleology: "Thou hearest prayer, all flesh cometh to Thee," Ps. lxxv. 3; and therefore in the same psalm, ver. 6, God is called "the confidence

of all the ends of the earth, and of seas, and of those that are far off." The divine providence extends also to the animals. They all wait on God, that He may give them their food at the right time, Ps. civ. 27; the lions that roar after their prey seek their food from God, ver. 21; the ravens call on God, Job xxxviii. 41, Ps. cxlvii. 9, etc.—No sphere of chance exists in the Old Testament; compare Ex. xxi. 13 (2). It is characteristic, that a distinction between chance (צִקְקָה) and divine decree occurs in the Old Testament only in the mouth of the heathen Philistines, 1 Sam. vi. 9. Even in drawing lots there rules no chance, Prov. xvi. 33 (3); as in Num. xxvi. 55 f., Josh. vii. 14 ff., xiv. 2, 1 Sam. xiv. 41, lots occur as used in inquiring into the divine will (comp. § 97).

(1) Compare further especially the angelology.

(2) It is said in Ex. xxi. 12, "He who strikes a man that he die, shall die." Now ver. 13 says: "But if he did not do it of design, but God permitted it to happen by his hand (הָאֱלֹהִים אָמַר לֵידוֹ)." Thus even what men call accidental death is by God's direction. Baumgarten-Crusius says, curiously enough, that in this place God means no more than circumstances.

(3) Prov. xvi. 33: "The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposal thereof comes from Jehovah."

§ 54.

Relation of the Divine Causality to Moral and Physical Evil.

Moral and physical evil were not originally in the world. The latter was penally ordained (Gen. iii. 17 ff.) after the former entered the world by the free act of man, and from this time forward both form an element of the divine order of the world.

1. The point of view under which physical evil in man's life is placed is thoroughly ethical, and mainly that evil is the punishment of sin, is divine judgment (1). But even in the Pentateuch there is the knowledge that the evil in man's life is also a means of proving him, especially of proving his obedience and his trust in God, and thus a means of purifying man; and that even merited suffering must in this way tend to the salvation of man. These thoughts are expressed in the providential history of the lives of Jacob and Joseph, but it is especially the providential leading of the people in the

wilderness, which in the Pentateuch is contemplated from this point of view; compare, as chief passage, Deut. viii. 2 f. (2). According to this, the privations endured in the wilderness were meant to be a school of humility and faith, that the people might learn to trust to the power of the all-mighty God. To the same purpose we read in ver. 16 of the same chapter, that this leading in the wilderness served "to humble thee and to try thee, and to do thee good in the end;" compare also Judg. ii. 22, and other passages.

2. But also, even in moral evil, in man's sin the divine causality operates, and this in various ways.—Man's sin cannot thwart the divine purpose of salvation; it must rather serve to the realization thereof (Gen. i. 20, comp. xlv. 8) (3). The wickedness of some must serve to prove and purify others, that it may be known whether they are strong to stand against it. The main passage is Deut. xiii. 4, where it is said that God even permits false prophets to be in the community, and even lets their signs be accomplished, although they seek to lead the people away to other gods: "For Jehovah, your God, tries you, to know whether ye love Jehovah, your God, with your whole heart and your whole soul." Nay, in order to punish and humble a man, God even permits another to wrong him; this David acknowledges, when he says, on being cursed by Shimei (2 Sam. xvi. 11), "Jehovah has said unto him, Curse David." But a divine causality works also in the sinner himself, and for various ends; God permits one who habitually walks in God's ways to fall into sin, in order to try him, to reveal to him a hidden curse in his heart, and so to bring to its issue a merited judgment, and thus bring God's justice to light. To this belong cases like that in 2 Sam. xxiv. (the numbering of the people); compare passages such as Ps. li. 6, 2 Chron. xxxii. 31. On another, who intentionally cherishes sin within him, and wilfully strives against God, the divine causality acts by giving him up to sin, so that sinning becomes necessary to this man, and he must glorify God by the judgment which he has incurred. This is the hardening of the heart of a man, so often spoken of in the Pentateuch: Ex. iv. 21, vii. 3; Deut. ii. 30, etc. Pharaoh and the Canaanite tribes are especially the types of this hardening. In reference to such examples, it is said in Prov. xvi. 4, that Jehovah has made all things for His own ends; also the evil-doer for the day

of calamity. Ex. ix. 16 serves especially to explain this passage. God could at once have annihilated Pharaoh and his people (ver. 15); but "I have set thee there," that Pharaoh may experience Jehovah's might, and that His name may be glorified on the whole earth. With this compare Ps. ii. 4, Isa. xviii. 4. But the presupposition of all hardening of the heart is, that God, as the long-suffering One, אֲרֻחַ דְּעֵס, awaits the ripening of wickedness; see already Gen. xv. 16. The expressions used to express hardening of the heart cannot be referred to a simply negative relation to wickedness; but still man's sin is not removed because a positive divine activity rules in his hardening. Man can indeed do nothing that would not on one side be God's work (see Lam. iii. 37 f.), and yet he must acknowledge sin as his guilt (ver. 39). Isa. xlv. 7—a passage possibly directed against the dualism of the Persian religion—shows especially how the monism of the Old Testament permitted nothing to be withdrawn from the divine causality (4).

(1) Compare the particulars on this afterwards, in the doctrine of death and in the doctrine of retribution.

(2) Deut. viii. 2 f.: "Jehovah thy God hath led thee these forty years in the wilderness, to humble thee and to try thee (לְבַחֲךָ), to know what is in thy heart, whether thou wilt regard His commands or not. He humbled thee, and caused thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna, to cause thee to know that man doth not live by bread alone; but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live."—In this lie the germs of the thoughts which form the theme of the book of Job.

(3) Gen. 1. 20: "Ye meant evil against me; but God meant it for good, to do as it is this day, and to save alive this people." So Joseph (xlv. 8) could say to his brothers, "It was not ye who sent me hither, but God."

(4) Lam. iii. 37 f.: "Who speaketh, and it cometh to pass, without God having commanded it? Out of the mouth of the Most High should not evil come as well as good? Ver. 39. Why doth man murmur at his life? let every one murmur over his sins."—Isa. xlv. 7: "He who forms light and creates darkness, makes peace and produces evil; I Jehovah do all this."—Here we have only to do with the simple points of the position; compare, further, the doctrine of sin (§ 76), and the further development of these doctrines in the later parts of Old Testament theology.

THIRD DOCTRINE.—OF THE REVELATION.

§ 55.

Introductory Remark and General View.

Inasmuch as the whole universe, nature, and history serve divine ordinances of fixed aim, and the manifestation of the divine glory is one that comprehends all things (comp. § 53), man, as has already been shown in the Introduction (§ 6), can know God even from nature. But here we have to do with revelation in a more limited sense, and to answer the question, How, according to the Old Testament, God sets Himself forth to man by personal witness to Himself? The answer to this falls into the following parts:—

1. Although God, in the transcendental fulness of His being, is incomprehensible to man, He is nevertheless pleased to enter into the limits of the sphere of the creature, in order to present Himself personally, and give testimony of Himself to man. This side of the revelation of the Divine Being is characterized as the divine name, divine presence, divine glory (רִיבּוֹ).

2. The forms and vehicles in which this divine self-presentation and self-witness reaches man *from without* are the voice, the Mal'ach, the Shekhinah in the sanctuary, and miracle. The divine self-witness enters the *heart* of man by means of the spirit. The latter form of revelation appears first after the founding of the theocracy (not in Genesis); it unfolds itself in proportion as the outward theophany disappears, but its main sphere is only found in prophecy, and therefore this subject falls to be treated but briefly here in the first part, and in detail in the doctrine of prophecy (1).

(1) It is quite the same with the course of revelation in the New Testament, as has been very correctly pointed out. Christophanies go on for some time after the ascension of our Lord; then they disappear and make room for the revelation of the Lord in the inwardness of the spirit.

I. ON THE REVELATION-SIDE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE.

§ 56.

The Divine Name (1).

The most general designation of the revelation-side of the divine essence is the divine name, which, as one of the fundamental notions of the Old Testament, demands a more exact treatment. It is true in general, and so also in regard to God, that every name presupposes a manifestation of what is to be named; and on the other hand, what closes itself against knowledge is, as such, a thing that cannot be named, an *ἀκατονόμαστον*. Man can imagine names for false gods, but the true God can only be named by man in so far as He reveals Himself to man, and discloses to him His nature. The name of God is first *nomen editum*, and then *nomen inditum* (2). Now, to man God does not name Himself after the compass of His perfections, as the earlier dogmatic was wont inexactly to define the biblical notion of the divine name, but according to the relation in which He has placed Himself to man, according to the attributes by which He wishes to be acknowledged, known, and addressed by man in the communion into which He has entered with him. In short, God names Himself, not according to what He is for Himself, but to what He is for man; and therefore every self-presentation of God in the world has stamped itself in a corresponding name of God, as we have already seen (3). But the biblical notion of the divine name is not exhausted by this. It is not merely the title which God bears in virtue of the relation in which he places Himself to man; but the expression “name of God” designates at the same time the whole divine self-presentation by which God in personal presence testifies of Himself—the whole side of the divine nature which is turned towards man. Be it understood, the divine name is not everywhere present where there is a working of divine power; but everywhere where the God of revelation, as such, gives Himself to be recognised in His acts so as to be confessed and invoked. So the name of God is certainly (as Otto, *Dekalogische Untersuchungen*, p. 81, rightly says) not the ideal existence of God in the consciousness of the created spirit, but an objective existence, inde-

pendent of every subjectivity. But this power of God within the world, and objective to man, is a name of God only in so far as it offers itself to be named by man and comes to him in the form of revelation, that is, in as far as man can know of it. Whether he will know of it is another matter; for man may deny and profane the name of God, the divine self-presentation which has reached him. Now the Israelite who knows his covenant God as the creator and supporter of the universe, does indeed recognise God's name, God's self-presentation in the whole course of nature; and therefore it is said in Ps. viii. 2, "How glorious is Thy name in all the earth!" (הוֹר corresponds to שׁוּ in the second hemistich). Still the divine name—and this is its exclusive use in the Pentateuch—conducts us specially into the sphere of the divine kingdom; it here designates every manifestation of the Divine Being which attaches to places, institutions, and facts, in virtue of which God gives His people a direct experience of Himself. The following are the principal passages:—Of the Mal'ach, in which is the divine presence (countenance), it is said in other words that the divine name is within him (Ex. xxiii. 21; comp. § 59, 8); the dwelling of the divine glory in the sanctuary (§ 62), by which God gives experience of His presence there, is called a dwelling of His name in this place, Deut. xii. 5, xi. 14, 23 f., 1 Kings viii. 29, compare Jer. iii. 17 (hence the service there is *שִׁמְתַּי בְּיְהוָה*, Deut. xviii. 5, 7). If, as has been done by many, and even by Winer, who is usually so exact (in his *Hebrew Lexicon*), we simply explain the Old Testament expression, that God puts His name in a place, or causes it to dwell there, *locum eligere, ubi sacris solennibus colatur*, the consequences which are connected with the dwelling of the divine name are mistaken for the thing itself. According to the Old Testament view, there is in such cases something more than an ideal symbolical presence of God in the sanctuary, for fearful expressions of God's presence proceed from the sanctuary, e.g. Lev. x. 2, etc.—So, then, everywhere where God is known and experienced in personal presence, there His name is. He *sends forth* His word, but where His name is, there He presents Himself; and therefore the phrase, "Thy name is called over us," in Jer. xiv. 9, is only a further explanation of the word, "Thou art in our midst" (4).—The reality which this gives to the name of God may be made more distinct by a few further

examples. When Isaiah (chap. xxx. 27) sees the Lord approach in judgment, he says: "See, Jehovah's name cometh from afar, His wrath burning," etc. (5). The Psalmist prays (Ps. liv. 3): "Help me by Thy name;" and this corresponds to "by Thy strength" (בְּגִבּוֹרָתְךָ); compare Jer. x. 6: "Thy name is great in power" (בְּגִבּוֹרָה) (as in 1 Kings viii. 42 the strong hand and the outstretched arm correspond to the great name). Hence it is said in Prov. xviii. 10: "The name of Jehovah is a strong tower; the righteous runneth into it, and is safe" (6).

(1) Compare my article, "Name, biblische Bedeutung desselben," in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* x. p. 193 ff.

(2) Therefore אֱלֹהִים, which in its original meaning designates divinity in general, looked at apart from God's historical witness to Himself, is not regarded really in the Old Testament as properly a name of God (comp. § 41). [Above cited art.]

(3) The God who causes the forsaken Hagar to experience that His all-seeing eye overlooks no helpless one, wins immediately the name, the God of vision, Gen. xvi. 13 (comp. § 42 with note 2). The characteristic of the patriarchal stage of revelation is stamped in the name of God, El-shaddai, Gen. xvii. 1 (comp. § 37), which name corresponds to the change of the name Abram to Abraham, xvii. 5; Shaddai there designating God as Him who subjects nature to the purpose of His revelation by His powerful sway, mainly in reference to the fact that a rich offspring was to be given to the childless Abraham. In the same way, God's relation to the patriarchs is fixed in the name, "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," Ex. iii. 6 (comp. § 25). The stage of the revelation which began with the redemption of Israel from Egypt is distinctly stamped in the disclosure of the meaning of the name Jehovah, Ex. iii. 15 ff., vi. 2 ff. (comp. § 40). The name קְדוֹשׁ appears with the founding of the theocracy (comp. § 44). When God reveals Himself in His grace, mercy, and long-suffering after the first breach of the covenant, this is again connected with a manifestation of the corresponding name, Ex. xxxiv. 6 (comp. § 29). In the New Testament stage, when the only-begotten Son has revealed God's name to man (John xvii. 6), God wishes to be named the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, or, to express universally the now completed relation of salvation, by the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (Matt. xxviii. 19).

(4) For this reason, in Deut. xxviii. 10 the fact that God raises Israel to be a people holy to Him, and standing in His revealing

fellowship, is expressed by saying that God's name is named on the people. God's name is great and glorious in the redemption of His people and the institution of the covenant, Ps. cxi. 9 (note also the correlation of notions in Isa. xliii. 7). Israel walks in the name of his God in an objective sense, inasmuch as he experiences the effective power of the God who manifests Himself in his midst (hence, Zech. x. 12, *וַיִּבְרָכֵם בִּיהוָה* precedes *וַיִּשְׁמְנוּ יְהוָה לְבָבָם*); and in a subjective sense, in so far as he acknowledges his God in accordance with this in word and walk, and fears His name in fulfilling his law, Deut. xxviii. 58. Mic. iv. 5, a passage frequently misunderstood, is to be interpreted conformably. The prophecy that in future time all nations shall go in pilgrimage to Zion, there to receive the law, has its basis in this, that Israel walks in the name of Jehovah, that is, stands in communion with the true God, who manifests Himself among His people; whilst the other nations (although they also stand under the power of the true God, yet as long as they do not acknowledge it as the power of this God) walk in the name of their gods, and as belonging to them.—The aim of the divine kingdom is, that the name of the true God shall be named also over the remnant of the heathen people who are rescued from judgment, Amos ix. 12 (comp. Mal. i. 11); that is, that they shall be brought into the communion of His revelation, whilst He assumes towards them the relation of a king, Zech. xiv. 9, the consequence of which shall be that they on their side shall acknowledge and call on the name of Jehovah (Zeph. iii. 9) [*ibid.*].

(5) With this compare Isa. xxvi. 8: "We await Thee in the path of Thy judgments; the desire of our soul is after Thy name and Thy remembrance."

(6) Compare Ps. xx. 2, xliv. 6: "Through Thy name we tread down our adversaries," cxxiv. 8, etc. When God causes His people to experience His powerful presence by miracles, it is said, "Thy name is near," Ps. lxxv. 2; where Hengstenberg seeks incorrectly to give the expression a subjective turning. God gives honour to His name, Ps. cxv. 1, and sanctifies it, etc., when He proves Himself to be the true God by demonstrations of His power and glory; and, on the other hand, anything from which it might appear as if the might and glory of the God of Israel were nought,—for example, the permanent rejection of His people,—would be a desecration of His name in an objective sense, Ezek. xx. 14, 22. The divine name is subjectively hallowed by man when he gives due acknowledgment of the self-witness and self-presentation of God in the world. On the other hand, the divine name is desecrated by men when they treat the divine self-witness, and that with which it is connected,—in short, what is most real,—as a thing of nought

and powerless, which man may neglect without punishment, in words (Ex. xx. 7) or in deeds (comp. the חַסֵּד וְרַחֲמִים, Prov. xxx. 9).—God guides the pious for His name's sake, Ps. xxiii. 3, xxxi. 4; He lends assistance for His name's sake, Ps. cix. 21, cxliii. 11; He remits guilt for His name's sake, Ps. xxv. 11, compare ciii. 1 ff.; inasmuch as He cannot be at variance with what He has represented and manifested Himself to be. The various other connections in which “in the name of God” occurs, are explained by what has been already discussed. In an objective sense, the expression designates, in God's strength and authority, and as His representative (comp. Mic. v. 3, where “in the majesty of the name of Jehovah” corresponds to יְהוָה הַגָּדֹל, as Acts iv. 7 *ἐν ποίᾳ δυνάμει* stands beside *ἐν ποίῳ ὀνόματι*, Deut. xviii. 18 ff.). To this, then, corresponds the subjective meaning, the naming and acknowledging of God as that power in which one speaks and deals, for whose cause one suffers, etc. [*ibid.*].

§ 57.

2. *The Divine Countenance and the Divine Glory.*

That by which God is present among His people is further designated the divine countenance (פָּנִים). Ex. xxxiii. 14 ff. is the main passage. Jehovah had declared, in ver. 2 f. of this chapter, that He Himself would no more go in the midst of the stiffnecked people, but would cause them to be guided by an angel (namely, a subordinate angel). Afterwards He permits Himself to be entreated by Moses, and says, פָּנֵי יְלֹכִי, my countenance shall go. This certainly means, He Himself will go (comp. xxxiv. 9). But, again, the divine countenance is not identical with the divine essence; for whilst (according to the passages cited in § 46) the latter must be conceived as shapeless and exempt from every limitation of space, it follows from xxxiii. 20 that the divine פָּנִים is in itself visible, only that a human eye is not able to bear the sight (compare Gen. xxxii. 31). The contradiction, that the divine countenance is not visible to man, while yet we read in the same chapter (Ex. xxxiii. 11) of Moses speaking with God face to face (פָּנִים אֶל-פָּנִים), and in Num. xii. 8 mouth to mouth (פֶּה אֶל-פֶּה), and also in the latter passage that Moses saw Jehovah's form (רָאָה יְהוָה),—this contradiction is to be solved by understanding the “countenance” in the latter passage in a merely relative sense, as is made clear from the connection (compare also

Num. xiv. 14, "eye to eye"). Moses gets a view of the reflex of the divine form (Ex. xxxiii. 23). From all this it is clear that in the divine countenance, God's letting Himself down into the sphere of the creature, by means of which He places Himself before men, so that they may have immediate experimental knowledge of Him, is distinguished from God's transcendental nature in His infinitude. To this subject belongs, further, Deut. iv. 37, where we read that Jehovah brought Israel out of Egypt by His countenance (פָּנָיו). Hence also the Mal'ach by whom Jehovah redeems His people—the same in whom, as we have already observed, the divine name was—is called, Isa. lxiii. 9, the angel of the divine countenance; compare how, in Gen. xxxii. 31 f., the divine countenance stands for the manifestation of God, Hos. xii. 4, which Hosea, ver. 5, refers to the Mal'ach. Only from this, too, is the full meaning of the high priest's blessing rightly understood, Num. vi. 25 f.: "Jehovah cause His face to shine upon thee, and be gracious to thee; Jehovah lift up His countenance on thee, and give thee peace," which is characterized in ver. 27 as the laying of God's name on Israel. Here, too, we have not merely something symbolical, but a definite experience of God's gracious presence and aid proceeding from the real dwelling of God in Israel; as, conversely, the manifestation of Jehovah's countenance brings destruction on His enemies (Ps. xxi. 10), or the hiding of the divine countenance shows a withdrawal of God's gracious presence. On the other hand, Ps. cxxxix. 7, "Where shall I flee from Thy face?" corresponding to "Where shall I go from Thy Spirit?" goes further than the theocratic relation. Here the expression "the divine countenance" clearly teaches that God's omnipresence, which by means of the Spirit interpenetrates the universe, is everywhere a personal presence of God.

Finally, for name and countenance the indefinite expression *glory* (פָּבוֹד יְהוָה) is used; so Ex. xxxiii. 17 ff., where it interchanges with פָּנִים. In the same way, it is פָּבוֹד יְהוָה through which Jehovah appears to His people on Mount Sinai, under covert of the cloud (Ex. xxiv. 16), and which is present in the holy tabernacle (xl. 34). In this respect 1 Kings viii. is especially distinct: earth and the heaven of heavens cannot contain God (ver. 27); but His פָּבוֹד (ver. 11), for which His name is put in ver. 29, is present in the sanctuary.

II. THE FORMS OF REVELATION.

§ 58.

The Divine Voice.

As divine speech is in general the form of divine working in the world, so the word is the most general form of divine revelation. Compare, for example, how in Ps. cxlvii. 18 f. the word of God acting in nature and the divine word of revelation are placed over against one another. Hence the formula, “the word of Jehovah came to,” or similar forms, frequently recur from Gen. xv. 1 onwards. Now, in so far as this word of God comes by inner means to the organs of revelation, it coincides with the revelation which is effected by the Spirit (compare § 65). But the Old Testament specifies among its mediums of revelation also the outwardly audible voice (קול); indeed, in Deut. iv. 12, special weight is laid upon this form of revelation: “Jehovah spoke to you out of the fire; ye heard (קול דְּבָרִים) a sound of words, but ye saw no form, וְלֹא־רָאִיתִי קוֹל,” in which also קול is placed in opposition to מַאֲרָא. Thus also, 1 Sam. iii. 4, 1 Kings xix. 11 ff., the voice is the material substratum of the theophany.

To this is annexed in the later Jewish theology the doctrine of the Bath-kol, or revelation by means of heavenly voices, such as Elijah received,—a form of revelation which was supposed to continue in the time of the second temple, after prophecy had grown dumb. The expression “daughter of the voice” means that the divine voice itself is not heard, but only its working, since either קול was understood as a divine attribute, and בַּת קול as its manifestation (as was done by the Cabbalists); or, according to the common acceptance, קול designated the heavenly voice itself, and בַּת קול its echo. This form of revelation appears in the New Testament in Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5, and the parallels to these passages; also John xii. 28; and it occurs very often in the Apocalypse.

§ 59.

The Doctrine of the Angel of the Lord, of the Covenant, of the Countenance (1). The Exegetical State of the Case.

In a more concrete form God manifests Himself in the מַלְאָךְ, generally called מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה (comp. § 41), or מַלְאָךְ הָאֱלֹהִים, or simply הַמַּלְאָךְ; in the Elohist section (Gen. xxi. 17) מַלְאָךְ אֱלֹהִים (and in 1 Sam. xxix. 9, in the mouth of the Philistine Achish). This Mal'ach is in part identified with Jehovah, and again in part distinguished from Him. It is above all things necessary, in this weighty and difficult doctrine, to represent the exegetical state of the facts according to the main passages (2).

1. Gen. xvi. 7 ff., the מַלְאָךְ appears to Hagar, and says (ver. 10): "I will multiply thy seed." Now in ver. 11 Jehovah is spoken of in the third person; but we read in ver. 13 that Jehovah spoke to Hagar, and Hagar named Him that appeared to her "the God of seeing." With this compare how (xxi. 27) אֱלֹהִים and מַלְאָךְ אֱלֹהִים change one with the other.

2. Among the three men who appeared to Abraham (chap. xviii.), one is distinctly distinguished as Jehovah (vers. 20, 26, etc.) from the two others, who are called מַלְאָכִים, and are said (xix. 13) to be sent by Jehovah. But the transactions between these two and Lot (xix. 18 ff.) are carried on, and the account runs, exactly as if Jehovah Himself stood there. Now it may be disputed here, whether Jehovah is also represented by these two angels, or whether Jehovah is to be supposed to have rejoined them after Lot has been led out of the town (ver. 18), even though it is not expressly mentioned. The latter conception appears to me (in opposition to Delitzsch, Keil, and others) to be the right one (Stier agrees).

3. Gen. xxii. 12, the מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה calls to Abraham from heaven, as if he were God Himself, "Now I know," etc., and Abraham himself receives (ver. 14) the manifestation as a manifestation of Jehovah; on the contrary, ver. 15 ff. may again be understood as if the Mal'ach were distinguished from Jehovah: "Jehovah saith, I swear by myself."

4. Gen. xxiv. 7, compared with ver. 40, Abram says to his

servant, "Jehovah, the God of heaven, . . . send His angel before thee." Thus the angel of Jehovah—for it is clear that a particular one is meant—is distinguished from Jehovah, as in the theophany at Bethel (Gen. xxviii. 12 f.) the מַלְאָכִים are distinguished from Jehovah. But (xxx. 11–13) the Mal'ach that appeared to Jacob says, "I am the God of Bethel;" whilst, on the other side (xxxv. 7), the plural מַלְאָכֵי הָאֱלֹהִים may be so understood that the angels that appeared are subsumed under the theophany.

5. The apparition at night with which Jacob wrestles (chap. xxxii.) is designated (vers. 29–31) as an appearance of God (אֱלֹהִים), or more exactly, as the appearing of the divine countenance (פָּנִים); just so Hosea (chap. xii. 4) treats this as a manifestation of God, but immediately (ver. 5) substitutes מַלְאָךְ for אֱלֹהִים.

6. Gen. xlviii. 15 f. is specially remarkable. Jacob blesses his sons with the words: "The God before whom my fathers Abraham and Isaac walked, the God who has been my shepherd till this day, the Mal'ach who delivered me from every evil, let Him bless these lads."

7. Ex. iii. 2 the מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה appears to Moses in the flame, in ver. 4 Jehovah and Elohim is substituted for Him, and now in ver. 6 He speaks: "I am the God of thy father;" and the whole of the following relation intentionally conveys the impression of converse between Jehovah and Moses.

8. In Ex. xiii. 21 it is said: "Jehovah went before Israel;" on the contrary, in xiv. 19 we read that it was the Mal'ach; compare how it is said in Num. xx. 16, Jehovah sent an angel to lead Israel out of Egypt. But in Ex. xiv. 24 ff. the leader is again called Jehovah, and in xxiii. 20 ff. God promises to bring the people into the promised land by His Mal'ach; the people were to obey the Mal'ach, for in Him is Jehovah's name. In a multitude of other passages it is again definitely said, that Jehovah Himself is in the midst of His people.

9. But the section Ex. xxxii. f. is of especial importance. After the first breach of the covenant, Jehovah will Himself no longer go in the midst of the people (xxxiii. 3), He will send a Mal'ach before them (ver. 2), and He calls him (xxxiii. 34) also מַלְאָכִי {my angel}. Thereafter He yields to the entreaties of Moses to allow His counte-

nance (פָּנֵי) to go with them (xxxiii. 14 f.). This countenance must again have appeared in the form of an angel; for it is said in Isa. lxiii. 9, in reference to the leading through the wilderness, מַלְאָכָה פָּנָיו הוֹשִׁיעַם. Also Deuteronomy, which never has the Mal'ach (which makes a remarkable difference between this book and the preceding ones), but always brings forward Jehovah instead as acting, says (iv. 37) that God led Israel out of Egypt by His countenance. From this it is clear that there are two kinds of angel of Jehovah: one within whom is the name Jehovah, who is the bearer of His countenance; and another with whom this is not the case.

10. Josh. v. 14 f., the Prince of the army of Jehovah appears to Joshua. This is told as if he were different from Jehovah. But in ver. 15 He identifies Himself manifestly with the Mal'ach that appeared to Moses in Ex. iii., and in Josh. vi. 2 He again appears as Jehovah Himself, who gives Jericho into Joshua's hand.

The following passages from the later books of the Old Testament come especially into consideration, as analogous to the passages in the Pentateuch:—

11. Judg. ii. 1-5, where it is probable that a prophet is not to be understood by מַלְאָכִי (as Bertheau, for example, expounds). The Mal'ach says: "I brought you up out of Egypt," etc.; v. 23: "Curse Meroz, saith the angel of Jehovah;" vi. 11 ff., the Mal'ach that appeared to Gideon, who (ver. 14) quite passes over into Jehovah, and even accepts an offering, though Gideon (ver. 22) in addressing Jehovah seems in a remarkable manner to distinguish the Mal'ach from Him, and afterwards when the Mal'ach has disappeared, still (ver. 23) receives Jehovah's word.

12. Similarly in Zechariah the angel of the Lord is distinguished on the one hand from Jehovah: he appears (i. 12) interceding for Israel before Jehovah. But, on the other hand, he takes the place of Jehovah Himself in chap. iii., where, however, the angel speaks again of Jehovah in the third person.

(1) The doctrine of the angel of the Lord is one of the most weighty and most difficult doctrines of the Old Testament, on which, even as early as the theology of the Fathers, there were various views, and about which, up to this day, no agreement has been come to. The literature is enormously rich. Ode's book, *Commentarius de*

Angelis, 1739, still deserves to be mentioned for the sake of its copiousness. The following are the most notable treatises of the last fifty years:—A programme of Steudel, *Veterisne testamenti libris insit notio manifesti ab occulto distinguendi numinis*, Tüb. 1830 (one of his best writings); Hengstenberg, *Christologie des A. T.* i. 2d ed. p. 124 ff. Kurtz formerly defended Hengstenberg's view, "Der Engel des Herrn," in Tholuck's *liter. Anzeiger*, 1846, Nos. 11–14, but treats the matter differently in his *Geschichte des A. Bundes*, i. p. 144 ff. Compare further, Trip, *Die Theophanien in den Geschichtsbüchern des A. T.*, Leiden 1858; in the same year a programme by Kahnis, *De angelo Domini diatribe*; Barth, *der Engel des Bundes*, *Sendschreiben an Schelling*, 1845; compare Schelling's answer in *Schelling's Leben in Briefen*, iii. p. 189 ff.—Schultz does not discuss the doctrine of the angel of the Lord so thoroughly as might be expected from the importance which he acknowledges it to possess.

(2) The grouping of the passages by numbers is to facilitate reference in the following section.

§ 60.

Continuation: The Different Views.

The question is now, Which view of the Mal'ach gives the most satisfactory explanation of these apparently contradictory passages? The following main views are to be distinguished:—

1. The first view was followed in the early ages of the Church by Augustin, Hieronymus, and Gregory the Great; in later times especially by Steudel and Trip, and with special modifications by Hofmann (in *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, i.), from whom it has been adopted by Kurtz and Delitzsch, who gave up their former view under Hofmann's influence, though the latter indeed holds the view with a peculiar indecision. On this view, an angel in the more narrow sense is to be understood by the Mal'ach, that is, a finite spirit under subjection to God, which accomplished the divine command in the cases mentioned. That even a particular angel may be designated the angel of Jehovah,—that the term Mal'ach, in and for itself, does not necessarily imply that the person so characterized stands in a higher sphere above the angels,—must certainly be conceded to this view. On this view, then, the explanation of the fact, that in a series

of passages what the angel speaks and does, appears as speech and act of Jehovah, is, that words and acts of a messenger are properly the words and acts of him whom he represents. We are reminded that also in the prophetic style the word of the prophet is often identified with the word of Jehovah; and that in the New Testament too, where the *ἄγγελος κυρίου* is certainly a created spirit, his act (*e.g.* Acts xii. 17) is represented as an act of the Lord Himself; indeed, in Rev. xxii. 6, 12, the angel is introduced speaking for the Lord Himself, and that in the first person. In reference to the prophetic style it must indeed be noted, that the prophets nevertheless almost always introduce the divine word with "Thus saith Jehovah," "Jehovah's saying is," and such like, which is a rare exception with the Mal'ach, *e.g.* Gen. xxii. 16; and with regard to Rev. xxii. 6, 12, the angel there refuses the *προσκύνησις* offered in ver. 9, whilst the Old Testament Mal'ach accepts it (Josh. v. 14), and allows a sacrifice to be made to him (Judg. vi. 19 ff., xiii. 18 ff.).

But, again, this first view occurs in two forms. According to the first of these, the Mal'ach is just an angel specially deputed by God from among the number of Mal'achim for each separate occasion, and there is nothing to tell us whether he is always the same angel or not (Steudel); according to the second form, on the other hand (mainly Hofmann), it is always one and the same angel by whose means God sets forth His relation to the race of revelation from the beginning to the end of the Old Testament—"the special angel (as Hofmann expresses himself in the *Schriftbeweis*, 2d ed. i. p. 177) who rules in the commonwealth and history of this people," the archangel Michael of the book of Daniel (compare also *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, i. p. 131). Apart from the question whether the מִלְאָךְ יְהוָה really passes over into the Michael of Daniel, which is not to be spoken of till in the prophetic theology, and there must be answered in the negative, the latter form of the view seems to be decidedly preferable to the former, from the high titles which are conferred on the angel. But in reference to the whole first view, it is indisputably to be held as correct, if we proceed on the supposition that the mediation of angels is quite the same through the whole history of revelation of the Old and New Testaments. Then the older passages must be explained by the later, especially by the New Testament passages; and in these

latter the angel is manifestly hypostatically distinguished from God, and is a created finite being subordinate to God. This conception is also admissible in several of the older passages. The one that favours it most is No. 2, if Gen. xix. 18 ff. is understood to mean that even the angels, which are certainly subordinate, are treated exactly as if Jehovah appeared in them (see particularly ver. 24). Among the passages in the Pentateuch, Num. xxii. 31, in which the angel is definitely distinguished from Jehovah, is to be adduced here; but in a number of other passages no natural sense arises out of this presupposition, and the passages Nos. 6 and 9 especially contradict it. It is, however, to be noted in general, that the presupposition that the Mal'ach of the Pentateuch must be explained by the *ἄγγελος κυρίου* of the New Testament is not authorized, because it does not acknowledge the gradual progress of revelation, which advances from the theophany to revelation through divine organs and through the Spirit. To this is to be added, that exactly the same expressions are used in speaking of the representation of God by the Mal'ach as in speaking of the divine indwelling in the sanctuary; in both is the divine name and the divine countenance (comp. the passages under Nos. 8 and 9). Now if the Shekinah, the indwelling in the sanctuary, is to be understood, according to the Old Testament, not simply as an ideal and symbolical, but a real presence of God, a sinking of the divine into the sphere of the creature, the presence of God in the Mal'ach must also be taken in no other way (1).

2. Thus we are led to the second main view: that the Mal'ach of Jehovah is a self-presentation of Jehovah entering into the sphere of the creature, which is one in essence with Jehovah; and is yet again different from Him (2). This view has been put forward in three different modifications:

(a) According to the first of these, the Mal'ach is the Logos—the second person of the Godhead in the sense of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. This is the view of most of the Greek Fathers: of Justin, in his *Dialogue with Tryphon*, chap. 56, 61, 127 f.; also of Irenæus, with Tertullian and Cyprian. Eusebius of Cæsarea gives us a complete discussion of the Old Testament theophany, from this point of view, in his *Eclogæ Prophetiæ* (published by Th. Gaisford, 1842). At a later period this was the view of the Lutheran writers

on dogmatic; in more modern times it has been defended by Hengstenberg (who speaks of the Mal'ach as an uncreated angel), and by others.

(b) According to the second modification (so Barth), the angel of Jehovah is a created being; with which, however, the uncreated Logos was personally connected.

(c) According to the third (so Vatke, De Wette, and others), the Mal'ach is not anything hypostatical, but only an unsubstantial manifestation of God; a momentary descent of God into visibility; a *mission* of God (here מַלְאָךְ is taken in its original abstract meaning), which again returns into the Divine Being.

Against the first conception, it is to be observed that it brings into the Old Testament a finished dogma on the subject of an immanent distinction in the divine nature for which the passages which lie before us contain no sufficient authorization, since these do not tell us anything of an inward and essential relation in God's being, but only distinguish the divine which has entered into the sphere of created phenomena from the Divine Being in His celestial infinitude, as appears in a very remarkable manner in Gen. xix. 24, "Jehovah caused it to rain by Jehovah from heaven" (3). Even Hengstenberg admits that, in the Old Testament, the Revealer and He whom He reveals, lose themselves in each other, as it were; so that from this view ideas might easily arise very similar to those of Sabellianism. Moreover, as we are rightly reminded by the adherents of the second conception (Barth), it is certainly a wrong expression to speak of an uncreated angel. The phenomena of nature, which serve as a form of manifestation to the Mal'ach; the flame (Ex. iii.), the cloudy covering (Ex. xl. 36-38), the human form (in well-known passages), are certainly created. It is not the Mal'ach that is uncreated, but the God who veils Himself in His appearance. In opposition to the *second* modification, it is to be remarked that there is no proof that the manifestation of the Divinity in the form of the Mal'ach was such that the Son of God became abidingly an angel; so that again in becoming man He had as it were to strip off the angelic form which He had received, and change it for a human nature (to which Barth's view amounts). Finally, the third modification does justice to a number of passages; but from others it clearly appears that not

merely a personification, but a real hypostasis, is present in the manifestation of the Mal'ach.

It must be acknowledged, then, that no one of the various views quite does justice to all the passages; that the doctrine of the Mal'ach in the Old Testament vacillates in a peculiar manner between a modalistic and a hypostatic conception of the angel, so that it seems impossible to bring the matter to a definite intelligible expression. But the matter has a different aspect from the standpoint of the New Testament. From this (see especially 1 Cor. x. 4) it is the Logos, the Son of God, through which revelations to Israel are mediated, and who therefore works in the Mal'ach. But in the New Testament, the Son of God is nowhere so identified with the Mal'ach as if His incarnation had been preceded by His permanently becoming an angel; but the Logos, according to the New Testament view, works in all the other forms of old covenant revelation in just the same way as in the form of the Mal'ach (4).

(1) Delitzsch also has not failed to acknowledge this element, when, in his Commentary on Genesis (1st ed. p. 256, 2d ed. p. 337), he insists, indeed, that the Mal'ach is to be understood as a finite spirit, but at the same time says that it must not be forgotten that in this personally living finite spirit God presents Himself in person; that the angel has Jehovah, not outside of him, but within him; that the relation to the Mal'ach is less than becoming an angel, and yet more than mission of an angel,—a conception which takes up an unclear position between the first and second main view now under discussion.

(2) Movers, *Die Phöniciër*, i. pp. 389 ff., 428 ff., has pointed to a remarkable analogy in which the Phœnician religion here stands to that of the Old Testament, namely, in the way in which the relation of Heracles to the ancient Bel is understood in the former faith,—difference in unity, and unity in difference, being firmly held.

(3) On Ewald's perverse explanation of Gen. xix. 24, see § 40, note 1.

(4) In the later Jewish theology, the doctrine of the Metatron (probably of *μετάθρονος*, sharer of the throne),—the Prince of the countenance, who is the revealer of God, the mediator between God and the creature,—is developed out of the Old Testament doctrine of the angel of the Lord, the angel of the covenant, of the countenance. In order to draw him as near as possible to God, he was understood by some to be not a creature, but an emanation from the Divine

Being; and then, in order to do justice to other passages in the Old Testament, they again distinguished from him a second lower, created Metatron. But even the later Jewish theology did not penetrate to an acknowledgment of an immanent and real distinction in the Divine Being.

§ 61.

Other Points of the Mosaic Angelology.

Even in the Pentateuch, though there comparatively seldom, other angels of God appear side by side with the *Mal'ach* מַלְאָךְ. Nothing is said about their creation; the fact that they are not mentioned in the account of the creation is probably to be explained from the circumstance that this record aims merely at a precise delineation of the creation of the earth, and its completion in man. On the contrary, the book of Job, chap. xxxviii. 7, presupposes the existence of the angels when the earth was created. In those passages in the Pentateuch in which other angels besides the *Mal'ach* are mentioned, they appear without independent activity, as a sort of multiplication of the operating power of God: thus especially Gen. xxviii. 12, besides which compare xxxii. 2 f., in which passage they are called God's army; Deut. xxxiii. 2, where they appear as the attendants of God, manifested in His glory at the giving of the law. Gen. vi. 1 ff. would hold a position unparalleled in its kind, not only in the Pentateuch, but in the whole Old Testament, if higher spirits are to be understood by the בְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים (1). Certainly the angels, the מַלְאָכִים, besides this name, which is characteristic of their calling, bear in the Old Testament the name sons of God (בְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים), Job i. 6, ii. 1, or בְּנֵי אֱלִים, Ps. xxix. 1, lxxxix. 7, in order to express the closer fellowship in which they stand to God (2). Accordingly, Gen. vi. 1 ff. is referred to the fall of the angels by many recent theologians (Hofmann, Kurtz, Delitzsch), as had been already done by several of the Church Fathers,—a view which originally (as Keil has pointed out) sprang from the book of Enoch. According to another view, on the contrary (some of the Fathers of the Church, the Reformers, in more modern times Dettinger, Hengstenberg, Keil, and others), the expression "sons of God" refers to men, to the pious race descended from

Seth, as the name “sons of God” is used in Deut. xiv. 1, xxxii. 5, Hes. ii. 1, Ps. lxxiii. 15. On this view, the passage refers to the marriage of Seth’s descendants with Cainitic women, by which means the corruption of Cain’s race entered into the Sethites. Not only the connection which the whole story bears to what precedes, but also ver. 3, in which an erring of man, not of the higher spirits, is spoken of, is in favour of the latter view; and so is the expression “they took wives,” which is admittedly used in the Old Testament only in speaking of formal marriage, not of unchaste connection. The assertion that הָאֱלֹהִים, in contrast with the בְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים, must refer to the whole race of mankind, and cannot be taken in a relative sense, is refuted by comparing it with similar passages, such as Jer. xxxii. 20 (בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וּבְאֲדָמָה), Isa. xliii. 4, Ps. lxxiii. 5. The assertion, repeated by Schrader, that there is no ground to assume that two moral tendencies radically different ran through mankind in primeval times, can only be wondered at in view of Gen. iv. Note especially that Seth’s race, iv. 26, is characterized as that race by which God is addressed as Jehovah, and therefore as the race of revelation (3).

In comparison with the later books of the Old Testament, the angelology of the Pentateuch is but little developed. This testifies against the opinion of those who hold the angels of the Old Testament to be degraded gods of an ancient polytheism. De Wette, in his *Biblical Dogmatic* (3d ed. p. 81), has already remarked, in opposition to this view, that if this had been the case, the course of the angelology in the Old Testament must have been exactly the opposite from what it is. The angels would necessarily have appeared with definite names and functions in the older books, not first in the latest ones. But De Wette himself holds a view equally false,—namely, that angels were originally personifications of natural forces, or of the extraordinary operations and visitations of God. Even Ps. civ. 4 is no proof of the former point (4); on the contrary, such a personification of natural forces presupposes a belief in angels.—In the Pentateuch, the *Mal’achim* are obviously connected with the *Mal’ach*, forming as it were many fainter copies of him, and in this connection the vision in Gen. xxviii. is especially instructive. But the idea of the *Mal’ach* is not the product of a tendency to personification; but its meaning is, as we have already seen, that in him a beginning is made

towards the doing away of the separation between God and the world (5).

(1) Gen. vi. 1 ff.: "And it came to pass, when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, and daughters were born unto them, that the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair; and they took them wives of all that pleased them. Then Jehovah said: My spirit shall not always rule in men, in their errors they are flesh; and let their days be a hundred and twenty years. There were giants on the earth in those days; and also afterwards, when the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they bare unto them, there were strong ones who were of old renowned men."—We need lose no words on the ancient view (Onkelos, etc.) that בְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים here denotes sons of princes, magnates, and that the whole matter refers to mesalliances, that noble blood was mixed with plebeian blood, and this drew down the divine wrath on man. The question is: Are the sons of God Sethites, or are they higher spirits? and is a fall of the angels here spoken of? On the latter conception, we find an element in Genesis of which there is certainly no trace in the Old Testament, and which rather puts us in mind of the heathen myths. But this must not hinder us from candidly acknowledging anything that the text demands. The passage has led to a very bitter feud between Kurtz and Hengstenberg. Kurtz wrote two separate polemical treatises upon it (1857–58). At present the hypothesis of the angels is the most widely spread. But I believe that especially Dettinger ("Bemerkungen über den Abschnitt 1 Mos. iv. 1–vi. 8, den Zusammenhang und einzelne schwierigere Partien desselben," *Tüb. Zeitschr. für Theol.* 1835, vol. i.), and Keil ("Die Ehen der Kinder Gottes mit den Töchtern der Menschen," *Zeitschr. für luth. Theol. und Kirche*, 1855, p. 220 f.), who also still defends the older view, and has likewise been passionately combated by Kurtz, are quite in the right here.—Compare also, for the angel hypothesis, Schrader, *Studien zur Kritik und Erklärung der biblischen Urgeschichte Gen. i.–xi.*, 1863.

(2) Some understand אֱלֹהִים to be a *pluralis majestatis* for אֱלֹהִים, which would be admissible if only אֱלֹהִים occurred in this sense in any one passage. But elsewhere אֱלֹהִים is everywhere a pure plural. Therefore I hold that view to be correct which regards בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים grammatically as a double plural of בְּנוֹת, as בְּנוֹתֵי הָאֱלֹהִים, 1 Chron. vii. 5, for בְּנוֹתֵי הָאֱלֹהִים.

(3) The inconvenient בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים is removed by Schrader by a change of text.

(4) Ps. civ. 4 is explained in different ways, according as one or the other word is held to be the nearer object. I hold the common explanation to be the right one: "He makes the winds His messengers, and flames of fire His servants." The other view is: "He makes His messengers winds," etc.

(5) Compare also Schultz's *Old Testament Theol.*—For the further development of Old Testament angelology, see the *Prophetic Theology*.—On Azazel, see the *Doctrine of the Day of Expiation*, in the third division.

§ 62.

The Shekina.

The enduring localization of the divine revealing presence is the Shekina, that is, the indwelling of God distinguished from passing theophanies by virtue of its continuance. The expression belongs properly to the later Jewish theology, but is drawn from those passages in the Old Testament where a dwelling (שֶׁכֶן) of Jehovah or of the name of Jehovah among the people is spoken of—Deut. xii. 5, 11, xiv. 23, 1 Kings viii. 12, because of which the holy tabernacle is called the dwelling (מִשְׁכַּן יְהוָה), for which it is said more fully, 1 Kings viii. 13, בֵּית זְבוּל לִי לְשִׁכְתִּי, לְךָ מָכוֹן לְשִׁכְתְּךָ.

The first abode of the divine Shekina, according to the Old Testament, is Eden, as follows from the whole delineation in Gen. ii. f., but in particular from the mention of the cherubim, iii. 24, which are bearers of the divine presence (1). There it remained after the fall; there is the divine countenance, according to which iv. 14 is to be interpreted. The book of Genesis seems to suggest the notion that the dwelling-place of the glory and the countenance of God continued there upon the earth until the judgment of the flood came on the world. Then after the flood God revealed Himself for the first time from heaven (2). At a later time, God's dwelling among His people was in the sanctuary, of which, Ex. xl. 34–38, the glory of Jehovah (קְבוֹר יְהוָה) took possession in the phenomenon of the cloud, in the same way in which, Lev. xvi. 2, it appears in the same phenomena over the ark of the covenant (3). Here now is God's countenance, according to which the well-known expressions are to be explained: Ex. xxiii. 17, נִרְאָה, אֶל-פָּנֵי יְהוָה, to appear before the face of Jehovah; Deut. xxxi. 11,

לְרֹאשׁ אֶת־פָּנָי יְהוָה; compare further Ps. xlii. 3, lxiii. 3, in which the consciousness of the especial presence of God in the sanctuary is actually characterized as a gazing on God. From passages such as Lev. ix. 24, x. 2, the Shekina shows its reality in the sanctuary by means of actions of power which go out from it. Because of it, the Israelite was in all places to turn himself towards the sanctuary when praying, 1 Kings viii. 30, 35, 38 (in Solomon's prayer)—the so-called *Kebla*, compare Dan. vi. 11. Hence the explanation of passages like Ps. iii. 5: "I cried to Jehovah with my voice, and He answered me from His holy hill." The Shekina of God on earth corresponds to His dwelling in heaven, 1 Kings viii. 30, 39, 49, which, like that in the sanctuary, is definitely distinguished from the presence of God, which embraces the whole universe; see ver. 27 of the same chapter; compare Deut. iv. 39, Isa. lxvi. 1. In this sense the heavenly dwelling-place is explained as the sphere from which answers to prayer proceed, 1 Kings viii. 30, 32, 34, 39, 43. In view of such utterances, it is not in the sense of the Old Testament, to explain passages in which heaven is designated as the temple of God, Ps. xi. 4, xviii. 7, xxix. 9, or in which God's throne in heaven is spoken of, Ps. ii. 4, ciii. 19, etc., as a purely popular, unconsciously symbolical manner of expression (4).

According to the foregoing, God's dwelling falls outside the human subject; the notion of the divine indwelling is not applied to the mission of the Divine Spirit into the heart of man (5). Even the passage Isa. lvii. 15 does not speak of God dwelling in the heart of the humble ones. The New Testament (John i. 14) is the first to place the divine Shekina in a human person, in the Logos become flesh (*ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν*), and then it speaks of God making His abode (*μονήν ποιεῖν*) with the believers (John xiv. 23). Still the proper Shekina of God in heaven appears again in the Apocalypse (Rev. vii. 15), and the aim of the divine kingdom is said to be the *σκήνωσις* of God on the glorified earth (xxi. 3); compare also Jer. iii. 16 f. (6).

(1) On the cherubim, compare the delineation of the ordinances of worship, § 119.

(2) But it cannot be conceded that Ps. xxix. 10 treats of this, as Hofmann thinks in the *Schriftbeweis* (2d ed. i. p. 208). There is no

doubt that **כִּבְיֹל** is there the flood; but the words do not mean: At the flood Jehovah took up His residence in heaven, while before that He was upon the earth; but only: "Jehovah sat enthroned for the flood."

(3) On the **יָצַף** in Lev. xvi. 2, see § 118 with note 1.

(4) This conception is common, and is that of De Wette, *Biblische Dogmatik*, 3d ed. p. 73.—Compare, too, the doctrine of God's omnipresence, § 46.

(5) Compare the doctrine of the **רוּחַ**, § 65. Here is a remarkable difference between the theology of the Koran and the Old Testament: the Koran, borrowing from the New Testament, speaks of the divine Shekina being sent down into the hearts of believers, Sur. xlviii. 4 and 26 ("Who sends down His Shekina into the hearts of believers, that they grow continually in the faith"). But the Koran so wholly lacks the New Testament knowledge of the indwelling of God in believers' hearts through the Spirit, that this idea is reduced to an empty phrase. Compare Dettinger, "Beiträge zu einer Theol. des Korans," *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1834, pp. 16–21.

(6) Rev. vii. 15: "They serve Him day and night in His temple, καὶ ὁ καθήμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου σκηνώσει ἐπ' αὐτούς."—According to Jer. iii. 16 f., the Shekina of Jehovah is to be no longer connected with the ark of the covenant in the time of salvation. That indwelling of God, whose vehicle was the ark of the covenant, and whose abode was the holy of holies, shall be extended over the whole of Jerusalem, so that the ark of the covenant shall not be missed. The barrier which separated the sinful people from their God is taken away. Jerusalem is now co-ordinate with the name of Jehovah; he who comes to Jerusalem, comes to the name of Jehovah.—Touching the import of the Old Testament doctrine of the Shekina, compare also the passage from Luther's *Exeget. opera lat.* xvi. p. 71, already quoted, § 6, note 3.

§ 63.

The Doctrine of Miracle. Its Historical Appearance and Various Characteristics.

Even the forms of revelation discussed in the preceding paragraphs may be subsumed under the notion of the miracle, in so far as they are manifestations which interrupt the ordinary course of nature, and cannot be explained thereby. But in the stricter sense, the Old

Testament understands by miracles נִפְלְאוֹת, not manifestations of the Divine Being in the sense of immediate personal communication, but manifestations of the divine efficacy in the objective world, both in nature and in history. It is characteristic of the course of Old Testament revelation, that no real miracle—that is, no miracle accomplished by man's hand—is related in the time of the patriarchs. Not until the deliverance from Egypt did God reveal Himself as עֹשֶׂה פִלָּא (Ex. xv. 11), or, in other words, not till then begin the divine נִפְלְאוֹת (iii. 20). Moses is the first organ of revelation endowed with the gift of performing miracles. From that time onwards, miracles are grouped only round a few organs of revelation; and, indeed, they occur chiefly when the point in question is to lay down testimony for the reality of the God revealed in Israel, in contrast to heathenism, that is, where the living God measures Himself in combat with false gods; so from Ex. viii. 18, xxxiv. 10, onwards in many passages (in Egypt, in the kingdom of the ten tribes, in Babel, etc.).—The closer definition of the notion of miracles follows mainly from the names for a miracle:—

1. The most general expression, נִפְלְאוֹת, פִּלָּא, from פִּלָּא = פִּלָּה, to select, characterizes miracle in its negative aspect, as an occurrence withdrawn from the common course of things, and thus an extraordinary occurrence. This, too, seems to be the notion expressed by the original meaning of the word מוֹפֵת; but the explanation of this difficult word is uncertain. According to the derivation given by Delitzsch (on Ps. lxxi. 7), it would come from the Arabic root فَتَّ, which signifies “to twist, to turn;” it would then mean something tortuous, strangely turned, and in this sense something to excite astonishment. Others refer to the stem יפה, to gleam, or, like Fürst, to the stem יפע, which has the same meaning (so that the word would stand for מוֹפֵעַת), from which it would signify glittering, gleaming. In the New Testament this negative characteristic of a miracle is denoted by the expression τέρας.

2. On the contrary, the positive side of a miracle is expressed in the denomination נִבְרִיאוֹת, corresponding to the New Testament δυνάμεις, that is, indications of divine power, side by side with which (comp. e.g. Deut. iii. 24) there appears the more general emphatic expression מַעֲשֵׂים, or more frequently עֲלִילוֹת, great deeds, corresponding to ἔργα in

John. According to this, a miracle would mainly be a divine act of power, exempt from the common course of nature and history. In so far as it is something new which cannot be understood from the past, it is placed under the view-point of creation, Ex. xxxiv. 10: "I will do נַפְלְאוֹת, such as have never been created (נִבְרָאוּ) on the whole earth." Indeed, a miracle is itself called בְּרִיאָה, a thing created, Num. xvi. 30, compared with Jer. xxxi. 22.

3. But the notion of a miracle is acknowledged in full, for the first time, by its teleological designation as אֵיזֶה, σημεῖον, according to which its import is to be an indication of something higher and divine, and so to serve a definite divine aim. The word מוֹפֵת, in its original meaning, would come in here on the explanation adopted by some scholars, who refer it to a root פִּת, from the biliteral פת, signifying to open. It would thus indicate that by which anything is opened and unlocked. And this idea is certainly brought out by מוֹפֵת in its narrower meaning, in which it denotes *portentum*, a sign pointing to the future, or sometimes a type; compare Isa. viii. 18, xx. 3. Perhaps the word is so to be understood in Deut. xiii. 2, where it is distinguished from אֵיזֶה (אֵיזֶה מוֹפֵת).

§ 64.

Continuation. More accurate Discussion of the Notion of Miracles.

What has been already stated gives no more than a relative notion of miracle. Every more notable manifestation of the course of nature and history presents a side on which it is extraordinary and excites astonishment, brings the divine power to view, and is acknowledged as serving a divine aim. And, in fact, the Old Testament sometimes makes use of the expression נִפְלְאוֹת in a wider sense; when, for example, marine phenomena are called God's wonders in the deep, Ps. cvii. 24; when in Ps. cxxxix. 14 it is said with reference to man: "I praise Thee, because I am an astonishing wonder; Thy works are marvellous, and my soul knoweth it right well." What Hegel says in the *Philosophy of Religion* (ii. 1st ed. p. 49) is not correct,—namely, that the things in the Old Testament religion are prosaic things, presented in various intellectual connections of cause,

result, quality and quantity, according to all these categories of the understanding. This, says Hegel, is what we call natural intelligible connection; here also, for the first time, the definite notion "miracle" can occur in contrast to the natural connection of things (1). On the contrary, what has been already said shows that the way of looking at nature characteristic of the Old Testament does not at all consist in the contemplation of such a natural *causal nexus*. God's power rules in everything,—God, who causes the breath of life to go forth and draws it in again (Ps. civ. 29 f.); who unrolls the heaven, and renews the earth, etc. (2). Thus, according to the Old Testament view, God does not by miracle, in the narrower sense of the word, do anything that surpasses in quality His general great sway in nature and history. The exacter definition of the notion of miracles in the more limited sense follows only from the exacter definition of the aim of miracles, namely, that miracles serve to reveal God in His kingdom. Miracles, in the stricter sense, are extraordinary manifestations and occurrences, in which God makes known His power for the purposes of His kingdom in a unique manner. From this it is explicable why miracles appear as manifestations of the divine holiness; the נִצָּנִיךְ בְּקִדְשׁוֹ, who is glorious in holiness, is the doer of miracles, Ex. xv. 11, compare Ps. lxxvii. 14 f. (3). Miracles serve this aim by means of the impression which they make (Ex. viii. 15: "This is the finger of God"), but only in connection with the word-witness which accompanies them or stands in connection with them. Even in such a case as 1 Sam. vii. 10, in which the corresponding word of God does not follow expressly, the sign is still made distinct by Samuel's preceding prayer. But particularly those miracles which serve as the credentials of an organ of revelation are themselves accredited by the word of God given in advance. Even a false prophet may through circumstances perform signs and wonders, but he is to be measured and judged by his false doctrine, Deut. xiii. 2 ff.—In this union with the word of God, and this priority of the latter, there lies a preservative from the vain quest after wonders and signs, and a noteworthy difference between the Old Testament מוֹתָוִת and the τέρατα, σήματα, *ostenta, portenta* of heathenism, which, as a rule, do not become intelligible by means of a testimony in words added to them, but require explanation, and thus devolve on the

advice of man (4). Israel is directed to the word of revelation (Deut. xviii. 9 ff.), in contrast to all heathen Mantik, which has searched through heaven and earth to find signs of the divine counsel, but finding no help falls into dissolution. The exorcism of the dead, and other forms of the Mantik, are a horror, Lev. xix. 26, 31, xx. 27; and astrology is a folly, Isa. xlvii. 13, Jer. x. 2 f., etc.

(1) Hegel, *l.c.*, continues: "In earlier religions there are no miracles; in the Indian religion everything is already quite crazy. The notion of miracles appears first in opposition to the ordinances of nature, the laws of nature, the conformity of nature to law, . . . and this is represented as a manifestation of God to a single person."

(2) Compare the doctrine of maintenance, § 52.

(3) Ps. lxxvii. 14 f.: "God, Thy way is in holiness . . . Thou art the God that doeth wonders."—Compare the delineation of the notion of holiness, § 44.

(4) Compare Naegelsbach's *Homerische Theologie*, 1st ed. p. 145 ff., 2d ed. p. 168 ff., on the Homeric notion of miracles.

§ 65.

On the Spirit of God.

God reveals Himself in the heart of man by His Spirit, רִיחַ, which, as the spirit of revelation, corresponds to the cosmical רִיחַ, in the same way as the word of revelation corresponds to the word of creation. As the cosmical principle of life, as רִיחַ אֱלֹהִים, as the mighty divine force of all things, the Spirit is already the principle of the life of man's soul, and every natural intellectual gift in man is traced back to it: Joseph's wisdom, Gen. xli. 38; Bezaleel's skill in art, Ex. xxxi. 3, xxxv. 31 (1). It lies in Gen. vi. 3 that this Spirit of God has also an ethical bearing, for, according to this passage, the government of God's Spirit is hampered by the errors of mankind. But clouding and derangement of the mental life, such as was sent on Saul, is also the working of the רִיחַ אֱלֹהִים, 1 Sam. xvi. 14–16, 23, xviii. 10. And here this evil רִיחַ אֱלֹהִים is definitely distinguished from רִיחַ יְהוָה, for the latter forsook Saul; but it was (xvi. 14) רִיחַ מֵאֵת יְהוָה, from Jehovah. But the Spirit as רִיחַ יְהוָה, or, to express

it more definitely, רִיחַ קֹדֶשׁ יְהוָה, only acts within the sphere of revelation. It rules within the theocracy (Isa. lxiii. 11; Hag. ii. 5; Neh. ix. 20), but not as if all citizens of the Old Testament theocracy as such participated in this Spirit, which Moses expresses as a wish (Num. xi. 29) (2), but which is reserved for the future community of salvation (John iii. 1). In the Old Testament, the Spirit's sway in the divine kingdom is rather that it arms the organs of the theocracy with the gifts required for their calling, and those gifts of office in the Old Testament are correlative to the gifts of grace in the New Testament, 1 Cor. xii. ff. In the Pentateuch its working appears exclusively in this connection. The Spirit bestows on Moses and the seventy elders skill to guide the people (Num. xi. 17 ff.), also to Joshua (Num. xxvii. 18; Deut. xxxiv. 9), and works at a later period in the judges, awakening and arming them (Judg. vi. 34, xi. 29, xiii. 25), and comes on the kings who were called by God at their anointing (1 Sam. x. 6, xvi. 13); as the Spirit of revelation, He produces in particular the gift of prophecy, Num. xi. 25 ff.; and even as רִיחַ אֱלֹהִים imparts the ability to prophesy to the heathen Balaam (Num. xxiv. 2), by which means he is made an organ of the revealing God against his will (xxii. 38). On the contrary, the Spirit does not appear in the Pentateuch as the principle of sanctification in the pious; this is first spoken of in the Psalms, Ps. li. 13, comp. vers. 12 and 14, cxliii. 10 (3).

Now this Spirit is represented as a power proceeding from Jehovah, —a something communicated by Him which clings to the person to whom it is communicated, so that it may be apportioned from him to others (Num. xi. 17, 25; comp. also 2 Kings ii. 9), but it can also be taken away from him (as from Saul, 1 Sam. xvi. 14). It does not follow from 1 Kings xxii. 21 that the Spirit is regarded as personal, even if more than a personification is meant there (4); but the passage Isa. lxiii. 10, "But they strove against His Holy Spirit, and grieved Him" (an expression which reminds us of the word in reference to the Mal'ach, Ex. xxiii. 21, "Do not provoke Him"), does imply that in the Spirit Jehovah personally acts (5).

The relation of the Spirit of revelation to the human subject is characterized in a way that makes it clear why a full indwelling of the Spirit in man, a penetration of the human spirit by the Holy

Spirit, is not reached in the Old Testament, but only a working on the human mind. The Spirit is put on man, רוח with על, Num. xi. 25, 29; שם with על, ver. 17; He rests on him, יָרָה, ver. 26; He clothes Himself with a man, עָלָה, Judg. vi. 34 (compare 1 Chron. xii. 18, 2 Chron. xxiv. 20) (6); He breaks in upon him, עָלָה with על, Judg. xiv. 6, 19, and in other passages. His operations are characterized as an impulse or stroke, עָלָה, xiii. 25, and therefore He often operates violently and overpoweringly on the human constitution (7).

(1) See the particulars in the *Anthropology*, § 70.

(2) Num. xi. 29: "Would that all the people were the prophets of the Lord, and that the Lord would put His Spirit upon them!"

(3) Ps. li. 13, "Take not Thy Holy Spirit from me;" cxliii. 10, "Let Thy good Spirit lead me."

(4) The passage 1 Kings xxii. 21, on the Spirit of God, which acted as a lying spirit in the prophets, is discussed under the doctrine of Satan in the prophetic part of this book.

(5) Though we must not read the dogma of the New Testament doctrine of the Trinity into the Old Testament, it is yet undeniable that we find the way to œconomic Trinity of the New Testament already prepared in the doctrine of the *Mal'ach* and of the Spirit.

(6) The expositors dispute the explanation of the expression לְבִישׁ. Bertheau, Keil, Fuerst thus explain Judg. vi. 34: The Spirit laid itself round Gideon like a coat of mail. But on this view, ought not Hiphil to be used? and is it not more correct to render *induit eum* . . . *Gideoni se includens*? The man is looked on as the covering of the Spirit, which rules, speaks, and testifies in him.

(7) The further delineation of the operations of the Spirit on the prophets, when we come to the theology of the prophets, must connect itself with these simple notions, as they are deduced mainly from the principal passage, Num. xi.

§ 66.

The Psychical States of the Organs of Revelation.

As the psychical states in which the reception of revelation by man takes place, the principal passage (Num. xii. 6-8) names, 1. The Dream; 2. The Vision; 3. The immediate contemplation of the Divinity as imparted to Moses, which stands higher than the other two (1).

1. Dreams occur in the Old Testament, as in antiquity generally, as the vehicle of divine revelation, but only in a subordinate way (2). It may be concluded from 1 Sam. xxviii. 6—in which a scale of the forms of revelation is given—that it stands lowest among the forms of revelation; this becomes still more clear from Deut. xiii. 2–5, according to which no one can accredit himself as an organ of revelation by means of dreams alone, but especially from Jer. xxiii. 28 f., where the “straw” refers to dreams, and the consciously received word of God is designated “corn” (3). So, too, Eccles. v. 2, 6 says, “Dreams come through much care.” “Where there are many dreams and vanity, there are also many words; but thou shalt fear thy God.” While the prophets never appeal to dreams in their extant prophecies, dreams serve mainly as a vehicle of revelation to those who, though they are not properly speaking organs of revelation, obtain a divine communication in extraordinary circumstances. In the Pentateuch, dreams and the power of interpreting dreams given by God occur only in Gen. xx. 3, 6, xxviii. 12, xxxvii. 6 f., chap. xli. (Joseph); besides these, compare in the Old Testament, Judg. vii. 13 ff., 1 Kings iii. 5, and the dreams in the book of Daniel, because at the Babylonian as at the Egyptian court the revelation of the true God had to prove its superiority over the heathen Mantik. How God awakens the sleeping conscience of man by dreams is shown by Elihu in the book of Job xxxiii. 15 ff.

2. Visions, which are called מֵרָאָה in the above-cited passage in Numbers, elsewhere in general בְּחִזְיוֹן, Gen. xv. 1, הִיָּיוֹן, presuppose a previous elevation of the life of the soul into an extraordinary state, as is made prominent in the first narrative in which a vision appears, in Gen. xv. (with Abraham) (especially in the תִּרְדֵּמָה, ver. 12, sleep’s deepest stupor, in which the inner vision arises). Still the difference between a dream and a vision may be regarded as not sharply marked. Visions do not become a common form of revelation until the appearance of prophecy, and therefore this point is to be treated more fully in the prophetic theology.—God speaks by the two forms, dreams and visions, as is said in Num. xii. 8, only בְּחִידָה, in riddles, in a way which demands an explanation of the pictures viewed.

3. The immediate view of the Divinity (פָּה אֶל־פָּה) with which Moses was favoured stands higher than these forms; that figureless,

perfect, clear communication of knowledge, which is to be distinguished also from the vision of God in emblematical tokens, spoken in Ex. xxiv. 10 of Aaron and the elders of Israel. For the rest, the principle that a clear consciousness when receiving revelation is placed higher than ecstasy is of great import for the standpoint of Old Testament religion; comp. the psychological discussion of prophecy, as well as use of the passage Num. xii. 6–8 in 1 Cor. xiii. 12 (4).—The idea that in the case of some persons a view into the future opens at the moment of death is expressed in the Old Testament in Gen. xlix. and Deut. xxxiii. (in the blessings of Jacob and Moses). This idea is also found in heathen antiquity (5).

(1) Num. xii. 6–8: “Hear ye my words: If there is among you a prophet of Jehovah, I will manifest myself to him in vision (בִּמְרֹאֶה), and I will speak with him in dreams. Not so my servant Moses. He is faithful in my whole house. I speak with him mouth to mouth and through the medium of vision (בִּמְרֹאֶה), and not in riddles, and he sees the form of Jehovah; and how is it that ye are not afraid to speak against my servant Moses?”

(2) This was also the Homeric view; see Nägelsbach, *homer. Theol.* 1st ed. p. 159 ff., 2d ed. p. 182 ff.

(3) 1 Sam. xxviii. 6: “Jehovah answered Saul neither by dreams, nor by the Urim, nor by prophets.”—Jer. xxiii. 28 f.: “Let the prophet who has dreams tell dreams, but he who has my word must speak my word in truth; what has the straw to do with the corn? is Jehovah’s saying.”

(4) In 1 Cor. xiii. 12, that vision of the Divinity which took place with Moses is designated by Paul as the form of knowledge with which we are not yet favoured, but shall be in the future.

(5) Comp. Nägelsbach, *homer. Theol.* 1st ed. p. 163, 2d ed. p. 185 f.

SECOND DIVISION.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

§ 67. ✕

General View.

First of all, the nature of man is to be described without reference to the contradictory elements which through sin entered into its development; and then these contradictory elements are to be set forth as they appear in the difference between the original perfection of the life of man on the one side, and the state of sin and death in which man now is on the other side. The anthropology of Mosaism is here to be carried up to the point in which it passes over into the delineation of the theocratic relation of man to God (1).

(1) For the rich literature on Biblical anthropology, compare the most detailed work on this topic: Delitzsch, *System der bibl. Psychologie*, 1855, 2d ed. 1861. {Translated in Clark's For. Theol. Lib.} Besides this, the little book, *Fundamenta Psychologiæ ex sacra scriptura collecta*, 1769, by Roos, which is rich in fine remarks, and not yet obsolete; and the *Umriss der bibl. Seelenlehre*, by Beck, 1843, 3d ed. 1871, deserve special mention. Umbreit's book, *Die Lehre von der Sünde, ein Beitrag zur Theol. des A. T.*, 1853, goes over a good part of anthropology. Separate monographs will be mentioned in their proper places.

FIRST CHAPTER.

THE NATURE OF MAN IN ITS MAIN UNCHANGEABLE FEATURES.

I. THE IDEA OF MAN.

§ 68.

The idea of man is expressed in the statement that he is created in the image of God (Gen. i. 26 f.). This divine image is propagated (v. 1, compared with ver. 3). The dignity of the divine image is a second time ascribed to man (ix. 6), from which it is clear that the

divine image lies inalienably in man's being.—The divine image is not twofold in the sense that in the words, i. 26, נִצְּיָה אָדָם בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כְּדְמוּתֵנוּ (LXX. ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν), a distinction is to be made between צֶלֶם (εἰκών) and דְּמוּת (ὁμοίωσις); as, for example, Justin Martyr and Irenæus referred the first to the bodily form and the second to the spirit; or the Alexandrian Fathers proposed to understand κατ' εἰκόνα of the rational basis of man's nature, and the καθ' ὁμοίωσιν of its free development to τελείωσις. The כְּדְמוּתֵנוּ in the passage quoted refers rather to the same thing as the בְּצַלְמֵנוּ; it only serves to fix and strengthen the meaning of the latter; it is specially intended to express that the divine image which man bears is really one corresponding to the original pattern (1). In the omission of כְּדְמוּתֵנוּ in the passage ix. 6, we might be led to find an indication that the divine image in sinful man was no longer adequate to its original type. Still, ix. 6 simply refers to i. 27, in which the דְּמוּת is not repeated.

But now what is to be understood by the divine image? Not, certainly, that the human body was to be supposed to be a copy of the divine form, for Elohim, the creative God, is without form (comp. § 46). We might rather say (2), that the human figure was to be so formed that it might serve to represent God Himself when He revealed Himself; compare also Ezek. i. 26 (3), and in especial Ps. xciv. 8-10 might be here adduced; while, on the contrary, the forms of animals never appear in the Old Testament as a vehicle of God's self-manifestation, but were applied to Jehovah only in idolatrous worship (4). The nobility which appears in the bodily figure of man is certainly not to be excluded from the divine image, but it is undoubtedly an error to limit the latter to what is bodily. It is equally erroneous to limit the divine likeness to the dominion over the animal world, as the Socinians did. This, no doubt, is also contained in the notion, but only as a consequence, and so as a secondary element; compare Gen. i. 26, and the passage ix. 6, which looks back on the latter. The divine likeness is rather to be referred to the whole dignity of man (כְּבֹד וְהָדָר, comp. Ps. viii. 6), in virtue of which human nature is sharply distinguished from that of the beasts, man is set over nature as a free person, and designed for communion with God, and to take God's place on earth. The first or negative element, the

strict separation of man from beast, is expressed, firstly, in the fact that although animals are animate like man, and possess a נִפְשׁ, yet the creation of man and his animation, according to Gen. i. 26, ii. 7, is a unique and peculiar divine act (5); and further, in the circumstance that man finds no corresponding companionship among all the animals (ii. 20); lastly, in the permission to man to kill every animal, but not another man (ix. 2 ff.), and this because of the divine likeness (comp. § 108). The prohibitions in Ex. xxii. 18, Lev. xviii. 23, xx. 15, rest on this acknowledgment of the dignity of human nature, by which all connection of man with beast—an abomination for which the heathen have no moral abhorrence—was to be punished by the death of the criminal. Thus the standpoint of the religion of nature is absolutely denied in the Old Testament, alike in the idea of God as the Holy One, and in the idea of man as God's image.—The second positive element is indicated partly in the main passage Gen. i. 26, and partly in the whole history, chap. ii. and iii.: A being is to stand at the head of the creatures, invested with dominion over them (comp. Ps. viii. 7–9), with whom God holds intercourse as with His equal, and who is appointed, like God, to be a free personality (though we see from Gen. iii. 22, comp. ver. 5, that man arrives at this by a wrong way). To the ethical idea of God corresponds the ethical idea of man. The spiritual dominion of man over the beasts is indicated in the giving of names, Gen. ii. 19 f. In regard to this dignity of man, Ps. viii. 6 says that man was made little lower than Elohim, than a numen, a divine being (6). The book of Sirach xvii. 3–6 (enumerating dominion over the animals, free will, speech, sense, etc.) gives an explanation of the divine image which is on the whole correct, only that the essential feature, that man was appointed to communion with God in virtue of his likeness to Him, is not brought forward (7).

(1) My view is that this is the correct conception of Gen. i. 26. Umbreit, for example, has understood the passage quite differently in the book cited above, p. 4: "The אֵלֹהִים seems rather to lessen than strengthen the meaning of אֱדָם; man is to appear in the image of God—not, however, in complete similarity to God's image, but only after His likeness."—But the emphatic repetition of בְּצַלְמֵנוּ בְּעֵלְמֵנוּ אֵלֹהִים in ver. 27 does not agree with this; on this view, the בְּדְמוּתֵנוּ would rather require to be repeated in explanation.

(2) Compare Hofmann, *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, i. p. 73.

(3) In Ezek. i. 26 it is said, in reference to the theophany: "On the figure of the throne there was *כְּמֹנֶת בְּמִרְאֵה אָדָם*, a form with the appearance of a man."

(4) On the point that divine attributes are symbolized in the cherubim, see hereafter the delineation of the ordinances of worship, § 119.

(5) For particulars see § 70.

(6) The LXX. translate the *מַלְאָכִים* in Ps. viii. 6 by *παρ' ἀγγέλους*, and it is certain that this translation is not exact. But it is generally overlooked that the text does not say "as thou," or at least "as Jehovah," as Schultz (*alttest. Theol.* i. p. 358) has well remarked. The idea, Thou hast made him little lower than Jehovah, would not have been possible in the Old Testament. *מַלְאָכִים* here stands in the indefinite and general meaning numen, divine being, and thus far the translation of the LXX. is not exactly incorrect.

(7) Upon the import of the Old Testament idea of man, see in especial Lutz, *Bibl. Dogmatik*, p. 17. He characterizes it as a fact of absolute weight and greatness that the difference between spirit and nature is here so fully brought out, and that the value of spiritual existence is not placed merely in the power of thought, but in moral purity.



II. SEXUAL RELATIONS OF MAN.

§ 69.

1. The sexual relation of man and woman is originally ordained in Gen. i. 27 (*וַיִּבְרָא יְהוָה אֱדָם בְּצַל אֱלֹהִים*). The frequent assertion that, according to Genesis, man was originally created androgynous (1), cannot be reconciled with the passage quoted, and has only arisen from a false view of the relation of chap. i. to chap. ii. (2). Besides, even chap. ii. teaches nothing about a man who was at once man and woman, and drawn from whom man and woman as such derived their being. But man was created first, and the woman by being taken from him; as also the passage is understood in 1 Tim. ii. 13, 1 Cor. xi. 8 f. (3). It agrees with this that the perfection of mankind is also realized in a man, in the *δευτερος Ἀδάμ*, and that the *ἀναστάσεις υἱοί* are not spouses, neither marry nor are given in marriage, but shall be *ἰσὺγγελοι*, Matt. xxii. 30, Luke xx. 36. But that man's

existence in two sexes as compared with his original singleness is already (as has been maintained even in modern times) the beginning of the fall, is contrary to the natural sense of Gen. ii. 18 ff.

2. According to this passage, marriage, that primitive form of human society from which all other forms of society arise, and for which man gives up the others (comp. ii. 24), did not spring from the blind sway of natural impulse, but from divine institution. Its original form is monogamy (comp. Matt. xix. 6); and the fact that the bond of matrimony is represented as stronger than that moral relation between parents and children, which is placed so high in the Old Testament, indicates that it forms not simply a bodily union (בְּצִרָה), but also a spiritual oneness. Monogamy appears still among the first patriarchs (Abraham, Nahor, Isaac), besides which, to be sure, the taking of concubines is allowable (Gen. xxii. 24, xxv. 6), and even in certain circumstances happens at the wish of the legitimate spouse herself (xvi. 3, xxx. 3, 9). It is characteristic that polygamy (Gen. iv. 19) is traced to the Cainites. The law—we here at once observe (comp. § 102)—does indeed tolerate polygamy, but does not sanction it, and, moreover, provides against the hardships that readily attach to it; comp. Ex. xxi. 10, Deut. xxi. 15 ff. Bigamy, in the form in which Genesis represents it as forced on Jacob, namely, the simultaneous marriage with two sisters, was afterwards expressly forbidden in the law, Lev. xviii. 18 (comp. § 103, with note 3). In general, monogamy remained predominant among the people of Israel, as, in fact, the description of a wife in Prov. xii. 4, xix. 14, xxxi. 10 ff., and in particular the prophetic representation of the covenant between Jehovah and His people as marriage, clearly presuppose that monogamy is the rule (4).—The possession of children, by which the house is built up (Gen. xvi. 2, xxx. 3, etc.), is looked on as a divine blessing from Gen. i. 28 onwards. “From Jehovah” Eve obtains her first son, iv. 1 (5); it is God who in Seth gave her another seed instead of the murdered Abel, iv. 25; it is always God who makes a mother fruitful or unfruitful, xxix. 31, xxx. 2, and who will be entreated for the fruit of the body, xxv. 21, xxix. 32 f., xxx. 17, 22. Unfruitfulness is a heavy divine dispensation (xvi. 2, compare 1 Sam. i. 6 f.), indeed a dishonour to a woman, Gen. xxx. 23; childlessness is looked upon as the greatest misfortune to a house. Compare also such passages

as Ps. cxxvii. 3 ff., cxxviii. 3 ff. (where a fruitful wife and a group of joyous thriving children are designated as the crown of earthly joy), etc. To hinder fruitfulness is treated, Gen. xxxviii. 9 f., as an abomination worthy of death. There is in ancient Israel no trace of the custom of killing and casting out children to ward off the increase of family cares, which is so widely spread in heathenism (6). Thus the natural forms of human society are sanctified from the beginning by the religious point of view under which they are placed (7).

3. All mankind is a connected race of brothers (ἐξ ἐνὸς αἵματος, Acts xvii. 26). The differences between nations and ranks of life do not rest on various physical origin, but upon the law of God, who made the nations to differ and who set them their boundaries (Deut. xxxii. 8), and who reveals His retributive ordinances even in their natural character (Canaan, Moab, Ammon, etc.).

(1) The fiction in Plato's *Symposion*, chap. 14-16, has been very unsuitably adduced in comparison.

(2) The false view referred to is that Gen. ii. wishes to portray something different from and later than chap. i. If so, we should be compelled to find in chap. i. the creation of man and wife in inseparable union. But it was remarked above (§ 18, with note 3) that the second account is rather to be looked on as a supplement to the first.

(3) 1 Cor. xi. 8 f.: Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀνὴρ ἐκ γυναικός, ἀλλὰ γυνὴ ἐξ ἀνδρός· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκτίσθη ἀνὴρ διὰ τὴν γυναῖκα, ἀλλὰ γυνὴ διὰ τὸν ἄνδρα.

(4) There is a moral moment contained in the fact that conjugal cohabitation is characterized as a knowing (the expression is certainly used a few times euphemistically of vicious human intermixture, but never of animal copulation)—namely, that it is “an act of personal freedom of will, and not the work of blind natural impulse, and contains moral self-decision as its presupposition” (Keil on Gen. iv. 1) [Article, “Pädagogik des A. T.”]; comp. § 81.

(5) That is, the communion with God in which man has remained even after the fall is testified to her by his birth. Gen. iv. 1 refers back to iii. 15 f., but still the passage by no means speaks of the birth of the God-man (as Luther translates, “I have the man, the Lord”).

(6) Compare Philo, *de Spec. leg.*, ed. Mang., ii. 318. This is also represented by heathen writers as something peculiar; see Tacitus, *Histories*, v. 5.—The exposing of Moses, which was an attempt to

save the child, cannot, of course, be cited here; Job iii. 11 ff. and Ezek. xvi. 5 (where Jerusalem is compared to a child cast out in its blood) prove nothing for an Israelitish custom. Since the exposing of daughters is mentioned as an ancient Arabian custom, we may, with Hitzig, find a reference in the latter passage to what might sometimes happen at the birth of a Bedouin child, particularly a girl [above art.].

(7) In answer to those who, for example, compare the importance of the family in the Old Testament with the importance which the Indian religion lays on the possession of descendants, because the condition of the dead ancestors depends on the offerings of their descendants, it is enough to point to Hegel's review of W. v. Humboldt's essay, "Ueber die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des Mahabharata" (Hegel's *Werke*, xvi. p. 368 ff.).

III. THE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE (1).

§ 70.

Body, Soul, Spirit.

The nature of man, like that of all animated beings, arose out of two elements—namely, from earthly material (עֶצֶר, אֶרֶץ), and from the Divine Spirit (רוּחַ), Gen. ii. 7, comp. Ps. civ. 29 f., cxlvi. 4. As in general נֶפֶשׁ, soul, originates in the בָּשָׂר, the flesh, by the union of spirit with matter, so in particular the human soul arises in the human body by the breathing of the divine breath (נִשְׁמַת הַיִּים) into the material frame of the human body. But although the life-spring of the רוּחַ, from which the soul arises, is common to man and beast, both do not originate from it in the same way. The souls of animals arise, like plants from the earth, as a consequence of the divine word of power, Gen. i. 24 (תוֹצֵא הָאָרֶץ נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה). Thus the spirit of the creation, who entered in the beginning, i. 2, into matter, rules in them; their connection with the divine spring of life is through the medium of the common terrestrial creation. But the human soul does not spring from the earth, but is created by a special act of divine inbreathing; see ii. 7 in connection with i. 26. The human body was formed from the earth before the soul; in it, therefore, those powers operate which are inherent to matter apart from the soul (a proposition which is of great importance, as Delitzsch rightly remarks). But the human

body is still not an animated body; the powers existing in the material frame are not yet comprehended into a unity of life; the breath of life is communicated to this frame directly from God, and so the living man originates. According to the view of some, this specific difference between the life of the human soul and that of animals is expressed by the use of the term נִשְׁמָה in ii. 7 (2). This, however, cannot be established, for in vii. 22 ("All in whose nostrils was the breath of life died") the exclusive reference of the expression נִשְׁמָה to man (as merely another expression for בָּל הָאָדָם, ver. 21), coming between the general terms comprehending man and beast, which stand both before and after it, is not natural. In Deut. xx. 16, Josh. x. 40, xi. 11–14, כָּל-נִשְׁמָה denotes only men; but in these passages the special reference of the expression is made clear by the connection,—in the passage in Deuteronomy by ver. 18, and in the book of Joshua because from viii. 2 onwards the cattle are expressly excepted from the הָרֶם. Otherwise one might as well prove from Josh. xi. 11, where כָּל-הַנְּפֹשׁ is used exclusively of man, that the human soul alone is called נֶפֶשׁ. But it is correct that in the other places in the Old Testament in which נִשְׁמָה occurs it is never expressly used of the mere animal principle of life; comp. Isa. xlii. 5, Prov. xx. 27, Job xxxii. 8, and Ps. cl. 6 (כָּל הַנִּשְׁמָה). Thus the substance of the human soul is the divine spirit of life uniting itself with matter; the spirit is not merely the cause by reason of which the נֶפֶשׁ contained beforehand in the body becomes living, as Gen. ii. 7 has by some been understood (3). For in the עָפָר as such, in the structure of dust, there is, according to the Old Testament, as yet no נֶפֶשׁ, not even latently. This is first in the בָּשָׂר, in the flesh; but the earthly materials do not become flesh until the רוּחַ has joined with it, vi. 17, vii. 15, Job xii. 10, xxxiv. 14 f. It is no proof against this (as has further been objected) that in some passages (Lev. xxi. 11; Num. vi. 6), the dead body from which, according to Gen. xxxv. 18, the soul has departed, is called נֶפֶשׁ כֵּת before it crumbles to dust. I believe this expression is to be understood as a euphemistical metonymical phrase, as we speak of a dead person without meaning to say that the personality lies in the body; or perhaps in this designation of a dead person the impression is expressed which the corpse makes immediately after death, as if the element of the soul had not yet entirely separated itself (thus

Delitzsch) (4). But as the soul sprang from the spirit, the רִיחַ, and contains the substance of the spirit as the basis of its existence, the soul exists and lives also only by the power of the רִיחַ; in order to live, the soul which is called into existence must remain in connection with the source of its life. "God's spirit made me" (רִיחַ אֵל עָשָׂה לִּי), says Job, xxxiii. 4, "and the breath of the Almighty animates me" (וְנִשְׁמַת שְׁרֵי תַחְיִי), with the imperfect). The first sentence expresses the way in which the human soul is called into being; the second, the continuing condition of its subsistence. By the withdrawing of the רִיחַ the soul becomes wearied and weak, till at last in death it becomes a shadow, and enters the kingdom of the dead (comp. § 78); while by the רִיחַ streaming in it gains energy of life. Now from this the Old Testament usage in connection with the terms נֶפֶשׁ and רִיחַ becomes intelligible. In the soul, which sprang from the spirit, and exists continually through it, lies the individuality,—in the case of man his personality, his self, his *ego*; because man *is not* רִיחַ, but *has it*—he *is soul*. Hence only נֶפֶשׁ, נִפְשׁוֹ, can stand for egomet ipse, tu ipse, etc., not רִיחִי, רִיחְךָ, etc. (not so in the Arabic); hence "soul" often stands for the whole person, Gen. xii. 5, xvii. 14, Ezek. xviii. 4, etc. When man is exhausted by illness, his רִיחַ is corrupted within him, Job xvii. 1 (רִיחִי הִכְלָה), so that the soul still continues to vegetate wearily. When a person in a swoon comes to himself again, it is said his spirit returns to him, 1 Sam. xxx. 12 (וַתָּשָׁב רִיחוֹ) compared with Judg. xv. 19. But when one dies, it is said the soul departs, Gen. xxxv. 18; his soul is taken from him, 1 Kings xix. 4, Jonah iv. 3. When a dead person becomes alive again, it is said the soul returns again, 1 Kings xvii. 22 (וַתָּשָׁב נֶפֶשׁ). It is said of Jacob, whose sunken vital energy revived when he found his son again, that his spirit was quickened, Gen. xlv. 27 (וַתְּחַי רִיחִי). On the contrary, of one who is preserved in life it is said, הִיחַיָה נֶפֶשׁ, Jer. xxxviii. 17–20. When God rescues one from the jaws of death, it is said, Ps. xxx. 4, "Thou hast brought up my soul out of Sheol;" comp. Ps. xvi. 10 (5).—Man perceives and thinks by virtue of the spirit which animates him (Job xxxii. 8; Prov. xx. 27); wherefore it is said in 1 Kings x. 5, when the Queen of Sheba's comprehension was brought to a stand, that "there was no spirit in her more" (לֹא-הָיָה בָּהּ עוֹד רִיחַ); but the perceiving and thinking subject itself is the נֶפֶשׁ (comp. § 71). The

impulse to act proceeds from the רִיחַ, Ex. xxxv. 21; hence one who rules himself is a מַלְיָא בְּרוּחוֹ, Prov. xvi. 32. But the acting subject is not the רִיחַ, but the נַפֶּשׁ; the soul is the subject which sins, Ezek. xviii. 4, etc. Love and attachment are of course a thing of the soul, Gen. xxxiv. 3 (וַתִּדְבַּק נַפְשׁוֹ) and ver. 8 (הִשְׁתָּקָה נַפְשׁוֹ); and so in Cant. v. 6, the word of the beloved יָצָא נַפְשִׁי cannot be explained, "I was out of my senses" (as De Wette thinks), but the bride feels as if her very personality had gone forth from her to follow and seek her beloved. In many cases, indeed, נַפֶּשׁ and רִיחַ stand indifferently, according as the matter is looked upon—that is, to use Hofmann's words (*Schriftbeweis*, i. 1 A. p. 258, 2 A. p. 296), according as "the personality is named after its special individual life, or after the living power which forms the condition of its special character." Thus it may be said on the one hand, "Why is thy spirit so stubborn?" (מִתְרִיחַ), 1 Kings xxi. 5; on the other hand, "Why art thou so bowed down, my soul?" (מִתְרַחֵם נַפְשִׁי), Ps. xlii. 12. Of impatience it may be said, "The soul is short" (וַתִּקְצַר נַפְשִׁי), Num. xxi. 4, and "shortness of the spirit" (קִצְרַת רִיחַ), Ex. vi. 9; compare Job xxi. 4. Trouble of heart is "bitterness of the spirit" (מִרַת רִיחַ), Gen. xxvi. 35; and of the soul (חֲמַר נַפְשִׁי), Job xxvii. 2, it is said וַתִּפְּעַם רִחוֹ, Gen. xli. 8, and נַפְשִׁי בְּבִהְלָה מָאֵד, Ps. vi. 4. Compare with this in particular the climax in Isa. xxvi. 9 (6). From all it is clear that the Old Testament does not teach a trichotomy of the human being in the sense of body, soul, and spirit being originally three co-ordinate elements of man; rather the whole man is included in the בָּשָׂר and נַפֶּשׁ (body and soul), which spring from the union of the רִיחַ with the matter, Ps. lxxxiv. 3, Isa. x. 18; comp. Ps. xvi. 9. The רִיחַ forms partly the substance of the soul individualized in it, and partly, after the soul is established, the power and endowments which flow into it and can be withdrawn from it (7).

(1) Besides the books already quoted in § 67, cf. Hofmann, *Weisung und Erfüllung*, i. pp. 17–25; my *Commentationes ad theologiam biblicam pertinentes*, 1846, p. 11 ff.; H. A. Hahn, *V. T. sententia de natura hominis exposita*, 1846; several sections of Böttcher's comprehensive but unfinished work, *De inferis rebusque post mortem futuris*, i., 1846; in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* iv. p. 728 ff., the article "Geist des

Menschen," by Auberlen; and vol. vi. p. 15 ff., the article "Herz im bibl. Sinn," by myself.

(2) This is the view of several rabbins, and of Beck and Hahn among more modern writers. There were even rabbins who connected the word נִשְׁכָּח with נִשְׁמָח.

(3) Thus Böttcher and others; the former in a review of my *Commentationes*, in the *Jenaer Literaturzeitung*, 1846, No. 254 f., p. 1013 ff.

(4) Delitzsch, *System der biblischen Psychologie*, 2d ed. p. 447: "The whole inward part of man lies in the corpse, as it were, turned outwards before us. We there look into the depth of the soul's combat and the soul's peace, in which the separation of the soul and body took place; and the soul still hovers, glorifying or distorting it, over the form which it has just quitted. Therefore does a corpse make an impression so gloomy, ghostly, and spectral, and therefore is it called נֶפֶשׁ. The corpse of one just dead still bears the fresh traces of his soul, which is imprinted upon it, as it were, in parting; it is the remaining case of the soul; it is, so to speak, the soul vanished itself."

(5) Ps. xvi. 10: "Thou wilt not leave my soul to Sheol;" compare also § 78.

(6) Isa. xxvi. 9: "In my soul I long after Thee (נִבְשֵׁי אֵייתֶךָ); yea, I seek Thee (אֶשְׁתַּחֲוֶה) in my inward parts with my spirit (אֶחֱיֶה)." The second sentence does not say the same as the first, but, as shown by אֶחֱיֶה, it ascends higher—"Yea, with my spirit," with the whole strength of my inward life.

(7) In all ages the conclusion has been deduced from a few passages that the Old Testament teaches a pre-existence of the soul. The main passages adduced are Ps. cxxxix. 15 and Job i. 21, and from them many have sought to conclude that human souls existed in Sheol, in the kingdom of the dead, before they came into a human body. But though the former passage might contain an idea of this kind, still, since there is no other trace of such a doctrine, an abbreviated comparison is without doubt to be assumed here, as in many other cases. "When I was formed in the depths of the earth," stands for "in such concealment, in a place as dark as the depths of the earth" (description of the mother's womb). Still less can such a doctrine be based on the passage in Job: "Naked came I forth from my mother's womb, and naked do I return thither." It is said that the mother earth must be meant by אֶמֶץ in the first member, since we are told that man returns thither. But, as has been very well explained, especially by Hupfeld (*Questionum in locos Jobeidos*

veratos specimen, 1853, p. 1), a sort of zeugma must be assumed here : the correspondence is between the mother's womb, proper and figurative, namely, the mother earth ; for the condition before birth, and the condition in the grave and in the kingdom of the dead, are correspondent.—On the other hand, in Wisd. viii. 20 there is undeniably a reminiscence of Platonic doctrine.

§ 71.

The Notion of the Heart, and its Relation to the Soul.

The soul of man has a double sphere of life,—firstly, it sustains the life belonging to the senses, is *ánima*, נֶפֶשׁ הַבָּשָׂר, the soul of the flesh in a narrower sense. As such it acts in the blood, and supplies life to the body in the blood, and hence the proposition, Lev. xvii. 11, נֶפֶשׁ הַבָּשָׂר הִוא בַּדָּם, “The soul of the flesh is in the blood” (1) ; indeed, it is said directly, “The blood is the soul,” Gen. ix. 4, Lev. xvii. 14, Deut. xii. 23. Still this does not mean that the soul of the flesh does not act also in respiration and nourishment. The chief meaning of נֶפֶשׁ is precisely “that which breathes,” “the breath,” Job xli. 13 ; and hence, as some passages speak of a streaming forth of the soul in the blood (Isa. liii. 12, and elsewhere), so in others the breathing forth of the soul is spoken of, Jer. xv. 9, Job xxxi. 39, etc. However, נֶפֶשׁ is not simply *ánima*, not simply the principle of life belonging to the senses, but it is at the same time *ánimus*,—the subject of all the activities of knowing, feeling, and wishing ; also, in particular, the subject of those activities and conditions of man that refer to his communion with God—Deut. iv. 29, vi. 5, Isa. lxi. 10, Ps. xix. 8, xlii. 2 f., and numberless other passages (2).

In both its relations as *ánima* and *ánimus*, the soul centres in the heart, לֵב or לִבָּב, which often interchanges with קֶרֶב ; which, however, designates in a wider sense the whole cavity of the breast, with the intestines (3). The heart, as the central organ of the circulation of the blood (4), forms the focus of the life of the body ; whence, for example, the strengthening of the body by nourishment is called supporting the heart, קָצַר לֵב, Gen. xviii. 5, Judges xix. 5, Ps. civ. 15 ; and, on the other hand, exhaustion of physical vital energy is designated as a parching or melting away of the heart, Ps. cii. 5, xxii. 15. The heart,

too, is the centre of all spiritual functions. Everything spiritual, whether belonging to the intellectual, moral, or pathological sphere, is appropriated and assimilated by man in the heart as a common meeting-place, and is again set in circulation from the heart. All the soul's motions of life proceed from the heart, and react upon it, so that the word, Prov. iv. 23, "Above all that thou hast to protect, keep thy heart; for from it are all the issues of life," has a quite general reference. In particular, the heart (the הֶרֶץ בֵּיטֵן, Prov. xx. 27) is the place in which the process of self-consciousness is carried out,—in which the soul is at home with itself, and is conscious of all its doing and suffering as its own (5). The heart, therefore, is also the organ of the conscience, Job xxvii. 6. But in general, when a man takes anything home to him, or appropriates anything, designs anything, is busy with any plan or resolution, this happens in the heart (6). Hence expressions such as יָדַע עִם לִבְּבִי, Deut. viii. 5; הַשֵּׁב אֶל-לִבִּי, Isa. xlv. 19, etc.; אָמַר אֶל-לִבִּי,—this even of God,—Gen. viii. 21; מִשְׁכָּבוֹת לִבְּבִי, Ps. lxxiii. 7; עֵשָׂה בְּלִבִּי, Prov. xvi. 1 (7). But the heart is the organ not simply of those acts of consciousness which are purely inward, but also of the functions of knowledge in general, which is essentially an appropriation, so that לֵב has frequently exactly the meaning intellect, insight; for example, אֲנִשִּׁי לִבְּבִי, *virī cordati*, Job xxxiv. 10; קָבַל אֶת-לֵב, Jer. v. 21, comp. Prov. xvii. 16, also of God; בְּבִיר כֹּחַ לֵב, Job xxxvi. 5; רַחֵם לֵב, 1 Kings v. 9 (8).

Now, because the heart is the focus of the person's life, the work-place for the personal appropriation and assimilation of everything spiritual, the moral and religious condition of man lies in the heart. Only what enters the heart forms a possession of moral worth, and only what comes from the heart is a moral production. The individual tendency of man's life as a whole, as well as all his separate personal acts, receive their character and moral value from the constitution and contents of the heart, in virtue of the necessary connection which subsists between the centre and the periphery (9). Because of this, man is characterized by his heart in all his habitual and moral attributes. We read in 1 Kings v. 12, Prov. x. 8, etc., a wise heart; in Ps. li. 12, of a pure heart; in Gen. xx. 5 f., etc., of an honest and righteous heart: and so, on the other hand, in Ps. ci. 4, of

a perverse heart; in Jer. iii. 17, etc., of a wicked and stubborn heart; and in Ezek. xxviii. 2, etc., of a haughty heart (10). Even Genesis sets forth its doctrine of the *לֵב יִצָּר*, the figment of the heart, Gen. viii. 21, in opposition to the superficial doctrine which makes man in a moral sense an indifferent being, in whose choice it lies in each moment to be either good or bad; and so this book understands sin as a principle which has penetrated to the centre, and from thence corrupts the whole circuit of life (11). Therefore the human heart is characterized in Jer. xvii. 9 as “guileful (*בִּצָּר*, properly rugged, the opposite of *יָשָׁר*) above all things, and mortally diseased (*טָמֵא*),” so that God alone (but He completely, Prov. xv. 11) is able to fathom the depths of its perverseness; and hence the prayer in Ps. cxxxix. 23 f. So every revelation addresses itself to the heart, even the revelation of law, Deut. vi. 6; for it demands love to God from the whole heart, and, starting from this centre, also from the whole soul; compare xi. 18. The condition of insusceptibility for what is divine is called the uncircumcised heart (*לֵב עֵרָל*), Lev. xxvi. 41, Deut. x. 16, comp. Ezek. xlv. 9; and callousness in sin is a hardening, an obduracy of the heart—Ezek. iv. 21, and many other passages (12). And because of this the power of revelation is directed to renew man from the heart; and its aim, Deut. xxx. 6, is to circumcise the heart—to establish God’s will within the heart, Jer. xxxi. 33.—Also on man’s side the process of salvation begins in the heart. Faith, in which man’s personal life in its deepest basis takes a new direction, belongs entirely to the sphere of the heart, and is described as a making sure (from the root-meaning of *הִצָּמִין*), a making strong (*הִצָּמִין*, Ps. xxvii. 14, xxxi. 25), a stablishing of the heart (compare especially Ps. cxii. 7 f.) on that foundation which is God, the *צִר לֵב* Himself, Ps. lxxiii. 26; compare the same view in the New Testament—for example, Rom. x. 9 f., Acts viii. 37 (13).—On the contrary, frames of mind and emotions are just as often predicated of the soul as of the heart, according as they are understood as something which occupies the whole personality of man, or as a state ruling the inmost heart of man. In the Old Testament, grief and care, fear and terror, joy and confidence, tranquillity and contentment, are referred sometimes to the heart and sometimes to the soul; compare the union of the two expressions, Deut. xxviii. 65, and also Prov. xii. 25, Eccles. xi. 10, Jer. xv. 16, 1 Sam. ii. 1, Ps.

xxviii. 7, on the one hand, and Ex. xxiii. 9 (where Luther translates נֶפֶשׁ by heart), Ps. vi. 4, xlii. 6 f., Isa. lxi. 10, Ps. lxii. 2, cxxxi. 2, cxvi. 7, on the other. In these points usage has established peculiar distinctions, so that, for example, as a rule, נִיר and its derivatives are connected with נֶפֶשׁ, and נִפְח and its derivatives with לֵב, etc. (14). However, נֶפֶשׁ, and not לֵב, generally stands if the functions spoken of are those in which the subject is in motion towards an object. Jer. iv. 19 is instructive in this connection (15). But it is specially to be remarked that (16), in the notion of נֶפֶשׁ, the character of desire is obviously that which predominates and reaches furthest; and here the connection of desire with the breath and with breathing must not be overlooked (17). Certainly the impulses by which man allows himself to be determined (comp. Ex. xxxv. 5, xxii. 29), the tendency of the will which rules him, the views which he cherishes, the pleasure which he enjoys internally, are matters of the heart (comp. Ezek. xi. 21, xx. 16, xxxiii. 31; Deut. xi. 16; Job xxxi. 7, ix. 27; Ps. lxvi. 18; Prov. vi. 25); but as soon as the tendency of the will extends to the utterance of the desire, נֶפֶשׁ generally comes in, and the stem נָפַח, together with its derivatives, is almost exclusively connected with נֶפֶשׁ (18). Indeed, it is well known that נֶפֶשׁ is sometimes placed for desire or inclination itself; compare in particular, Eccles. vi. 7, 9, Prov. xiii. 2 (19).

(1) Compare the theory of sacrifice, § 127.

(2) The Old Testament and the Homeric anthropology offer parallels of the highest interest, but here there is a remarkable difference between the two: the Homeric ψυχή is impersonal,—simply the sensual principle of life; the spiritual elements have their seat in the φρένες. Compare Nägelsbach, *Homeric Theol.* 1st ed. p. 331 ff., 2d ed. p. 380 ff., and my *Commentationes*, p. 11 f.

(3) Compare Ps. xxxix. 4 (לֵבִי בְּקִרְבִּי), cix. 22, 1 Sam. xxv. 37; see Delitzsch, *System der bibl. Psychologie*, 1st ed. pp. 203, 220; 2d ed. pp. 248, 265. According to Hupfeld, on Ps. xvii. 10, הֵלֶב, *l.c.*, and lxxiii. 7, is also a mere name for the heart, which is scarcely probable [art. "Herz."].—The question on the relation of the heart to the soul belongs to the more difficult questions of Biblical psychology; however, a sure result can be attained.

(4) The bucket at the spring of blood, Eccles. xii. 6. See on this passage Delitzsch, *l.c.*, 1st ed. p. 185, 2d ed. p. 229 [above art.].

(5) "In corde actiones animæ humanæ ad ipsam redeunt," says Roos, *Fundam. psychol. ex. s. scr.*, p. 99, shortly and strikingly.

(6) Roos, *l.c.*: "Dum ipsa [anima] sibi aliquid ostendit ac proponit, ad cor suum loqui dicitur. Dum suarum actionum sibi conscia est, et illarum innocentiam vel turpitudinem ipsa sentit, id ad cor refertur. Anima humana ut ψυχῇ suavia appetit, ut spiritus scrutatur, etc. *Sed quatenus cor habet, ipsa novit, se hoc agere, et ideas reflexas habet.*"

(7) See the particulars in the dictionaries.

(8) By this Ps. cxix. 32 is to be explained (differently by Hengstenberg), and similarly the passage 2 Kings v. 26, which has been understood in so many different ways. The LXX. often put νοῦς for לֵב, Ex. vii. 23, Isa. x. 7, etc. Compare, too, on the close connection of the two notions, Beck, *Christl. Lehrwissenschaft*, i. p. 233. There are indeed exceptions. The soul, too, is put as the subject of insight, Prov. xix. 2, Ps. cxxxix. 14; the thoughts that move man are called a speaking and meditating of the soul, Lam. iii. 20, 24, 1 Sam. xx. 4; men form imaginations in the soul, Esth. iv. 13, and cherish plans there, Ps. xiii. 3, etc. Still there are comparatively very few such passages (see Delitzsch, *l.c.*, 1st ed. p. 156, 2d ed. p. 198)*; and it seems sometimes, as in the last-cited passage, that the mention of the soul is occasioned mainly by the parallelism, which demands a second expression. [Above art.]

(9) The divine judgment being passed on man not according to what he appears to be, but according to what he is, is described as a looking on the heart, 1 Sam. xvi. 7, Jer. xx. 12; a knowing and trying the heart, 1 Kings viii. 39; Prov. xvii. 3; Ps. vii. 10, xvii. 3; Jer. xi. 20.—Even of God it is said, Lam. iii. 33, "He does not afflict men לֵבָב," in order to express the difference between that which is rooted in His being and the appearance as it is taken up by man. [Above art.]

(10) In all such connections לֵבָב is not readily used. The LXX. are not so rigorous in this usage; comp. Böttcher, *de inferis*, § 41 (but there are various readings in some passages there quoted). The usage in the book of Wisdom is peculiar; it speaks of holy souls (vii. 27), and on the contrary of κακότεχνος ψυχῇ, into which wisdom does not enter, and of εὐθύτης ψυχῆς (ix. 3, etc.). This usage is connected with the book's peculiar theory of the differences of natural character in souls, indicated in viii. 19. [Above art.]

(11 and 12) See the doctrine of sin, § 75 and § 76.

(13) According to Delitzsch, *l.c.*, 1st ed. p. 109, 2d ed. p. 145, Ps. lxxiii. 26 proves that faith is an exertion of the pure Ego, which

is distinguished from spirit, soul, and body: "His Ego remains faithful to God, even when the body and also the heart—that is, the life of soul and spirit—perish." To me it seems rather that in the first hemistich, לֵב, going with שָׁרָר, denotes the bodily heart; even if this fails, God remains the rock of the heart (that is, in its psychical meaning). [Above art.]—Rom. x. 10: *καρδιά πιστεύεται*; Acts viii. 37: *πιστεύεις ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας*.

(14) The passage Prov. xiv. 10 is interesting in this connection: "The heart knoweth the sadness of its soul; in its joy also must no stranger mingle."

(15) According to Jer. iv. 19, the soul hears the tumult of war, and on this the heart is moved by sorrow and horror.—לֵב שָׁמַעַ, 1 Kings iii. 9, has a quite different meaning. [Above art.]

(16) Thus, rightly, Delitzsch, *l.c.*, 1st ed. p. 162, 2d ed. p. 204.

(17) As vehement, passionate desire is expressed by panting; see, for example, Am. ii. 7. [Above art.]

(18) *לֵב הָאֱוֹת לֵב* is found only in Ps. xxi. 3. Compare, further, passages like Ps. lxxxiv. 3, cxix. 20, 81, Isa. xxvi. 8 f. [Above art.]

(19) By this, *לֵב הָרָחֵב נָפֵשׁ*, Isa. v. 14, Hab. ii. 5, and *רָחֵב נָפֵשׁ*, Prov. xxviii. 25, are to be explained; the latter is different from *רָחֵב לֵב*, Ps. ci. 5, which Ewald incorrectly translates "of greedy heart," since, like Prov. xxi. 4, it designates puffed up, conceited security.—In conclusion, the question would still fall to be taken into consideration, in what relation the heart, as the focus and centre of the spiritual life of the soul, stands to the heart as the centre of physical life. But this question can be sufficiently discussed only in connection with a comprehensive examination of the relation of the body and soul in general. Here it can only be remarked, shortly, that according to Holy Writ there is not merely a parallelism between the body and soul, in virtue of which what is bodily stands simply as the symbol of spiritual occurrences, but that as the soul which supports the personality is the same as that which rules in the blood and in the breath, so also in its higher functions the bodily organs have a real share. Now, indeed, with the well-known experience that affections and passions affect the intestines, that the beating of the heart in particular is modified by all passionate excitement, no one will find simple tropes where the Psalmist says (Ps. xxxix. 4), "My heart was hot within me;" or Jer. xx. 9, "It was in my heart like a burning fire;" comp. iv. 19, xxiii. 9. There are two remarkable points in biblical anthropology: firstly, the specific relationship in which the Holy Scriptures place separate parts of the intestines to specific emotions (see what Delitzsch, *l.c.*—1st ed. p. 222 ff., 2d ed. p. 266 ff.—says on the biblical

meaning of רֶכֶסִים, the liver, the kidneys); and secondly, the way in which the heart, and not the head and the brain, is referred to in connection with the activity of knowledge and will (the book of Daniel is the first to speak of "the visions of the head"). It is well known that the view of the whole ancient world agrees entirely with the Bible in this. As regards the Homeric doctrine (*e.g.* the meaning of κῆρ, καρδίη), compare Nügelbach's *Homer. Theol.* 1st ed. p. 332 ff., 2d ed. p. 384 ff.; remember also the Roman usage of words like *cordatus*, *recordari*, *recors*, *excors*, and others; compare in particular Cicero, *Tusc.* i. 9, 18, and also Plato, *Phæd.* c. 45, and the commentators on this passage, etc. The spiritual significance of the heart cannot—as Delitzsch, *l.c.*, 1st ed. p. 215, 2d ed. p. 260, rightly maintains—be simply referred to the fact that the heart is the centre of the circulation of the blood. The way in which Delitzsch, 1st ed. p. 216 f., 2d ed. p. 260 ff., has adduced the phenomena of somnambulism in illustration of the matter is deserving of all notice; but physiology has hitherto given almost no answer to the questions that here suggest themselves [above art.].

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN IN REFERENCE TO THE CONTRADICTORY ELEMENTS WHICH ENTERED BY SIN INTO ITS DEVELOPMENT.

I. THE PRIMITIVE STATE OF MAN.

§ 72.

The constitution of man's primitive state can be made out in part from the second chapter of Genesis, and in part by arguing backwards from the change which came in by sin. Thus the following points are reached:—innocence and childlike intercourse with God, harmonious relationship to nature, and, in a manner, immortality.

1. Man was created good, Gen. i. 31—that is, answering the divine aim. But as the good in him is not yet developed to free self-determination, he does not as yet know the good as good (compare iii. 5). This is the condition of childlike *naïveté* and innocence (compare Deut. i. 39). It is characterized in Gen. ii. 25 by the circumstance that shame was not yet awakened. Hence, in the first

place, that conception of the original state which viewed it as a created condition of *sapientia* and *sanctitas* contradicts the delineation in Genesis; instead of which, it would be much more in the sense of the Old Testament to say, as Eccles. vii. 29 expresses it: "God made man צַדִּיק (right)." But in the second place, that view which takes the original state to be only a condition of being without sin—either a state of pure indifference, or a state in which the evil was already latent, so that in the Fall the disposition which already existed in man only came forth—is equally irreconcilable with Genesis. The delineation of the origin of sin (Gen. iii.) is thoroughly opposed to all doctrines according to which the evil in man is to be looked on as a necessary factor in man's development (see § 73).

2. In the primitive condition, man lives in undisturbed and harmless union with nature as with God. The former is made especially clear by the contrast in Gen. iii. 8 ff., in which it is contained that the fear, which in man's present condition predominates in his relation to the Divinity, is not the normal relation. The peaceful relationship of man towards nature is seen, partly in the description of the life in Paradise in general, and partly by the present relation of man to nature being contrasted with the condition before sin, since man must now make nature serviceable to him by toiling and struggling (iii. 17 ff., v. 29), and exercises his dominion over the animals in especial by deeds of violence and destruction of life, ix. 2 f. (a passage which stands in contrast to i. 29) (1). Hence prophecy (see later) has also adopted the abolition of this hostile relation as a feature in the description of the time of salvation (in the well-known passages, Isa. xi. 6–8, lxxv. 25).

3. Lastly, in Gen. ii., immortality is ascribed to man, but conditionally in the sense of *posse non mori*. This is denied by many. Certainly the idea, that if man did not sin he should never die, does not necessarily lie in the words, Gen. ii. 17, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt die;" the words, taken by themselves, could also mean only a quick and early death. But it is quite clear from iii. 22 that, according to the sense of the record, the possibility of reaching immortality is annexed to the life in Paradise, or that immortality was reserved for man in so far as he should live in unbroken communion with God. And iii. 19 (2) does not mean, as

many expositors have maintained, that by nature man must assuredly die; but the words only give the reason why the end of man's life, when once decreed, is brought about in the manner assigned as a corruption of the body (3).

(1) In Gen. i. 29 man is still directed to vegetable nourishment. The power to kill animals is not given him till chap. ix.

(2) Gen. iii. 22: "That he may not take of the tree of life, and live to eternity." Ver. 19: "Till thou returnest again to the earth, for out of it wast thou taken; dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."—Particulars on the last-quoted passage in § 77.

(3) It may be asked why the Old Testament looks back so little on the primitive state? This question has been very well answered by Gustav Baur, in his treatise, "*Die alttest. und die griechische Vorstellung vom Sündenfalle*," in the *Theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1848. He says there, p. 360: "The lost Paradise lying in the past is not further regarded by the religion of Israel, which forgets what is behind, and reaches forward to what is before, pursuing the aim of a future and blessed communion with God, which is placed before it; instead of idly mourning over the lost golden time, it rather strives to win Paradise again, filled, refined, and strengthened by God's Spirit."

II. OF SIN.

1. THE ORIGIN OF SIN.

§ 73.

The Formal Principle of Sin.

The way in which both the formal and the material principle of sin are to be comprehended according to the Old Testament is embodied in the history of the Fall (Gen. iii.). In this (quite symbolic) delineation there lie the following doctrines:—

1. Man can pass from the condition of innocence into the state of free morality only by an act of self-determination. For this it is mainly necessary for him to distinguish his will, in which till then the good was immediately posited, from the good itself, and so to

gain the notion of something not good (רָעָה טוֹב וָרָע, ii. 17). Therefore the good is placed before him objectively, in the form of a command, ii. 16 f. But the meaning of the story is not (as some modern theologians have understood it) that it was intended that man should transgress the law, because, as Bruno Bauer, for example (*Die Religion des A. T.* i. p. 23), has expressed it, the knowledge of the good is only possible if the subject distinguishes itself from the good—that is, knows itself as sinful. The meaning of the record is rather, that if the will is objectively confronted by what is good, and thus distinguishes itself accordingly from the good, still this does not involve a decision of the will against the good. This is taught by the record when it does not represent the will of man as immediately reacting against the express command, but refers the first impulse to a decision against the command to the operation of an influence from without, and represents the woman (iii. 1–3) as at first still acknowledging the obligatory force of the divine command. This also excludes, on the side of the Old Testament, the supposition that man has a conscience only in so far as he knows himself to be sinful (as has been maintained from a Hegelian standpoint). For (1) when the woman, iii. 2 f., remembers the divine command, and knows that she is bound by it, and thus acknowledges its obligatory force, she has not yet sinned, and yet she shows that she has a conscience. Hence it follows that, according to the Old Testament, sin is not a necessary factor in the development of man, but a product of optional decision; as is also the case afterwards, though no longer, as we shall see, in an absolute sense, Deut. xxx. 15: “See, I have to-day laid before thee life and what is good, death and what is evil.” In opposition to this, such passages are cited from the later books as Job iv. 17 ff., xiv. 4, Ps. ciii. 10, 14, which, when looked at by themselves, might favour the supposition that sin is just a necessary consequence of the finiteness of human nature; but these passages are to be understood from the standpoint of the present constitution of man.

2. As has been said, the first incitement to transgress the command came from without. The story apparently presupposes an ungodly principle which had already entered the world, but does not give any further account of it. No further attention is paid to the

serpent, and therefore it cannot be laid down as a doctrine of Mosaism that it was either Satan or a tool of Satan's, because, as we shall see hereafter, the doctrine of Satan does not appear in the Old Testament till much later, although it is probable that in the Azazel, Lev. xvi. 8 ff., a wicked demon is to be seen (2). On the other hand, Wisd. ii. 23 f. teaches that the seduction of the first man is the work of Satan; and this is also presupposed in the New Testament (3). But the chief thing in connection with this point in Gen. iii. is, that the seduction does not at all act by compulsion on man, but is successful only when man freely renounces resistance to temptation. Here there is an essential difference between the Old Testament delineation and the Zend doctrine, according to which the evil is simply physically inserted in man (4).

(1) Compare Nitzsch, *System der christlichen Lehre*, § 98, note.

(2) Compare the account of the day of reconciliation, § 140 {?}.

(3) It is doubtful whether John viii. 44, the ἀνθρωποκτόνος, refers to this; for, comparing 1 John iii. 12, 15, we are inclined to interpret the passage about the murderer as referring to Cain's fratricide. But Rev. xii. 9, where the devil is called ὁ δράκων, ὁ ὄφις ὁ ἀρχαῖος, refers to the Fall in Gen. iii. Compare, too, the allusion in Rom. xvi. 20 to Gen. iii. 15.

(4) In modern times there has been no lack of attempts to understand the matter physically, by making the tree of knowledge a poisonous tree. These are all additions to the Old Testament delineation.

§ 74.

The Material Principle of Sin. The Old Testament Names of Sin.

3. The following is the process of the origin of sin: First, a doubt is awakened whether what God has commanded is really good, and along with this the command itself is exaggerated, Gen. iii. 1 (1). Distrust of God was first to be called up, as if He were an envious being, who sought to keep man back in a lower stage; and then ver. 4 proceeds to a decided denial of God's word. Only then, after self-seeking rising over God's will and God's word, has been awakened, does sensuous charm, ver. 6, exert its power. In other words, the real principle of sin is, according to the Old Testament, unbelief in

the divine word,—the selfish raising of self-will above the divine will, and presumptuous neglect of the limits drawn by divine command. The share of the sensuous nature in the production of sin appears as merely secondary. Thus Gen. iii. disproves the doctrine so often put forward, especially in the rabbinical theology, that according to the Old Testament the real principle of evil lies in matter, in the body (2). It continues to be a fundamental doctrine of the Old Testament that evil was originally the denial of the divine will; that sin is sin because man lifts himself in self-seeking above God and His will. The Old Testament knows of no evil which is purely an injustice of men against each other, or a simple retardation of the development of human nature, simple weakness (3).—But that the Old Testament sees the ground of all evil in the selfish transgression of bounds prescribed to man by God, is not to be explained by thinking of God as an envious being, but because He is the Holy One, and holiness as such (from what was already proved) cannot bear anything contradictory to it. The God who rules over the world in immoveable omnipotence, giving measure and aim to all things, has no ground for envy like the Greek gods (4). It is preposterous to take the words of Gen. iii. 22, “The man is become like one of us,” as an expression of divine envy, as has been done by some expositors (*e.g.* P. v. Bohlen); it rather contains a melancholy irony—the man has by the Fall really reached what he was to reach, but in a wrong way, and to his misfortune. In one sense the serpent, in the words “eritis sicut Deus,” told the truth, for man has reached independence over against God. But still he was deceived and deluded, for it is only independence in evil. Instead of being raised to free communion with God, he is free to go upon ungodly paths. It is shown by the curse to which man is now subjected that the account does not in the least mean to speak of a *felix culpa*, of an elevation of man by sin (5).—It cannot be said with perfect certainty whether there are allusions to the story of the Fall in the following books of the Old Testament. Most probably there is such an allusion in Hos. vi. 7, where the explanation, “they transgressed the covenant like Adam,” certainly deserves to be preferred to the other views,—“after the manner of men,” or even “like men of the mob,” or “like a covenant with a man” (6). In Job xxxi. 33, too, the explanation, “If I had dissembled my transgressions like

Adam" (referring to Adam's excuses for himself), is more probable than the other view, "after the manner of man." On the contrary, Isa. xliii. 27, "thy first father sinned," without doubt does not refer to Adam's fall; rather to Abraham, but probably to Jacob, the proper ancestor of the people.

The Old Testament designations for sin are to be understood in conformity with the account we have given of the principle of sin. (a) The most common expression is **חַטָּאת**, first in Gen. iv. 7, or shorter, **חָטָא**; it comprehends sins of weakness as well as sins of wickedness. The physical meaning of **חָטָא** is to miss the mark, Judg. xx. 16. **חַטָּאת** denotes missing—deviation, that is, from the divine way and the goal laid down for man by the divine will; and **חָטָא** joined with **ל'** means to go astray from God, to deviate, to sin against Him. (b) The second expression, **עָוֶן**, means properly crookedness, perversion, *pravitas*; primarily it does not designate an action, but the character of an action; hence in Ps. xxxii. 5, **עָוֶן חַטָּאתִי**. In the mouth of men of the world, Hos. xii. 9, the word means injustice in general (7). But since, according to Old Testament doctrine, there is no injustice which is not sin, **עָוֶן** is the perversion of the divine law, *avopia*; then especially the guilt of sin, firstly in Gen. xv. 16, and thus in many connections: **עָוֶן לְקַח**, to take away guilt; **עָוֶן לְשׁוֹב**, to impute guilt; **עָוֶן לְפָרֵן**, to forgive guilt. (c) In its intensification, sin becomes **פְּשָׁע**, an expression which probably means properly breach with God, and hence apostasy, rebellion against God; for the stem **פָּשַׁע** seems to be connected with **פָּרַק**, *rupit*. While **חַטָּאת** includes sins of negligence and weakness, design and set purpose are always implied in **פְּשָׁע**. Job xxxiv. 37 may be regarded as the chief passage (8). Still it often stands side by side with **עָוֶן** and **חַטָּאת**, Ex. xxxiv. 7, Num. xiv. 18. (d) If the evil has become an habitual feature of the disposition and of the actions, it is **רָשָׁע**. The **רָשָׁע** is the opposite of **צַדִּיק**. Still this expression, like **צַדִּיק**, can be used in reference to a single case. The main notion in **רָשָׁע** appears to be stormy excitement (connected by its root with **רָגַז**, etc., although the term is often explained otherwise); comp. passages like Job iii. 17, Isa. lvii. 20, etc. (e) Evil, as in itself void and worthless, is called **רָעָה** (also **רָעָה**, etc.).

(1) The passage Gen. iii. 1 must necessarily be thus explained: "Hath God said ye shall not eat of all the trees of the garden?" that is, of no tree whatever. **לֹא** is separated from **בָּל**, and belongs to the verb. Comp. *οὐ πᾶς* in the New Testament.

(2) Compare, *e.g.*, Maimonides, *More Nebuch.* iii. 8.—That Gen. vi. 3, which has also been appealed to, proves nothing for this is shown in § 77.

(3) In reference to the relation of the doctrine of sin in the Old Testament on the one side, and among the Indo-Germanic peoples on the other side, Grau has rightly found a cardinal point here. He says (*Semites and Indo-Germanians*, p. 94): "Sin is not merely a transgression of the bounds given in the nature and constitution of man; this is the purely earthly, philosophical notion reached by the Indo-German, whose thought does not go beyond the world. But sin is essentially a transgression of the law of God, an injury to the absolutely Holy Ego. From the former standpoint, when the limits which were passed are set up again, and the harm which was the consequence of the transgression is blotted out, the sin itself appears to be done away with. If, on the other hand, sin is a deed against God, it is not something simply finite, something which can be done away with again by the doer, but it is infinite guilt, because the injured person has an infinite value."

(4) The Greek gods have reason to be envious, because they do not stand in the relation of absolute superiority to men. The Hellenic doctrine of the origin of sin is expressed in the myth of Prometheus. There, indeed, the envy of the gods is an important element. In Mekone, men and gods gathered together in order to limit their rights on both sides. On this occasion Prometheus was able to entrap Zeus. It is a struggle between the gods and men, which is something entirely different from the struggle known in the Old Testament. Compare the above-cited treatise of Gustav Baur, p. 347.

(5) On the connection of death and sin, see § 77.

(6) Ps. lxxxii. 7 does not speak in favour of the second explanation of **פְּאָרָם** in Hos. vi. 7, because there the contrast is different. The third explanation would be admissible only if **הַפְּמָה** referred to men of higher station—to priests and prophets; but it refers to Judah and Israel. Lastly, if according to the fourth explanation **פְּאָרָם** stood for **בְּבִרְיַת אָדָם**, the order of the words would be different.

(7) Hos. xii. 9: **לֹא יִמְצְאוּלִי עֵץ אֲשֶׁר-חַטָּא**, "They find none iniquity in me that were sin."

(8) Job xxxiv. 37: **בִּי יִסִּף עַל-חַטָּאתָו פִּשְׁעֵע**, "That he adds to his sin rebellion."

2. THE STATE OF SIN.

§ 75. *Sin as an Inclination. Transmission of Sin.*

In consequence of the Fall, sin appears as a state in mankind—that is, as an inclination which rules man, and as a common sinful life which is transmitted partly in humanity in general, and partly in an especial degree in separate races, and so subjects these to the curse of guilt and judgment.

1. After once appearing by the free act of man, sin does not remain in this isolation. The second sin, that of self-excuse and palliation of the offence, follows immediately on the first, the sin of disobedience, Gen. iii. 10. This is the רִמְיָה (deceit), Ps. xxxii. 2, which, when sin has once entered, prevents the realization of earnest opposition thereto. As sin thus joins to sin, it becomes a *habitus*, and in this way a definite feature of the heart, or, as it is termed, a יֵצֶר לֵב, figment or imagination of the heart, an inclination, which gives a perverted tendency to man's will. Thus it is said before the flood, Gen. vi. 5: "Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only evil continually" (כָּל-יֵצֶר מַחְשַׁבַּת לְבוֹ רָק רַע בְּלִי-חַיִּים); and after it again, viii. 21: "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth" (יֵצֶר לֵב הָאָדָם רַע מִנַּעֲרֵי). That this יֵצֶר is not to be understood simply as a physical disposition, as is taught by the rabbinical theology (1), is shown by the more exact expression in vi. 5: יֵצֶר מַחְשַׁבַּת לְבוֹ (comp. 1 Chron. xxviii. 9). Because this sinful inclination—this is the meaning of the variously explained passage Gen. viii. 21—cleaves to man from his youth, the human race would lie under a continual sentence of destruction if God gave severe justice its course. The ground for sparing him is, according to the context of that passage, that man still seeks communion with God, as is shown by sacrifice.—The natural striving of man against God's law—the stiff-neckedness and hardness of heart so often spoken of in the Pentateuch—is based on this sinful inclination. Therefore, when Israel promises to keep the divine law, the divine voice complains, Deut. v. 26 (29): "They have spoken right, but oh that they had a heart to fear me and keep all my commands."

2. That this sinful inclination is hereditary is indirectly contained in the passages cited, although it is not expressly said. It comes into notice along with this, that Mosaism, although it derives the propagation of man's race from God's blessing, still regards all events and conditions which refer to birth and generation as requiring a purifying expiation; compare the law, Lev. xii. and xv., in which the thought lies that all these conditions are connected with the disturbance of sin. Hence Ps. li. 7 just expresses the idea of the law: "Behold, I was born in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." Even if this passage spoke only of a יָצָא and נִשְׁמָה of the parents, according to the explanation which is now more common, it would still follow, from the fact that the very origin of man is connected with sin, that even the newly born child is not free from sin; as Job xiv. 4 expresses it, "How can a clean thing come from an unclean? not one,"—a thought which is certainly connected with the passage in the Psalms. But there is nothing to prevent יָצָא and נִשְׁמָה in the passages in the Psalms being referred, as is done by Hitzig, to the child itself as soon as conceived and born; according to which, the passage says directly that evil is ingrown in man from the first moment of his origin (2).—This transmission of sin takes place with special intensity in certain races, especially those that have fallen under the divine curse. This is implied in the history of the Cainites, Gen. iv.; of Ham, and especially Canaan, from ix. 25 onwards; of Moab and Ammon, from xix. 36 onwards, etc.; but it is especially contained in the repeated declaration that God visits the sins of the fathers on the third and fourth generation. For this point the main passages are—Ex. xx. 5, xxxiv. 7; Num. xiv. 18; Deut. v. 9. This passage does not mean to say (as it has often been misrepresented) that God punishes the sins of the fathers on guiltless descendants, as conversely He brings the blessing of pious fathers on the latest generations, even though they walk in the path of sin. This is not contained in Ex. xx. 5 f. (3). Even if (with the Vulgate,—“in . . . generationem eorum, qui oderunt me,”—Knobel, and others) we refer the יִשְׁמְךָ simply to אֲבֹתֶיךָ, and understand it as a repetition of the genitive,—“visiting the iniquity of the fathers—of the fathers who hate me,”—it is not said that the sons are innocent, but nothing is said about their character at all. But לְ does not resume the genitive again after יָצָא, for then it would stand after אֲבֹתֶיךָ. From

its position and parallelism with אָבֹתָם, ver. 6, אֲבוֹתָם must rather be referred to fathers and sons together. The presupposition certainly is, that as a rule a moral condition of life is introduced by the father of the race, which continues to act as a power in the family (4). Now, if the descendants continue in the sin of their ancestors, and fulfil its measure (comp. Gen. xv. 16), then, even if the divine forbearance should wait till the third and fourth generation, they meet the judgment incurred by the common sins of the race; their sins and those of their fathers are punished at the same time upon them. For this idea compare the particularly instructive passage Lev. xxvi. 39: "They pine away in the lands of your foes for their iniquity; and also for the iniquity of their fathers, which is amongst them, do they pine away." The possibility of breaking the curse lying on a race, as in the case of Levi (comp. § 29, with note 2), or at least of some freeing themselves from it, is not here denied (compare the case of the Korahites). According to this, Ex. xx. 5 f. is not contradictory to Deut. xxiv. 16 (5); a passage which, moreover, mainly refers to the administration of penal justice by man (comp. 2 Kings xiv. 6). But if the prophets Jeremiah, xxxi. 29 f., and Ezekiel, chap. xviii. and xxxiii. 17 f., use the doctrine of Deuteronomy in reference also to the divine justice, they do not in so doing enter into polemic against the proposition in Ex. xx. 5—which, indeed, is placed by Jeremiah himself, chap. xxxii. 18, beside the other, ver. 19 (comp. Lam. v. 7 with iii. 39 ff., where again both propositions are found); but the prophets combated the perverse application which the self-righteous people of their time made of that ancient word to palliate their guilt (6). The passages on both sides proceed from different historical points. If we proceed from the consideration of individuals, each one suffers for his own sin; but if we consider the species, the sin of each individual is the stepping forward and continuance of the sin of common life, which went out from the sin of the father of the race.

(1) Compare Vitringa, *Observationes Sacrae*, iii. 8, p. 618.

(2) The Talmud, indeed, speaks of children born in holiness, but not the Old Testament. The divine equipment of some men in the womb (Jer. i. 5, etc.) does not exclude the general sinfulness of man. [Article, "Pädagogik des A. T."]

(3) Ex. xx. 5: "Thou shalt not worship them (the idols), for I,

Jehovah, thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children to the third and fourth generation, 'לְשֹׁנָה.'"

(4) Compare Hävernicks, *Theol. des A. T.*, 2d ed., edited by Schultz, p. 113: "It is to be regarded as an exception when a godless father has a virtuous son. That ethical states follow a rule is presupposed in the law; this is viewed by it, so to speak, as the normal course of things with regard to wickedness."

(5) Deut. xxiv. 16: "The sons shall not be slain for their fathers' sake; each one shall die for his own sin."

(6) The Jews, in Jer. xxxi. 29, interpreted: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge."

§ 76.

Antagonism of the Good and the Evil in Man. Degrees of Sin. Possibility of a Relative Righteousness.

Along with all this, the power of sin is represented as a power which may and is to be fought against by the freedom of man. And thus on the deportment of man depend the various degrees of sin, which at its height becomes callousness; whilst, on the other hand, by submission to the word and will of the revealing God, a godly life in the midst of the world's life of sin is laid down as possible, and thus a distinction is constituted between the righteous and unrighteous.

According to the Old Testament, the condition of man in consequence of the Fall is not that of an absolute subjection to sin which destroys the power of resistance, but it is an antagonism which has entered in between man's disposition to good and the power of sin. The feeling of a contradiction now dwelling in man shows itself, Gen. iii. 7, in the appearance of shame, but iv. 6 f. is in this connection the main passage. It is to be explained thus: Jehovah said to Cain, "Why art thou wroth, and why has thy countenance fallen? Is it not so, if thou doest well, thy countenance is lifted up, but if thou doest not well, sin is before the door, as a liar in wait (1); his desire" (sin's) "is towards thee; but thou shouldst rule over him." Here is expressed the duty and possibility of resisting the sinful inclination. The whole law rests on this presupposition (compare especially the section Deut. xxx. 11-20), though, at the same time (as we shall see later), it is distinctly stated that the overcoming of the power of sin in

man is not attained. But according as men seek or do not seek to rule over sin, there arises a difference of relation to God and a difference in the degree of sinfulness. This difference of degree is not in any way to be traced to the difference of the inner and outer, as if the decisive point were the outward relation of man to the law; for, in Ex. xx. 17, a wicked desire is forbidden no less than wicked deeds, and the law does not seek mere outward conformity to the divine will. Though the ordinances of justice and ritual must, in the nature of things, look primarily at the outward condition of offences, still, in reference to individual sinful actions, they distinguish between sins committed through error and negligence (בְּשִׁגָּגָה, Lev. iv. 2, 22, etc.; compare Num. xxxv. 22 ff.) and those committed with wicked intention (בְּיָד רָמָה, Num. xv. 30, etc.). But what the spirit of the Old Testament is in reference to the moral estimate of the whole man, is shown in the history in many examples. Moses—although even on him, the faithful servant of God, sin was heavily punished—did not sin as did Pharaoh, in whom God's judgments produce an appearance of repentance only till the moment when he gets relief from punishment. David, to the depth of whose fall corresponds a repentance just as deep, sinned differently from Saul, who is sorry for his sin because it brings him misfortune. In short, the measure for the divine estimate of man lies in the uprightness and purity of the attitude of the heart towards God (יָחַד לַבָּר). The Old Testament calls the highest degree of sin obduracy, or hardening of the heart (הִקָּה לֵב, Ex. iv. 21; אָמַץ, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 13; בָּבַד, הִקָּבַד, 1 Sam. vi. 6; הִקָּשָׁה, Ps. xciv. 8, Prov. xxviii. 14, for which we find also, to close up the heart, Isa. xlv. 18, to make fat, הִשְׁמִין, vi. 10; comp. Ps. cxix. 70, to make the heart like a diamond, Zech. vii. 12). This is the condition in which a man, by continually cherishing sin, has lost the ability to withstand it; and it is added, that God can glorify Himself on such a one only by punishment. For it is God's ordinance, that as the power to do good grows by its practice, so also sin is punished by continued sinning; compare Ps. lxxxi. 12 f. (2). The hardening is at once a divine act and the proper act of the subject, so that the two expressions interchange; compare on the one side Ex. vii. 3 (וַיִּתְּקֵן יְהוָה), iv. 21. x. 20 (וַיִּתְּקֵן יְהוָה), and on the other side, viii. 15–28 (32) (וַיִּכְבְּדוּ בָרָעָה אֶת־לִבּוֹ), ix. 34, xiii. 15 (comp. 1 Sam. vi. 6, Prov. xxviii. 14: בִּקְשָׁה לִבּוֹ יִפּוֹד בָּרָעָה, etc.).

In the first connection, hardening is the effect of the divine wrath. In this way the difficult and often misinterpreted passage, Isa. lxiv. 4 (5), is to be explained. It is not, "Thou wast wroth because we sinned," but, "Thou wast wroth and then we sinned; in those, *i.e.* in the ways of God, (we sinned) from time immemorial, and shall we be saved?" The passage refers to lxiii. 17, "Why dost Thou permit us to err from Thy ways, and hardenest our hearts not to fear Thee?" (3). But we must here note as essential that the Old Testament (like the New) always speaks of hardening only in connection with a divine testimony in revelation,—in reference to a divine revelation offered to the sinner, but rejected by him. This is applicable to Pharaoh, who sees the miracles of Moses, which forced even the Egyptian Magi to feel, Ex. viii. 15, "that is God's finger;" "but," it is continued, "Pharaoh's heart was hardened (וַיִּכְזֹּב לִב־פַּרְעֹה)." The same thing is applicable to Israel in view of the divine leading in the wilderness; and according to this also, that which is said of the Canaanite tribes (Josh. xi. 20) is to be explained: "For it was of Jehovah to harden their heart to strive with Israel, that He might destroy them and they might find no grace." The Canaanite tribes merited penal judgment on account of their idolatrous abominations; and now that this judgment was executed upon them in the form of extermination, it was effected by themselves in virtue of a divine ordinance, through their hardening themselves to do battle with Israel, for whom God manifestly fought. In such passages the point is not (as understood by Calvin and the Calvinists) a dark and hidden decree of reprobation, but a divine decree of judgment, well-grounded and perfectly manifest (4).—The path taken by obduracy is described in Isa. vi. 10, incapability to hear the divine word and see God's ways (הִטְשָׁנוּ לֵב . . . וְאָזְנוֹי הִכְבֵּד וְעֵינֵי הִטְשָׁע); and this connects itself with dulness of heart, and again reacts on the heart, so that the insusceptibility of the heart becomes incurable.

Now, on the other side, in the midst of the common life of sin, a righteousness (צִדְקָה) is won by ready resignation to the divine will, and by the loyalty with which a man accepts the witness of God, given to him in accordance with the then stage of revelation; and thus the difference between the relatively righteous and unrighteous goes through all the different periods of revelation. Enoch walked with

God, Gen. v. 22; Noah is looked upon as righteous in the general corruption, vii. 1; Abraham believed the promise, and it was counted to him for righteousness, xv. 6 (5). But the Old Testament knows nothing of absolutely righteous persons (in the canonical books): "There is no one who hath not sinned," 1 Kings viii. 46; "Before Thee no living man is righteous," Ps. cxliii. 2; compare Isa. xliii. 27, Prov. xx. 9, Eccles. vii. 20 (6). The Mosaic law proves this by excepting none from the need of atonement (7).

(1) מִצַּחַח, in Gen. iv. 7, is not masculine, but צַחֵץ stands as a substantive.

(2) Ps. lxxxi. 12 f.: "My people did not hearken to my voice, and Israel would not conform to my will. So I gave them up (וְאֶשְׁלַח־הֶם) to their hardness of heart, that they might walk in their own counsels."

(3) Isa. lxiv. 4; מִצַּחֵץ at the beginning of the verse still depends on צַחֵץ, lxiii. 19.—Ewald gives the meaning of אֶת־הַצַּחֵץ וְהַצַּחֵץ most correctly, referring back to lxiii. 17: "The longer God's wrath, *i.e.* misfortune, lasts, the more rankly does sin grow and spread." Delitzsch explains: "and we stood as sinners."—צַחֵץ does not mean, as Ewald says, "upon them (the Israelites) continually," but צַחֵץ refers, as Maurer and Stier have correctly seen, to the ways of God before named.—וְהַצַּחֵץ is best understood as a question.

(4) Gustav Baur, in the essay cited at § 72, note 3, p. 349, remarks, in reference to this Old Testament doctrine of hardening of the heart, "that if in the Old Testament the divine sway appears in the hardening of the heart in a way which seems to limit free human power, this was because the notion which the Israelites had of God and the creation, from which human freedom necessarily follows, was not yet worked out in its whole consequences with perfect clearness, nor brought into unison with the experiences of the human life." This is decidedly wrong. The remark would refer equally to the New Testament, which contains the very same doctrine. Human freedom has limits in reference to sin; the New Testament, too, knows of a bondage to sin, and we cannot here speak of a narrowness of the Old Testament standpoint.

(5) Compare hereafter the doctrine of the righteousness of the law and of faith.

(6) Isa. xliii. 27: "Thy first father has sinned, and thy intercessors were faithless to me."—Prov. xx. 9: "Who can say, I have kept my

heart clean, I am clean from my sin?"—Eccles. vii. 20: "There is none righteous on earth, who doeth good and sinneth not."

(7) Only Manasseh's apocryphal prayer says in the notorious passage, ver. 8: "Because Thou art a God of the righteous, Thou hast not appointed repentance to the righteous Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who did not sin against Thee." The passage is in direct opposition to Isa. xliii. 27, and it was on its account that this prayer was not canonized even by the Romish Church.

III. ON DEATH AND THE STATE AFTER DEATH (1).

§ 77.

The Connection between Sin and Death.

Death is the consequence of sin. The proof for this lies already in the fact that, as has been shown in § 72, *posse non mori* was attached to the life in Paradise. But the connection between sin and death is positively expressed in Gen. ii. 17: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt die." The difficulty arising from these words because death did not really follow immediately on the Fall is not (as some wish) to be set aside by saying that יום denotes a larger space of time; the eating and dying are, on the contrary, placed in immediate connection by the ימים, etc. (for this expression compare the quite similar passage 1 Kings ii. 37). Neither is it to be set aside by supposing (like Böttcher, Knobel, and others) that the threat in Gen. ii. 17 was not meant by the narrator to be serious (2); for, without regard to the fact that the Old Testament never makes God play with His words, death does indeed appear, iii. 19 (3), as the end of the punishment. For the words עַד־שִׁבְיָה, etc., must not be understood (4) of the term up to which the punishment which hung over man should continue,—for in this case the following reason would be most superfluous,—but the words tell in what way the punishment runs its course, and in what it is to be executed. The issue of the punishment is at once placed foremost in the threat, ii. 17, as is generally the case in prophetic proclamations. Indeed, man entered on the path of death immediately on the execution of sin (5).—The punishment of death is attached to disobedience, not to the effect of the fruit of the tree, as many expositors conclude from the contrast in iii. 22. The tree does not bear the name of the tree of

death in contrast to the tree of life, but it is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The use of the fruit has death as its consequence merely because moral self-decision was attained by it. The inner connection of sin and death is clear from vi. 3, though this passage primarily treats only of the shortening of the length of life through sin. This difficult passage is thus to be explained: (Jehovah speaks) "My spirit shall not always strive with man; in his erring he is flesh; his days shall be a hundred and twenty years" (6). It is not necessary to assume that עֲוֹן stands here in the ethical sense of the New Testament σάπξ (7). The word is rather to be taken in its common Old Testament meaning; compare Isa. xl. 6, Ps. lxxviii. 39, etc.: "in his erring he is flesh,"—mortal, perishable. According to this passage, the divine spirit of life which supports man is impaired by sin, and thus man's vital strength is ruined; while, as Isaiah (lxiii. 10) expresses himself, the Spirit of God is grieved by sin; it is also repressed as the physical principle of life, and thus man is subject to mortality. The passages Num. xvii. 29, xxvii. 3, which are also brought to bear on the proposition that death is the reward of sin, admit of a different interpretation. Still in the first passage,—“If these (Korah and his company) die like all men, וַיִּפָּקֶדְתָּ כָּל־הָאָדָם יִפָּקֶד עֲלֵיהֶם,”—the last words are certainly not to be explained, with Keil, “and the (protective) care extended to all men is exerted for them;” and scarcely either with Böttcher, “and a punishment of all the world”—that is, a usual punishment of death is decreed against them, such as commonly falls on criminals.—The sense probably is, if they die in the common way; and thus the common lot of death is called a penal visitation, which comes on all men (8). In reference to the second passage (where Zelophehad's daughters are introduced speaking), the sense may be: “Our father was not among the company of Korah, so as to die because of his sin;” if so, הָאָדָם refers to the sin of that conspiracy, and the passage is not relevant here. But even if we render “he was not in that company, but he died in his sin,” it is very questionable whether הָאָדָם should here be referred to the common sinfulness of man, and not to the general sin of the nation, which brought about the death of that whole generation in the wilderness. Lastly, we have to notice the passage from the Mosaic Psalm, xc. 7–10: “For we are consumed in Thine anger, and by Thy wrath are we troubled.

Thou settest our iniquities before Thee, our secret faults in the light of Thy countenance; for all our days pass away in Thine anger," etc. This passage does not primarily speak of death in general, but only of early death,—the brevity and transientness of life as the punishment of sin. But still this passage does show how the Old Testament connected death with sin; and this serves, at the same time, to explain why the law, Num. xix. (compare also v. 2 f.) (9), demands a purifying propitiation for everything which comes into contact with a corpse, although, at the same time, burial is considered so high a duty of affection. Certainly in many passages mortality and frailty are predicated of human nature generally without being placed in connection with sin,—as when man (Gen. xviii. 27) is called dust and ashes; when, in Ps. lxxxix. 48 f., it is said: "Remember, Lord, how short my life is; to what nothingness Thou hast created all sons of men;" compare further ciii. 14 ff., and other passages. But this does not mean that death originally belonged to man's nature, but such words are uttered simply from the experience of the present frailty of man; which experience, indeed, is so predominant in the Old Testament view of man, that the meaning to be sick or diseased attaches to the verbal stem נָסָה , which properly means to be man.

(1) Compare my *Commentationes* and my article "Unsterblichkeit. Lehre des A. T. von derselben," in Herzog's *Realencyklop.* xxi. p. 409 ff.—There is no topic of Old Testament theology on which the literature is so rich as on the one in question. Various views existed on the subject, even in the older Judaism—see Himpel, *die Unsterblichkeitslehre des A. T.*, 1857 (Ehinger Progr.), p. 2 f.; over it the Church Fathers disputed with the heretics—see my *Commentationes*, p. 1 ff. The discussion was renewed by the Socinians and Deists—see the same, p. 4 f., and Himpel, *l.c.* p. 6 ff., where reference is also made to the various views of more modern theologians. The literature of the subject up to the year 1844 is noted in Böttcher's learned work, *de Inferis*, etc. [above art.].—Besides the writings of Böttcher and Himpel, we here mention Mau, *vom Tode, dem Solde der Sünden, und der Auferstehung Christi*, 1841; H. A. Hahn, *de spe immortalitatis sub V. T. gradatim exulta*, 1846; Fr. Beck, "zur Würdigung der alttest. Vorstellungen von der Unsterblichkeit," in Baur's and Zeller's *theol. Jahrbüchern*, 1851, p. 469 ff.; H. Schultz, *V. T. de hominis immortalitate sent.*, 1860, with which are to be compared the relevant

sections in the same author's work, *Die Voraussetzungen der christl. Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit*, 1861.—The more modern writings on biblical anthropology and eschatology enter, also, more or less on the Old Testament doctrine of the state after death; especially Delitzsch, *bibl. Psychologie*, 2d ed., where, p. xiii., a list of works on this topic is given.

(2) Knobel remarks on Gen. ii. 17: "Jehovah proclaims a worse consequence than He means to follow—as a father sometimes in giving commands threatens the children with more detrimental consequences than he apprehends."

(3) Gen. iii. 19: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou returnest to the earth, for out of it art thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."

(4) So Mau, *l.c.* p. 60.

(5) The passage Gen. ii. 17 was already well expounded by Augustine, *de pecc. mer.* i. 21: "Quamvis annos multos postea vixerint, illo tamen die mori cœperunt, quo mortis legem, qua in senium veterascerent acceperunt." On this passage compare also my *Commentationes*, p. 21, and Herm. Schultz, *Die Voraussetzungen*, etc., p. 121 ff.—It is indicated by the incident of clothes made from animals' skins, mentioned in Gen. iii. 21, that man at once was given to see, in the case of the beasts, what like death is.

(6) Gen. vi. 3.—In הָיָה בְּיָמָיו a change of numbers, as is often the case, takes place. The בְּיָמָיו cannot possibly be taken to mean, "because also" = בְּיָמָיו נִסְיָן. Apart from the fact that in the idiom of the Pentateuch וְ for וְיָמָיו is not found, a combination of particles of this sort would be entirely without example, besides which the "also" would be quite unnecessary. The word is rather to be understood as the infinitive of שָׁנָה, to wander, to go astray,—an infinitive in A, such as is found from some intransitive roots "עָע.

(7) Thus Keil: In his erring he has shown himself to be flesh—that is, as unable to let himself be governed by God's Spirit.

(8) Jul. Mueller, too, thus explains the passage (*Die christl. Lehre von der Sünde*, ii. 5th ed. p. 404).

(9) Compare the discussion of the acts of expiation in the ceremonial law.

§ 78.

The Doctrine of Mosaism on the Condition after Death.

Death takes place when the divine spirit of life which sustains man is withdrawn by God, Ps. civ. 29, by which means man expires

(this is meant by נָפֶשׁ, see Gen. vii. 21 with 22), upon which the body returns to the dust from whence it is taken; see also passages like Job xxxiv. 14 f., Eccles. xii. 7 compared with viii. 8. It might appear from these passages that the human being as a whole is annihilated in death, which has been given out as Old Testament doctrine by not a few (even by H. A. Hahn) (1). Indeed, from the standpoint of natural contemplation, as shown in Eccles. iii. 18–21, there exists no certainty whether man is different from the animals in death. But it is clear from the whole connection of Old Testament doctrine (2), that as the origin so also the last lot of man's soul is different from that of the soul of an animal (with which it seems to be identified in Ps. civ. 29), and that, when the sustaining spirit of life is withdrawn, the band by which the נָפֶשׁ is bound to the body is indeed loosed, but the נָפֶשׁ itself, and man, so far as his personality lies in the נָפֶשׁ, continues to exist; although, indeed, since all vital energies depend on the infusion of the רוּחַ, he exists only as a weak shadow, which wanders into the kingdom of the dead (שְׁאוֹל). Certainly the name of souls is never used in the Old Testament of the inhabitants of the kingdom of the dead; nor do we find the expression spirits, for Job iv. 15 is not a case in point (3). But that it is the נָפֶשׁ which wanders into the kingdom of the dead is clear from passages like Ps. xvi. 10, xxx. 4, lxxxvi. 13, lxxxix. 49, xciv. 17, Prov. xxiii. 14, and Ps. xlix. 20, if there (which is, indeed, disputed by some) רְבוּאָה is third person, and נָפֶשׁ is to be supplied as subject from the preceding verse (4). So it is also the נָפֶשׁ which in reanimation returns again to the body of the dead person, 1 Kings xvii. 21 f. (5). The narratives of resurrection from the dead (1 Kings xvii. 21 f.; 2 Kings iv. 34 f.) may be adduced as proving that a closer connection between the body just quitted and the soul still subsists immediately after death (apart from what has been remarked on the application of נָפֶשׁ to denote a corpse, § 70) (6). Perhaps, too, this idea may be found in the difficult passage Job xiv. 22, which certainly, according to the context, refers to the state of the dead, not of the dying, and then speaks of the dull pain experienced after separation by the soul and the body. Delitzsch, for example, has understood this to mean, "that the process of the corruption of the body casts painful reflections into the departed soul;" but the passage can be also understood (and perhaps more correctly) to speak

of the pain which the body and soul separately feel, as in Isa. lxvi. 24 sensation in corpses is presupposed. On the contrary, there is no trace in the Old Testament of the Egyptian notion that a continual connection subsists between the soul and body, in virtue of which the maintenance of the body secures the continuance of the soul, although Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 5, ascribes this Egyptian conception to the Jews; and there is just as little trace of the heathen idea that the soul of the departed one cannot find rest before the burial of its dead body. Isa. xiv. 15 ff. speaks expressly against the latter view (7).

The place into which man migrates, the *בֵּית מוֹעֵד לְכָל־חַי*, Job xxx. 23, is called Sheol (*שְׁאוֹל*, seldom written defectively). The word, which is to be regarded as feminine (8), may, with Winer (9), Hengstenberg, and others, be derived from *שָׁאָל*, *poscere*, so that the kingdom of the dead would be characterized as that which is insatiable in its demands. Passages like Prov. i. 12, xxvii. 20, xxx. 16, Isa. v. 14, Hab. ii. 5, in which the insatiable appetite of Sheol is spoken of, are favourable to this derivation; only it is improbable that the word, which without doubt is very old, should really have only the character of a poetical epithet. The word is traced by most modern writers to the stem *שָׁעַל*, to be hollow (as in German, *Höhle*, a cavern, is connected with *Hölle*, hell), a softening of the *y* into *s* being assumed; or they go back to the root *שָׁאָל*, *שָׁל* = *χάω*, *hio*, which lies at the basis of the stem *שָׁעַל*, and hence *χάσμα*, ravine, abyss, is regarded as the original meaning of the word (10).—The separate traits of the descriptions of the kingdom of the dead cannot be all taken very literally, owing to the poetical character of most of the passages; still the following essential features of the conception of Sheol come distinctly forward:—The kingdom of the dead (in contrast to the upper spheres of light and life, Prov. xv. 24, Ezek. xxvi. 20, etc.) is supposed to be in the depths; compare Num. xvi. 30, and expressions like *שְׁאוֹל תְּהִי־תַיִת*, Dent. xxxii. 22, Ps. lxxxvi. 13, the depths of the earth; Ps. lxiii. 10, comp. lxxxviii. 7, the land beneath; Ezek. xxvi. 20, xxxi. 14, xxxii. 18, deeper even than the waters and their inhabitants. It agrees with this, that it is a region of thickest darkness, where, as Job x. 22 says, the light is as midnight. The dead are there gathered in tribes; and hence the oft-recurring term in the Pentateuch, “to go (*בֵּא*) or be gathered (*נִאֲסַף*) to his fathers (*אֲלֵ־אֲבוֹתָיו*), or to his people (*אֲלֵ־עַמּוֹ*)” (Gen. xxv.

8 f., xxxv. 29, xlix. 33, Num. xx. 24 ff., etc.; compare, too, the picture of Sheol in Ezek. xxxii. 17-32). These terms cannot possibly be referred to the grave (11). The kingdom of the dead and the grave are, on the contrary, definitely distinguished. For example, when Jacob says, in Gen. xxxvii. 35, "In sorrow I shall go down יָצֵלָה to my son," he cannot think to be united with Joseph in the grave, since he believes that he was torn by beasts. It is true that traits taken from the grave are transferred to the kingdom of the dead, e.g. Isa. xiv. 11, where it is said to the conqueror who has sunk into the realm of the dead, "Corruption is spread under thee, and the worms cover thee;" indeed, in Ezek. xxxii. 22 ff., the expression *graves* is used of the place of the dead. But in both passages there can be no doubt of the distinction between the grave and Sheol, for in Isa. xiv. 18 ff. it is said, that whilst the king of Babylon descends to Sheol, his corpse was to be cast away unburied; and the two poetical pictures depict a common place of rest for the various nations of the earth and their rulers. The expression בֹּר, that is, pit, is used in several passages for the kingdom of the dead (12).

As follows from the foregoing, the condition in the realm of death is supposed to be the privation of all that belongs to life in the full sense; and so the realm of death is also called simply אַבְדִּיִן, that is, fall, destruction (Job xxvi. 6; Prov. xv. 11, xxvii. 20); also הֶרֶל, cessation (Isa. xxxviii. 11). Powerless, heavily brooding, and like sleeping ones, the dead rest in stillness (דִּיּוּקָה), Ps. xciv. 17, cxv. 17. Sheol is the land of forgetfulness, Ps. lxxxviii. 13 (אֶרֶץ נִשְׁכָּחָה, a term to be taken actively). "The living know that they shall die, but the dead know not anything, and have no more a reward, for the memory of them is forgotten. Their love, their hatred, their envy are long since perished, neither have they any more a portion for ever in anything that is done under the sun.—There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in Sheol, whither thou goest," Eccles. ix. 5, vi. 10. Here, therefore, no praise of God and no contemplation of divine things is possible, Ps. vi. 6, cxv. 17, lxxxviii. 12, etc. (13). With all, however, self-consciousness is not destroyed, but is capable of being aroused from its slumber; the identity of the personality continues (compare such passages as Isa. xiv. 10, Ezek. xxxii. 21, 1 Sam. xxviii. 15 ff.). It is probable that the designation of the dwellers

in the kingdom of the dead as רַפָּאִים refers to this,—a designation which occurs only in the writings which are later than the Pentateuch (Isa. xiv. 9, xxvi. 14; Job xxvi. 5; Ps. lxxxviii. 11; Prov. ii. 18, xxi. 16). The term is probably connected with רָפָה, languid (as נִכְאָים with נִכָּה), and means accordingly the languid, enervated (compare תִּלְיָה, Isa. xiv. 10; אֵיזֵאֵל, Ps. lxxxviii. 5). In the Pentateuch, on the contrary, רַפָּאִים has a quite different meaning, denoting in several passages a giant people of antiquity. Still, in this meaning the word can be traced to the same stem, if we suppose the primitive sense of רָפָה to be to stretch, which gives for the dead the meaning “stretched out” (*in languorem projecti*), and for the giants the meaning extended, in the sense of *proceri* (14).—It is not possible to ascend or return from the realm of the dead, Job vii. 9, xiv. 12. It is not considered how this is to be united with the resurrection of the dead, 1 Kings xvii. 21 f., 2 Kings iv. 34 f.; the question may be solved in the way given above. The Old Testament relates only one example of the appearing of a dead person—that is, Samuel’s, 1 Sam. xxviii. (15). The popular superstition about conjuring the dead, דָּרַשׁ אֶל־הַמֵּתוֹת, שָׂאֵל אוֹב, is strictly prohibited, Lev. xix. 31, xx. 6; Deut. xviii. 11. The term אוֹב properly denotes not the conjuror himself, but the spirit which is conjured by him, and is supposed to speak in him. This is shown by the expressions in Lev. xx. 27 (where the necromant is designated as אִישׁ אוֹ אִשָּׁה כִּי יִהְיֶה בָהֶם אוֹב), 1 Sam. xxviii. 7 (where the witch of Endor is called בַּעֲלַת אוֹב), and in ver. 8 of the same chapter (where necromancy is called divination through the Ob, קָסָם בְּאוֹב); compare, too, Isa. xxix. 4. The term אוֹב is hardly to be explained = *revenant*, returning (from a stem אוֹב; in Arabic, âba), but is probably the same word with the name אוֹב, which signifies a leather bottle (properly, something blown up). The translation of the LXX., who always render the word by ἐγγαστρομίμυθος, ventriloquist, also points to this view. Then, by means of a metonymy, the plural אוֹבוֹת, leather bottles, is used to indicate the necromancers themselves (1 Sam. xxviii. 3). The absurdity of necromancy is pointed out in Isa. viii. 19 (16); the people are rather directed to the law and to the word of revelation, ver. 20 compared with Deut. xviii. 15 (17).

(1) Compare, too, Ps. cxlvi. 4.—To this are to be added utterances such as Ps. xxxix. 14: “Look away from me, that I may

recover before I go hence and am no more ;” Job vii. 21 : “ Now will I lay myself in the dust ; Thou seekest me, and I am no more ;” Job xiv. 10 : “ A man dies, and where is he ?” [Above cited art.]

(2) In the conception of a realm of death which goes through the whole Old Testament, and which, as will be shown, is definitely distinguished from the grave, as well as in what is narrated of resurrections from the dead (1 Kings xvii. 21 ; 2 Kings iv. 34), and what is prophesied about the future rising of the dead, some continued existence of man after death is undoubtedly presupposed. The same book of Ecclesiastes which, xii. 7, teaches that the spirit returns to God who gave it, speaks, ix. 10, also of Sheol, “ to which thou goest.” That Job vii. 8, xiv. 10, speak only of man’s disappearance from the earthly scene, and do not mean that he has entirely ceased to be, is shown in both chapters by the reference to sojourn in the kingdom of the dead. For explanation of the term in Ps. xxxix. 14, compare Ps. xxxvii. 36. We may well say that man’s existence after death is treated in the Old Testament so much as a thing of course, that the reality of it is never the subject of doubt. It is not even true of the book of Job that “ a wavering between the traditional representations of a kingdom of the dead, and the consideration of the dead simply as beings which no more exist,” is found here (see F. Beck, *l.c.* p. 475). The doubts with which the Israelitish spirit wrestles refer only to the *how* of existence after death ; but just as this struggle becomes so hard because the mind cannot free itself of the notion of Sheol, so we are not entitled to see in the latter only something outwardly taken over from popular belief. [Above art.]

(3) On Job iv. 15, see note 15.—The book of Wisdom, iii. 1, is the first to speak of souls of the dead ; then the New Testament, Rev. vi. 9 ; also πνεύματα, 1 Pet. iii. 19, Heb. xii. 23.

(4) Ps. xvi. 10, “ Thou wilt not leave my soul in Sheol.”—In xciv. 17, he who has been saved from death by divine succour says, “ My soul had almost made its dwelling in silence.”—According to another view, תְּבוֹיָה, in Ps. xlix. 20, is taken as the second person, and then the enallage with אֶל־תְּבוֹיָהּ is to be explained, with Böttcher and Delitzsch, by supposing that the customary formula, בּוֹא אֶל־תְּבוֹיָהּ, was before the mind of the poet.

(5) On the other hand, indeed, the death of the soul is spoken of in Num. xxiii. 10, Job xxxvi. 14, which is to be explained by the well-known usage by which נַפְשׁ, etc., takes the place of the personal pronoun (comp. § 70). [Above art.]

(6) Thus Himpel, *l.c.* p. 32 ; comp. also Delitzsch, *bibl. Psychologie*, 1st ed. p. 385, 2d ed. p. 445.

(7) Tacitus writes, *l.c.*, of the Jews: "Corpora condere, quam cremare, e more Ægyptio; eademque cura et de infernis persuasio."—For the rest, compare my *Commentationes*, p. 28, and Himpel, *l.c.* p. 31.

(8) According to the analogy of other substantives which indicate spaces; see Ewald, *Ausführl. Lehrbuch*, 8th ed. § 174, b. *בֵּינָם* is not *generis communis*, as the lexicons state; the few passages in which it seems to appear as masculine have been cleared by Böttcher, *de Inferis*, § 139 f.

(9) Winer says in his *Lexicon*: "Orcus laud inepte dici videtur a poscere, quippe qui omnes sine discrimine homines insatiabili quadam cupiditate poscat."

(10) See Hupfeld in the *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, ii. (1839) p. 462, and in his *Commentary to the Psalms*, on Ps. vi. 6, note.

(11) Not only because the burial of the corpse is often especially mentioned along with it (comp. Gen. xxv. 9, xxxv. 29, l. 13, etc.), but chiefly because the said formula, and also the cognate one, "to go to one's fathers" (Deut. xxxi. 16; 1 Kings ii. 10, xvi. 28, etc.), are used in speaking of those who were not united with their fathers in the grave, as Abraham, Aaron, Moses, David, and others. See a complete presentment of the passages belonging to this subject by Böttcher, § 112 ff. [Above art.]

(12) Thus *בֵּית* appears in Isa. xiv. 14, Ezek. xxxii. 23, Ps. lxxxviii. 7; also the phrase *בֵּית יִרְיָ* (Ps. xxviii. 1, xxx. 4; Prov. i. 12; Isa. xxxviii. 18; Ezek. xxvi. 20), which in itself might refer to the grave, is probably as a rule to be referred to Sheol (see Böttcher, *l.c.* § 165). [Above art.]

(13) Though God's omnipotence reaches down to the world beneath, which is present to Him at all times unconcealed (Job xxvi. 6; Prov. xv. 11; Ps. cxxxix. 8), still every experience of communion with God is wanting to those resting there (Ps. lxxxviii. 6). [Above art.]

(14) See Ewald, *Geschichte Israels*, i. 3d ed. p. 327, etc.—On the contrary, there is no probability in Böttcher's view (*l.c.* § 193 ff.), that the word primarily designates the race of giants as "hurled down," and that then, these fallen giants being regarded as *pars potior* of the inhabitants of Sheol, the name was extended to these in general.

(15) We may look upon it as decided that the narrative in 1 Sam. xxviii. is intended to be so understood (as the LXX. have done on 1 Chron. x. 13 and Sir. xli. 20 (23)), and that it does not record a mere deception, as the older theologians interpreted it. (Besides the relevant literature cited in Keil's *Commentary*, the essay, "Die

Geschichte von der Zauberin zu Endor," in the *Zeitschr. für Protestantismus und Kirche*, 1851, xxii. p. 138 ff., deserves to be noticed.) On the contrary, it is not the manifestation of a dead person that is spoken of in Job iv. 12-15, but a divine revelation; in ver. 15, רִיחַ does not indicate a spirit, but the breathing by which the manifestation proclaimed itself. [Above art.]

(16) Isa. viii. 19: "Shall not a people seek unto its God?—the dead for the living?" Ewald's explanation of the latter clause is false—"instead of the living" (of the living God). It does not follow from Isa. viii. 19, as Diestel has said (in *Herzog's Realencyklop.* xvii. p. 482), that even the enlightened prophets believed in the possibility of inquiring at the dead, but rather the contrary. [Above art.]

(17) In this the Old and New Testaments agree. When our Lord says, in Luke xvi. 29, "They have Moses and the prophets, let them hear them," He speaks quite in the spirit of the Old Testament.

§ 79.

(Continuation.)

In no part of the Old Testament is a difference in the lot of those in the realm of death distinctly spoken of. Job iii. 17-19 describes how all are rather alike. Only in Isa. xiv. 15, Ezek. xxxii. 23, where the fallen conquerors are relegated to the uttermost depths (יִרְבֵּי-יָבוֹר), can we find an indication of different grades in the realm of the dead—perhaps in the sense in which Josephus (*Bell. Jud.* iii. 8. 5) places a ἄδης σκοτιώτερος in the view of suicides. Otherwise, only a division into peoples and races, and not a division of the just and unjust, is spoken of. "To-morrow," says Samuel to Saul, 1 Sam. xxviii. 19, "shalt thou and thy sons be with me." The inhabitants of the kingdom of the dead "have no more reward," Eccles. ix. 5 f. In itself, the condition in Sheol, which is in the main the most indefinite existence possible, is neither blessedness (although longed for as a rest by him who is weary of life, Job iii. 13-19) nor positive unblestness; for those who are swept away in the midst of the enjoyment of their vital energies the punishment lies just in being thus carried away, Num. xvi. 30 ff., Ps. lv. 16. The Mosaic order of retribution has its sphere entirely on this side of the grave (1). Of the traces of belief in a heavenly life beyond the grave which have been supposed to be found in the Pentateuch, the translation of

Enoch, Gen. v. 24, can alone come into consideration. But that is not a testimony to a higher existence of the soul after death; for the meaning of the passage is that Enoch never died—that is, his body and soul were never separated (2). In it, as in the history of Elijah's translation (2 Kings ii.), there lies rather the declaration, in fact, that even before the coming of death's vanquisher some specially favoured men were excepted from the curse of death and of the kingdom of death which hangs over man. These narratives, then, contain an indirect corroboration of the position that, according to the Old Testament, death is not absolutely connected with human nature. On the other hand, the passage on the death of Moses, Deut. xxxiv. 5 (comp. § 31 with Note 3), has no relation to this subject; and just as little is Num. xxiii. 10—"Let my soul die the death of the righteous"—a testimony to a belief on eternal life (for which the passage was formerly often taken). The meaning of these words is rather that Balaam wished he might be allowed to die after a life so richly blessed, as was the case with the righteous in Israel.

But it is clearly expressed in the Pentateuch that the relation of the righteous to God is not cancelled after death. The blood of the slain Abel calls to God, Gen. iv. 10. The relation entered on between God and the patriarchs continues; for, long after the patriarchs had fallen asleep, He calls Himself the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; Ex. iii. 6 compared with Gen. xxvi. 24, xxviii. 13. "But God is not a God of the dead, but of the living" (Matt. xxii. 32). To him who has an eternal value for God an eternal existence is made sure (3).

(1) Compare the delineation of the Mosaic doctrine of retribution, § 89 f.

(2) In speaking of Enoch, the word "dying" is not used, Gen. v. 24, but it is said that God took him away (נִקַּח) because he walked with Him.

(3) On the other presuppositions of the doctrine of the resurrection and of eternal life contained in Mosaism, see hereafter. The doctrine of the resurrection forms a doctrine of prophetic theology; and the foreboding wrestling of Israel's sages with the riddles about death and the realm of the dead is discussed in the third part of the *Old Testament Theology*.

THIRD DIVISION.

THE COVENANT OF GOD WITH ISRAEL AND THE THEOCRACY.

FIRST CHAPTER.

THE NATURE OF THE COVENANT.

§ 80.

Preliminary Remarks and General Survey.

THE form in which the covenant of God with Israel is closed, Ex. xix.—xxiv., is a treaty resting on the promises and engagements of the two parties in the bargain (see xix. 5, 8, xxiv. 3, 7; comp. afterwards Josh. xxiv. 15 ff.). But the relation of the parties is not purely mutual (1). In the first place, the theocratic covenant of law rests on the covenant of promise; in both, even in the covenant of the law, the initiative (the setting up of the covenant, הָקִים, Gen. ix. 9, xvii. 7, etc.) comes from God as an act of grace: "I am Jehovah, thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," Ex. xx. 2; "I have brought you to me," xix. 4, etc. So it is Jehovah who fixes the conditions of the covenant ("I am holy, be ye also holy," Lev. xi. 44 f.), and on whom depend the maintenance of the regulations of the treaty and the final realization of the aim of the covenant. Thus the covenant is especially διαθήκη, a divine institution (2), and only on this foundation is it συνθήκη, a treaty. How בְּרִית בְּרִית is used, even where God alone pledges Himself, is shown especially by Ex. xxxiv. 10. In the usage of the Pentateuch, the expression בְּרִית בְּרִית with עַם or אֵת is used throughout to signify the closing of God's covenant with Israel. On the contrary, in the later books a peculiar usage appears, and a distinction is made between בְּרִית בְּרִית, in connection with לְ, and in connection with עַם or אֵת (3). The first expresses that when a covenant is closed the covenant is laid by the one party

on the other; compare Isa. lv. 3, lxi. 8; Jer. xxxii. 40; Ezek. xxxiv. 25 (4). In the patriarchal covenant of promise, the first element, that of *διαθήκη*, institution, naturally appears more prominently. The closing of the covenant in Gen. xv. is a pure act of divine promise. In the vision, when deep sleep and great darkness had fallen on him, Abraham saw (ver. 12) a flame of fire pass between the parts of the divided animals. The meaning of the occurrence is not, as has been supposed from Jer. xxxiv. 18 f., that it shall be done to him who breaks the covenant as has been done to these divided animals (comp. Judg. xix. 29; 1 Sam. xi. 7), as similar customs occur in Greek and Roman antiquity at the making of covenants (Livy, i. 24; Plutarch, *Quest. Rom.* cap. iii.; Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 298 ff.) (5). This meaning of such covenant observances (especially as seen in Jer. xxxiv.) is to be looked upon as only secondary. The original meaning is, that the two halves denote the two contracting parties, and the flame passing through denotes their union by Jehovah, who alone is He who constitutes the covenant. On the contrary, the act in Ex. xxiv., in which the theocratic covenant is made, refers to both parties (6).

According to its nature, the covenant falls into the following factors:—

1. The divine act, from which the covenant proceeds, the divine choice, and the promises annexed to it.

2. Man's duty. He who lays down the obligation is again God, that to which man is bound is the revelation of the divine will in the law, especially the Decalogue, which is the obligatory document in the stricter sense; but the symbol of obligation is in particular the sign of circumcision, imposed on those who are subject to the covenant obligations.

3. By the way in which the people perform their duty the divine retribution is determined, which, however, is so carried out that at the end the divine purpose of election must come to be realized.

(1) As, for example, the matter has been quite wrongly taken up by Spencer, *de leg. Hebr. Rit.*, ed. Tubing., p. 234, and especially p. 236, etc. [Article, "Volk Gottes."]

(2) On the other hand, any relationship instituted by God between Himself and man (like the promise of grace given to David, Ps. lxxxix. 4), and indeed any regulation and limit laid by Him on the creature

(comp. passages like Jer. xxxiii. 20, Hos. ii. 20, Zech. xi. 10, etc.), in particular every theocratic regulation (as the institution of the Sabbath, Ex. xxxi. 16), may be characterized as בְּרִית. [Article, "Testament, Altes und Neues."]

(3) See, *e.g.*, Jer. xxxi. 31, 33. Compare Gesenius in the *The-saurus*, ii. p. 718.

(4) The Pentateuch uses בְּרִית בְּרִית with לְ only in speaking of covenants which Israel may make with Canaan and its idols.

(5) *Iliad*, iii. 298 ff.:

"All-glorious Jove, and ye, the powers of heaven,
Whoso shall violate this contract first,
So be the brains of them and of their sons
Poured out, as we this wine pour on the earth."

(*Cowper's translation.*)

(6) See the doctrine of sacrifice, § 121.

THE DIVINE ELECTION.

§ 81.

FIRST DOCTRINE.

Israel's Election as the Free Act of God's Love. בְּחֵר and יָרַע.

Israel's adoption to be the covenant people is a free act of God, that is, an act of the divine love, and necessary only in as far as God had bound Himself by His oath,—that is, as a proof of His truth and His faithfulness,—but is in no way dependent on man's desert.

These propositions are expressed in the whole historical guidance of the race of revelation from Abraham's calling onwards (1), but they are expressly impressed on the people at each opportunity. The God to whom the earth belongs wishes to have Israel for His own peculiar people and property, Ex. xix. 5. It is on the ground of the divine election of grace and the divine providence that the divine commands to the people arise, and therefore also the Decalogue, Ex. xx. 2, places at its forefront the fact of election (2). It is Deuteronomy in particular in which this point forms one of the fundamental thoughts. The following are the main passages:—vii. 7 f., "Jehovah has not set His love upon you and chosen you (בָּחַר) because ye are more than all nations, for ye are the least of all nations; but because Jehovah has loved you, and that He might keep the oath which He has sworn to your fathers." The divine love appears here as the first

point in the founding of the covenant relation with Israel. Compare further viii. 17: the people are not to say, "My might and the strength of my hand has procured me such power. Think on Jehovah thy God, that He has given thee strength to do valiantly, that He may keep His covenant;" also ix. 4-6: Israel shall not say in his heart that God has driven out the nations of Canaan for his righteousness' sake; but that happened partly because of the godlessness of the Canaanites, and partly to fulfil the promises given to the fathers; "for thou art a stiffnecked people." The divine promise is sealed by God's oath, which is given whenever the matter in question is an unchangeable decree, the performance of which was not to depend on eventualities (Heb. vi. 17) (3). Side by side with the term בָּחַר, in which the freedom of the divine purpose of grace stands out most strongly, the word יָדַע, to know; serves to characterize the divine decree of election; thus, first, Gen. xviii. 19, also Amos iii. 2, Hos. xiii. 5 (4). All cognition is an appropriation, by which the strangeness between the perceiving subject and the object is removed. Thus יָדַע has in various senses a more pregnant meaning than that of mere theoretical knowledge; it includes the heart's sympathy in taking in an object, and so means to take knowledge of anything with love, care, and the like—to care for one; compare Prov. xxvii. 23, where it stands parallel with נָשִׂית לֵב (to direct the heart, the attention, to anything), and thus forms the opposite of מָצָא, to reject (see *e.g.* Job ix. 21) (5). It stands thus for the divine care for the righteous, Ps. i. 6, xxxvii. 18, etc.; thus, Ex. xxxiii. 12, the words "I know thee by name" express the inward relation of personal appropriation in which Moses stands to Jehovah (corresponding to the words, "Thou hast found grace in mine eyes"). But as יָדַע is said of God not simply in reference to the relationship in which He already stands to man, but also in reference to His placing man in a relationship to Him, in virtue of which He acknowledges him as His property, יָדַע is just another name for the divine election (synonymous with בָּחַר) (6).

(1) Compare the historical section, § 22 ff.

(2) Ex. xx. 2: "I, Jehovah, am thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage."

(3) In Heb. vi. 17 the divine oath proclaims τὸ ἀμετάθετον τῆς βουλῆς αὐτοῦ. Compare Achelis' excellent paper, "Ueber den Schwur

Gottes bei sich selbst," in the *theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1867, 3 Num. The reader may see from this paper how well worth while it is to follow up such special points in Holy Scripture. There are promises and threats which are uttered conditionally, for which the main passage is Jer. xviii. 7-10. The promise which is uttered conditionally to Abraham in Gen. xii. is made unconditional by the oath of God in chap. xxii., when Abraham is proved.

(4) On Gen. xviii. 19, comp. § 23 with note 6.—Am. iii. 2, "You only have I known of all the families of the earth."—This pregnant notion of the divine knowledge appears in just as many forms in the New Testament *γινώσκειν*.

(5) The sexual meaning of ירע (compare § 69, note 4) is also to be derived from this.

(6) Older theologians expressed this briefly thus—ירע does not mean merely *nosse cum affectu*, but also *cum effectu*.

§ 82.

Points in which the Election of the People is expressed.

The divine election of the people is expressed in the following points:—Jehovah is the Father of His people; Israel His first-born son; His property out of all the nations of the earth; the holy, priestly people. All these notions are correlated.

1. In the Old Testament, the meaning of the divine fatherhood is not physical, as if God were called the Father of men because He gives them natural life and preserves them in it, but it is ethical. It denotes the relation of love and moral communion in which Jehovah has placed Israel to Himself. This relation is quite unique; Jehovah is only the Father of the chosen people, not the Father of the other nations. When Jehovah, in Ex. iv. 22 f., bids Moses say to Pharaoh: "Israel is my son, even my first-born; and I say unto thee, Let my son go that he may serve me," we may in the expression "first-born son" find an indication that at some time other nations also are to enter into this sonship; but the term is primarily to be explained by the contrast with Pharaoh's first-born—Israel is the same to Jehovah as Pharaoh's first-born son is to him. So also is Deut. xxxii. 6, the second main passage in the Pentateuch, to be explained: "Do ye thus requite Jehovah, O foolish people and unwise? is not He thy Father that hath created thee? hath He not made thee and established thee?"

קָנָה, עָשָׂה, בָּנָה do not indicate the creation of the people in the sense that all men are made by God, but the expressions include all those divine acts by which Israel is established and prepared in his quality as the people of God's possession and covenant, and so simply denote his election. Again, in Isa. xliii. 1, 15, xlv. 11, Jehovah is in this sense called Israel's creator and shaper; and when it is said, in lxiv. 7, "But now, O Jehovah, Thou art our Father; we are the clay, and Thou the potter; and we all are the work of Thy hand," the meaning is, that Israel owes to the gracious power of his God all that he is and has; comp. Ps. c. 3.—The fatherhood of Jehovah was exerted in redemption from Egypt, Hos. xi. 1; then in the divine guidance through the wilderness, which was fatherly discipline, Deut. viii. 5, compare Hos. xi. 3; and so also all future redemption and providential guidance of Israel is a manifestation of the divine fatherhood (see Isa. lxiii. 16) (1); and, as Jer. xxxi. 9 proclaims, when the ten rejected tribes return with weeping, and Jehovah leads them, He says, "For I am a father to Israel" (compare ver. 20, "Is Ephraim my dear son?"). Also in Mal. ii. 10, compared with i. 6, the idea of the divine fatherhood is not to be otherwise understood. The prophet denounces the marriages entered into with heathen women after rejection of their Israelitish spouses. When it is here said, "Have we not all one father? has not one God created us? why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother, by profaning the covenant of our fathers?" the heathen cannot possibly be taken along with Israel, and the בְּרִיתֵנוּ is to be understood quite in the sense of the above-cited passages, and taken of the creation and preparation of Israel to be the covenant people.—As Israel as a whole is called God's son, so the name is also transferred to the members of the people, Deut. xiv. 1: "Ye are sons of Jehovah, your God." Still this name is not to be understood as if every citizen of the theocracy could apply to himself individually the God-sonship. It is only the body of the covenant people that have the name "sons of God," and the Israelite has a share in the God-sonship only in virtue of his being incorporated into this body. The individual personal sonship of God did not appear till later in the theocratic kingdom (2).

2. The same relation between Israel and God which rests on the divine election is expressed in the titles—people of God's possession,

a holy people. Thus, on the words of Deut. xiv. just quoted,—“Ye are sons of Jehovah your God,”—ver. 2 follows: “Thou art an holy people to Jehovah thy God, and Jehovah hath chosen thee to be a peculiar people (עַם סְגֻלָּה = people of property) unto Himself, above all the nations that are on the earth;” comp. vii. 6, and for the סְגֻלָּה, Ex. xix. 5, Ps. cxxxv. 4 (3). In Deut. iv. 20, עַם נִחְלָה stands for it, which specially teaches that God won this people to Himself by an especial act (comp. § 83). In the notion holy people (as is mentioned in § 44) there is contained negatively separation from all other people, and positively admission or introduction into communion with God; as is said in Ex. xix. 4, “I have brought you to myself” (comp. Lev. xx. 24, 26). In virtue of this attitude to God Israel is a priestly people—xix. 6, “Ye shall be unto me מְמִלְכָּת פְּהֵיִים.” The expression מְמִלְכָּת may denote kingship (this is the more common meaning) and kingdom. If we take the first meaning, and translate “Ye shall be a priestly kingship to me” (the translation of the LXX. takes it thus—*βασιλείον ιεράτευμα*), both the priestly and the kingly dignity of the people are expressed, and both predicated of God’s people on the ground of this passage (1 Pet. ii. 9; Rev. i. 6, v. 10). Thus Keil, against which we need only remark that the Old Testament assigns a position of dominion in the world to the people of God as such, but still never uses the term “royal people.” On the second and more general explanation, Israel is a priestly kingdom—that is, a community of priests under King Jehovah. Vocation to immediate service of the true God is the main notion in the priestly character of the covenant people (4). Israel’s mediatorial position towards the other nations is also, perhaps, indicated; but this point is not followed out further in the Pentateuch, which only emphasizes the separation of Israel from all the other nations of the earth. This separation is, in the first instance, effected in an external manner. Israel is “the people that dwells alone” (לְבַדָּהּ יֹשֵׁב), and is not reckoned among the nations of the world (Num. xxiii. 9; Deut. xxxiii. 28). Further, all unclean persons, eunuchs, those begotten in incest (the latter is probably the meaning of the difficult word מְמִיזִי, Deut. xxiii. 2 f.), are excluded from the congregation; and those who have defiled themselves for a time must also withdraw themselves during this period from intercourse with the people. God sanctifies the people to Himself positively by dwelling

among them, by His revelation in word and deed, by every institution on which is imprinted the unique relation between Israel and God, and finally, by placing His Spirit in the congregation. Still, in all this it is only an objective relationship which is established: every Israelite has a share in this sanctity in virtue of natural birth, and in virtue of the outward connection of his life with the holy congregation,—not in virtue of the new birth of the Spirit and the communion of a spiritual life with God; for Jehovah's Spirit (which is placed in the congregation, comp. Isa. lxiii. 11) rests only on the leading organs of the theocracy, not on all its members, Num. xi. 16 ff. (comp. § 65). Nevertheless, a distinction, within the theocratic union between Israel according to the flesh and the covenant people who are really seeking after the true God (Ps. xxiv. 6), the race of God's children (lxxiii. 15), occurs in the Old Testament, as will be shown more particularly afterwards. Therefore the names "holy people," "priestly kingdom," "God's peculiar people," are names which are full of the future, prophetic types of that which shall come, since the ransomed Israel of the future time shall be called "sons of the living God" in the full significance of the word (בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים), Hos. ii. 1 (5).

3. The other nations, as גוֹיִם (which is a purely quantitative idea), form a great profane mass. The uniqueness of the covenant people in contrast to the heathen corresponds to Jehovah's uniqueness as the true God in contrast to the heathen gods as nothings (§ 43 f.). Thus the contrast between Israel and the גוֹיִם has a signification quite different from that betwixt Greeks and barbarians (with which it has sometimes been compared) (6), and makes Israel the object of the fiercest hatred to other nations. Still, even on the standpoint of Mosaism, the theocratic particularism is not absolutely exclusive; for, without regard to the fact that the people, even at the time when they came up out of Egypt, incorporated non-Israelitish elements (Ex. xii. 38, comp. with Lev. xxiv. 10, Num. xi. 4), every heathen, dwelling as a stranger in the land, could by circumcision become incorporated among the covenant people, and thus receive a share of all the gracious benefits bestowed on Israel, Ex. xii. 48; that is, with exception of the Canaanitish tribes, which fell under the curse. To these the Moabites and Ammonites (Deut. xxiii. 4 ff.) were added as excluded persons. But with regard to the Edomites and Egyptians, it was ordained

that their naturalization, in virtue of which they should come to be regarded as equal to the Israelites born in the land, was not to take place till the third generation, ver. 8 f.; that is, that the great-grandchildren of Edomites and Egyptians who had lived in Israel as strangers were the first who might be incorporated with God's people through circumcision. In particular, heathen slaves were to be incorporated into the family by circumcision, Ex. xii. 44. From Gen. xvii. 12, compared with ver. 23, where Abraham was compelled to circumcise all his servants (7), those born in the house and those bought from strangers, it follows that this passage is not to be understood as allowing slaves to be circumcised, but as actually commanding this.

(1) Hos. xi. 1: "When Israel was a child, then I loved him and called my son out of Egypt."—Deut. viii. 5: "As a man chasteneth his son, so Jehovah thy God chasteneth thee."—Isa. lxiii. 16: "Doubtless Thou art our Father, Abraham is ignorant of us, and Israel acknowledges us not: Thou, Jehovah, art our Father; our Redeemer is Thy name from everlasting."

(2) See the *Prophetic Theology*.

(3) In the $\eta\lambda\theta\iota$ lies the idea of precious property, which one has selected for himself, which one has set aside; LXX.: $\lambda\alpha\delta\varsigma \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$.

(4) Compare the idea of priesthood, *infra*.

(5) In this signification, the New Testament adopts the names as denominations of Christian communities.

(6) It was also acknowledged by the heathen that the people of Israel $\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\upsilon\eta\theta\omega\upsilon\eta\kappa\omicron\iota\nu\omega\nu\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota \tau\eta\varsigma \pi\rho\omicron\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron \epsilon\theta\nu\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\pi\iota\mu\iota\chi\iota\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$. Diodor. Sic. *Eklog.* xxxiv.

(7) Compare, *infra*, § 111, on the position of slaves not Israelites.

SECOND DOCTRINE.

MAN'S OBLIGATION.

§ 83.

The Notion of the Servant of Jehovah.

The covenant of promise with Abraham was concluded upon condition that he and his descendants are bound to a godly life and to

obedience to God's will, Gen. xvii. 1 f., xviii. 19 (1). The same condition is prescribed to the people, Ex. xix. 5, and accepted by the people, ver. 8; comp. xxiv. 3 (2). Laid under this obligation to their God, the Israelites are the servants of Jehovah, whom He has purchased by redeeming them from Egyptian bondage, and who, therefore, are exempt from all earthly lordship by being bound to the service of God, Lev. xxv. 42, 55, xxvi. 13 (3). Thus now "servants of God" is a designation of Israel, especially in the liturgical psalms (Ps. cxiii. 1, etc.). But the idea of the servant of God is complete only when he who is bound to God also binds himself to God's will, following God perfectly,—the praise which is repeatedly given to Caleb and Joshua as servants of God, Num. xiv. 24 (וַיִּמְלֹא אֶתְהָרִי), xxxii. 12 (מִלֵּא אֶתְהָרִי), Josh. xiv. 8 f. Thus to the servant of God belongs the subjective quality of righteousness (צִדְקָה). This notion expresses in general the conformity of man to God's will,—the normality of his relation to God. Inasmuch as God's will is elective and promissory, צִדְקָה consists in full surrender to elective grace and the divine word of promise, thus it is the righteousness of faith; and in this sense it is said of Abraham, Gen. xv. 6, "He believed in Jehovah, and it was imputed to him as righteousness" (4). So far as the will of God is a commanding will, צִדְקָה lies in the fulfilling of God's commands, Deut. vi. 25, וַיִּצְדַּק תַּחֲתָיָה לָנוּ בִּיְיָשׁוּבָר לְעֵשׂוֹת אֶת־כָּל־הַמִּצְוֹת הַזֹּאת לִפְנֵי יְהוָה. Also, so far as the name "servant of God" specially designates the chosen instruments of the divine kingdom, an essential element in the notion is the subjective factor of faithfulness in the house of God; and in this signification, "servant of the Lord" is the highest name of honour in the old covenant,—applied to Abraham, Gen. xxvi. 24; Moses, Num. xii. 7, Josh. i. 2–7. עֲבָד יְהוָה is different from מַשְׁתָּרֵת, which denotes a servant without regard to his subjective quality; on which account the word שָׁרָת is most frequently used of priestly and Levitic service (5).

(1) Gen. xvii. 1: "Walk before me and be perfect (תִּמְצִיחַ), so will I set my covenant between me and thee."—xviii. 19; comp. § 23, with note 6.

(2) Ex. xix. 5: "If ye hearken to my voice and keep my covenant," etc.—xxiv. 3: "All the words which Jehovah hath spoken will we do."

(3) Not under a human yoke—upright, קִיָּמָה—are the Israelites led by God, according to Lev. xxvi. 13; comp. § 109.

(4) More on the righteousness of faith in the Old Testament in the part on prophecy.

(5) The passage 1 Kings x. 5, about Solomon's court, is, I think, misunderstood by Roediger in *Gesenius' Thesaurus*, when he there takes מְשָׁרְתִים to be higher officials. מְשָׁרְתִים in this passage rather signifies the attendants, and עֲבָדִים the higher officials.

§ 84.

The Law.

The compass of the people's obligations, the revelation of God's commanding will, is the law (תּוֹרָה), whose principle is expressed in the words, "Be ye holy, for I am holy," Lev. xi. 44 f., xix. 2; or more completely, xx. 7, "Sanctify yourselves and be holy, for I am Jehovah your God."—The impress of consecration to the holy God is to be stamped on the life of the Israelites in ordinances extending to all important relations and conditions; in every important affair of life the Israelite has to accomplish something demanded by God. Therefore in all things he must realize to himself the voice of the commanding God. Hence, according to the ordinances in Num. xv. 38 f., Deut. xxii. 12, he wears tassels on the skirts of his garments, to remind him every moment to think on all Jehovah's commands, and not be guided by the imaginations of his heart and the lust of his eyes. Here there is no primary distinction between inner and outer life; the holy calling of the people must be realized in both. The traditional division of the law of Moses into moral, ceremonial, and juristic laws may serve to facilitate a general view of theocratic ordinances; but it is incorrect if it seeks to express a distinction within the law, and to claim various dignity for the various parts. For in the law, the most inward commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," stands beside "Thou shalt not sow thy field with two kinds of seed," Lev. xix. 18, 19. That Israel must be holy, like God, is the ground alike of the command not to be defiled by eating the flesh of certain animals, xi. 44 ff., and of the command to honour father and mother, xix. 2 f. In fact, the ceremonial law gives special expression to the

antagonism of the true religion to heathen nature-worship, by showing that while in the latter the Deity is drawn down into nature, in the former what is natural must be consecrated and hallowed to God. The whole law, in all its parts, has the same form of absolute, unconditional command. Before the closing of the covenant, the people had still the choice whether they would bind themselves by the law that was to be given; but after they pledge themselves, all choice is taken away. Because of this strictly objective character of the law, human judgment cannot be allowed to make distinctions between the individual precepts. Whether such distinctions are to be made can be decided only by the Lawgiver, who certainly appoints a punishment more severe than for other transgressions to follow on certain moral abominations, and on the transgression of such precepts as stand in immediate relation to the covenant idea (*e.g.* circumcision, the Sabbath, etc.). But, so far as man is concerned, the most inconsiderable precept falls to be viewed under the aspect of the obedience demanded for the whole law: "Cursed is he that fulfils not the words of this law to do them," Deut. xxvii. 26.

In these points lies what has been called the unfreedom and externality of the Mosaic law, a thing which has often been wrongly understood. For it is not correct to say that the law of Moses demands only external conformity to the law,—only the *opus operatum*, not a frame of mind; that, in short, it demands *legality*, not *morality*. On the contrary, the law insists on the disposition of the heart when it says, Ex. xx. 17, "Thou shalt not covet" (1); when it binds men to love God with the whole heart and soul, to be placable towards fellow-men, and the like, Deut. vi. 5, Lev. xix. 17 f.; when it demands the circumcision of the heart—that is, the purification and devotion of it to God, Deut. x. 16 (*cf.* also Josh. xxii. 5, xxiii. 11). But beyond doubt, as has been remarked, it demands the external along with the internal in direct co-ordination. But precisely in this lies an important pedagogic element. When all relations of life, even those merely external, are placed under a direct precept of God—when man in all he does or may not do has to give obedience to God, he is thus led to recognise that the standard for what he ought to be is not to be sought in rules of life arbitrarily formed and shaped by conventionality, but in an absolutely perfect will, which conditions and determines all things.

The revealed law, it is true, here undertakes the functions of conscience; and it is characteristic of the law of Moses, that for the present there is no reference made to the *νόμος γραπτός ἐν καρδίαις*. But this bondage of the servant of God to an absolute will standing above nature, this obligation to give up self-will and natural desires, and all that may seem good or pleasant to the individual judgment (2), is, as Rosenkranz (3) rightly says, an apparent regress in comparison with the free play of fancy in heathenism, but a real and decided step in advance towards the liberation of man. By bringing man to a consciousness of the essential nature of a higher divine righteousness, the law awoke the conscience from its slumber, taught the knowledge of evil as sin, and so awoke the need of reconciliation with God.

For a right estimate of the law of Moses, the following points have further to be noticed:—1. The whole ritual ordinances to which the Israelite is subject, from his circumcision onwards, have a symbolic character, mirroring the inner process of sanctification, and so forming the instrument of a tuition advancing from the outer to the inner (4). The prophets and the Psalms, when they speak of the true sacrifice, the true lustration which man needs, are simply expressing the thoughts that underlie the symbolical ritual. 2. The precepts of the law are carried out in detail mainly only on the negative side; what the Israelite may not do is told with great particularity. The scholastic subtlety of the rabbins, indeed, has made out the considerable number of 248 positive commands, against 365 prohibitions (5). But it is easy to see that with regard to positive duties the law often states only general rules; that, in fact, many positive points that lie in its intention are not expressly enjoined, but that only the facts, patterns, and institutions are set forth which serve to guide a free development of positive virtues (6). It was later Jewish tradition which first extended its leading-strings over the space which the law had left open to the free development of piety. 3. Finally,—and this is the main point,—we have to look at the motives for fulfilling the law which the latter sets forth. All legal righteousness presupposes faith in the divine election, gracious guidance, and promise. The legislation opens with the words, Ex. xix. 4, “Ye have seen how I bare you on eagles’ wings, and brought you to myself;” and so the Decalogue puts at the head of its demands (xx. 2) what God has done for Israel. But it is

Deuteronomy in particular, as we have already pointed out (§ 31, 81), which, by showing how God has loved His people, seeks to excite responsive love as the deepest motive for obedience, and especially to make the law acceptable to the people by awaking a sense of its excellency and fitness, Deut. iv. 6-8, xxx. 11-14 (7); though, at the same time, Deuteronomy leaves no doubt that the people neither can nor shall attain such willingness to obey (cf. v. 26, xxxi. 16 ff., xxxii.).

(1) More about Ex. xx. 17 in § 86.

(2) The Israelite, as Herder laments, "can never raise himself to an ideal that demands freer activity and truer delight in life."

(3) *Die Pädagogik als System*, 1848, p. 190.

(4) See also below, § 95 on the priesthood, § 112 and note 2 on the Mosaic cultus, § 135 on the Nazirate, etc.

(5) The rabbins associate these numbers with the 365 days of the year and the 248 members of the human body, according to the physiology of the time; cf. Maimonides' scheme of the precepts, in Jost's *History of Judaism*, 1857, 1 Abth. p. 451 ff.

(6) See, e.g., below on prayer, the Sabbath, etc. In this point especially the wise pedagogic system of the Mosaic law is seen.

(7) Ex. xx. 2, see § 81 and note 2.—Deut. iv. 6-8: "The law shall be your wisdom and understanding in the sight of the nations, which, hearing all these statutes, shall say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people; what great nation is there that has statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law, which I set before you this day?" (cf. Ps. cxlvii. 19 f.).—This boast has been justified by the spiritual dominion which the institutions of Israel have exercised over the nations.—Deut. xxx. 11-14: "This commandment which I command thee this day is not incomprehensible to thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, so that thou must say, Who shall go up for us to heaven and bring it unto us, that we may hear it and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea . . . but the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart to do it."

§ 85.

The Decalogue. Its Division.

The obligatory document of the covenant in the narrower sense is the book of the covenant (comp. Ex. xxiv. 7), which embraces Ex. xx. 1-17, and chap. xxi.-xxiii.; and in this, again, especially the

Decalogue (1), which stands at the beginning, xx. 2-17,—*the ten words* (as it is often called; see Ex. xxxiv. 28, Deut. iv. 13, x. 4) (2), which are specifically distinguished as spoken by Jehovah Himself, while the rest of the legislation is proclaimed by Moses (3). The Decalogue, therefore, is called κ. ἐξ. *the covenant* which God enjoined on Israel. It was written on two tables of stone, which, according to Ex. xxxii. 15, were inscribed on both sides. Since in these ten words God's witness to His people was concentrated, they were to be preserved in the centre of the sanctuary, in the ark (4).

The number ten characterizes the commandments as a self-contained whole, and similar series of ten are found more than once in the middle books of the Pentateuch (5).—The Decalogue is again given in Deut. v. 6 ff. The two editions are distinguished—not to speak of less important deviations (6)—*firstly*, by different reasons being annexed to the Sabbath-law (in Exodus the Sabbath of creation is adduced, while in Deuteronomy, agreeably to the predominantly subjective justification of the law in this book, Egyptian slavery and the deliverance therefrom are alluded to); *secondly*, by the addition in Deuteronomy, in the command against coveting, putting the wife instead of the house first and apart, and emphasizing this separation by a change of verb (7).

On the division of the Decalogue there have long been various views. The main schemes of division are three, distinguished by the way in which they take the first and last commandment. The first scheme became prevalent in the Roman Catholic Church by the influence of Augustine, and has been retained by the Lutherans, and in recent times has been defended by Otto, Kurtz, and others. It includes in the first commandment Ex. xx. 2-6, Deut. v. 6-10 (8). The ninth commandment is generally taken according to the text of Exodus, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house;" the tenth, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife," etc. Augustine himself, on the contrary, in the main passage in which he treats the subject (*Quæst. in Exod.* 71), holds to the text of Deuteronomy for the ninth and tenth commandments. He is followed among the moderns by Sonntag and Kurtz, who emend the text of Exodus by the aid of Deuteronomy (9). Thus the ninth commandment would refer to the coveting of the conjugal rights; the tenth, to the coveting of the substance of a

neighbour.—The second and third schemes of division agree in making the whole prohibition of concupiscence a single commandment (the tenth), but they differ as to the first and second commandment. According to the view now common among the Jews,—which, however, seems to rest on no very ancient tradition (10),—the first of the ten words comprises only Ex. xx. 2: “I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out,” etc. This, they say, implies the obligation to believe on God as the most perfect being. The second commandment (vers. 3–6) then includes the obligation to believe on God’s unity and the prohibition of false worship (11). The third scheme, accepted by the Greek and Reformed Churches, and by the Socinians, makes ver. 3 the first commandment: “Thou shalt have no other gods beside me;” and ver. 4 the second: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image,” etc. (12).

The third of these divisions has in its favour the oldest historical testimonies, being found not only in Josephus (*Ant.* iii. 5. 5), but also in Philo (*Quis rerum div. heres sit*, § 35, ed. Mang. i. p. 496, and *De Decal.* § 12, Mang. ii. p. 188). Of the Fathers, Origen takes the same view (13). He seems to have been also acquainted with the view which includes vers. 2–6 in the first commandment, but not with the division of the prohibition of concupiscence into two (14); and, in fact, Augustine’s view, that vers. 2–6 are a single commandment, must also rest on ancient Jewish tradition. The Hebrew accentuation of the Decalogue is twofold,—the one accentuation giving the usual Masoretic division into verses, the other regulating the intonation in the synagogue. The latter takes vers. 2–6 together, showing that these five verses were viewed as closely connected. It is even more important that the Romish and Lutheran division is that on which the division of the Decalogue into *parshijoth* is based (15); the *sethuma*, that divides the prohibition of concupiscence, is indeed lacking in the oldest manuscripts (16), but it is certain that vers. 2–6 formed only one *parasha*. The small *parshijoth* are so old that this cannot be due to Christian influence.—Since, then, the union of vers. 3 and 4 as a single precept must be very old, our decision between the various divisions must proceed on internal grounds.—Now, first, it is decidedly against the Jewish view that ver. 2 is the first of the ten words, that the second verse has not in the least the form of a precept (17). The

view which has sometimes been taken (see note 11), that this verse forms the first of the ten words as the covenant promise, is also improbable; and if vers. 2 and 3 are separated, we lose the close connection which obviously subsists between them. The words in ver. 2 have a double import. They apply, in the first place, to the whole Decalogue (comp. the opening formula, Lev. xviii. 2, xix. 2); thus they contain the general presupposition of the law, the ground of obligation for Israel, which lies in the nature of his God and the fact of his redemption. But, in the second place, they are the special ground of the command not to worship other gods besides Jehovah (18).—Further, as to vers. 3–6, the circumstance that these verses are at least closely connected seems favourable to the view that they form a single commandment, according to the Augustinian view, viz. the prohibition of idolatry; for the threat and promise of ver. 5 f. clearly refer to ver. 3 as well as to ver. 4. But if vers. 3–6 are taken as one commandment, the number ten can be reached only by dividing the prohibition of concupiscence in ver. 17 into two commandments; and since this division cannot be sufficiently justified, it remains more probable that vers. 3–6 are to be divided (19). They contain, in fact, two essentially distinct points. The command in ver. 3 to worship Jehovah alone does not preclude His being worshipped by an image. This is forbidden in ver. 4, which does not simply (20) add to ver. 3 the statement that the other gods, whose worship is forbidden in ver. 3, include idols, but especially forbids an image to be made (21) (comp. Deut. iv. 15).—Only on the Deuteronomic edition can a division of the prohibition of concupiscence be justified (for in it we might distinguish *cupiditas impuræ voluptatis* from *cupiditas inordinati lucrī*). But the text of Exodus is certainly to be taken as primary, and it offers no essential difference in the concupiscence forbidden in the two sentences (22). Accordingly, Mark x. 19, Rom. xiii. 9 treat this as a single command; and even Luther in his catechism found it advisable to unite the ninth and tenth commandments in his explanation of them (23).

(1) In the Greek Fathers generally, ἡ δεκάλογος sc. βιβλος, or νομοθεσία (see *Suiceri Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus*, s.v.). In Latin idiom, on the contrary, *decalogus* sc. *liber*.

(2) LXX. : οἱ δέκα λόγοι, τὰ δέκα ῥήματα.

(3) On this see already Philo, *De Decal.* § 5, ed. Mang. ii. p. 183.

(4) Of the very copious literature on the Decalogue the following notice may suffice :—Recent discussion on the Decalogue, and especially its division, was opened by several essays in Ullmann's and Umbreit's *Studien* by Sonntag, 1836, No. 1, 1837, No. 2; by Züllig, *ibid.* No. 1. Then appeared a lengthy and still valuable essay by Geffcken, *Ueber die verschiedene Eintheilung des Dekalogus und den Einfluss derselben auf den Kultus*, Hamb. 1838. Compare also my article "Dekalog" in Herzog's *R.E.* iii. p. 319 ff. But since that time a more extensive literature has arisen, from which I mention : Kurtz's full discussion of the matter in his *Geschichte des A. Bundes*, ii. 2d ed. p. 288 ff., and his essay "Ueber den Dekalog," in Kliefoth's and Meyer's *kirchl. Zeitschrift*, 1858; the paper by E. W. Otto, *Dekalogische Untersuchungen*, 1857; an essay by Fr. W. Schultz in Breslau, "Das Recht der lutherischen Dekalog-Eintheilung," in Rudelbach's and Guerike's *Zeitschr.* 1858, No. 1; an anonymous essay, "Die Eintheilung des Dekalogs," in the *Erlanger Zeitschr. für Protest. und Kirche*, 1858. Finally, special notice is due to the treatment of the point by Zezschwitz, *Katechetik*, ii. 1, p. 233 ff.

(5) The number ten had probably also the practical aim of making the commandments easy to remember by counting them on the fingers.—Bertheau's view of seven groups, each of 7×10 commandments (in his very interesting and instructive book, *The Seven Groups of Mosaic Laws*, 1840), must be considerably limited; comp. Ewald, *Gesch. Israels*, ii. 1st ed. p. 154 ff., 3d ed. p. 232 ff.

(6) See the exactest statement of these, and of the deviations of the Samaritan text, in *V. T.* ed. Kennicott, i. p. 149.

(7) The LXX. put the wife first in Exodus also, but the other old authorities, including the Samaritan Pent., favour the Masoretic text.—Ex. xx. 17: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife."—Deut. v. 18: "Thou shalt not desire (תִּחְמֹד) thy neighbour's wife, and thou shalt not covet (תִּתְאַוָּה) thy neighbour's house, field," etc.

(8) Thus, on this division, the complete first commandment runs in full thus: "I Jehovah am thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers

upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments."

(9) He is not consistent in other passages. See Geffcken, *l.c.* p. 174.

(10) Josephus and Philo do not know it. It probably arose from antagonism to the Christians.

(11) This division recurs with a peculiar modification in the above-mentioned essay in the *Erlanger Zeitschrift*. This essay makes ver. 2 the first of the ten words, but not as a precept, but as the covenant promise and display of God's being in its fulness of blessing and clearness.

(12) No notice is due to the view of Hesychius of Jerusalem, on which see Geffcken, *l.c.* p. 10.

(13) Origen, *Homil. in Exod.* viii., ed. Lommatzsch, p. 91. Hence this division is also called Origenistic.

(14) Against the union of the two first commandments, as he counts them, he objects, "Quodsi ita putetur, non complebitur decem numerus mandatorum. Et ubi jam erit decalogi veritas?"—The uncertainty then prevalent as to the division of the first and second commandments is testified by the remarkable treatment of the Decalogue by Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* vi. 16,—a passage certainly not to be adduced in favour of the Romish or Lutheran division, but not sufficiently freed from obscurity by the remarks of Geffcken, p. 159 ff.—The first trace of the view of the first two commandments accepted in the Jewish division is found in the Babylonian Gemara Tract, *Makkoth*, 24 a; perhaps Origen, too, *l.c.* p. 90, refers to the same. [Above-cited article.]

(15) Vers. 2–6 form a small *parasha*, then ver. 7 follows as an open *parasha*; then, again, vers. 8–11 are taken together as one, then ver. 12, and so forth.

(16) In general, the position of the *parasha* at that point remained matter of discussion among the Jews; cf. Kennicott, *Diss. Generalis in V. T.*, ed. Bruns, p. 59. [Above art.]

(17) It is already remarked by Origen, *l.c.*, "Hic sermo nondum sermo mandati est, sed quis sit, qui mandat, ostendit."

(18) Because the redemption of Israel from Egypt reveals Jehovah's faithfulness and His might over heathen gods, Israel is to have no other gods beside Him. [Above art.]

(19) The special ground of the command in ver. 3 lies, as we have seen, in ver. 2, which must not be viewed merely as introductory to the whole Decalogue.

(20) As Lutherans have often said; cf. *e.g.* Gerhard, *Loci*, ed. Cotta, v. p. 244: "Primum præceptum deos alienos in genere prohibet, præceptum de sculptilibus certam speciem deorum alienorum exprimit."

(21) When, for example, King Jeroboam I. set up his separatist worship, he did not break the first commandment, ver. 3, for the bovine image which he erected at Bethel was meant to represent Jehovah; but he broke the second commandment, ver. 4, by worshipping Jehovah by an image.

(22) The meaning of the text in Exodus is, that the house precedes, as the general word including all possessions, and then the individual good things in the house follow. Deuteronomy, on the contrary, has an eye to the peculiar and honourable position of the wife.

(23) The assertion of Lutheran theologians, that the ninth commandment forbids *concupiscentia actualis*, the tenth *concupisc. originalis* (cf. Gerhard, *l.c.* p. 247), is a mere invention of polemical zeal.—The differences affecting the other commandments are only as regards order. The order of the Masoretic text is supported by the LXX. of Deut. v.; Josephus, *l.c.*; Matt. xix. 18. But the LXX. of Ex. xx. diverges, placing adultery first, then theft, then murder (οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ κλέψεις, οὐ φονεύσεις;—the variation is probably due to a natural association of ideas, which suggests that the other commandment regarding family life should follow the fifth commandment about the relation of parents and children, and that the prohibition of theft should go along with that of murder). Different, again, is the order in Philo (in both passages cited), and in New Testament in Rom. xiii. 9, cf. Jas. ii. 11, Luke xviii. 20, Mark x. 19 (where the reading varies), and finally in Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vi. 16,—all these placing adultery first, and then murder and theft. (On the order in Matt. xix. 19 and parallels, where honour to parents stands after the others, see Stier, *ad loc.*, and Lechler, "Das A. T. in den Reden Jesu," *Stud. und Krit.* 1854, p. 801.) These differences prove nothing more than that there was considerable freedom used in Jewish and Christian antiquity in reckoning up the commandments. [Above art.]

§ 86.

Continuation.—The System of the Decalogue.

The Old Testament does not expressly tell us on what system the Decalogue was divided,—especially how the commandments were dis-

posed on the two tables. If the third of the divisions given above is correct (that of Philo, Origen, the Reformed, and the Greeks), it is most likely that five precepts are to be assigned to each table, as is already assumed by Philo (*l.c.*) and Josephus (*Ant.* iii. 6. *fin.*) (1). The first five precepts are distinguished from those that follow by the reasons annexed to each, and by the appearance of the words "Jehovah thy God" once in each commandment, including the first if vers. 2 and 3 are taken together. The chief objection to this division is, that it gives so much more writing on the first table than on the second—eleven verses on the one, only two on the other; but this point is not decisive. The material difference between the two tables is, as it has been briefly put, that the first contains *præcepta pietatis*, the second *præcepta probitatis*. That the command to honour parents is put among the precepts of piety is justified by the way in which elsewhere the law connects earthly relations of piety with piety towards God; *e.g.*, Lev. xix. 32, Ex. xxii. 27 (2).—Another view, which is that of Calvin (*Inst.* ii. 8. 12), followed by the Reformed Church, puts four precepts on the first table, and six, commencing with the command to honour parents, upon the second (3). The followers of the Augustinian division generally agree in beginning the second table with the last-mentioned precept, assigning three commandments to the first table and seven to the second (4). On this view the number three has been associated with the Trinity, while it is urged that seven is also a holy number (5).

The systematic plan of the Decalogue, on the Philonic division which we assume, is in detail the following:—In the first table, the first commandment expresses the principle of monotheism, and forbids a plurality of gods. The forbidding the use of any image in the worship of the Deity abolishes the deification of nature in any sense (6). The third commandment ("Thou shalt not take up, apply, the name of Jehovah thy God to vanity") demands reverence to God in life and walk as a whole, by forbidding the most obvious and frequent breach of this duty, the profanation of God's name by false swearing (*cf.* Lev. xix. 12) or other misuse. The fourth commandment lays the basis of the ordinances of worship, by appointing the Sabbath. The fifth, the command to honour parents, lays the foundation of all social ordinances of life. The second table, which defines duties to neigh-

hours, is obviously based on the common Old Testament trilogy of hand, month, heart (cf. *e.g.* Ps. xxiv. 4) (7). It first attacks sins in deed,—injuries to the life, wedded state, or property of a neighbour; and then sins in word,—injury of a neighbour's good name by any false testimony or lie. Finally, when the last commandment forbids even to covet what belongs to another, it is made clear that the obedience demanded is that of the heart, and it is indicated that the fulfilling of the law is not complete except in the sanctification of the inner man. No doubt this exposition of the tenth commandment is disputed. Even Luther gives its sense as being, "that no man shall think or propose to take to himself what is another man's, even with a fair pretext, if his neighbour is injured thereby" (*Larger Cat.* ed. Rechenb. p. 476). In accordance with this, Geffcken and others, also Schultz (8), have understood the precept of deceitful undertakings. The Decalogue, on this view, literally interpreted, looks only at the outer fulfilling of the law; to refer the outer demand to its inner principle is left to the *plerosis* of the law (cf. Matt. v. 21 ff.). It may be admitted that the commandment does not mean to draw a sharp line between inner lust and the appearing of that lust in attempts to gratify it (in Mark x. 19 the commandment is represented by *μη ἀποστερήσης*). But if Schultz appeals to Ex. xxxiv. 24, Mic. ii. 2, to show that *הַיָּד* refers to attempts to touch another's property, it is undeniable, on the other hand, that the commandment is alluded to in Prov. vi. 25, *אַל-תִּתְּחַמֵּד בְּלִבְּךָ*; and the *תַּתְּחַמֵּד*, which Deuteronomy puts in the second clause, can, in accordance with the constant use of the word (9), refer to nothing but the desire that leads to action (LXX. gives throughout *οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις*, which in Rom. vii. 7 is likewise applied to concupiscence). A comment on the commandment is to be found in Job xxxi. 1-4 (10).

The self-contained and rounded character of the Decalogue, as we have it, is a decisive proof that it retains its original form. Recent attempts to mutilate and simplify it rest on the most arbitrary hypotheses (11).

(1) Cf. also Irenæus, ii. 42 (xxiv. 4).

(2) If in Lev. xix. 32, "Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and honour the face of the old man, and fear thy God;" Ex. xxii. 27, "Thou shalt not curse God, nor revile the ruler of thy people,"—

reverence to princes and to the aged is deduced from the honour due to God (this is the sense of the connection, cf. Prov. xxiv. 21), the same thing must be still more true of honour to parents, since all authority of superiors is originally derived from that of the father. Similarly, in Lev. xix. 3, the command to honour parents stands with religious precepts in the narrower sense,—the Sabbath law and prohibition of false worship. The reason for this is rightly given by Luther (in his *Exposition of the Decal.*, 1518): “Ideo istud præceptum post præcepta primæ tabulæ ponitur, quia est de illis, qui sunt vicarii Dei. Quare sicut Deus colendus est honore, ita et vicarius ejus.” [Art. “Pädagogik des A. T.”] At the same time, this precept makes a fitting transition to the second table (so, on the whole, the thing is viewed by Philo, *l.c.*).

(3) Because to join the precept about parents to the first table is to confound *religionis et caritatis distinctionem*, and at the same time with reference to Matt. xix. 19. The passage Eph. vi. 2 has often been regarded as an evidence that the second table began with the command to honour parents; and so, *e.g.*, the Ambrosiaster on the passage (Appendix to *Ambrosii Opera*, Paris ed. p. 248 f.), assuming the Philonic division, gives four commandments to the first table, and six to the second. The common answer to this view is, that this commandment, even if it stood on the first table, may be called the first in the Decalogue to which a promise is annexed,—the promise in ver. 6 being not only united to a threat, but possessing a more general character, and not standing in any specific relation to the preceding precept. But the true exegesis of Eph. vi. 2 is: which is a prime, *i.e.* a main precept in promise, *i.e.* because united with a promise (see Winer, *ad l.*). On this view, the passage has nothing to do with the place of the commandment in the Decalogue. [Above art.]

(4) See Augustine, *l.c.*; *Catechism. Rom.* iii. chap. 5; Luther, *kurze Form der zehn Gebote*, in the Erlang. ed. of the German works, xxii. p. 5; and *Gr. Katechism.* ed. Rechenb. p. 429.

(5) But that the whole division here presupposed is, as we have seen, false, this view might claim the argument that it makes the writing on each table pretty equal in amount.

(6) It is not to be viewed as a prohibition of all plastic art, as it was taken by Philo,—“Quis rerum div. hæc sit,” ed. Mang. p. 496,—and by some excessive purists in the Reformed Churches (compare Geffcken, *l.c.* p. 32 ff.; Zeller, *Das theolog. System Zwingli's*, p. 107 ff.).

(7) So Thomas Aquinas, Savonarola (see Rudelbach, *Savonarola and His Time*, p. 406), Hengstenberg, *Beiträge*, iii. p. 600.

(8) See Geffcken, pp. 141 ff. and 255 ff.; Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.* i. p. 432; and the above-cited article in the *Erlanger Zeitschrift*. The impulse, asserting itself in all possible agitations, to do hurt to our neighbour's property.

(9) The verb נָסַח is always, and the noun נִסְחָה almost always, united with נָסַח .

(10) Züllig thinks that in each table of the Decalogue every precept refers to a less offence than that preceding. That this is not correct has been shown by Geffcken, *l.c.* p. 244 ff. This view would open the door to most dangerous casuistry.

(11) I do not think these attempts worthy of further notice. A book of the kind is E. Meier's *Original Form of the Decalogue*, Mannheim, 1846. On the theological controversies concerning the Decalogue which refer partly to its division, partly to the compass and dignity of its precepts, see the article already cited, p. 323 ff.; and in general, compare Baumgarten's *Unters. theol. Streitigkeiten*, ed. by Semler, iii. p. 226 ff.

§ 87.

Circumcision.—Its Historical Origin.

All theocratic ordinances (cf. § 80, note 2) are in general signs and pledges of the covenant relation, and in this respect the observance of the Sabbath is especially emphasized, Ex. xxxi. 13, 16 f. But the main sign of the covenant (אוֹת בְּרִית , Gen. xvii. 11; $\text{בְּרִית בְּשָׂרָהֶם}$, ver. 13) is circumcision, which is the abiding symbol of covenant obligations, of consequent covenant rights. It was prescribed not only for born Israelites, but also (as already remarked, § 82, 3) for all who were received into the house as slaves, Gen. xvii. 12–27 comp. with Ex. xii. 44–48. On new-born boys it was performed on the eighth day (Gen. xvii. 12; Lev. xii. 3), that is, at the end of the period in which, according to xii. 2, the mother of the child, and therefore probably also the child she was suckling, was considered as unclean; so also, according to Ex. xxii. 29, Lev. xxii. 27, beasts could not be offered till eight days old (cf. § 123, 2) (1).

The historical origin and the religious import of circumcision must be carefully distinguished. It is quite possible that the operation was customary in other tribes before it was introduced in the race of Abraham; and, in fact, the statement in Gen. xvii. presupposes a

previous acquaintance with it. But this does not justify the inference that the significance of circumcision in the Old Testament must be explained from heathenism (2). Moreover, the historical origin of the rite among heathen nations lies in obscurity. It is not probable that the usage spread from a single centre; Diodorus (according to an observation in *Biblioth.* iii. 32) found it even among the Troglodytes, and in recent times it has been found in the South Sea Islands and among heathen negroes. It may be taken as certain that it was a custom of immemorial antiquity among some nations of Western Asia and Africa, but not, as far as appears, among Japhetic races. It may be held as probable that it first appeared among the Egyptians, and, in connection herewith, among the Colchians and Ethiopians; but, strictly speaking, the assumption of an Egyptian origin of circumcision rests only on Herodot. ii. 104 (comp. chap. 36); and it is to be observed that Herodotus' assertion that the Phœnicians and Palestinian Syrians adopted circumcision from the Egyptians, is, so far as the former are concerned, either based on a complete misapprehension, or else can only be understood of a custom accepted from the Egyptians at a comparatively late date (3). The notice in Diodorus, *Bibl.* i. 28 (with which is to be compared Joseph. *Ant.* vii. 10. 3, and *cont. Ap.* i. 22), is beyond doubt taken from Herodotus. The Old Testament offers no certain information about the circumcision of the Egyptians; for in Josh. v. 9 (4) the expression "the reproach of Egypt" does not mean the foreskin, but the sense of the passage is the reproach falling on Israel from the Egyptians (for the expression, cf. Zeph. ii. 8, etc.), viz. that their God brought them out of Egypt to let them perish in the wilderness (cf. for elucidation, Ex. xxxii. 12; Num. xiv. 13 ff.; Deut. ix. 28). This reproach is now wiped off, the covenant relation being restored in act. As for Jer. ix. 24 f., this obscure passage would be easily cleared up if (with Hengstenberg and others) we might interpret, "I visit all the circumcised with the uncircumcised." But this rendering is philologically untenable. The most natural rendering is, "all who are circumcised in uncircumcision," i.e. all who, though physically circumcised, are really, that is, in the heart, uncircumcised (5),—"Egypt, Judah, Edom, Ammon, Moab, and all who cut their hair on the two temples who dwell in the wilderness." On this rendering, the passage proves that the Egyptians were

circumcised, but proves the same for the Edomites and the other nations named. And it may be assumed that the Edomites, who are sprung from Abraham, did originally possess circumcision; but at a later date they must have given up the practice, for Josephus (*Ant.* xiii. 9. 1) tells us that Hyrcanus compelled the Idumeans to accept circumcision, as afterwards Aristobulus, his son, forced the same rite upon the Itureans, who were probably of Arabic blood. On the other hand, we know absolutely nothing of circumcision being practised in Ammon and Moab. Their ancestor, Lot, left Abraham before circumcision was instituted (*Gen.* xiii.) (6). And finally, if we compare the close of the passage in Jeremiah, ver. 25, where the Gentiles, who are עַרְלִים, are contrasted with the Israelites, who are עַרְלֵי-לֵב, the whole reference of the passage to the circumcision of these heathen nations becomes doubtful (7). It seems that in ver. 24 כֹּל must be taken in a wider sense, so as to include also other customs, like that hinted at in the קְצִיצַי פְּאֵה. The latter expression we know refers to a custom of some Arab tribes to shear the hair of the temples in honour (says Herod. iii. 8) of their god Orotal, a custom which was forbidden the Israelites as idolatrous (*Lev.* xix. 27). On the other hand, it cannot be proved from *Ezek.* xxxi. 18, xxxii. 19, that the Egyptians were uncircumcised, since in these passages (cf. xxviii. 10) the word עַרְל seems to have a wider meaning. Philo, in his treatise *De Circumcisione* (ed. Mangey, ii. p. 210), certainly speaks of circumcision as an Egyptian practice, but hints that it was mainly an affair of the priests, to whom exclusively it is ascribed by Origen. Probably it was prescribed to the priests and permitted to others (8). In this case it remains possible, though the point does not admit of sufficient proof, that circumcision in Israel was connected with Egyptian usage (9). Wholly to be rejected is another view, which derives the practice from Canaanitish Saturn-worship. The narrative in *Gen.* xxxiv. shows that it was not originally a Canaanitish usage, and the myth in *Pseudo-sanchuniathon* (ed. Orelli, p. 36), that Chronos, to avert his father's wrath, circumcised himself and his companions, does not even prove that the Phœnicians viewed circumcision as a consecration to Saturn. The hypothesis, which in recent times has repeatedly been put forth with confidence, that circumcision in Israel is simply a milder form of the mutilations performed in the religions of Western Asia in honour

of the Deity, cannot adduce a shadow of argument in its favour. Mutilation absolutely excludes from the congregation of God, Deut. xxiii. 2. But even from a purely physical point of view, circumcision was viewed as increasing instead of destroying the powers of reproduction (10).

(1) This is the simplest explanation of the command. Kurtz's explanation is too artificial,—that the day after the lapse of the first week was chosen to show that circumcision is a fresh starting-point in life (*Gesch. d. A. B.* i. p. 187).—The Arabs, imitating the circumcision of Ishmael, practise circumcision in the thirteenth year.

(2) So *e.g.* Baur, "Ueber die ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Paschfestes und des Beschneidungsritus," *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1832.

(3) See Movers, *Phönicië*, i. pp. 60 and 362.

(4) Josh. v. 9 speaks of the circumcision under Joshua, and says: "And Jehovah said to Joshua, To-day have I rolled away from you the reproach of Egypt."

(5) So Ewald, "Every uncircumcised-circumcised one" (Graf in his *Commentary* falsely cites Ewald for a different exegesis).

(6) Also, according to Judith xiv. 10, the Ammonite Achior is circumcised only after his conversion to Judaism.

(7) Quite wrong, however, is the view of Hitzig, Graf, and others,—all who are uncircumcisedly circumcised, *i.e.* not circumcised.

(8) Further archæological discussion is not necessary. Ambrosius, *de Abrahamo*, ii. 11, says that the Egyptian circumcision was in the fourteenth year of life.

(9) The recent hypothesis, that circumcision came to the race of Abraham through the Hyksos, is without foundation.

(10) Cf. Philo, *l.c.* p. 211. Thus all the inferences drawn from a supposed reference of circumcision to Saturn are nugatory. We must confine ourselves to the Old Testament.

§ 88.

Continuation: Religious Import of Circumcision in the Old Testament. The Giving of a Name.

To understand the Old Testament import of circumcision, we must start from the fact that, according to Gen. xvii., it was instituted before Isaac, the son of promise, was begotten. It obviously pre-

supposes that the natural life is hampered by impurity, which must be removed in those who are called to covenant fellowship with God. Circumcision may be named, with Ewald, "the offering of the body;" and this is carried out in a way that shall declare that the propagation of the race of revelation is consecrated to God. The Old Testament nowhere gives expression to the notion, which many entertain, that the propitiation of God's justice is a distinct element in the rite, expressed by the shedding of the blood. This idea is not contained in Gen. xvii. 14, where the cutting off of the uncircumcised is simply the punishment of disobedience. Nor does the idea lie in the passage adduced by Ewald (1), Ex. iv. 24 ff. As Moses is returning to Egypt, Jehovah falls on him—such is the expression—to slay him (which probably indicates a mortal sickness). Then Zipporah cuts off her son's foreskin, and with it (2) touches his, *i.e.* (on the most probable interpretation) Moses' feet, and says, "A bloody bridegroom (הַחֵדָּוָה הַדָּמִי) art thou to me." "So He let him go. She said *bloody bridegroom* in reference to the circumcision." The most obvious explanation of the passage is, that Moses had omitted the circumcision of his son—his eldest son, it seems—probably because Zipporah, the mother, objected to the dangerous operation. For this he is punished; for, as Knobel well observes, "he who is to force Pharaoh to do his duty to God's first-born must fulfil his own duty to the first-born son who stands in his power, but belongs to God." To save her husband, Zipporah performs the circumcision, but tells him that she is united to him in a marriage the children of which must be bought with blood. The rabbinical exegesis is, that the mother calls the son הַחֵדָּוָה upon his circumcision, as the Arabs use the verb حَتَّنَ of circumcision. The act of circumcision would, on this view, fall to be regarded as a betrothal of the new-born offshoot of the people to the covenant God (3). But this whole interpretation is opposed to the fact that it is Moses, and not the child, that falls into danger of death because the circumcision is omitted (4). Moreover, and this consideration is decisive, the Old Testament applies the symbol of bridal and marriage only to the fellowship of God with His people—not to His fellowship with individual members of the nation. Circumcision is essentially distinguished from Christian baptism by not constituting an immediate

personal relationship between God and the recipient of the ordinance. It does not operate as an individual means of grace. Circumcision is no vehicle of sanctifying forces, as it makes no inner demand of the recipient; of whom no more is presupposed than that he is physically of Israelitish descent, or, if a born heathen, has been externally incorporated in the national union of Israel. The rite effects admission to the fellowship of the covenant people as an *opus operatum*, securing to the individual as a member of the nation his share in the promises and saving benefits granted to the nation as a whole (5). On the other hand, circumcision certainly makes ethical demands on him who has received it. It binds to obedience to God, and to blameless walk before Him (cf. Gen. xvii. 1). Thus it is the symbol of renewal and purification of heart. This signification of the rite is in the Old Testament specially brought out in the use of the term uncircumcision of heart, to denote a want of receptivity for the things of God, Lev. xxvi. 41, Jer. ix. 25 (Ezek. xlv. 7); while, on the other hand, the purification of the heart, by which it becomes receptive for the things of God, and capable of executing God's will, is called circumcision of heart, Deut. x. 16, xxx. 6 (Jer. iv. 4), etc. (6).

With circumcision was combined the naming of the child, which is not expressly mentioned till Luke i. 59, ii. 21, but is already plain from the connection of Gen. xvii. 5 with what follows and xxi. 3 f. By this it is indicated that his name expresses a man's place in the divine covenant (7). How frequently the giving of a name was in Israel an act of religious confession, is seen in the meanings of numerous biblical proper names (8).

(1) Cf. Ewald, *Alterthümer*, 1st ed. p. 98, 3d ed. p. 123. Also Baur, *l.c.*

(2) כַּלְפֵּי Hiphil, as Isa. vi. 7. The כַּלְפֵּי is the foreskin. It is not "cast it at his feet."

(3) It readily suggests itself to apply to the child under the knife of circumcision the account of the closing of the covenant in Ezek. xvi. 6 ff.: "I said to thee when thou wast lying in thy blood, Live. And I swore to thee, and entered into covenant with thee, that thou shouldest be mine."—The further interpretation, that the flowing of the blood contains a propitiation for the inborn guilt and impurity of human nature, might be accepted; but Baur's notion that the passage

implies that the rite of circumcision is a propitiation offered to a threatening power of nature, to a gloomy fate, gives the ordinance a sense directly opposed to the Old Testament faith in God.

(4) As rightly observed by Deyling, *de sponso sanguinum*, in his *Observationes Sacre*, ii. p. 152 ff.

(5) On this point, comp. Zezschwitz, *l.c.* i. p. 222 f.

(6) Other ends contemplated by circumcision, and expressed even by ancient writers, must be viewed as at best secondary: such is the dietetic use of the rite, which, says Herod. ii. 37, is observed *καθαρίω- τητος εἵνεκεν*; or the surgical value, mentioned by Philo, *l.c.* p. 211, as the best means against carbuncle; or the value for the growth of the nation, also mentioned by Philo, of an observance that increases fecundity. But Philo also views it as a symbol of the purification of the soul.

(7) Hence in later times Jewish proselytes were wont to take new names. Particulars in my article "Name," in Herzog's *Encyk.* x. p. 193 ff.

(8) The names of every nation are an important monument of national spirit and manners, and thus the Hebrew names bear important testimony to the peculiar vocation of this nation. No nation of antiquity has such a proportion of names of religious import. The collection in Mat. Hiller's *Onomasticum Sacrum*, 1706, which requires to be sifted, contains more than a hundred such names of men (comp. also Hieronymus, *De Nominibus Hebraicis*, Opp. ed. vall. iii.); and how much more commonly used these names were, is seen from a glance at the long list of names, *e.g.*, in Chronicles. (There are far fewer religious names of women in comparison with secular names, especially names taken from favourite animals, plants, etc. Many names of men, too, are taken from the animal kingdom (see Simonis, *Onomast. V. T.* p. 393 ff.), which is explicable from the early nomadic life of the nation.) The older of these names are generally compounded with אלה, less often with שׁדי and צור (cf. § 47, and Ewald's *Lehrbuch*, 8th ed. § 676 ff.); while later, especially from David's time, they chiefly appear compounded with יהוה. They express truths about God's attributes,—His almighty, righteous, and gracious rule, and the like; or they express thanks, hopes, and petitions to God. Some names contain regular formulæ of prayer; as, for example, El-io-enai (1 Chron. iii. 24, iv. 36, vii. 8) = To Jehovah are mine eyes (directed); Hodaviah (iii. 24, v. 24) = Thank Jehovah. Specially noticeable is the female name Hazlel-poni (iv. 3) = Give shade, Thou who turnest to me Thy countenance (Ewald, *l.c.* p. 680). The meaning of these names generally remained clear, though sometimes יהוה especially was

much shortened. (On the last point, see the statements of Caspari, *Ueber Micha den Morasthiten*, p. 8 ff.) Often, no doubt, the giving of such religious names was a mere matter of custom; even Ahab gave his two sons by Jezebel names compounded with יהוא (Ahaziah and Joram). But it is equally certain that in many cases the choice of the name (which seems to have been often made by the mother, Gen. xxix. 32 ff., chap. xxx.; 1 Sam. i. 20, iv. 21) was an act of religious confession on the part of the parents [above art.].—A religious consecration for girls is neither prescribed at the institution of circumcision, nor at a later date. This agrees with the dependent position of woman, who has a part in national and covenant life only as the partner of man—as wife and mother (see Kurtz, *Hist. of the O. C.* i. p. 188). Girls are said to have been named when weaned. [Art. “Pädagogik des A. T.”]

THIRD DOCTRINE.

DIVINE RETRIBUTION.

§ 89.

Blessing and Curse.

As the people bound themselves when the covenant was concluded to observe the law, so Jehovah on His part binds Himself to fulfil to the nation, so long as it observes its obligations, all the promises He makes, and to grant it the fulness of His blessing; but in the opposite case, to execute on the people the punishment of a breach of covenant. For if man turns against God, God turns against him. Comp., as main passage, Lev. xxvi. 23 f.; also Deut. xxxii. 21; Ps. xviii. 26 f. (1). The *jus talionis*, the principle that a man is dealt with as he himself deals, is, in fact, the principle of penal justice in Mosaism, Ex. xxi. 23 f. (cf. § 99). As the whole theocracy is purely earthly, blessing and curse are confined to the life on earth. Where the will of the holy God is to be fulfilled in every nation, there also His righteous sway must be seen in the corresponding lot of man. The natural life, as well as the history of the nation, must reveal the order of divine retribution. At the same time it is to be noted, that when Mosaism teaches that piety brings good fortune, and godlessness misfortune, this does not justify one in arguing directly from every

misfortune to a corresponding sin, and from every piece of good fortune to corresponding righteousness. For God sometimes shows patience towards the wicked, Gen. xv. 16, and spares them for the sake of the righteous, xviii. 26 ff.; while, conversely, the righteous are proved and purified by affliction (as in the history of Joseph). But in the end, man's earthly lot must correspond to his desert.

The compass of divine blessings is *Life*, חַיִּים, Deut. xxx. 15 f.; comp. also iv. 1, viii. 1 (2); most frequently in the Proverbs, xii. 28, viii. 35, and elsewhere. Life embraces all the good things that pertain to earthly prosperity: long life in the promised land, Ex. xx. 12, Deut. iv. 40, xi. 9 ff., xxx. 20 (3); the blessing of children, fertility of the soil, victory over enemies, Lev. xxvi. 3 ff., Deut. xxviii. 1 ff.: compare, in elucidation, passages from the Proverbs like iii. 2, iv. 10, etc. But it is not these earthly benefits in themselves that make up life. It is wrong to accuse the Old Testament of gross Eudemonism. The idea that a godless man possessing such external good things is really to be felicitated cannot be entertained from the moral standpoint of Mosaism; but the earthly good things form a state of felicity only when the possession of them is united with the experience of the gracious presence of the covenant God, so that they are pledges of His favour. Thus, in the leading passage Lev. xxvi., the whole promise of earthly happiness closes in ver. 11 with the words: "And I will set my tabernacle among you; and my soul shall not abhor you. And I will walk among you, and will be your God, and ye shall be my people." Hence it is quite in the spirit of Mosaism when David, Ps. iv. 8, says that he would not exchange his heart's delight in God for the abundance of the godless; when, xvi. 2, 5, he praises Jehovah as the highest good; or when, Ps. lxiii. 4, he says, "Thy favour is better than life;" only that the Old Testament standpoint, as such, does not permit the godly to look away from earthly reward, but rather demands that outward prosperity shall ultimately confirm the fellowship with God in which the godly knows himself to stand (4).—The pattern of individual felicity in the Old Testament is the life of the patriarchs in friendship with God, and in the rich experience of His blessing; their end "in peace, in a good old age," as the expression runs, Gen. xv. 15, xxv. 8, etc., full of confident hope in the fulfilment of the divine promise resting on their descendants,

xlviii. 21; l. 24, etc. (cf. 1 Kings ii. 4). The picture of a happy state of the nation—enjoying felicity in the experience of God's grace, apart from the nations of the earth, provided with the bounteous plenty of its land, victorious over all its foes—is drawn in Deut. xxxiii. 27–29.

On the other hand, faithlessness to the covenant on the part of the people issues in the withdrawal of all these blessings,—shortening of life, childlessness, ill growth and famine,—so that Israel may know that it possesses all natural blessings only as the gift of God (comp., as a main passage, Hos. ii. 8 ff.); also political misfortune, defeat by foes (5). And the punishment culminates when the servant of Jehovah who refuses to serve his God is delivered into bondage to other nations—when Israel is banished from the house of God (as it is put in Hos. ix. 15), and therefore from the land with which the theocracy is connected, and scattered among all nations as a timid, despised, maltreated people; comp., as main passages for these details, Lev. xxvi. 14–39 (6), Deut. xxviii. 15 ff. If the national disasters of heathen nations are a witness of the powerlessness of their gods, Israel's disasters, on the contrary, shall be a proof of the reality of Israel's God and of His retributive justice; cf., as main passage, Deut. xxxii. 39: "See now that I, I, am He, and there is no god beside me: I kill, and I make alive; I wound, and I heal: neither is there any that can deliver out of my hand." Therefore, also, the Old Testament history is not marked by that mendacious patriotism which conceals national misfortune (7).

(1) Lev. xxvi. 23 f.: "If ye walk contrary to me (וְהִלַּכְתֶּם עִמִּי קִרְי), I also will walk contrary to you (וְהִלַּכְתִּי אֶת־אֲנִי עִמָּכֶם בְּקִרְי)."—Ps. xviii. 26 f.; see § 48.

(2) Deut. xxx. 15: "See I set before thee this day life and good," etc.; viii. 1: "Ye shall keep the commandments, that ye may live."

(3) Ex. xx. 12: "That thy days may be long," etc.; Deut. xxx. 20: "This is thy life and the length of thy days, that thou mayest dwell in the land which Jehovah sware unto thy fathers."

(4) To this point attaches the doctrine of retribution in the Chochma.

(5) Four leading judicial plagues are distinguished in Ezek. xiv. 21 and other passages,—sword, famine, wild beasts, and pestilence.

(6) The punishments form a climax; if the first does not succeed, "then I will punish you seven times more for your sins, and break

your haughtiness of heart," Lev. xxvi. 18 f.; and if this too fails, still severer chastisements ensue, ver. 23 ff.

(7) Cf. the remarks of M. v. Niebuhr, *History of Assur and Babel*, p. 5, where the veracity of the Old Testament history is justly contrasted with the patriotic lies of heathen chroniclers.

§ 90.

Solution of the Apparent Contradiction between Divine Election and the Mosaic Doctrine of Retribution. Attacks on the latter.

But if Israel by breaking the covenant is exposed to God's judgment and rejected, this seems to nullify God's decree of election and the realization of the aim of His kingdom, which, though secured by God's covenant oath, is again dependent on man's action. But to this difficulty Mosaism provides an answer. God's compassionate love is higher than His penal justice, as is already hinted in the relation of Ex. xx. 6 to ver. 5, and especially is expressed in xxxiv. 6 f. (cf. Deut. vii. 9). God's faithfulness cannot be broken by man's faithlessness. His judgments have a fixed end, and therefore are always in measure, as is taught in the beautiful parable Isa. xxviii. 23-29. God's judgments are so executed that through them Israel must reach restoration, and the perfecting of God's kingdom must be brought about. Israel is not annihilated in the judgment; even in banishment, in dispersion among the nations, it must not coalesce with them, but is preserved as a separate nation unto the fulfilment of its vocation. The passages in which the Pentateuch solves the apparently insoluble contradiction in the divine decrees, by expressing the prospect of a future restoration of Israel, are the following:—Lev. xxvi. 44, "When they be in the land of their enemies, I will not cast them away, neither will I abhor them, to destroy them utterly, and to break my covenant with them." If they now turn to Jehovah, He, remembering His covenant, will again take them as His people and bring them back. See Deut. xxxii. 36 ff., but especially the chief passage, Deut. xxx. 1 ff.: "And it shall come to pass, when all these things are come upon thee, the blessing and the curse, which I have set before thee, and thou shalt call them to mind among all the nations whither the Lord thy God hath driven thee, and shalt return

unto the Lord thy God, and shalt obey His voice: then the Lord thy God will turn thy captivity, and have compassion upon thee, and will gather thee again from all the nations whither the Lord thy God hath scattered thee. If any of thine be driven out unto the outmost parts of heaven, from thence will the Lord thy God gather thee, and from thence will He fetch thee: and the Lord thy God will bring thee into the land which thy fathers possessed, and thou shalt possess it; and He will do thee good, and multiply thee above thy fathers." The final restoration of the people is, according to this, an act of God; but is effected by ethical means, through the conversion of the people, for the order of God's kingdom excludes all magical means. This conversion is complete when, by the operation of divine grace, that renovation of heart is accomplished in virtue of which the law shall no longer be an external obligation on the people, but, by God's might, shall be a living will and purpose on their part. For, as the last-cited passage continues (ver. 6), "Then the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live." Thus, in spite of man's sin and faithlessness, the realization of the divine decree of election, the perfecting of the people of God, are firmly based in God's faithfulness and mercy (Rom. xi. 25-36) (1).

The attacks made on Mosaism by the Deists and by later theologians, on account of the doctrine of retribution, rest mainly on the assertion that Mosaism has no higher motives to urge for obedience to the law than carnal desire of reward and fear of punishment; that this national delusion, as De Wette calls the Mosaic doctrine of retribution, made the nation of Israel vastly unhappy, and engendered a gloomy view of life, which destroys the fair harmony of man with the world, in which the Greek appears so nobly (2); while, finally, fault is found with the absence of a doctrine of future retribution.—The general answer to these objections is contained in our previous statements. A morality which rests on the basis of faith in the elective grace and providential faithfulness of the covenant God, and whose doctrine of the good culminates in the prominence assigned to fellowship with this God, cannot surely be accused of gross, sensuous Eudemonism. Certainly it is a limitation to Mosaism, in comparison with the higher stage of New Testament revelation, that fellowship with

God cannot be conceived without corresponding blessing in earthly good, and that life is not yet understood as life everlasting; but, on the other hand, the earnest way in which Mosaism carries out the postulate of a moral government of the world, the manner in which it forbids all fatalistic consolation in adversity and arouses the conscience of the sufferer, and in general, the way in which it instils into the whole life reverence for a holy, divine power that attests its presence in every human fortune, raise this religion high above all forms of heathenism. Thus the moral life of Israel gains a freshness and energy which stand in the strongest contrast to the Egyptian character, which is ever busy with thoughts about death and the future state (3).

(1) The application of this law of divine grace to a single race—viz. that of David—is given in 2 Sam. vii. 14 ff.

(2) See especially an essay by De Wette, which in other respects contains much that is good, “Beitrag zur Charakteristik des Hebraismus,” in Daub’s and Creuzer’s *Studien*, iii. p. 241 ff.

(3) Yet the foundation of a hope of immortality that is full of meaning—such a hope as can only arise in connection with the fact of the vanquishing of death—is laid in the institution of a fellowship of man with God, the ever-living. The imperishableness of this fellowship is felt to be sure, in the first instance, because God’s eternity secures the everlasting duration of His people (cf. Ps. cii. 28 f.); but the growing intensity with which, in the further development of the Old Testament religion, fellowship with God becomes the experience of individual saints, serves to arouse a presentiment of the eternal destiny of the individual also (see my *Commentationes*, p. 71 ff.). [Art. “Volk Gottes.”] We shall find that this point leads on to the prophetic eschatology.

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE THEOCRACY.

§ 91.

The Idea of the Divine Kingship.

The system of government founded by Moses is the government of God,—*θεοκρατία*, as Josephus, who seems to have invented this word, calls it (1). Jehovah is King of Israel. The Old Testament idea of

the divine kingship does not express God's general relation of power towards the world (that He is its creator and supporter), but His special relation of dominion towards His elect people (2). The patriarchs called Him Lord and Shepherd, and it is not until He had formed a people for Himself by bringing Israel up out of Egypt that He is called, Ex. xv. 18, "He who is King for ever and ever." But the real beginning of His kingly rule was on that day on which He bound the tribes of Israel into a community by the promulgation of the law and the closing of the legal covenant: "Then He became King in Jeshurun," Deut. xxxiii. 5 (3). The notion of the divine kingship is therefore connected with the notion, "Holy One and Creator of Israel;" comp. Isa. xliii. 15, Ps. lxxxix. 19. On the divine kingship in Israel, compare also the passages, Num. xxiii. 21; Isa. xli. 21, xliv. 6; Ps. x. 16. In Ps. xlviii. 3, Jehovah is called the "Great King;" in xxiv. 7 ff., the "King of Glory." Although He has been the King of His people in all ages, Ps. lxxiv. 12, He will not become the King of the nations until a future time, when He comes in the last revelation of His kingdom (4). In Him, as King, all political powers are united (their earthly bearers are only Jehovah's organs); church and state, if we may speak thus, are here joined in immediate union. As King, He is the Lawgiver and Judge of His people, Isa. xxxiii. 22. Legal and civil regulations are but an efflux of the divine will. Some things, indeed, that rest on usage are adhered to or tolerated on account of the *σκληροκαρδία* of the people (comp. Matt. xix. 8); still even these things are limited and regulated by provisions of the law. Lastly, as King, God is also the leader of His people's army (5) (comp. Num. xxiii. 21); Israel forms the hosts of Jehovah, Ex. xii. 41 (יְהוָה יֵצֵא) (He goes before them as leader in the combat, Num. x. 35); Israel's battles are יְהוָה יִלְחָמֵם, Num. xxi. 14. An example of this is the first battle with Amalek, in which Israel conquers by Moses' hands held up in prayer (Ex. xvii. 8-16) (6).

(1) Josephus says in his book, *c. Ap.* ii. 16: "Οἱ μὲν μοναρχίαις, οἱ δὲ ταῖς ὀλίγων δυναστείαις, ἄλλοι δὲ τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐπέτρεψαν τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῶν πολιτευμάτων. Ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος νομοθέτης εἰς μὲν τούτων οὐδοποιοῦν ἀπέειπεν, ὥς δ' ἂν τις εἴποι βιασάμενος τὸν λόγον, θεοκρατίαν ἀπέδειξε τὸ πολίτευμα, θεῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ κράτος ἀναθείς, καὶ πείσας εἰς ἐκείνον ἅπαντας ἀφορᾶν," etc.

(2) The nation therefore calls on God as King in this specific sense, Ps. xlv. 5, lxviii. 25, etc.

(3) The subject in Deut. xxxiii. 5 is Jehovah; it is quite wrong to take Moses for the subject.

(4) This will be further shown in the prophetic theology.

(5) Στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, as Josephus expresses himself (*Ant.* iv. 8. 41).

(6) The delineation of the theocratic regulations is most fitly divided into two sections: in the first, we have to delineate the whole theocratic organism, and, along with this, to treat of the connected ordinances of law and justice; in the second, we have to delineate the ordinances of worship.

FIRST.

THE THEOCRATIC ORGANISM, AND THE ORDINANCES OF LAW AND JUSTICE CONNECTED THEREWITH.

I. THE THEOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE.

§ 92.

The Division into Tribes. Israel's Representation before Jehovah.

The people form by nature twelve tribes, or, as Joseph receives double tribal rights in Ephraim and Manasseh (Gen. xlviii. 5), thirteen tribes, מְנוּחָה or שְׁבָטִים (LXX. φυλαί),—the former of these designations apparently designating the tribes more in their genealogical division and natural relations, the latter (according to the meaning of שֵׁבֶט, sceptre) more their political corporation (1). But as Levi received no special tribal territory, the number twelve still remains for all political relations; while, on the contrary, wherever Levi is numbered, the two tribes of Joseph appear as only one. Thus, in the prophecy in Ezek. xlvi., in speaking of the division of the land, vers. 1–7, 23–28, Manasseh and Ephraim are reckoned as two tribes; and on the contrary, in vers. 30–35, where it is said that the twelve gates in the New Jerusalem shall be called by the names of the twelve tribes, Joseph is reckoned as but one tribe (2).—These twelve tribes together form the priestly kingdom (מְמִלְכַּת כֹּהֲנִים, Ex. xix. 6). But though Korah and his company are so far in the right, Num. xvi. 3, that “all the

congregation are holy together, and the Lord is among them," the manifestation is not adequate to the idea. On account of their uncleanness and sinfulness (comp. Ex. xix. 21, etc.), the congregation are able to draw near to God only by means of a propitiation (comp. § 127). Every one who at twenty years of age entered the army of Jehovah had to pay at the mustering the sum of half a shekel of the sanctuary as כִּפָּר, "covering," propitiation, Ex. xxx. 11-16,—the rich giving no more and the poor no less, because they are equal in God's sight (comp. § 136, 4). A whole series of other institutions are directed to such propitiation; but this thought is pre-eminently expressed by the institution of a representative body put between Jehovah and the people. A priesthood springing out of natural circumstances existed even before the time of Moses, comp. Ex. xix. 22. In the time of the patriarchs, the father appears as the priestly intercessor for his family (comp. also Job i. 5), or the prince as priest to his tribe, as kingship and priesthood were united in Melchisedek; and Jethro also is to be reckoned as the spiritual and civil captain of Midian (רֹבֵא וְקִרְיָן, Onk. Ex. ii. 16, iii. 1), as imâm and sheikh. Thus, too, the priests mentioned in Ex. xix. 22 must have possessed the priestly dignity in virtue of a higher natural position, whether, as Jewish tradition declares, and as false exegesis finds even in Gen. xlix. 3 (3), the priesthood was originally connected with the right of the first-born, and therefore the charge of the cultus was entrusted to the first-born before the introduction of the Aaronic priesthood (Mischna, *Sebachim* xiv. 4) (4), or whether those elders who in Ex. xxiv. 11 are called אֲנִיִּים (excellents) were called to this honour. At a still later time (Num. xvi. 2) it is the princes of the congregation (נְסִיִּי עֵדָה) who are its representatives (קְרִיִּים), and in especial the princes of the tribe of the first-born, Reuben, who demand a priesthood on the broadest basis.—But all claims which arose from the right of nature are set aside by the theocratic law. As Israel as a whole is a holy people only in virtue of the divine election—as all the regulations of the covenant, especially those of worship (comp. § 112), rest on the divine institution, the bestowing of the priesthood can also be only an act of divine grace. Those only whom God Himself has called, whom He has brought there and sanctified to Himself (Num. xvi. 7 compared with Heb. v. 4), are permitted to draw near to God in intercession

for the people. Certainly "out of the midst of the children of Israel," for the people's representative must stand in the natural connection with them; but Aaron and his sons are chosen for the priesthood from their midst by the divine good pleasure (Ex. xxviii. 1, comp. 1 Sam. ii. 28); they receive their priesthood as a gift, Num. xviii. 7 (מִתְּנָה). And this divine act of election took place (see Ex. xxviii. 41, xxix. 9) earlier than the occurrence Ex. xxxii. 16 ff., when the tribe of Levi won for itself the blessing, through its zeal for the honour of Jehovah (5). From that time forward, however, Levi as a tribe appears likewise in a mediatorial position between Jehovah and the people (6); the race of Aaron rises from its midst with a specific priestly prerogative, and in such a way that the priesthood itself culminates in the office of high priest. There are therefore three steps by which the representation of the people ascends upwards before Jehovah.

(1) The two terms are often used promiscuously; but, *e.g.*, in geographical descriptions the term מִטָּה is the commonest. On the distinction in the text, see Keil, *Commentary on Joshua*, 1847, Introduction, p. xix. ff.; also Gusset in his *Lexicon*, under מִטָּה.—The tribal constitution which (comp. § 27) was formed during the time of the people's stay in Egypt was not dissolved by Moses, but was incorporated in the theocratic regulations. The number of twelve tribes was regarded as expressing the normal state of the covenant people, and therefore (Judg. xxi. 17) it is regarded as a misfortune, to be avoided at any price, that a tribe should disappear out of Israel [Art. "Stämme Israels"].—This number twelve is so entirely identified with the normal subsistence of the theocracy, that it continues to be the signature of God's people even in prophecy (comp. *den Prophetismus*). In the New Testament, too, the *twelve* tribes continue to be the type of the covenant people (Acts xxvi. 7; Rev. vii. 4 ff.), to which the number of the apostles corresponds.

(2) So also in Jacob's blessing, Gen. xlix., and in that of Moses, Deut. xxxiii.

(3) Comp. the Targum of Onkelos and Jerus. Onkelos interprets, "Three things belonged to Reuben—birthright, priesthood, and kingship." Luther also translates, "The chief in the sacrifice."

(4) The young men who were set apart by Moses to assist at the sacrifice (Ex. xxiv. 5) are taken by Onkelos as the first-born sons, and the priests mentioned in xix. 22, 24 are so understood by Rashi and

Aben Esra. In opposition to this explanation of the latter passage, comp. Vitringa, *Observationes Sacrae*, i. p. 284 [article, "Levi, Leviten, Levitenstädte"].

(5) It is not therefore right to say that the election of the tribe of Levi to the priesthood was a reward for that deed (comp. Philo, *Vit. Mos.* iii. 19).

(6) However we understand the difficult passage Ex. xxxii. 29, it is clearly indicated in Deut. xxxiii. 9, which obviously refers to Ex. xxxii., that the tribe, by its zeal for Jehovah's honour, showed itself worthy of this share in the priestly honour which Aaron's race enjoyed (comp. § 29, note 2). Also Deut. x. 8 does not contradict this, since this passage must be taken in connection with vers. 1-5 and 10 f., which likewise refer to Ex. xxxii. ff. Vers. 6 and 7 are recognised by their whole form as an insertion which interrupts the close connection that subsists between vers. 5 and 8. We may conjecture, in view of ix. 20, that the author of this gloss made the insertion in order to indicate the acceptance of Moses' prayer on behalf of Aaron, who died much later. On this passage compare especially Ranke, *Unters. über den Pentateuch*, ii. p. 283. Riehm, on the contrary (*die Gesetzgebung Moses im Lande Moab*, p. 37 f.) again, forces on Deuteronomy a gross discrepancy from the book of Numbers, as if the former book made the Levites be chosen only after Aaron's death, in the fortieth year of the wandering!—As regards the sense of Ex. xxxii. 29, it is to be observed that the view which sees in this passage a repetition of the words in which Moses summons the Levites to execute judgment against their brethren, as a sacrifice well pleasing to God, is not only liable to other objections, but does not conform to the strict usage of *Vav consec. cum imperf.* Instead of וַיִּצְוֶה, we should on this view look rather, as in iv. 26, for וַיִּצְוֶה. From the common use of the expression "to fill the hand" (xxviii. 41, xxix. 9; 2 Chron. xiii. 9), we should be led to think of an offering of consecration, which the Levites had to offer up after the deed was executed, in reference to the calling which was now set before them. What can be brought against this explanation has been best collected by J. G. Carpzov, *Apparatus hist. crit. antiquitatum sacri cod.*, p. 103 f. On the contrary, even Targ. Jon. finds in the passage a command to bring an offering of expiation for the shed blood; and Kurtz, *Geschichte des A. Bundes*, i. 2d ed. p. 313, has declared for the same meaning [in the above-cited article].

1. THE LEVITES (1).

§ 93.

The Modality and Meaning of the Representation of Israel by the Levites.

The circumstances of the dedication of the tribe of Levi are represented in the following manner in the Pentateuch. We are told in Ex. xiii., that from the night in which Israel was redeemed all the first-born males among man and beast were dedicated to Jehovah. Now Jehovah takes the Levites, instead of all the first-born sons then living from a month old and upward, as a standing gift of the people (comp. Num. viii. 16); and instead of the people's cattle, he takes the cattle of the Levites, Num. iii. 11 f., 45 (2). Opinions differ about the precise meaning of this transaction. The first question is, what first-born sons it was whose place was taken by the Levites; and the second, what meaning is to be put upon this substitution.—With regard to the first point, it is to be premised in explanation, that two different kinds of first-born sons are distinguished in Jewish law (3). The first-born in the sense of family rights (בכור לכהלה, *primogenitus hereditatis*), spoken of in Deut. xxi. 17, is the oldest son of the father by any one of his wives, whether she has had children before or not; but the first-born of the redemption (בכור לכהן, *primogenitus sacerdotis*) is the son who “first opens the matrix,” that is, a woman's first child, if that child be a male. In the opinion of most rabbis, the husband of several wives had to redeem the first-born of each of them; while, on the contrary, his first-born son, if he were not at the same time the first-born of his mother, did not require to be redeemed. On this view, the Levites were taken by Jehovah instead of the first-born sons of every mother (4). This view certainly seems to agree best with Num. iii. 12 f., xviii. 15,—no other definition of first-born than by the mother was possible among animals,—but it not only goes against Ex. xxii. 28 (where it is not said, “the first-born of thy wives,” but “the first-born of thy sons shalt thou give to me”), but also against the reference to the first-born of Egypt brought forward in Num. viii. 17; in which case, from Ex. xii. 29, Ps. lxxviii.

51, cv. 36, we can only think of the first-born of the fathers. Hence the view of Lund and Keil (5) has more probability, according to which those first-born sons are meant who are the first of both father and mother. On this view, too, we can most easily understand the relatively small number of first-born sons in Num. iii. 43, if at the same time we remember that all the first-born sons who were themselves fathers were, without doubt, no longer regarded as first-born sons to be redeemed.

Secondly, with regard to the sense in which the Levites took the place of the first-born sons : on the one view, the Levites were accepted by Jehovah to take charge of the priestly services, which were previously incumbent on the first-born as the representatives of the families ; on the other view, on the contrary, the substitution of the Levites is to be looked upon under the aspect of sacrifice. In order to get at the right understanding, we must proceed from the latter conception. Nowhere in the Levitical law is anything said of an entrance on priestly rights which the first-born children before received ; the idea lying at the root of the dedication of the Levitical tribe is rather this :—As the Egyptians were judged in their first-born children because of their guilt, so that the children took the place of the whole nation, and bore as a sacrifice the curse of extermination which lay on all ; so, on the contrary, Israel—the people chosen by Jehovah and redeemed from the bondage of man—in testimony that it owes its existence and possessions to divine grace alone, that it is indebted to its God for all that it has and is, shall bring to God, as payment, the firstling blessings of his house in the place of the whole. But the offering of men is not executed by sacrificing them, but by giving them up for permanent service in the sanctuary (comp. the story of Hannah, 1 Sam. i. 22, 28). But instead of all the first-born sons of the people performing this service in the sanctuary, one tribe is taken for ever from life's common worldly calling by divine election, and placed in a closer and particular relation towards God, to take charge of the service in the sanctuary, and thus to mediate to the people the communion of the sanctuary. Thus, in the first place, the Levites were the living sacrifice by which the people rendered payment to Jehovah for owing their existence to Him ; but secondly, the Levites, who in consequence of this performed in the sanctuary the service

which the people ought to have rendered through their first-born, but could not on account of their uncleanness (Num. xviii. 22 f.), serve also, in their substitution, as an atonement (לְכִפּוּר) for the people who come near to the sanctuary, Num. viii. 19. In the first respect, the Levites are given to the priests (to whom, in general, the use of the sacrifice of the firstlings is given), as a gift assigned to them by Jehovah (xviii. 6, comp. with iii. 9, viii. 19); they shall (as is said in xviii. 2, comp. with ver. 4, with allusion to their name) join themselves to the priest (לְיָהוֹנָדָב), and serve him. In the second respect, the Levites themselves obtain a certain share in the mediatorial position which belongs to the priesthood, and thus the Levitical tribe forms the basis of the gradually ascending representation of the people before God. Emphatically as it is inculcated on the Levites (comp. xvi. 10) that the dedication of their tribe does not involve the priesthood proper, yet their relative share in the priestly mediatorship, in contrast to the other tribes, is imprinted very clearly in the regulations of encampment,—in the Levites having to encamp with the priests, close round the sanctuary, “that wrath come not on the congregation of the children of Israel,” i. 53 (comp. § 20).—What has been said explains further the difference which exists in reference to the Levites between the legislation in the middle books of the Pentateuch and Deuteronomy—that, namely, the former gives special emphasis to the difference between the priests and Levites, while Deuteronomy, on the contrary, takes priests and Levites together, as a holy estate in contrast to the people (6). The two views do not contradict, but supplement each other mutually. That Deuteronomy, as has often been said, does not at all acknowledge the difference between the Levites who were priests and those who were not is decidedly wrong; for in Deuteronomy, where simply לֵוִי or לְוִיִּים stands, it is just the common Levites who are meant; see especially xviii. 6–8, comp. with vers. 3–5 (7). It is correct, however, that both are treated as essentially a single whole, as is manifest even from the fact, that while the middle books of the Pentateuch are wont to denote the priests as “sons of Aaron,” in Deuteronomy, on the contrary, the Levitical character of the priesthood is made prominent by the priests being called “sons of Levi” (xxi. 5, xxxi. 9), or “Levitical priests” (הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלֵּוִיִּים), xvii. 9, 18 (the same in Josh. iii. 3, etc.), and

that also the vocation of the Levites is designated by terms which are elsewhere applied precisely to the priestly calling, viz. "to minister in Jehovah's name" (שָׁרַת בְּשֵׁם יְהוָה), "to stand before Jehovah" (עָמַד לִפְנֵי יְהוָה); e.g. Deut. xviii. 7, comp. with ver. 5 and xxi. 5, xvii. 12 (8). In Moses' blessing (xxxiii. 8 ff.), the idea of the priesthood is similarly transferred to the tribe; and accordingly the ordinance of the priesthood is, as Mal. ii. 5 designates it, a covenant with Levi.

(1) Compare my article, "Levi, Leviten, Levitenstädte," in Herzog's *R.E.* viii. p. 347 ff.

(2) Since (Num. iii. 43) the number of first-born sons in the nation amounts to 22,273, and the number of the Levites, on the contrary, only to 22,000, the overplus is compensated by a fine of five shekels a-piece, to be paid to Aaron and his sons (vers. 46-51).—There must be a mistake in the reckoning in vers. 22, 28, 34, which would give a sum of 22,300; see Kurtz, *l.c.* 335 f. Others suppose that these 300 supernumerary Levites were themselves first-born children [in above-cited art.].

(3) Comp. Mischna, *Bechoroth*, chap. viii., and Maimonides on the passage; Selden, *de success. in bona def.* p. 27; Saalschütz, *mos. Recht*, pp. 349 and 815.

(4) Kurtz, pp. 143 and 337.

(5) See Lund, *alte jüd. Heiligthümer*, p. 622; Keil, in Hävernick's *Introduction to the Old Testament*, 2d ed. i. 2, p. 425.

(6) The Levitical regulations are a chief point in the disputes on the composition of the Pentateuch.

(7) Compare the explanation of this passage by Riehm, *l.c.* p. 35 f.

(8) On the contrary, Num. xvi. 9 says the Levites are appointed לְעֹמֵד לִפְנֵי הָעֵדָה לְשָׁרָתָם.

§ 94.

Official Functions, Dedication, and Social Position of the Levites.

The official functions of the Levites are placed along with the service of the priests under the common point of view of "keeping the charge of the sanctuary" (מִשְׁמֶרֶת הַקֹּדֶשׁ) (comp. Num. iii. 28, 32 with xviii. 5), but at the same time are distinguished definitely from the latter. The charge of "all concerns of the altar (1) and within the veil" (Num. xviii. 7), with which, also, the performance of liturgical acts connected with the other sacred utensils is united, falls

exclusively to the priests (2). On the contrary, the service of the Levites is called the service of Jehovah's dwelling-place, or of the tabernacle of meeting (comp. various expressions, i. 53, xvi. 9, xviii. 4); it is designated as martial service (לְמִלְחָמָה), iv. 3, 30, viii. 24 (in the camp of Jehovah, 1 Chron. ix. 19), and even at a later period it was organized entirely in a military manner. During the wandering in the wilderness, the Levites had to take charge of the taking down, carrying, and setting up of the holy tabernacle (Num. i. 50 ff.); also to carry the sacred utensils, and in particular the ark of the covenant (comp. Deut. x. 8, xxxi. 25) (3). The division of these duties among the three Levitical families is given in Num. iii. 25–37, chap. iv. (4). According to chap. iv. 3, 23, 30, the Levites were called to this service from their thirtieth to their fiftieth year; on the contrary, viii. 24 ff. represents their time of service as beginning as early as with their twenty-fifth year (5).—But the functions laid down in the book of Numbers refer only to the time of the people's wandering. Nothing is determined in the Pentateuch, or even in Deuteronomy, about the services which fall to the share of the Levites in future, during the settlement of the people in the Holy Land (6). How very different would this be if the Levitical legislation of the Pentateuch were as modern a production as the modern critics maintain! (7).

The act of the dedication of the Levites is described in Num. viii. 5–22. The first set of these ceremonies aims at purification, טָהַר (an expression which, moreover, in vers. 6 and 21, stands as a designation of the whole act of dedication, while, on the contrary, Ex. xxviii. 41, xxix. 1, קָדַשׁ is used in speaking of the dedication of the priests). The purification falls (ver. 7) into three parts,—sprinkling with the water of purification (בְּמֵי הַטָּהָרָה) (8); shaving (“they shall cause the razor to pass over their whole body”) (9); washing of their clothes. There is no mention of investiture, as at the dedication of the priests, for the Pentateuch does not recognise any special costume of office for the Levites (such as appears later). Thus purified, the Levites become fitted to be given over to Jehovah. This is divided into the following ceremonies:—The laying on of hands (ver. 10). When the sacrifices which were to be offered afterwards had been prepared (ver. 8), the whole congregation was to gather before the holy tabernacle. “Then bring the Levites before Jehovah, and the children

of Israel (namely, the representatives of the congregation) shall lay their hands on the Levites." By this action the intention of the people to give over the Levites as an offering in their name is expressed (§ 126). The actual giving over is performed by waving or swinging (הִנִּיף, comp. § 133), the ceremony which takes place at all the offerings which God resigns as a gift to the priest (10). In the case of the Levites, it is generally understood as a simple leading backward and forward. Then the sin-offering and burnt sacrifice are presented (11) in the name of the Levites (who must therefore lay their hands, ver. 12, on the sacrificial animals), to atone for them (לְכַפֵּר עַל-הַלֵּוִיִּם); for even those whom God has accepted as a gift must be atoned for before they can begin to serve in the sanctuary (12).

In order that the tribe of Levi might be withdrawn from the common calling of life,—which in the theocratic state was agricultural,—and might give itself completely to its sacred vocation, no inheritance as a tribe was assigned to it (Num. xviii. 23). What Jehovah said to Aaron (Num. xviii. 20) is in Deut. x. 9 applied to the whole tribe of Levi—namely, that Jehovah Himself will be their inheritance. The tribe is scattered among all the other tribes, in whose dominions (Num. xxxv. 6) it received forty-eight towns (13), with their suburbs (ver. 7, מִנְּשֵׂי), that is, pasturages (14). In this law, moreover, the priests are taken along with the Levites. The thirteen towns belonging to the priests are not separated till Josh. xxi. 4 (15). Without doubt, this dispersion served the purpose of placing the Levites in a position where they could watch over the keeping of the law. The tithes were assigned to them for their support (more hereafter, § 136, 3). This was not a splendid endowment. Even when the tithe was conscientiously handed over, it was no certain income (and, besides, did not increase with the increase of the tribe). Moreover, if the people showed themselves averse to this tax (as was to be expected in times of falling away from the theocratic law), the tribe of Levi was subjected to unavoidable poverty. And thus Deuteronomy represents the Levites as placed in a position requiring the support of alms, and looks on them as standing in the same line with strangers, widows, and orphans (xii. 19, xiv. 27, 29, and elsewhere) (16).

(1) Viz.—comp. 1 Chron. vi. 34—as well of the altar of burnt sacrifice as the altar of incense.

(2) The attempt of the Levite Korah to offer incense is punished as a criminal attempt, Num. xvi.

(3) The ark, however, must first be covered by the priests, Num. iv. 4 ff.; a sight of it is unconditionally forbidden to the Levites, ver. 17 ff.

(4) The family of Gershon had to take charge of the coverings and curtains; that of Kohath, which held the first rank because Aaron sprung from this family, took charge of the sacred vessels; and Merari of the boards, bolts, and pillars. The Kohathites stood under the superintendence of Eliezer the priest, the Gershonites and Merarites under Ithamar. (The notice 1 Chron. ix. 19 f. will be spoken of in David's history.) [In the cited article.]

(5) This apparent contradiction is easiest solved by the assumption that the former passages refer to service in transporting the tabernacle, and the latter to Levitical service in general (comp. Hävernick's *Introduction*, 2d ed., edited by Keil, i. 2, p. 432); on another explanation (comp. Ranke, *Untersuchungen über den Pentateuch*, ii. p. 159), the time from the twenty-fifth to the thirtieth year is to be regarded mainly as a preparation for entering on the full service.—From fifty years old and upward the Levites are not to be compelled to do the work of serving, but only to help their brethren (probably as overseers, or by instructing the younger men). According to the tradition of the Talmud (*Cholin*, f. 24, a), the latter command had reference only to the service in the wilderness; afterwards, in Shilo, an advanced age did not exclude them from service unless from want of voice. [In above-cited article.]

(6) In Deuteronomy the vocation of the Levites, as has been already indicated, is subsumed under the priestly calling in general (x. 8, xviii. 7), but this without in any way assigning to the Levites those functions which especially belong to the priests. For a mixture of the offices of the two classes does not at all follow from the priests, xxxi. 9, and also the Levites, ver. 25, being designated bearers of the ark of the covenant. Subsequent practice (Josh. iii., vi. 6; 1 Kings viii. 3 ff.) shows that the ark was carried by the priests on all solemn occasions; while, on the contrary, this labour was incumbent on the Levites during the wandering in the wilderness (so, too, in 2 Sam. xv. 24). [In the above-cited article.]

(7) Riehm is very far from having made out his point, that the Deuteronomist, in what he says of the Levites, assumes a state of things that arose not before Hezekiah's time. On the contrary, as will appear more clearly afterwards, Stähelin ("Versuch einer Geschichte der Verhältnisse des Stammes Levi," in the *Zeitschr. der deutschen*

morgenl. Gesellsch. 1855, p. 708 ff.) is probably in the right when he finds that what is contained in Deuteronomy in reference to the Levites applies quite well to the time after Joshua. [In the article cited.]

(8) It cannot be found out whether common, natural, spring water is meant, such as was used at the washing connected with the dedication of the priests, or a specially prepared water of purification, analogous with that ordained in Num. xix.; the expression chosen makes the latter more probable. [In article cited above.]

(9) Bähr (*Symbolik des mos. Kultus*, ii. p. 178) says that this is to be understood with the exception of the head, since the shaving of the head and the removal of the beard would, from Lev. xxi. 5, rather have been regarded as desecration. But the analogous purification of the leper, Lev. xiv. 9, seems to be in favour of complete shaving (compare what Herodotus, ii. 37, tells of the customs of the Egyptian priests); but there the shaving was not for once, but was repeated every three days. [In the cited article.]

(10) See Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. a, 1st ed. p. 187, 2d ed. p. 283.

(11) It is clear from ver. 12 comp. with ver. 21 that this double sacrifice did not precede the dedication, as Hofmann (*l.c.* 1st ed. p. 159, 2d ed. p. 253) states. [In the cited article.]

(12) Special provisions for the personal conduct and regulation of the life of Levites (such as Lev. xxi. gives for the priests) are not contained in the Levitical laws in the Pentateuch. [In the cited article.]

(13) Of which six are also appointed to be cities of refuge; comp. *infra*, the avenging of blood, § 108.

(14) The area of these suburbs was pretty limited. In Num. xxxv. 4 f. it is said that they were to extend 1000 cubits from the wall of the town round about, and the dimensions from corner to corner were to amount to 2000 cubits. Very various plans have been sketched from these statements; compare Keil's *Commentary on Joshua* (1847), p. 272 f.; Saalschütz, *mos. Recht*, p. 100 ff.; and his *Archäol. d. Hebr.* ii. p. 86 ff. [In cited art.]

(15) The thirteen towns of the priests are, Josh. xxi. 4 f., in the south of the land on the west side of Jordan, in the territory of the tribes of Judah, Simeon, and Benjamin. Of the thirty-five properly Levitical towns, ten are assigned in Ephraim, Dan, and the half-tribe of Manasseh on this side of Jordan, to the remaining Kohathites; thirteen in the half-tribe of Manasseh on the east side, in Issachar, Assher, and Naphtali, to the Gershonites; and lastly, twelve in Zebulon, Gad, and Reuben to the Merarites. The list in 1 Chron. vi.

46 ff. deviates in many ways from the statement in the book of Joshua.—The allotment of these towns is doubtless not to be understood as if the Levites were their only possessors, but that they received only the needful number of houses, along with the suburbs round the town to pasture their cattle, whilst the other houses, and the fields and granges belonging to each town, were occupied by the members of the tribe in whose land the town lay (comp. Josh. xxi. 12, and Keil on the passage). Reference has also been made in this connection with good reason to the law about the sale of Levites' houses, Lev. xxv. 32 f., since this has a meaning only on the presupposition that other Israelites dwelt with the Levites. So we really find afterwards, 1 Sam. vi. 13, in Bethshemesh, which was a priests' town, Josh. xxi. 16, inhabitants who are distinguished from the לֵוִיִּים who were in it. It is probable that the latter expression was also used in speaking of members of the priestly family when they were not really installed in the priest's office (see Stähelin, *l.c.* p. 713 f.). [In the art. cited above.]

(16) Riehm (*l.c.* p. 33 f.) says that Deuteronomy distinctly contradicts the provisions in the book of Numbers about the dwelling-places of the Levites by presupposing a houseless tribe of Levites, and by representing the Levites as strangers living scattered in the various towns of the various tribes. This assertion is at first sight guilty of gross exaggeration, as, with the exception of xviii. 6, the Levites themselves are not designated as strangers in any of the passages cited by Riehm (xii. 12, 18; xiv. 27, 29; xvi. 11, 14). [In cited art.] In order to appreciate the statements in Deuteronomy rightly, compare also what is said on the situation of the Levites as it was from the beginning of the time of the judges and onwards, in the historical section of the "Theology of Prophecy."

2. THE PRIESTHOOD (1).

§ 95.

It appears from what has been already said (§ 92), that the priestly vocation is in the first place essentially to represent the people as a holy congregation before Jehovah with full divine authority (comp. Deut. xviii. 5), and to open up for them the way to their God (2). Standing as a holy order between Jehovah and the congregation in its approach to Him, the priests cover the latter by the holiness of their office (3), which official holiness (Num. xviii. 1) covers also the guilt

which adheres to the person of the priest himself; and in the functions of his office the priest is the medium of the intercourse which takes place in worship between Jehovah and the congregation, and which, on account of the sinfulness of the congregation, becomes a service of expiation. The name כֹּהֵן (and כֹּהֲנִיתָ) probably refers to this priestly calling. The stem כֹּהֵן appears to be connected with כָּהַן (as כָּהֵל with כֹּהֵל, כָּהַן with כֹּהֵן), and to mean either intransitively, “to present oneself,” or transitively, *parare, aptare*; in the former case, כֹּהֵן would be one who stands to represent another (4), and in the latter case the priest would be named from the preparing and presenting the sacrifice (5).—Besides this mediatorial calling, the priest has the office of teacher and interpreter of the law, Lev. x. 11, in which respect he has to accomplish a divine mission to the people; hence the priest is, in Mal. ii. 7, called a מִלֵּאכֶה יְהוָה, “for the priest’s lips should keep knowledge, and men should seek the law at his mouth.” As it is said in Ezek. xlv. 23, the priests shall “teach my people the difference between the holy and profane, between the unclean and the clean” (comp. Lev. x. 10, and the functions described in chap. xiii. f., Hag. ii. 11 ff.); it is further said by Ezekiel, ver. 24: “And in controversy they shall stand in judgment; they shall judge according to my judgments” (6). The two sides of the priestly calling—to teach Israel Jehovah’s judgments and law, and to offer incense and sacrifice on His altar—are embraced together, Deut. xxxiii. 10.

The bearers of this priestly dignity are, as has already been remarked, only the Aaronites; and this choice of Aaron’s house is re-confirmed (Num. xvi.) in consequence of Korah’s rebellion, and certified (Num. xvii.) by the sign of the budding almond-rod, which indicated that the priesthood does not rest on any natural preference whatever,—for Aaron’s rod had originally nothing more than the others,—but only depends on the divine grace, which fills this office with living energy. But thenceforth the divine calling to the priesthood is connected with the natural propagation of Aaron’s family; and as Aaron’s two sons, Nadab and Abihu, died because they offered strange fire (Lev. x. 1 f.), and left no sons, it passed to the race of the other two sons of Aaron, Eliezer and Ithamar (7).

The holiness of the priesthood was to be stamped in the whole appearance of the priests, which ought to excite an impression of the

highest purity and exclusive devotion to God. To this refer, in the first place, the provisions as to the bodily condition and regulation of life of the priests. The law (Lev. xxi. 16-24) treats of the bodily condition of the priests. By it, all considerable physical blemishes make a man unfit for the priest's office (8). But though excluded from service, a person afflicted with such blemishes might (ver. 22) enjoy the sacred gifts given for the sustenance of the priests (as well of the first as of the second order) (9). The provisions for the regulation of life are given in Lev. xxi. 1 ff. In it we are told that the priest shall not defile himself with any dead body, by taking charge of the funeral and sharing in the customs of mourning, except in the case of his nearest relations, viz. his father, mother, son, daughter, brother, and his sister if she was still a virgin. The same six cases are named in Ezek. xlv. 25 (10). But even in these cases he must avoid every disfigurement of his body (11). With regard to marriage, the law (Lev. xxi. 7 ff.) commands that they shall not marry a whore, or one who has been deflowered or divorced, but only a virgin or a widow; which in Ezek. xlv. 22 is limited to "virgins of the seed of Israel, or a widow of a priest" (12). Discipline and order ought to rule in the priest's family. If a priest's daughter give herself up to lewdness, she shall (Lev. xxi. 9) be burned (without doubt after being stoned). The dietetic directions which the law lays down for the priests, are simply that they must avoid the use of wine and other intoxicating liquors at the time of their service in the sanctuary, Lev. x. 9 f., that they may preserve full clearness of mind for their functions; and further, that the general prohibition to defile oneself by partaking of what has died of itself, or been torn by beasts, is specially inculcated on them, xxii. 8. If a priest had levitically defiled himself involuntarily, or in an unavoidable way, he might not eat of the holy food until he was legally cleansed again. Every offence against this rule was threatened with death, xxii. 2 ff. There is no prescription in the law as to the age at which men shall enter on the priestly office. It is to be supposed that what was established about the Levites' age held good of the priests also (13).

The dedication of the priests, for which, as has already been mentioned, the expression קָדַשׁ (Ex. xxix. 1, xl. 13) is used, is ordained Ex. xxix. 1-37, xl. 12-15, and accomplished in Lev. viii. on Aaron

and his sons. The priests' dedication consists of two series of actions:—1. Washing, robing, and anointing; which three acts form the real dedication of the person to the priestly office. 2. A threefold offering, by which the persons thus dedicated were wholly put into the functions and rights of the priesthood. The dedication began by leading those who were to be dedicated to the door of the tabernacle, and washing them—doubtless their whole body, and not merely hands and feet. The putting off of the uncleanness of the body is a symbol of spiritual cleansing, without which no one dare approach God, and least of all he who conducts the functions of atonement. This negative preparation was followed by the robing, which, with the common priests, consists in putting on four articles of dress,—breeches, coat, bonnet, and girdle; comp. Ex. xxviii. 40–42 (14). The clothes were made of fine shining white linen, as the symbol of purity; only the girdle was embroidered with bright colours (woollen garments were forbidden). The service was to be accomplished unshod. Then followed the priestly unction with the anointing oil,—prepared by mixing four sweet-smelling substances with olive oil,—a symbol of the communication of the Divine Spirit which operates in the priestly office (15). According to tradition, we are only to think of it as applied to the forehead, in distinction from the unction of the high priest (16). This anointing was (Ex. xl. 15) to serve Aaron's sons “for an everlasting priesthood throughout their generations;” and this has often been understood as if this anointing had not to be repeated afterwards in the case of common priests.—The offering which followed, and which naturally was not performed by those who were being dedicated, but by Moses, comprised a threefold sacrifice. First, priests and altar are purified, Lev. viii. 15, by the sin-offering of a young bullock; then the offering of the purified priests to God is completed by the whole-burnt-offering of a ram (17). Thirdly, this is followed by a modified thank-offering (18). This is the specific sacrifice for the consecration of the priests, and bears the name מִלֵּחַ, “filling,” Lev. viii. 22, 28 (vii. 37),—an expression which is to be explained by the phrase “filling the hand” with an office (= inauguration), and which refers to the conveyance of authority to the priest (19). Not only is the altar sprinkled with the blood of the sacrificed ram, as at other thank-offerings, but also the right ear, the right thumb, and the great

toe of the right foot of Aaron and his sons are touched with it: the ear, because the priest must at all times hearken to the holy voice of God; the hand, because he must execute God's commands, and especially the priestly functions; the foot, because he must walk rightly and holily. Further, it is peculiar to this offering that Moses takes the fat pieces, the right shoulder, and some of the three different kinds of cakes belonging to the thank-offering, and lays all these together in the hands of Aaron and his sons, and waves them before Jehovah, whereafter all is burned. This act signifies, firstly, the conveyal of the function which belongs to the priest to offer the fat pieces on God's altar; secondly, the infeoffment of the priests with the gift, which they receive in future for their service, but which they must now give over to Jehovah, because they are not yet fully dedicated, and therefore cannot yet themselves act as priests (20). The conclusion of the festival is the sacrificial meal (21). The duration of the dedication is fixed at seven days (Ex. xxix. 35 ff.; Lev. viii. 33 ff.). (During this whole time, those who are to be dedicated were to pass the time, day and night, at the entrance of the tabernacle.) On each of the six following days a repetition of the sin-offering was to take place (Ex. xxix. 36); it is not said whether the other two offerings and the anointing were to be repeated or not (22).—The sense and meaning of all these *δικαιώματα σαρκός*, these outward priestly regulations, and the aim of their pedagogic system, is distinctly expressed by the Old Testament in Deut. xxxiii. 9 f.: "Who said unto his father and to his mother, I have not seen him; neither did he acknowledge his brethren, nor knew his own children; for they have observed Thy word, and kept Thy covenant. They shall teach Jacob Thy judgments, and Israel Thy law; they shall put incense before Thee, and whole burnt sacrifice upon Thine altar." The priesthood, indeed, as such, is linked to birthright, and the priestly service demands only outward purity and perfection; but that the real subjective qualification for the priesthood lies in undivided devotion to God, which, when His honour is in question, is willing to sacrifice even the highest worldly interest, is distinctly expressed both here and in the calling of the tribe of Levi, Ex. xxxii. 26 ff. (comp. § 29 with note 2). Unbroken obedience is demanded of the priest, Lev. x. 3: "I will be sanctified in them that come nigh me (*קָרְבָנִי*, designation

of the priests), and before all the people I will be honoured" (comp. Mal. ii. 5 ff.) (23).

The maintenance of the priests was cared for in the following manner:—They received as dwelling-places thirteen of the towns which were given to the Levites, Josh. xxi. 4, 10 ff. (compare the enumeration in 1 Chron. vi. 39 ff., which, however, is not free from corruptions of text); further—compare Num. xviii. 8 ff., chief passage—the Levites had to give them the tithes of their tithes (24), and they received the gifts of the first-fruits, and certain parts of the offerings, etc. (25). Thus the maintenance of the priests was cared for sufficiently, but by no means abundantly; in comparison with the endowments of the priestly caste in many other ancient nations, the provision for the Levitical priests is very moderate.—The deeper meaning of the word, that Jehovah alone is the portion and inheritance of the priests, Num. xviii. 20 (26), and what, therefore, ought to be the deepest ground of priestly thought and life, is expressed, Ps. xvi. 5, in these words: "The Lord is the portion of mine inheritance and of my cup; Thou maintainest my lot. The lines are fallen unto me in pleasant places," etc.

(1) Compare Küper, *Das Priesterthum des A. Bundes*, 1866, and my article, "Priesterthum im A. T.," in Herzog's *R.E.* xii.

(2) Mediatorship between God and the people is generally said to constitute the essence of the priesthood; and this is, generally speaking, correct, but it is not an adequate expression of the specific business of the priesthood in distinction from the two other theocratic offices. Mediatorial vocation belongs also to the king and the prophet: to the king, because he acts in the name of Jehovah, and exercises judicial and executive authority in God's state as the bearer of His power; to the prophet, because he speaks in Jehovah's name, and opens up the divine counsel to the people. [In cited article.]

(3) A meaning of the priesthood which is suggested also in the place which was pointed out for Aaron and his sons in the camp, immediately in front of the sanctuary (Num. iii. 38). [In cited art.]

(4) As, according to Firuzabadi (see Gesenius, *Thesaurus*, ii. p. 661), *kāhin* means one—"qui surgit in alieno negotio et operam dat in causa ejus." [In cited article.]

(5) *Kahana*, in Arabic, is chiefly used of soothsaying, but it is clear that this meaning is a derived one. On the כֹּהֲנִים, who are found

among the king's officers, see my article, "Könige, Königthum in Israel," in Herzog's *R.E.* viii. p. 15.—In the Old Testament, כֹּהֵן is also used of priests of heathen cultus (Gen. xli. 45, 1 Sam. v. 5, and elsewhere); but the term כֹּהֲנֵי יִדֹּלִים serves specially to designate the idol priests in several passages; and this term is used in Syriac of priests in general (see on this word, Iken, *Dissert. philol.* i. p. 177 ff.). [In the above-cited article.]

(6) Comp. Deut. xvii. 9 ff. See the judicial functions of the priesthood, *infra*.—On its second side, also, the priestly vocation is divided from that of the prophets by the priest being bound solely to the interpretation and practice of the law, and not receiving in the spirit any further information on the divine counsel; to which the Urim and the Thummim of the high priest alone form an exception, if, as some have supposed, he by them was made acquainted by inspiration with the divine decision. Note how Jer. xviii. 18 ascribes *law* to the priests, *counsel* to the wise, *word* to the prophets; or Ezek. vii. 26, *law* to the priests, *counsel* to the elders, *vision* to the prophets. [In cited art.]

(7) Whilst the prophet, the servant of Jehovah (עֲבָדָה), carries on his office in virtue of a free divine calling, which is not confined to any tribe, and in virtue of personal equipment by the Divine Spirit, the priest, the minister (מְשִׁיבָה) of Jehovah, must prove his personal right to office by his genealogy, although divine living power works in his office. Want of proof of descent from Aaron excluded from the priesthood; an example of which is recounted in Ezra ii. 62, Neh. vii. 64 (comp. Josephus, c. *Ap.* i. 7). [In the cited article.]

(8) Mischna *Bechoroth* (vii. 1) says that these blemishes were the same as those which made the firstling of cattle unfit for sacrifice; and in truth the enumeration of animal blemishes in Lev. xxii. 22 f. agrees almost entirely with xxi. 18 ff. The latter passage excludes the blind, the lame, the חֲרִים (according to most old authorities, the flat-nosed; according to Knobel and others, every one who has suffered a mutilation, especially in the face), the שָׂרִיץ (he whose limbs go in any way beyond rule; according to Vulg., in a narrower sense, *vel grandi, vel torto naso*); further, he who suffers from a broken arm or leg, the crook-backed, dwarfed, or one with a blemish in the eye, or scurvy, or scabbed, etc. To this list of blemishes, Mischna *Bechoroth*, chap. vii., adds a considerable list of others. Thus, naturally, an examination of the body had to precede calling to the priest's office. Compare on this the already cited article, p. 176. A blemish, too, which appeared afterwards incapacitated one for service; Josephus gives an example of this, *Ant.* xiv. 13. 10. [In cited art.]

(9) In Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* v. 5. 7, priests by birth, who διὰ πῆρῳσιν durst not discharge any service, were still found inside the railing which divided the court of the priests from that of the people; they received the portions which were their due in virtue of their descent, and were also employed in subordinate services, but wore only the common dress.—It is scarcely needful to remark, that not all Aaronites, even when possessed of the qualifications required by the law, were really priests in office; thus Benaiah, military commandant under David and Solomon (2 Sam. viii. 18, xx. 23; 1 Kings ii. 25), was, 1 Chron. xxvii. 5, a priest's son. [In the cited article.]

(10) Comp., too, Philo, *de Monarch.* § 12. But on the common, though certainly not quite certain, rendering of Lev. xxi. 4, he must not defile himself among his people as a husband (לְיָמָיו)—that is, not at the death of his spouse, his mother-in-law, or daughter-in-law. Nevertheless, Ezek. xxiv. 16 ff. has been rightly adduced against this view, where it is counted something uncommon that Ezekiel does not mourn at the death of his wife. [In the above-cited article.]

(11) He shall not make his head bald (which in Deut. xiv. 1 is indeed forbidden to the Israelites in general), nor cut off the corners of his beard, nor cut himself in his body (both of which are also generally forbidden, Lev. xix. 27 f.). On the contrary, the other customs of mourning,—uncovering the head and rending the garments,—which were forbidden to the high priest, Lev. xxi. 10, must have been allowed to the common priests; though in x. 6 even these two customs of mourning were denied the sons of Aaron. [In above-cited article.]

(12) The latter limitation has only a prophetic character (s. Wagenseil, *Sota*, p. 557 f.), while the former is without doubt in the sense of the law, and is followed, Ezra x. 18 f., Neh. xiii. 28 ff. [In the art. cited.]—See the traditions on this topic in the same art., p. 177.

(13) Manhood, or more precisely the twentieth year, is reputed in Jewish tradition to be the term before which none might act as priest (see the passage by Ugolino, *sacerdot. hebr. im Thes.* xiii. p. 927). [In the above-cited article.]

(14) In 1 Sam. xxii. 18, even the common priests wore an ephod, but of less valuable stuff (עֲפֹדָה).

(15) Certainly Ex. xxix. 7, Lev. viii. 12, speak only of Aaron's unction; but Ex. xxviii. 41, xxx. 30, xl. 15, Lev. vii. 35 f., x. 7, point definitely to the anointing of Aaron's sons. [In the art. cited above.]

(16) According to Kurtz (*Der alttest. Opferkultus*, p. 285), only as a sprinkling of the person and clothes with the anointing oil.

(17 and 18) Comp. *infra*, the delineation of the sacrificial cultus, § 131 ff.

(19) The phrase 'מָלֵא אֶת־יָד פ' (Ex. xxviii. 41, xxix. 9, 29, 33; Lev. viii. 33, xvi. 32; Num. iii. 3; comp. Judg. xvii. 5) does not indicate the bestowal of a gift on the priest by Jehovah, but a conferring or delivering over of the rights of office, authorization (comp. Isa. xxii. 21). On the contrary, if one fills his hand to Jehovah (1 Chron. xxix. 5, 2 Chron. xxix. 31; comp. Ex. xxxii. 29), this means, providing oneself with something to offer to Jehovah. [In the article cited above.]

(20) The breast, which was given to Jehovah at the common thank-offerings by waving it, but then relinquished by Him to the priest, falls on the present occasion to the share of Moses, who was acting in the character of priest.—Lastly, Moses sprinkled the priests and their garments with a mixture of anointing oil and blood of the sacrifice (Lev. viii. 30; on the contrary, Ex. xxix. 21 represents this act as taking place immediately after the sprinkling of the altar). [In the cited article.]

(21) No one but the priests might partake of this meal (Ex. xxix. 33). The remains of the meal were burned, to prevent profanation. [In the cited article.]

(22) Doubtless a repetition of the other two sacrifices was to take place, for the daily filling of the hands prescribed in Ex. xxix. 35, Lev. viii. 33, took place just through the offering of consecration, which had itself, again, the burnt-offering as its necessary presupposition. Whether, as the rabbis assume, the anointing took place daily cannot be decided, since at most the only argument in favour of this view is the analogy of the unction of the altar of burnt-offering repeated through seven days, Ex. xxix. 36 f., and the priests commence their duties on the day after the seventh day of the dedication, by presenting a calf for a sin-offering and a ram as a burnt-offering for themselves, after which there follow sin-offerings and thank-offerings for the people (Lev. ix. 1 ff.). Probably, too, the perpetual meat-offering treated of in Lev. vi. 13 ff. was first offered on the same eighth day. The circumstance that this meat-offering was to be presented by Aaron and his sons, thus showing that they must have been fully dedicated, is against the reference of the words בְּיוֹם הַמִּשָּׁח אֹתוֹ to the time of the dedication itself (which would make what is here spoken of only a Mincha, to be offered on one of these seven days). This meat-offering is expressly designated as one to be presented by Aaron and his sons. Tradition says that the high priest had to present this offering every day from the time of his entering into office, whilst the common priests had only to offer it once, on entering

office; and indeed, according to tradition, this meat-offering would be the only part of the ceremonies that we have just described which was retained subsequently at the introduction of the common priests into their office, whereas the whole series of dedication acts was at a later time only carried out at the inauguration of the high priest. [In the cited article.]

(23) The official functions of the priests, in distinction from those of the Levites, Num. xviii. 3, are shortly designated by "coming near to the vessels of the sanctuary and the altar." The functions in the holy place were—lighting the incense on the golden altar every morning and evening, cleaning and taking charge of the lamps and lighting them in the evening, placing the shewbread on Sabbath; in the court—keeping up the continual fire on the altar of burnt-offering, removing the ashes from the altar, presenting the morning and evening sacrifice (Lev. vi. 1 ff.), pronouncing the blessing on the people after—completion of the daily offering (Num. vi. 23–27), waving the pieces of the sacrifices, sprinkling of blood, and laying upon the altar and kindling all the parts which were offered. It was also, Num. x. 8–10, xxxi. 6, the priests' duty to blow the silver trumpets at festivals and sacrificial ceremonials as well as in campaigns (comp. 2 Chron. xiii. 12). [In the cited art.] Compare hereafter the discussion of the new-moon Sabbath, § 150, on the meaning of the trumpet-blast, in virtue of which the blowing of the trumpets forms a part of the priestly intercession.

(24) Thus, on the one hand, the higher position of the priests over the Levites is expressed; and on the other hand, an essential portion of the priests' sustenance is made dependent on the conscientiousness of the Levites. [In the cited article.]

(25) See the particulars in the above-cited article, p. 180 ff., and compare, *infra*, the discussion of the sacrificial ritual and the theocratic gifts.

(26) In Num. xviii. 20, "Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part among them: I am thy part and thine inheritance among the children of Israel," was said to Aaron; comp. Deut. x. 9, xviii. 1 f. (Ezek. xlv. 28).

3. THE HIGH PRIEST (1).

§ 96.

The name of the high priest is *הַכֹּהֵן הַגָּדוֹל*, Num. xxxv. 28, or *הַכֹּהֵן הַקָּדוֹשׁ*, Lev. iv. 3, 5, 16; the most complete expression is in xxi. 10, "The priest who is higher than his brethren, upon whose head the

anointing oil was poured ;” he is also called the priest $\kappa. \xi\xi.$, *e.g.* Deut. xvii. 12 (2). In the high-priesthood was concentrated the mediatorship by which the people were represented before God, and the official priestly sanctity by which they are reconciled. If God in the blood of an offering accepts the life of a clean animal by which the people’s sin and uncleanness is covered (according to the original meaning of כִּפֹּר), in the high-priesthood, on the contrary, a man is elected and sanctified by God that he may in virtue of his holiness appear before Him for the people, and, as is said in the important passage Ex. xxviii. 38, bear the iniquity of the holy things which the children of Israel hallow in all their holy gifts, that they may be accepted before Jehovah. Thus every reconciling and sanctifying effect of the sacrifices is dependent on the existence of a personally reconciling mediatorship before God (3); and here the old covenant proclaims its inadequacy to institute a real reconciliation, in the fact that even the high priest himself, through whose intercession the defect which attaches to the offering is made good, himself in return has need of reconciliation and purification by the blood of sacrifices, as one subject to sin and weakness (comp. Heb. v. 3). As the representative of the whole nation, the high priest bears on his shoulder and on his heart the names of the tribes of the people, Ex. xxviii. 12, 29. (Particulars on this passage below.) The same expiatory sacrifice is demanded for his person as for all the people, because he unites in his person the significance of the whole people (4) (comp. the ritual of sacrifice). When he in whose person the people stand before Jehovah commits an error, this, as is said in Lev. iv. 3, operates לְאַחֲזֶמֶת הָעָם {to the inculpation of the people}; that is, a disturbance of the theocratic order, which requires to be atoned for, is imputed to the whole people. When, on the contrary, God acknowledges a high priest as well-pleasing in His sight, this is a real declaration that He graciously accepts the whole people (5).

This meaning of the high priest, in virtue of which he is the קָדוֹשׁ יְהוָה $\kappa. \xi\xi.$ (comp. Ps. cvi. 16), must be stamped in his whole appearance, which ought to awaken an impression of highest purity and exclusive devotion to God in a still higher degree than that of the common priests. To this end are directed, in the first place, the precepts that relate to the personal condition and order of life of the

priest. With regard to descent and bodily constitution, the law does not lay down anything in which the high priest is different from the other priests (comp. § 95). On the other hand, the provisions in Lev. xxi. 10-15, referring to the order of his life, relate exclusively to the high priest. According to these, he who indeed reflects the wholefulness of a holy life must be freed from all polluting fellowship with death, and not even come in contact (ver. 11) with the corpses of his parents; his priestly rule in the sanctuary may not be interrupted by any consideration whatever of the natural bonds, otherwise regarded as most holy. Even every sign of mourning is denied him (6). With regard to the marriage of the high priest, the prohibition to marry a widow is added to the marriage hindrances relating to the common priests. He must marry a pure virgin (ver. 13 f.) (7).

Further, the high priest's dedication to his office differed from that of the common priests (comp. § 95) with reference to the robing and anointing. On the former, see Ex. xxix. 5-9, Num. xx. 26-28 (8). Without the ornaments of his order, the high priest is simply a private individual, who, as such, cannot intercede for the people; therefore he is threatened with death if he appear before Jehovah without them. The description of the high priest's official garments is given in Ex. xxviii. and xxxix., with which Sir. xlv. 8-13; Josephus, *Ant.* iii. 7. 4 ff., *Bell. Jud.* v. 5. 7, are to be compared (9). Over the ordinary priest's dress the high priest wore, first, the *חֲבִירָה* (LXX. *ποδήρης*), a woven upper dress of blue cotton, which is to be supposed, from the description we have of it, to be not in the style of a mantle, but a close dress, with a laced opening for the neck and (according to Josephus and the Rabbis) armholes (not sleeves), so that the white sleeves of the under dress were seen. It was trimmed on the under hem with a fringe, on which were alternately pomegranates of cotton and golden bells; rabbinical tradition says there were seventy-two of the latter. These served to signal to the people gathered in the court the entrance and performances of the high priest, Ex. xxviii. 35; they could thus follow him with their thoughts and prayers (10). Over the *Meil* was the *ephod*, *אֶפֶד*, and to this the breastplate, *חֹשֶׁן*, with the Urim and the Thummim, was fastened by chains and ribands. The covering of the head is a mitre, *מִצְנֶפֶת* (11). On the front of it was a plate of gold, *פָּאן* (12), called in Ex. xxix. 6 *זָבֵן*, that is, a diadem, with

the inscription קדש ליהוה. For his duties on the yearly day of expiation another dress of office, made of white linen, was prescribed (comp. *infra*, § 140, on the day of expiation).—This dress of office has received very various symbolic interpretations. These go back even to Philo, *de Monarch.* ii. 5 f., who referred it to cosmical relations, in conformity with his conception of the Mosaic cultus. Among more modern writers, Bähr (*Symbolik*, ii. p. 97 ff.) has entered into the particulars of the matter. Proceeding from the position that the high priest, as mediator of the theocratic people, unites in him its three theocratic dignities (comp. *Pirke Aboth* iv. 13),—that of the priesthood, the law, and kingship,—he finds that those of the high priest's garments which he had in common with the other priests express the priestly character; the Me'il, that of the covenant law; the ephod and choshen, that of a king. But the whole presuppositions on which this interpretation rests are incorrect. The Old Testament does not know anything of a royal dignity belonging to the high priest; for the present time it awaits the union of the two dignities in the Messiah (Ps. cx. 4; Zech. vi. 13). Even for the high priest, only the two sides of the priestly calling appear (comp. Deut. xxxiii. 10) which were treated of in § 95; and so also, in Sir. xlv. 16 f., a twofold office is ascribed to the high priest,—the ἐξιλάσκεσθαι περὶ τοῦ λαοῦ by sacrifice, and the ἐξουσία ἐν διαθήκαις κριμάτων διδάξαι τὸν Ἰακώβ τὰ μαρτύρια, κ.τ.λ. (to have power over the ordinances of justice, that He may teach Jacob the precepts, and enlighten Israel in His law). Thus the high priest's dress can have a symbolic meaning only in the two directions which have been mentioned, and this is unmistakeably proved in its main part, the ephod and the breastplate (13). The power to give divine decisions to the people is expressed in the Urim and the Thummim (on these see § 97). The reference to the reconciling mediatorship, as has already been indicated, is especially marked by the fact that the high priest, when clothed with the ephod, bears the names of the twelve tribes on his heart and shoulders. As the heart (comp. § 71) is the focus of personal life, bearing them on the heart denotes personal interpenetration of his life and theirs, in virtue of which the high priest has the most lively sympathy with those for whom he intercedes (14). That the ephod is essentially a shoulder-piece (LXX. ἐπωμὶς) does not make it a symbol of kingly power; what,

generally speaking, lies in this, is only that the dignity of *office* rests on him. When it is said in Ex. xxviii. 12 that the names of the twelve tribes were engraved on the onyx-stones by means of which the shoulder-pieces were fastened together, that certainly does not denote (as v. Gerlach also explains the passage) that the high priest is the people's regent, but it is meant to signify that he, as mediator, carries, as it were, the people to God—that, so to speak, the people (comp. the term in Num. xi. 11) lie as a burden on him.

The robing of the high priest is followed by his unction. The peculiarity of the unction of the high priest is designated by the expression *יָצַק עֲלֵי־רֹאשׁוֹ* (Ex. xxix. 7; Lev. viii. 12, xxi. 10), which implies that the anointing oil is poured on him in rich abundance (comp. Ps. cxxxiii. 2) (15). From his unction, the high priest was called (as remarked above) *κ. ἐξ.*, “the anointed priest” (16).

Lastly, with reference to the high priest's functions, it is first to be noted that all the functions of the common priests fell also on him. The law does not distinguish any services which fell on the latter only. Josephus (*Bell. Jud.* v. 5. 7) says that the high priest's functions were limited to the Sabbath, the new moons, and festivals; but in *Mishna Tamid*, vii. 3, it is presupposed that he might, as he pleased, take part in the sacrificial services. Secondly, the service on the day of atonement, and the Urim and the Thummim, were specially allotted to the high priest (comp. § 140 f.). On his share in the administration of justice, see below.—It is further to be noted, that the whole sacrificial service forms a self-contained unity, and that the same is true of the priesthood. When the subordinate priests officiate at the service of the sacrifice, they do not act as single persons, but by the authority which is bestowed on the whole priesthood, and concentrated in the high priest; and thus they really act in the place of the high priest. Hence it corresponds entirely with the Mosaic view of the priesthood, that Sir. xlv. 14, 16 (17, 20) designates the service of the altar absolutely as the service of Aaron (17).

(1) Comp. my article “Hoherpriester,” in Herzog's *R.E.* vi. p. 198 ff.

(2) In the passages which treat of the high-priesthood in the middle books of the Pentateuch, Aaron, the first bearer of the office, is generally named instead of the office itself.—*כֹּהֵן הָאֵלֹהִים* appears only

in the later style, in 2 Kings xxv. 18, Ezra vii. 5, 2 Chron. xix. 11, comp. xxiv. 6.—The LXX. generally write *ὁ ἱερεὺς ὁ μέγας*,—Lev. iv. 3, *ἀρχιερεύς*, and generally so in the New Testament, in Philo, and Josephus.—On the meaning of the plural of *ἀρχιερεύς*, see the above-cited article, p. 198.

(3) Comp. Calvin's good exposition of Ex. xxviii. 38: "Oblationum sanctarum iniquitas tollenda et purganda fuit per sacerdotem. Frigidum est illud commentum, si quid erroris admissum esset in ceremoniis, remissum fuisse sacerdotis precibus. Longius enim respicere nos oportet: ideo oblationum iniquitatem deleri a sacerdote, quia nulla oblatio, quatenus est hominis, omni vitio caret. Dictu hoc asperum est et fere *παράδοξον*, sanctitates ipsas esse immundas, ut venia indigeant; sed tenendum est, nihil esse tam purum, quod non aliquid labis a nobis contrahat.—Nihil Dei cultu præstantius: et tamen nihil offerre potuit populus etiam a lege præscriptum, nisi intercedente venia, quam nonnisi per sacerdotem obtinuit."

(4) שָׁקֹל כִּנְגֵר כָּל־יִשְׂרָאֵל, "æquiparatur universo Israël," says Aben Esra on Lev. iv. 13. Compare, in particular, Bähr, *Symbol. des mos. Kultus*, ii. p. 13 f.

(5) Zech. iii. must be explained from this point of view; comp. the Prophetic Theology.

(6) The words (Lev. xxi. 12), "He shall not go out of the sanctuary," must be supplemented according to the context, *funeris causa*; x. 7 serves for explanation.—The expression in xxi. 10, "he shall not uncover his head," refers, probably, to the removing of the head-dress in order to sprinkle the head with dust and ashes; see Hävernicks on Ezek. xxiv. 17 [in the above-cited article]. But Knobel understands פָּרַע to mean, leaving the hair loose or flying. Compare on this, and the command not to rend his clothes, the above-cited article, p. 199 f.

(7) And she must be—a point which is mentioned only in the case of the high priest—נָעֻמָּי, which, doubtless, only means that a foreign woman is forbidden; comp. Neh. xiii. 28; Josephus, *c. Ap.* i. 7. For particulars, see in the above-cited article, p. 200, and in it also traditions on the descent, the age required on entering office, and the ethical qualifications of the high priest.

(8) The transference of the office of high priest from Aaron to Eliezer took place (Num. xx. 26–28) by the transference of the ornaments of office.

(9) The most valuable monographs on this topic are: Braun, *de vestitu sacerdotum hebræorum*, 1680; Carpzov, *de pontificum hebræorum vestitu sacro*, in Ugolino's *Thes.* xii.; Abraham ben David,

dissert. de restitu sacerdotum hebræorum, in Ugolino, xiii. [Above article.]

(10) Compare, too, Sir. xlv. 9. The passage Ex. xxviii. 35 was formerly misunderstood, chiefly because it was thought needful closely to connect the words יָמֵת וְלֹא with what precedes them; see the genuinely rabbinical explanation in Abraham ben David, *l.c.* p. xx. f.—Bähr (*Symbolik*, ii. p. 125) thinks it permissible to see in the bells a symbol of the proclamation of God's word. [In the cited article.]

(11) Different from the priestly turban, which is called מִנְבֵּעָה. Particulars in the above-cited article, p. 201.

(12) LXX. πέταλον; the form of a flower is not to be thought of from the expression; see in the *Lexica*.

(13) The term מַעֲשֵׂי הַמֵּיִל, used in Ex. xxviii. 31, shows that the Meil has no independent importance. [Above-cited article.]

(14) Comp. Cant. viii. 6; 2 Cor. vii. 3; Phil. i. 7.—The plerosis of the above provision in the Epistle to the Hebrews is familiar.

(15) Jewish tradition says, that after the oil was poured on the high priest's head, the sign of a cross was made with oil on his forehead, in the form of a Greek X; if this tradition is reliable, Ezek. ix. 4 might be connected with it, for the form of *Tav*, in the old character, is the same as that cross. [Above-cited article.]

(16) According to the tradition of the Jews, the anointing of the high priest continued till the time of Josiah; then the holy anointing oil was hidden, and so lost (comp. Krumholz, *sacerd. hebr.*, in Ugolino, *Thes.* xii. p. lxxxvii.). The succeeding high priests were consecrated only by investiture. [Above-cited article.]

(17) More particulars on the later position of the high priest in the Synedrium, on the expressions כֹּהֵן מִשְׁנֶה (2 Kings xxv. 18; Jer. lli. 24) and כֹּהֵן הַמִּשְׁנָה (2 Kings xxiii. 4), on the later כֹּהֵן הַכֹּהֲנִים, on the continuance and succession of office in the high-priesthood, see in the above-cited article, p. 203 ff.

II. THE THEOCRATIC AUTHORITY.

1. THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

§ 97.

In virtue of the principles of the theocracy, all the powers of the state are united (§ 91) in Jehovah; even when the congregation acts, it is in His name. He is firstly the Lawgiver, מְחַקֵּק (Isa. xxxiii. 22).

He exercised His legislative power through Moses. The fundamental law given through Him is inviolably valid for all time. As God's covenant with His people is eternal, so also are the covenant ordinances; they are, as the expression frequently runs, everlasting laws and statutes for Israel and the future generations (see Ex. xii. 14, 17, xxvii. 21, xxviii. 43, and many passages). The Pentateuch knows nothing of a future change in the law, nor of an abrogation of it even in part; only the attitude of the people towards the law was to be different in the last times (see § 90). But, on the other hand, in the development of the theocracy, the need of receiving an immediate proclamation of Jehovah's kingly will must always reappear. This need was in part served by the Urim and the Thummim, through which the high priest, in whose breastplate they were set, had to receive the decision of Jehovah (Num. xxvii. 21); and this is why the breastplate bears the name *הִטָּן הַמִּשְׁפָּט* (Ex. xxviii. 30). It is probably analogous with the figure made of precious stones, which Diodorus (*Biblioth. i.* 48, 75) and Ælian (*Var. hist. xiv.* 34) say the Egyptian high priest wore round his neck, and which bore the name of truth (*ἀλήθεια*), as indeed the Urim and the Thummim are translated by the LXX. by *ἀλήθεια* and *ἀλήθεια*. The term *אורים* points to the divine illumination, the *תמים* to the unimpeachable correctness of the divine decision; comp. 1 Sam. xiv. 41. It cannot be determined from the Old Testament how the decision took place. It is not quite clear from the expression (Ex. xxviii. 30; Lev. viii. 8), "put the Urim and Thummim in the breastplate of judgment," that the Urim and the Thummim were something different from the precious stones which were set in the breastplate; for the expression may stand in a sense similar to the phrase, to lay a curse or blessing on anything. But if the Urim and Thummim are really spoken of in the passage 1 Sam. xiv. 41 f., as appears if we adopt the fuller text of the LXX. (with Thenius and other moderns), they must be regarded as a holy lot, different from the gems of the breastplate, and probably fastened to it, but capable of being taken off and cast (1). But, on the other hand, it is to be noted that the term *הפיל*, to throw, is nowhere else used for the Urim and Thummim. Since every part of the high priest's dress is described so accurately, we should expect to have a more particular description of the Urim and Thummim if they were anything distinct.

According to Josephus, the divine answer came by the glancing of the jewels; even the rabbinical tradition, though it is so divided on points of detail, is almost unanimous in declaring that the revelation was made by the illumination of particular letters of the writing on the jewels. But several more modern theologians, and especially Bähr (*l.c.* ii. p. 135 ff.), lay down the view, that when the high priest laid the matter in question before God in prayer, the decision followed by inspiration; and "that the pledge that an answer should be given him which should be in accordance with God's will, and serve for the good of the people, was worn on his heart in the Urim and Thummim." Similarly Hengstenberg (*Gesch. des Reiches Gottes*, 2 Per. p. 148 f.). Thus the Urim and Thummim, whether similar to the precious stones of the breastplate or different from them, would have had more the character of simple symbols and pledges (2).—Tradition says that it was not permitted to consult the oracle on private concerns and on matters of small moment, but only in such cases as concerned the welfare of the whole people (comp. Judg. xx. 27 f.). 1 Sam. xxiii. 9 ff., xxx. 7 f., agree with this, for David stands before the high priest here as the one who is called to the kingship. After David there is no occasion on which this oracle is consulted, and the Urim and Thummim seem to have fallen more and more into disuse—displaced, probably, by prophecy. Josephus, indeed, says (*Ant.* iii. 8. 9) that the oracle ceased only two hundred years before his time; but this contradicts the passage Ezra ii. 63, where we read that the oracle was wanting since the exile; and with this Jewish tradition agrees.

The sacred lot seems to have been different from the Urim and Thummim. It was employed (Num. xxvi. 55 f.; Josh. xiv.) at the division of the tribal territories, to discover the guilty one who had brought a curse on the people (Josh. vii. 14 ff.), and in 1 Sam. xiv. 41 (if there the Urim and Thummim are not meant) and 1 Sam. x. 20 f., at the king's election. The lot was also used to decide priestly {{ controversies; compare Prov. xviii. 18.—These methods of inquiring into the divine will retire into the background the more prophecy is unfolded. We read in Deut. xviii. 19 ff., how Moses, before parting from the people, led them to look for the sending forth of new organs of revelation. The people who stand in covenant with the living

God shall not be left to a helplessness which might be the occasion of seeking disclosures from the heathen Mantic, so stringently prohibited in all its forms (3). And as the people could not bear the terror of an immediate revelation from God, Jehovah will hold communion with them through men, raising up again and again from the midst of the people such men as Moses, in whose mouth He puts His words. These are the prophets, the נְבִיאִים (4).

(1) 1 Sam. xiv. 41, the inquiring into the divine will by Saul: "God of Israel, give תְּמִים,"—give a pure, true utterance. Ver. 42: "Draw lots between me and Jonathan."—I believe, with Keil, that another sacred lot is here spoken of. {That the Hebrew text of ver. 41 is corrupt is hardly to be denied; cf. Wellhausen on the passage.}

(2) Special points of support are wanting for Bähr's view. We must here close with a *non liquet*.

(3) Comp. Num. xxiii. 23: "Surely there is no enchantment in Jacob, neither is there any divination in Israel; in due time it is told of Jacob and Israel what God doeth." See Hengstenberg on the passage.

(4) The Prophetic Theology connects with this point.

2. THE JUDICIAL POWER (1).

§ 98.

The Principle and Organization of the Administration of Justice.

The administration of justice is, in virtue of the principles of theocracy, only an efflux of the divine judgment. "The judgment is God's," Deut. i. 17; to seek justice is to inquire at God, Ex. xviii. 15; he comes before Jehovah who appears in judgment, Deut. xix. 17; and thus also the expressions, הָיָא אֱלֹהִים, Ex. xxi. 6, and בּוֹא עַד הָאֱלֹהִים, xxii. 8, are to be explained, whether it be that these expressions point to the God who rules in the administration of justice (comp. also xviii. 19), or that the judge himself is called Elohim, as the one who takes the place of God (comp. Ps. lxxxii. 1, 6, but not Ex. xxii. 27, where אֱלֹהִים designates God; comp. § 86). The theocratic ordinances of judgment limit also the power of the head of a family, by taking from him (Deut. xxi. 18 ff.; Ex. xxi. 20) the

power over the life and death of those belonging to him, which he still exercised (comp. Gen. xxxviii. 24) in the time of the patriarchs. Penal retribution by self-help is besides excluded, because the office of avenger is God's alone, Lev. xix. 18. The old custom of blood revenge is indeed retained, but it is subjected to theocratic regulations (2).

With regard to the organization of the courts of justice, we must distinguish in the Pentateuch the provisions given mainly for the march through the wilderness, and the regulations in Deuteronomy, which had reference to later circumstances.—Moses, who at the beginning united in his person all theocratic offices, is also the first judge, Ex. xviii. 13 ff. As he was unable alone to meet the cares of justice, he set judges over the people,—over thousands, over hundreds, over fifties, and over tens, at Jethro's advice, ver. 25 f.; Deut. i. 12 ff. At the nomination of the judges, which was supported by the choice of the people (Deut. i. 13, "Take you"), the moral and intellectual qualities of those nominated were chiefly taken into account, Ex. xviii. 21, Deut. i. 13, 15; still it is probable that Moses (comp. Deut. i. 5, "I took the chiefs of your tribes") was guided by the constitution of the tribes then existing among the people, and at the same time by regard to the military division of the people, which was necessary during the march through the wilderness (comp. Num. xxxi. 14, where there is mention of military captains over thousands and over hundreds).—We are not to think of appellate courts in connection with the relation of these judges to one another. The subordinate judges are to decide minor matters, whilst the more difficult cases are brought before Moses, to whom they are referred not by the disputing parties, but by the subordinate judges who find the matter too difficult for them, Deut. i. 17 f. (Ex. xviii. 22, 26); upon which Moses brings them to Jehovah; comp. Ex. xviii. 19, and the examples in Lev. xxiv. 11 ff., Num. xv. 33 ff., xxvii. 2 ff. (3).

Deuteronomy lays down new regulations for the future time of the people's settlement in the land (the explanation of which has some difficulties). The administration of justice is placed in the hand of the congregation; for the people that is sanctified to God has, as such, the calling "to put away the evil from its midst," which is the ever-recurring formula; see passages like Deut. xiii. 6, xvii. 7, xxi.

21, etc., compared with earlier ones, Lev. xxiv. 14, Num. xv. 35.—A very vivid description of the way in which courts were held in Israel is given in later times by the story of the judgment of Naboth, 1 Kings xxi.—Hence the administration is to be exercised publicly, on the open places before the gates, Deut. xxi. 19, xxii. 15, xxv. 7. The community exercises its judicial power by special judges, who are to be placed in all the gates, Deut. xvi. 18 (who decide “if there be a quarrel between men,” xxv. 1). These are different—see Deut. xxi. 2, comp. Josh. viii. 33 (xxiii. 2)—from the שֹׁפְטִים, but probably are, as a rule, taken from them (4). The college of the שֹׁפְטִים itself acts only in cases of law, where the question is no longer one of judicial inquiry, but of judicial interposition in a matter already plain; Deut. xix. 12, xxi. 19, xxii. 15, xxv. 8 (5). A higher tribunal is ordained for more difficult cases, Deut. xvii. 8 ff. It is to judge “between blood and blood (*i.e.* where it is doubtful under which category (comp. Ex. xxi. 12 ff.) a manslaughter is to be placed); between strife and strife (וִיכָח, without doubt as designation of the *causæ civiles*); between injury and injury” (נִזְקֵי here, and in xxi. 5, no doubt denotes bodily injuries) (6). Here also the court is not a court of appeal, but has to decide cases in which the local courts do not venture to decide. The seat of this higher court was to be at the sanctuary; it was to be composed of priests, who (Lev. x. 11) were to give a decision out of the law (as already in Num. xv. 33, xxvii. 2, we find that the high priest took a part in the administration of justice), and a civil judge (7), who had other judges at his side, Deut. xix. 17 (8).—The שֹׁטְרִים appear as officers subordinate to the judges (and are mentioned as early as the residence in Egypt as the overseers of the people, comp. § 26), Deut. i. 15, xvi. 18 (comp. Josh. viii. 33; 1 Chron. xxiii. 4, etc.). These, as their name denotes, were “writers” (9), from which arose very multifarious employments. In the highest college of 70 elders, there were Shôterîm, Num. xi. 16. They had to act in selecting men for war service, Deut. xx. 5, 8, 9; and many other duties of police and administration may have been added to this (10).

(1) For literature, compare Schnell’s valuable little monograph, *Das israelitische Recht in seinen Grundzügen dargestellt*, Basel 1853. The chief work on this topic is the book by Saalschütz, *Das mosaische Recht*, two parts, 1846–48, 2d ed. 1853. See, too, my article,

“Gericht und Gerichtsverwaltung bei den Hebräern,” in Herzog’s *R.E.* v. p. 57 ff.

(2) See *infra*, in the treatment of family relationships, § 108.

(3) Lastly are to be cited the שֹׁפְטִים, mentioned in Ex. xxi. 22, umpires. In that passage their office is to estimate a bodily injury (in Job xxxi. 11, comp. ver. 28, the expression stands in a more general meaning).—Comp. Selden, *de Synedrüs vet. Hebr.* i. 16; Schnell, *l.c.* p. 6 ff. [In the cited article.]

(4) On Josephus’ notice of this local court, in *Ant.* iv. 8. 14, see in the above-cited article, p. 58.

(5) See Schultz on Deut. xvi. 18, etc.

(6) For other explanations of this very variously interpreted passage, see Gerhard’s *Commentary on Deut.* p. 1025 f.—When any man seeks by false witness to bring the guilt of a crime on another, this is specially designated (Deut. xix. 16 f.) as a case belonging to the higher court. [In the above-cited article.]

(7) For it is clear enough that the שֹׁפֵט, Deut. xvii. 9, 12, is not the same person as the high priest.

(8) Comp. on this topic, Gerhard on Deut. xvii.; also Riehm, *Die Gesetzgebung Moses im Lande Moab*, p. 62 f.—On the artificial exegesis of the passage by Saalschütz, *l.c.* p. 72, see the article cited above, p. 59, note.

(9) See Hengstenberg, *Beiträge*, etc. ii. p. 449 ff.

(10) Comp. Keil, *Commentary on Joshua* (1847), pp. 12, 115 ff., and Saalschütz, *l.c.* p. 58 ff.

§ 99.

The Course of Justice and Punishment.

The course of justice is very simple (1). The complaint is brought before the judges by word of mouth, either by the parties, Deut. xxi. 20, xxii. 16, or by others bringing both parties in the dispute into court, xxv. 1. The parties have both to appear in person before the judge. The judge sends for an accused person who does not appear, xxv. 8. A judge’s business is, as it is said, to hear and sift accurately. The law (as Schnell rightly observes) accumulates expressions (comp. *e.g.* xiii. 15) “to represent the whole thorough work of the judge, in its emphasis, its penetration, its patience.”—In some circumstances a simple sign of truth (Ex. xxii. 12 (13)) serves as evidence; Deut. xxii. 15 is an example of such a proof. Another

species of case is when parents complain against a disobedient son (xxi. 18 ff.). Here the complaint is witness for itself (2).—But the evidence of witnesses offers the most common means of proof. This point is handled with special emphasis. It is commanded that two or three (3) witnesses are to be brought, xix. 15, particularly in judging criminal matters, Num. xxxv. 30; Deut. xvii. 6. If the punishment of death be decreed, the hand of the witnesses must be the first lifted against the person who is to be punished, Deut. xiii. 10, xvii. 7 (4). All the witnesses (Lev. xxiv. 14) lay their hands on the head of him who is to be stoned. He who was convicted of false witness was condemned to the same punishment as the accused person had met, Deut. xix. 19 (5).—Further, the oath is also a means of evidence. It occurs as an oath of purgation; *e.g.* for theft, Ex. xxii. 6–10, comp. with 1 Kings viii. 31 f. Lev. v. 1 is often quoted for the use of the oath in witness; but what is there spoken of is not the administration of an oath to the witnesses with respect to what they utter, but a solemn adjuration of those present, by which those who have knowledge of the matter are called on to come forward as witnesses; comp. Prov. xxix. 24 (6). Lastly, we have to add the adjuration of a wife who was accused of adultery, which called forth an immediate judgment from God, Num. v. 11 ff. (7). Mosaic justice does not recognise torture as a means of evidence.—The form of the sentence of judgment is not laid down (8). As a rule, execution immediately followed on condemnation, Num. xv. 36; Deut. xxii. 18, xxv. 2.

The Mosaic principle of punishment is the *jus talionis*, as it is repeatedly expressed in the sentence, “Life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,” etc., Ex. xxi. 23–25; Lev. xxiv. 18 ff.; Deut. xix. 21: it shall be done to him who has offended as he has done; in other words, the punishment is a retribution corresponding in quantity and quality to the wicked deed. But that the *talio* is not meant to be abstractly and superficially carried out is not only shown by various provisions of punishment, but is made clear from the fact that not simply the objective manifestation of the deed, but the subjective side, viz. the guilt lying at the root of the deed, is often taken into account in determining the punishment (9). The punishment of death appears very widely applied. It is ordained not only for the crime of murder (10), maltreatment of parents, man-stealing (Ex. xxi. 12 ff.),

adultery, incest and other unnatural crimes, idolatry, and the practice of heathen divination and witchcraft (Lev. xx.; Deut. xiii. 6 ff.), but for overstepping certain ritual principles of the theocracy,—the law of circumcision, Gen. xvii. 14; the law of the passover, Ex. xii. 15, 19; the Sabbath law, xxxi. 14 f.; the pollution of sacrifices, Lev. vii. 20 ff.; sacrificing at other places than the sanctuary, xvii. 8 f.; certain laws of purification, xxii. 3, Num. xix. 13, 20. Yet the peculiar expression, *וַיִּכְרְתָהּ הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַזֵּאת מִקֶּרֶב עַמּוֹ*, or *מֵעַמִּיָּהּ*, is chosen for the punishment of transgressions of the latter class in distinction from the former,—an expression which, indeed, cannot refer to simple banishment (as some have interpreted it), but still, in some cases, seems to point to a punishment to be executed not by human judgment, but by the divine power; comp. what is said in Lev. xvii. 10 with reference to the person who eats blood: “I will blot out that person” (*וַיִּכְרְתֵנִי*). When the punishment was really to be executed by human judgment, the term *מוֹת יוֹמָת* is used—as of the violation of the Sabbath law, Ex. xxxi. 14, and in the passages of the former kind, Ex. xxi. 12 ff., Lev. xx., etc. In general, in all cases where the people did not execute judgment on the transgressor, Jehovah Himself reserves the exercise of justice to Himself; see, as main passage, Lev. xx. 4–6.—In Mosaic law, corporal chastisement (stripes) appears as another punishment, Deut. xxv. 2 f., also fines, *e.g.* Ex. xxi. 22, Lev. xxiv. 18, etc. The *jus talionis* was to be put in application for bodily injury, Ex. xxi. 23–25; Lev. xxiv. 19 f.; Deut. xix. 21. But it seems that this was only adhered to in principle; and in this case we may suppose that a proportionate money fine generally took the place of bodily punishment. Further, there occurs the judicial selling of a guilty person (11). The Pentateuch, on the contrary, knows of imprisonment as a punishment only among the Egyptians (Gen. xxxix. ff.), and the Mosaic law does not recognise it (though certainly at a later time this punishment occurs in Israel also); in Lev. xxiv. 12, imprisonment is only used to secure the man for the time.—With what emphasis the law demands stringent and impartial administration of justice, especially with reference to the poor, see Ex. xxiii. 6–8, Lev. xix. 15, Deut. i. 16 f., and other passages (12).

(1) I follow closely Schnell's excellent discussion, *l.c.* p. 10 ff.

The delineation of these topics is a matter for lawyers, and it is to be regretted that the Mosaic law has not received more attention from them.

(2) In Dent. xxi. 18 ff., it is ordained that, if the chastisement inflicted on a reckless, stubborn son is without result, he shall be brought by the parents before the court of the town, and be put to death by sentence of the judge.—Schnell continues, *l.c.* p. 11: "If the heart of the father and mother consents to deliver their child to the judge before the congregation of the people, this is more than all that the judges need to know."—See Saalschütz, *l.c.* p. 588 f.; Duschak, *Josephus and the Traditions*, 1864, p. 66 f. (*Tr. Sanhedrin*, chap. 8), on the provisions made, according to rabbinical tradition, to prevent the abuse of this law. Afterwards, the law was so limited that it could seldom or never come into operation.

(3) This point is excellently discussed in the paper, "Göttliches Recht und menschliche Satzung," Basel 1839: "There are witnesses of God, and faithful witnesses; and there are witnesses who cannot show the truth, and witnesses who must be put to shame. Therefore the judges are permitted and ordered to consider, besides those things which come before their eyes, other points which may decide whether they shall require the evidence of two or of three witnesses."

(4) Schnell, *l.c.* p. 12, remarks: "A provision which gave ground to expect that, without the utmost certainty or wickedness, none would be a witness."

(5) In cases of voluntary jurisdiction, as in mercantile contracts, the witnesses take the place of written documents; comp. the narrative in Gen. xxiii. 12–16, and particularly Ruth iv. 9–11. See the later regulations as to evidence in courts of justice, in *Tr. Sanhedrin*, iii. 3–6, v. 1–4. [Above-cited article.]

(6) The history in Judg. xvii. 2 also serves in elucidation. [Above article.]—More particulars on the oath in § 113.

(7) On this, compare the later discussion on adultery (§ 104), and the offering of jealousy under acts of purification (§ 143).

(8) We may find in Job xiii. 26, Isa. x. 1, a trace of a written record of judicial sentences; the latter passage may, however, also refer to general unjust decrees. [Above-cited article.]

(9) Compare afterwards, under the law of families, what is said of the avenger of blood (§ 108), and on the terms בִּיֵּד and בְּשֵׁנֶיָּה, what is said in § 137.

(10) On this, too, see the discussion of the avenging of blood.

(11) See § 110.

(12) See the scattered notices in the other Old Testament books on matters of judgment in the above-cited article, and various things in the historical section of prophecy.

3. THE EXECUTIVE POWER.

§ 100.

The Mosaic theocracy presents the peculiar phenomenon of being originally unacquainted with a definite office for executing the power of the state. The princes of the tribes (נְשִׂימִים), spoken of in Num. i. 16, 44, vii. 2, Ex. xxxiv. 31, and elsewhere, form no theocratic body (1). They are taken from the זְקֵנִים, who arose, doubtless, from the heads of clans and families (2). The latter had, indeed, a judicial position, but they appear mainly as representatives of the people (קְרִיאֵי הָעֵדָה, Num. i. 16, comp. with xvi. 2), not of Jehovah. That they were appointed for certain services always rests on particular nomination. Thus the committee of the Seventy was formed, who (Num. xi. 16 ff.) were to stand by Moses' side in leading the people, but who appear to have existed only for the time of the march through the wilderness, though the Talmud derives the origin of the Synedrium from them. In the same way, twelve chiefs were ordained to spy out the Holy Land (Num. xiii. 2 ff.), and twelve princes were called to the committee formed for dividing the land, xxxiv. 18 ff. But all this constitutes no permanent executive. Jehovah Himself comes in actively, as circumstances demand, in immediate revelation of power, in order to execute His kingly will and to maintain the covenant law; but for the rest, only the assurance is expressed (Num. xxvii. 16 f.) that Jehovah will not leave His congregation as a flock without a shepherd, but will always, again and again, appoint a leader over them and equip him by His Spirit, as He raised up Joshua in Moses' stead, and afterwards the judges.—This want of a regular executive in the Mosaic constitution has been thought very remarkable (3). It has been thought inconceivable that Moses did so little for the execution of his detailed legislation—that he did not see that without a supreme authority no state could possibly exist. It is said that this contains a main proof that the whole Mosaic state, as it is laid before us in the Pentateuch, is only an unhistorical abstraction.

But the theocratic constitution does not rest on the calculations of a clever founder of a religion, but on the stability of the counsel of revelation, which is certain of its realization (in spite of the presumed inadequacy of the earthly institution); that want just shows the strength and self-confidence of the theocratic principle. Moreover, the whole history of the people in the time of the judges is to be understood only on the presupposition that there was no established executive power in the State.

Yet Deuteronomy, in giving the law of a king in chap. xvii. 14-20, leaves open the possibility of setting up an earthly kingship. The real future existence of this office is, then, presupposed in xxviii. 36 (comp., moreover, the previous prophecy in Gen. xvii. 6, 16, xxxv. 11; Num. xxiv. 17). This future kingship is, however, subjected strictly to the theocratic principle. The people shall only set over them as king one whom Jehovah shall choose out of their midst. The kingly dignity shall indeed be confined to Israelites by descent, but not to any particular privileged family (like the priesthood); while, at the same time, it is not conferred by the free choice of the people (as the Edomites, for example, Gen. xxxvi. 31-39, must have had such an elective kingship). The chosen king shall "not keep many horses"—that is, he is not to support his dominion by a standing army (comp. Isa. xxxi. 1); he shall likewise avoid luxury and the keeping of many wives. He is, further, not to regard himself as the people's lawgiver, but shall take the divine law as his strict rule, "that his heart may not be lifted up above his brethren, and that he may not deviate from the command, either to the right hand or the left" (4). The stability of his kingship and its descent to his children are to depend on his obedience to the law.—It cannot be denied that the law of the king in Deuteronomy, inasmuch as it claims to be regarded as Mosaic, is a little remarkable; and what is remarkable in it is not that Moses contemplated in general the institution of an earthly kingship, for sufficient occasion for this is contained in the political constitution of "all the nations around" (Deut. xvii. 14); but the main difficulty is that, not to speak of the example of Gideon (Judg. viii. 23), there is no express reference to a pre-existing Mosaic law of the king when Samuel set up the kingdom (though the proceeding then was quite in the spirit of the law), but the prerogative of the king was first

established by Samuel, and then (1 Sam. x. 25) set down in the book which is before Jehovah, that is, the book of the law.

Hence, in connection with the supposition that the law in Deuteronomy is of more modern origin, many modern theologians regard the law of the king as a later production, formed on the model of the provisions sketched by Samuel, with reference to the unhappy experiences of the time of Solomon (5); but this makes it difficult to explain why a later writer could give as the reason of the law forbidding to keep horses (Deut. xvii. 16), that the people **must not** be brought back again to Egypt (6).

(1) The princes of the tribes were also called the heads of the tribes (נְסִיכֵי, Num. xxx. 2; Deut. v. 20).

(2) The elders were not appointed by free choice, as Winer, in the *bibl. Realwörterbuch*, 3d ed. i. p. 50, and Kurtz, *Geschichte des A. Bundes*, ii. p. 33, have supposed, holding the view that the elders form in a certain sense the personal nobility, or nobility of merit, in contrast to the nobility of birth, the princes of the tribes. See the proof for the view in the text in my article "Stämme Israels," in Herzog's *R.E.* xiv. p. 771.

(3) Comp. Vatke, *Religion des A. T.* p. 207 f.

(4) There cannot be a stronger contrast to Oriental despotism.

(5) Comp. Riehm, *die Gesetzgebung Moses im Lande Moab*, p. 81 ff., and against him Keil, in Hävernick's *Introduction*, i. 2, 2d ed. p. 473 f.

(6) Riehm, *l.c.* p. 100, says the passage points to a time when the Egyptians were in want of soldiers, so that the king of Israel could only get horses from Egypt on the condition of sending Israelite foot-soldiers there, and putting them at the disposal of the king of Egypt. This is supposed to apply to the time of Psammetichus. This hypothesis has no support in the Old Testament [article, "Könige, Königthum in Israel"].—The words only suit a time in which the stay in Egypt was still fresh in the people's memory, and so, in the hard struggles that they had to encounter, could reawaken a desire towards the habitation they had quitted. (Comp. Hengstenberg, *Beitr. zur Ehl.* iii. p. 247 f.)

III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FAMILY, AND THE LEGAL PROVISIONS CONNECTED THEREWITH.

§ 101.

The Subdivisions of the Tribes. The Principles and Division of Mosaic Family Law.

By nature the tribes fall into clans (מִשְׁפָּחוֹת, LXX. *δῆμοι*, or אֲבֹתָיִם) (1); these into families or houses (בָּתִּים, *οἴκοι*), generally called *fathers' houses* (בֵּית אָבוֹת); then follow the various householders (בְּרִיִּים), with those that belong to them. See the most distinct passage, Josh. vii. 14, 17 f., and also especially Num. i. 2, 18, also Ex. vi. 14. The term בֵּית אָבוֹת, "fathers' houses" (not "father's house," as Clericus and others have understood it), is to be regarded as a plural of the less common singular, בֵּית אָב (2). Beside this meaning of בֵּית אָב, which is unquestionable, from the already-cited passages and others, such as 1 Chron. vii. 7, 40, there is another sense of the word, which is, however, disputed. On the one view, *father's house* is a relative idea of general application, like our "family" or "house;" designating a community which has a common father, it may, it is said, designate whole tribes (Num. xvii. 17; Josh. xxii. 14), and also may stand for a מִשְׁפָּחָה (3); comp. Num. iii. 24, 30, 35, and other passages. On the other view, בֵּית אָב, in passages of this sort—and this is probably the original meaning—designates particularly that family which held the principality in each tribe and race as the family of the first-born (so that the representatives of tribes might be called also heads of the houses of the father) (4).

The principles of the Mosaic law of families are the following:—Each family forms a self-contained whole, which, as far as possible, is to be preserved in its integrity. Each Israelite is a citizen of the theocracy only by being incorporated in a certain clan of the covenant people; hence the value of genealogical trees. The representation of the family descends in the male line, and therefore marriages between the various tribes and families are of course allowed. On the contrary, if the male line has died out, the female line receives independent recognition for the preservation of the family, in order that no family in Israel may perish (a thing which is regarded as a

special divine judgment). The separation of family possessions is based on the separation of the families themselves.

The following points are the most important for biblical theology : —1. The law of marriage; 2. The relation of parents and children; 3. The law of inheritance, and the provisions touching the continuance of a family and its possessions (the avenging of blood goes along with this); 4. The right of servants (5).

(1) With reference to the expression אֲלָפִים, thousands, see in particular 1 Sam. x. 19, comp. with ver. 21. It is probable that this designation arose from Moses having followed, as much as possible, the natural organization of the tribes when, according to Ex. xviii. 25, he divided the people by thousands, hundreds, etc. (§ 98), for the purpose of the administration of justice. [Article, "Stämme Israels."]

(2) The term is thus a sort of compound; comp. Ewald, *Ausf. Lelrb.* 8th ed. § 270c. Thus, in 2 Kings xvii. 29, 32, בֵּית בָּמוֹת means houses of high places.—When רִאשִׁי precedes, the shorter form אֲבוֹת is sometimes used instead of בֵּית אֲבוֹת (Num. xxxvi. 1; 1 Chron. vii. 11; comp. with ver. 9, viii. 10, 13, etc.) [in the article cited above].

(3) As also מִשְׁפָּחָה is frequently used in a wider, and מִבֵּית (Num. iv. 18; Judg. xx. 12) in a narrower sense [in the article cited above].

(4) The controversy is difficult to decide, and we cannot here enter into it particularly. For the former view, comp. Knobel on Ex. vi. 14; this is the most common view. In reference to the latter view, which is, I believe, the right one, see, in particular, Keil's thorough discussion in his *bibl. Archäol.* ii. pp. 197, 201 ff.—A certain number of heads was probably requisite to obtain the rank of a clan or father's house; for in 1 Chron. xxiii. 11 it is said, in reference to two descendants of a Levitical race, that they were united into one paternal house on account of the small number of their children; comp., too, Mic. v. 1. The number of one thousand men able to go to war (see note 1) may have been the minimum size of a clan. But the clans must have been much larger at the numbering of the people recounted in Num. xxvi., when the people (without counting the tribe of Levi, which was not mustered) were divided into fifty-seven clans.—The subdivisions of the people were mainly formed on the principle, that as the tribes sprang from Jacob's sons, so the clans sprang from his grandchildren, and the father's houses from his great-grandchildren. However, it lay in the nature of the thing that this original relationship was modified in many ways in the course of time. Some clans

disappeared, while from others new ones were formed, in ways for which no fixed principle can be found, and which were doubtless modified by very various circumstances.—Examples to illustrate the above propositions in the above-cited article, p. 770.

(5) If we were discussing a system of modern law, we should indeed select a very different division; but the *Theology of the Old Testament* must explain the law as much as possible in the real connection in which it appears in the legislation itself.

1. THE LAW OF MARRIAGE.

§ 102.

(a) *The Conclusion of Marriage: the Dependent Position of the Wife, and the Forms of Marriage Contract.*

In the Mosaic law, woman appears not, indeed, in the position of degradation which she has among most other Oriental nations, but still dependent, inasmuch as her will is subject before marriage to the will of her father, and after marriage to the will of her husband; only when this tie is loosed does the wife hold a position of relative independence. This principle comes out with special clearness in the law about vows, Num. xxx. 4–10 (comp. § 134, with note 10).

The concluding of a marriage is generally supposed to have rested on a contract made between the parents of the bride and bridegroom, in virtue of which a price had to be paid to the father of the bride for his daughter, *מִתְּרָה* (generally translated “dowry”) (and so the principle just stated comes out even in the making of the marriage). According to others, on the contrary (1), no such selling took place, and *מִתְּרָה* means the present sent to the bride by the bridegroom, to which were added other presents called *מִנְּהָנוֹת* or *מִתְּנָן*, for the kinsfolk of the bride. Certainly this is the manner of procedure in Gen. xxiv. 53, with which we may compare xxxiv. 12; and in xxiv. 58 the consent of the eldest brother and the bride herself is demanded, besides that of the parents (2). Further, if the example of Jacob’s wooing and his treatment by Laban are adduced in favour of the dominant view, the opposite opinion appeals to Gen. xxxi. 15, where Laban’s daughters complain that their father has treated them like strangers, and wasted their money (*בִּפְסָדָנִי*). But not only does 1 Sam. xviii. 25 speak for the view that the Mohar was given to the father, but also the passages

Ex. xxii. 16, Deut. xxii. 29 (in which, in the case of a maiden being forced, the Mohar was given to the father), as well as the circumstance that, Ex. xxi. 7, the father had the right to sell his daughter formally to another, who wished her either for his own wife or for his son's wife (3). It is most probable that various forms of marriage contract subsisted side by side (4), and that the nobler form is to be looked upon as having come down from patriarchal times. As a rule, the wife did not bring property into the marriage, for by the law property rests with the husband. Heiresses are exceptions, as we shall see later (§ 106). Still at least one example of a dowry is mentioned in Josh. xv. 18 f. The law does not command a religious consecration of the matrimonial tie; but it is clear from Mal. ii. 14 that marriage was to be regarded as a divinely sanctioned tie. Purity of entrance into the married state is guarded by such laws as Deut. xxxii. 13 ff. and ver. 28 f. Owing to the wife's dependent state, marriage with women not Israelites could not in general be specially objected to; compare the law on marriage with virgins taken in war, Deut. xxi. 10–13 (even Moses himself had a Cushite as wife, Num. xii. 1); only marriage with Canaanite women was absolutely forbidden, Ex. xxxiv. 16, Deut. vii. 3. The wife's dependent place favoured the spread of polygamy, although, as has been already remarked (§ 69), this was in contradiction to the Mosaic idea of marriage. It is nowhere expressly approved, but only limited by the provisions Lev. xviii. 18 (comp. § 69, 2). In the same way, it is forbidden by the law, Ex. xxi. 10 f., to allow the rights of the first married wife to suffer by a later marriage.

(1) So, for example, following Saalschütz, Keil, *Archäologie*, ii. p. 67 ff.

(2) Gen. xxiv. 58: "Wilt thou go with the man?—I will go."

(3) Particulars on Ex. xxi. 7, what is to be said on the rights of servants (§ 110).

(4) Even Roman law knows various forms of marriage engagement.

§ 103.

Continuation.—Bars to Marriage (1).

In the Mosaic law of marriage, the provisions about obstacles to marriage—which stand in express contrast to the depravity of

Canaanite and Egyptian heathenism (Lev. xviii. 3, 24, xx. 23), and in which the moral earnestness of the Mosaic law is brought out—occupy an important place. These provisions are contained in Lev. xviii. 6–18, xx. 11–21; to which are added Deut. xxvii. 20, 22 f. All marriages with near relations are forbidden, and that not only with blood relations, but also with connections by affinity. In reference to blood relationship, the principle laid down is (Lev. xviii. 6), *אִישׁ אִשׁ אֶל-כָּל-שָׂאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ לֹא תִקְרָב*. We see here that the word *שָׂאֵר* (flesh) stands directly for a blood relation, *e.g.* ver. 12, etc.; and *שָׂאֵרָה* is a designation of blood relationship, ver. 17. Marriage is forbidden between parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren; also between brothers and sisters—as well between half as full brother and sister; likewise marriage with the sister of the father and mother, but not marriage between uncle and niece, is forbidden (Lev. xviii. 6–13). Nevertheless, marriage with an aunt is not treated as a crime worthy of death, like the rest; it is only said, Lev. xx. 19, “they shall bear their iniquity.” But the punishment of death was appointed for the other forbidden marriages, xx. 17; comp. Deut. xxvii. 22. The history of Tamar, in 2 Sam. xiii. 13, raises a difficulty, because there marriage with a half-sister seems to be looked on as permitted. Probably the words are only to be understood as an attempt at escape on the part of Tamar (2).—Among connections by affinity (Lev. xviii. 8, 14 ff.) marriage is forbidden—1. with a step-mother, step-daughter, step-grandchild, mother-in-law, and daughter-in-law. These are punished by death, Lev. xx. 11–14; comp. Deut. xxvii. 20, 23. 2. Marriage with an uncle’s widow on the father’s side, and with a brother’s widow—the latter with the exception of the Levirate marriage (on this later, § 106)—that is, if the brother has left children by his wife. Over those last-named marriages impends the punishment of childlessness, which is not to be understood, with J. D. Michaelis, *Mos. Recht*, v. p. 199, as referring to civil childlessness—that is, that the children of such a marriage were not reckoned to their real father, but to his dead brother or his father’s brother, but is rather to be regarded as the actual withdrawal of the blessing of children threatened by God, so that no judicial act has place.—Marriage with the widow of a mother’s brother, and a wife’s sister after the wife’s death, was allowed; for the prohibition mentioned in § 102, Lev. xviii. 18

(that a man may not marry two sisters), refers expressly only to the time when the wife still lives; marrying both at the same time, as the patriarch Jacob did, was forbidden (3).

Wherein lies the ground of these provisions of the law? They may appear in part remarkable, since the Pentateuch gives instances of such marriages from very early history, and even relates that Abraham married a half-sister, for this is the most probable view of his relation to Sarah (4). Michaelis (*l.c.* p. 178 ff.) takes the view that such prohibitions had only the purpose of preventing the seduction of persons living together in one house; but this is certainly wrong, for in this case such marriages would not be shameful in themselves, as they are called נִשְׁתָּהוּ (Lev. xviii. 17, xx. 14, etc.), an expression which properly means a design, malice, but is used in the Old Testament of gross crime; and further, עֲוֹן, outrage, xx. 17 (in the Aramaic use of the word), חֲבִיל, ver. 12. Even reference to the *horror naturalis* is not sufficient; for, as several heathen nations allowed marriages with the nearest blood relations (as Lev. xviii. 3, 24, this is mentioned as customary among the Egyptians and Canaanites), it is manifest that it is in the first instance a moral horror that must prevent such marriages, and that the feeling that is called *horror naturalis* proceeds only from this. The moral ground for the prohibition can be no other than that a moral fellowship is already constituted through the natural forms of near relationship, which would be disturbed by the matrimonial bond. Parental and brotherly love on the one side, and the love of married persons on the other, are so specifically different, that by mixing the two neither can find full and holy development. The one moral relationship is sacrificed, without the other being really called into existence (5). As far as a definitely marked moral relation is constituted by relationship, so far does the prohibition reach not to mingle it with marriage connection. Even the marriage of a nephew with the sister of the father or mother breaks up a natural relationship of piety, since the man ought to be the head of the woman; but not so the marriage of an uncle and niece. The circumstance that marriage is forbidden with a father's brother's widow, and not with a mother's brother's widow, is, I believe, to be explained by the fact that the father's brother stands in a position of higher authority towards the nephew than does the mother's brother, in virtue of the value which the husband's side has in the

family.—With the reason just stated is connected the further reason already given by Augustine (6), that by divine ordinance the moral fellowship of mankind was to be realized in a multiplicity of forms. In ancient times this purpose was served by the marriage of brother and sister; indeed, that was the only means of realizing it. But Abraham's marriage with his half-sister, if Sarah really was such, seems, from the Mosaic standpoint, to have been justified mainly because through it alone the pollution of the race of revelation by heathen elements was prevented; comp. Gen. xxiv. 3 (7).

(1) The provisions on this point are given in the Old Testament in full detail. Biblical theology must, of course, here confine itself rigidly to what is expressly stated. When Thiersch (*Das Verbot der Ehe in zu naher Verwandtschaft*, 1869) proceeds on the supposition that the law gives concrete provisions, from which other provisions are to be deduced, this is quite right in itself (and, indeed, is true of the whole Mosaic law). But if we will make deductions from the provisions in the Mosaic law of bars to marriage, the question is whether we hit the right principle; and here, I believe, Thiersch has failed.

(2) So Keil, following Clericus: Tamar only says it, “ut e manibus ejus quacunque ratione posset, elaberetur.”—Thus the words cannot be used for archæological purposes. The explanation of Thenius, that the law only forbids fornication between half-sisters, not regular marriages, is incorrect.

(3) This is the famous point of controversy so often discussed in the English Parliament. But there can be no doubt upon the matter whatever. All the arguments brought to prove that marriage with the sister of a dead wife is, according to Mosaism, a sin, and the analogies on which this conclusion is based (*e.g.* by O. v. Gerlach), are quite worthless.—Difficult is לָקִיץ in Lev. xviii. 18. Many, as Gesenius, give the word

a sense not elsewhere found in Hebrew (but in Arabic, ^{ضَم}): “ita ut zelotypæ fiant, una alterius æmula sit,” “to jealousy;” but it is probably to be taken in a wider sense, “to hostility” (Keil makes it, “to tie them together,” supposing this to mean an unnatural breach of the sisterly relation!).

(4) It is true that the rabbis and Calvin, as well as some moderns, viz. Hengstenberg, do not admit this. It is well known that the view that Abraham was married to a half-sister is based on what he said to Abimelech, Gen. xx. 12: “And yet, indeed, she is my sister, the

daughter of my father, though not the daughter of my mother." On the other hand, it is urged that there is nothing about this in the earlier passages (xi. 29); and it is maintained by the rabbis and others that Sarah was the same as Iscah, xi. 29, and was thus a sister of Milcah, daughter of Haran, and Abraham's niece, and that Abraham called her sister quite in the same way as he calls his nephew Lot his brother. There is no doubt as to this idiom, but it is certainly quite arbitrary to identify Iscah with Sarah. If it be asked, why, then, Iscah is named at all, the answer is, that this is done simply for the sake of completeness; in any case, there is nothing said about the identity of the two.

(5) Comp. Nitzsch, *System der christl. Lehre*, § 174: "Matrimonial love must not destroy or perplex that to which it is itself traceable, and which it wishes to reproduce and propagate."

(6) Augustine, *de civ. Dei*, xv. 16: "Habita est ratio rectissima caritatis, ut homines, quibus esset utilis atque honesta concordia, diversarum necessitudinum vinculis necterentur; nec unus in uno multas haberet, sed singulæ spargerentur in singulos; ac si ad socialem vitam diligentius colligandam plurimæ plurimos obtinerent."

(7) The further discussion of this topic does not belong to biblical theology, but partly to ethic and partly to church law. On the whole subject, compare especially the excellent essay in the *Evangel. Kirchenzeitung*, 1840, the June and July number, p. 369 ff.: "Ueber die verbotenen Ehen in der Verwandtschaft."—Among the marriage laws of the ancient nations, that of Rome corresponds best with that of the Old Testament, and is even in some respects more rigorous. See Rossbach, *Untersuchungen ueber die römische Ehe*, p. 420 ff. The principle on which marriages are forbidden is very clearly expressed in Roman law; it lies in the *patria potestas*. The son remained under the father's power until the father's death; grandsons and granddaughters honoured their grandfather as their father. Thus the children of brethren took the position of brothers and sisters, and hence, apparently, the marriage of cousins (*consobrini*) was not allowed in older times. Roman law also absolutely prohibited marriage with the offspring of a brother or sister; even marriage between uncle and niece was forbidden. However, in the year 49 A.D., this marriage, which was counted incest until then, was allowed by a *senatus-consultum* because Claudius wished to marry Agrippina, the daughter of his brother Germanicus.

§ 104.

(b) The Dissolution of Marriage.

The laws touching the dissolution of marriage also show how greatly the personal right of the wife is suppressed in the Mosaic law. The dissolution of marriage can take place in two ways:—1. By the real disruption of the matrimonial bond by the sin of adultery; 2. By a separation drawn up in a definite form.

1. In the Mosaic law, adultery is so understood that it is only committed through the unchastity of a wife. Thus, on the part of the husband, adultery is committed only when he dishonours the free wife of another; in this case both are to be punished with death (Lev. xx. 10; Deut. xxii. 22). If, on the contrary, the adulteress was only another's slave, the punishment was milder, Lev. xix. 20–22 (probably corporal punishment). Otherwise, the crime of adultery could not occur on the part of a husband, for the wife had no exclusive right to him whatever. Therefore by simple unchastity he offends indeed against the law which condemns as an abomination all fornication, and especially such prostitution as was committed among the neighbouring heathen nations in honour of their divinity (Lev. xix. 29; Deut. xxiii. 18), but not against his wife. On the contrary, the breach by the wife of the obligations of marriage was unconditionally adultery. If a woman was suspected of adultery without being taken in the act, and if no testimony could be brought to prove the offence, it was to be decided whether she was guilty or not guilty by a formal oath at the sanctuary, and the drinking of the water of the curse, since under the circumstances a judicial action could not be brought; comp. Num. v. 11–31 (1). The effect to be produced by the water of the curse on the guilty wife—the swelling of the belly and decaying of the thigh (which Josephus makes the dislocation of the right thigh)—corresponds to the *jus talionis* (2). Ver. 27 does not say that the sentence of God shall be manifested on the spot (as was the assumption in the German ordeals). But we must suppose an effect which could only be traced to drinking of the water of the curse, and which followed speedily thereupon, as otherwise there would have been no sure mark by which to clear guiltless wives.

The law rests on the assurance that the living God, who dwells in the midst of His people, will really acknowledge the solemn invocation of His name at His own command (3).

2. Divorce (בְּרִיתָהּ). The right of divorce belongs to the husband only; thus divorce is also called dismissal of a wife (שִׁפּוּץ אִשָּׁה) (4). The right of the husband to dismiss his wife is nevertheless not formally sanctioned by the law, but is presupposed as existing and limited, not only by the law in Deut. xxii. 19, 29, but also (on this see below) even in the law of separation in Deut. xxiv., by the addition עֲרֹתָ דָּבָר. The proper aim of the law (Deut. xxiv. 1 ff.) lies in the closing sentence, ver. 4. Ver. 1 does not contain a command, and even its last clause belongs to the conditional clause (5). The Pharisees indeed say (Matt. xix. 7): *Τί οὖν Μωϋσῆς ἐνετείλατο δοῦναι βιβλίον ἀποστασίῳ καὶ ἀπολῦσαι αὐτήν*; but the Lord answers, ver. 8: *Ὅτι Μωϋσῆς πρὸς τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν ὑμῶν ἐπέτρεψεν ὑμῖν ἀπολῦσαι τὰς γυναῖκας ὑμῶν*. However, it is implied in the presuppositions enumerated in Deut. xxiv. 1 that this process was to be necessary in cases of divorce. Since the formal making out of a bill of divorcement (כִּסְפֵּי בְרִיתָהּ, ver. 1) was requisite for the carrying out of a divorce, this might at least often prevent a too hasty repudiation. The passage assigns as the ground which renders divorce admissible עֲרֹתָ דָּבָר—that is, “shamefulness of a thing.” There existed among the Rabbis two different views about the meaning of this expression. The school of Hillel understood the expression to mean any matter of offence (6). The school of Shammai, on the contrary, did not, indeed, as has frequently been erroneously said, interpret the expression simply of adultery. Real adultery is not to be thought of, because in that case not separation but punishment followed; but they referred it to really disgraceful conduct, such as unchaste behaviour and the like. It is not to be admitted that Hillel (as many archæologists say) has hit the meaning of the law more correctly. The expression must certainly refer to something loathsome, comp. Deut. xxiii. 15 (7). If the divorced woman married another man, she might not, on his death, or on being separated from him, re-marry the first one, Deut. xxiv. 3 f. compared with Jer. iii. 1. In David’s conduct, recounted in 2 Sam. iii. 14 ff. (that David took again Michal, whom Saul had given to another), there is no offence

against the letter of the law; for David had not separated himself from Michal, but she was unfairly torn away from him, 1 Sam. xxv. 44. Nevertheless Saalschütz (*l.c.* p. 802) rightly remarks that David's conduct can hardly be regarded as consonant with the spirit of the law. The law does not say whether the divorce might be taken back if the divorced wife did not marry again. Probably that was lawful.

It is clear that this whole matter of divorce does not correspond with the idea of marriage proper to the Old Testament, and already expounded by us (§ 69, 2); and this is expressly set forth by Christ in Matt. xix. 8. Also, in Mal. ii. 10-16, divorce is treated as a breach of faith: "I hate putting away, saith Jehovah the God of Israel" (ver. 16).

(1) Comp. the subsequent discussion of the offering of jealousy in the part on Cultus (§ 143, 1), and my article, "Eiferopfer," in Herzog's *R.E.* xix. p. 472 ff.

(2) She shall receive her punishment in the organs with which she has committed sin. That נֶפֶשׁ, as Ewald (*Alterth. des Volkes Israel*, 1st ed. p. 187, 3d ed. p. 274) supposes, does not simply mean the swelling, but also its consequence, bursting, cannot be proved. Moreover, we cannot make out from the text how the swelling of the body is to be understood pathologically. Josephus calls it a dropsy, with fatal effects; J. D. Michaelis would understand by it more particularly the *hydrops ovarii*. Certainly, as is clear from the contrast in ver. 28, a disease is meant which involves unfruitfulness; but it is quite inadmissible to refer the words in which this punishment is threatened simply to unfruitfulness [in above-cited article].

(3) The punishment of the adulteress lay in the effect of the water of the curse; the purpose of the divine decision is not that the convicted person may be then handed over to human judgment, for the execution of the punishment appointed for adultery in Lev. xx. 10, Deut. xxii. 22.—This law is one of the number of regulations through which the purity of family life was to be protected. Yet it has its special aim, not merely in frightening frivolous women from leading a dissolute life, but, as Theodoret correctly observes on this passage, is meant at the same time to set bounds to the wrath of the jealous husband, who (comp. Prov. vi. 34) is capable of any violence, by withdrawing from him the right of taking the vindication of his interests into his own hand in a matter in which a blind passion is so easily kindled, and by compelling him to make his suspicion submit to the judgment of the omniscient God. In so far, also, the law aims

at protecting the wife against a groundless jealousy on the part of the husband; only it is not said that the woman herself may claim to drink the water of the curse in order to her justification [in the article already cited].

(4) According to the rabbinical view (see Saalschütz, *mos. Recht*, p. 806), it did not need to be explained that the wife to whom her husband denied what is commanded in Ex. xxi. 10 might demand separation.

(5) Deut. xxiv. 1 ff.: "When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her,"—then the verse does not go on, as Luther and *E.V.* give it, "then let him write her a bill of divorcement," but, continuing the conditional clause, "and he write her a bill of divorcement, and give it into her hand, and send her out of his house, and she go," etc.; the apodosis begins only in ver. 4.

(6) For example, if the wife have let the dinner burn; if even, says Rabbi Akiba, another please the husband better. Josephus holds the same lax view, *Ant.* iv. 8. 23: καθ' ἡδονοποιῶν αἰτίας.

(7) The LXX. have indeed softened the expression by the translation ἄσχημον πρᾶγμα, but have probably caught the general meaning correctly.

2. THE RELATION OF PARENTS TO CHILDREN (1).

§ 105.

The importance of this relation is already clear, by its being placed, like the relation of marriage, in analogy to the relation of Jehovah towards His people (comp. § 82, 1). In explaining the decalogue, we have already spoken of the way in which the command to honour parents is ranked among the duties of piety in the first table (§ 86, with note 2) (2). The same promise is given to the honouring of parents as to obedience to the divine will in general; comp. Ex. xx. 12 with Deut. iv. 40, vi. 2, etc. Breach of the reverence due to parents is punished in just the same way as offences against the reverence due to God, Ex. xxi. 15, 17 (3), Lev. xx. 9.—Still the parents have only such rights over their children as are consistent with the acknowledgment of God's higher right of property. This is already conveyed in the command to offer up Isaac, Gen. xxii. (comp. § 23, with note 9), but particularly in the ordinances with reference to the redemption of the first-born sons, who here

vicariously take the place of the whole blessing of children hoped for. Although the tribe of Levi (comp. § 93) was accepted in the stead of all the first-born of the people, the first-born sons must nevertheless be brought to the sanctuary when a month old, and there be redeemed by the payment of five shekels; see Num. xviii. 16 in connection with Ex. xiii. 15. This presentation at the sanctuary might be conjoined with the offering of purification, to be presented by the woman on the fortieth day after her delivery, as appears from Luke ii. 22 ff. Even the human right of parents over their children is limited (4); in particular, the father has no right over the life and death of his children (such as Roman law concedes) (5), but the parents must bring a disobedient, reckless son before the magistrates, Deut. xxi. 18 (comp. § 99, with note 2).—The law also requires that children be brought up holily, and in the fear and love of God. There are no special precepts in the law with a view to this, but it is repeated again and again with great emphasis, that the divine deeds of the redemption and guidance of Israel, and the divine commands, are to be impressed on the children; see Deut. iv. 9 f., vi. 6 f. (6); also ver. 20 ff., xi. 19, xxxii. 46, comp. with Gen. xviii. 19 (Ps. lxxviii. 3–6, xliv. 2), etc. The passover, in particular, was to serve to hand down from race to race the knowledge of Israel's redemption from Egyptian bondage; for in Ex. xii. 26 f., xiii. 8, the people are expressly directed to join with the festival the historical instruction of the children in the object of the feast. The same direction is given, xiii. 14 f., for the presentation of the first-born. We may say that by those Deuteronomic regulations the basis was laid for the mnemonic, which became the principle of later Jewish instruction. But the Pentateuch knows nothing of a scholastic inculcation of the divine laws; it knows no formal religious instruction at all. With the exception of the command, Deut. xxxi. 11–13, that the law be read before the assembled people, including the children (בְּנֵי = little children), at the feast of tabernacles, there is no arrangement calculated directly for instruction in the law (7). The passage in Deuteronomy just cited presupposes that the children take part in the festival pilgrimages, as also the presence of the sons and daughters at the celebration of the festivals in the sanctuary is spoken of in the law of feasts in Deut. xvi. 11, 14; and in particular, by the transference of the celebration of the passover to the place of the

sanctuary, the pilgrimage of the whole family thither was favoured. Nevertheless, the law in Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16, which enjoins the pilgrimage of all the male members of the family, contains no definitions about their age (8). The rabbinical tradition that boys were bound to fulfil the law at twelve years old (9) may be very old, but the earliest indication of this rule which we have is in the history of Jesus when He was twelve, and in Josephus' statement (*Ant.* v. 10. 4) that Samuel was called to be a prophet in the twelfth year of his life (10).

(1) Comp. my article, "Pädagogik des A. T.," in Schmid's *pädagog. Encyklop.* v. p. 653 ff.

(2) The theocratic principle, that every authority among the covenant people is to be regarded as an efflux of divine authority, and as sanctified by this, finds its application here [in the above-cited article].

(3) Ex. xxi. 15, 17: "He who smiteth father or mother, and he who curses father and mother, shall surely be put to death."

(4) In this there is a remarkable difference from the rules of justice of other ancient nations.—Compare also the discussion of the law of inheritance (in the following §), and of slavery (§ 110).

(5) See what is remarked on the abrogation of the judicial power of the father of a family in § 98, and comp. Prov. xix. 18.

(6) Deut. iv. 9: "Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul diligently, lest thou forget the things which thine eyes have seen: but teach them thy sons, and thy sons' sons."—vi. 6 f.: "And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart: and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up."

(7) Though it is natural to conjecture that the scattering of the Levites amongst the other tribes was to serve to promote the knowledge of the law, the Pentateuch gives us no commands about this. The rabbinical tradition, that the tribe of Simeon busied itself particularly with the instruction of children, whilst the higher office of teaching was entrusted to the Levites, is of no more value than other such like traditions [in the article cited].

(8) Keil, on Ex. xxiii. 17, conjectures that the command was binding on the male members of the people from the twentieth year and onward, because in that year they were taken into the census (?).

(9) See the relevant passages in Lightfoot, *horæ hebr. et thalmud.*, on Luke ii. 42.

(10) Singing was another vehicle for the propagation of religious knowledge, which we can show to have been cultivated in Israel from the earliest period of the nation's history. See the particulars in the above-cited article, p. 671.—It was certainly a very ancient custom to teach the youth songs, in order to establish the memory of great events and of the heroes of past days (2 Sam. i. 18, comp. Ps. lx. 1). Also, with reference to the song in Deut. xxxii., it is commanded, xxxi. 19 ff., that it should be taught, in order to serve in later times as a witness against the people.—Lastly, the many local monuments scattered through the land served the coming race as instructive witnesses. Thus we read in Josh. iv. 6 f., 21 f., with reference to the stones set up on the banks of the Jordan: "When your children ask their fathers in time to come, saying, What mean ye by these stones? then ye shall answer them," etc. Thus, in particular, the memories of patriarchal times were linked with memorable trees, wells, altars, stone-heaps, etc., Gen. xxi. 32 f., xxvi. 19 ff., xxxiii. 20, xxxi. 46 ff., xxxv. 7, 20, 1. 11 [in the article above cited].

3. THE LAW OF INHERITANCE, AND PROVISIONS FOR THE PERMANENCE OF FAMILIES AND THEIR INHERITANCE.

§ 106.

The Law of Inheritance. Laws about Heiresses and the Levirate Marriage.

After the father's death the first-born son is the head of the family, and therefore in family registers he is often distinguished by this honourable predicate; cf. Num. iii. 12, etc. By the law in Deut. xxi. 17, the provision that the first-born son is to receive a double inheritance is confirmed, and therefore, doubtless, the care of the mother and unmarried sisters, etc., was incumbent on him. This regulation probably rested on old custom; for Jacob followed it (comp. § 25) when he gave the inheritance of a double tribe to Joseph, who, in the place of Reuben, was invested with the right of the first-born, comp. 1 Chron. v. 2. But it is remarkable that here again (comp. § 69, 2) the law, Deut. xxi. 15–17, forbids others to imitate what the patriarch did when he gave preference to the son of the beloved spouse. For the rest, the rule of inheritance was ap-

parently that the other sons inherited equally (1). If an Israelite left behind him no son, but only daughters, the daughters came into the inheritance; if he had also no daughter, the brother inherited; in want of a brother, the brother of the father; and if he had none, the nearest blood relation, Num. xxvii. 8–11. But to prevent land from passing into the possession of another tribe, daughters who were heiresses might, according to the law, Num. xxxvi., only marry men of the tribe of their father, or even, if vers. 6 and 8 were to be understood in a narrow sense, only men of their father's house; probably in as close a relationship as was admissible, as the heiresses (the daughters of Zelophehad) mentioned in Num. xxxvi. took, ver. 11, the sons of their father's brother for husbands.—Side by side with this ordinance stands the Levirate law, which, as we see from Gen. xxxviii., rested on ancient custom, but was legally sanctioned by Deut. xxv. 5–10. The main provisions run thus (ver. 5 f.): “If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not marry without (that is, out of the family) unto a stranger: her husband's brother shall go in unto her, and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of an husband's brother unto her (יבם). And it shall be, that the first-born which she beareth shall succeed in the name of his brother which is dead, that his name be not put out of Israel.” The exposition of the law is doubtful. On one view, the presupposition of “dwelling together” is taken to mean that the brother who accepts the Levirate duty has as yet no house of his own, and is thus still unmarried (for this is urged the phrase, “if brethren dwell together”). On another view, on the contrary, it is only presupposed that the brother lived in the same place, and was therefore in the position to take up the Levirate duty. The words, “if he have no son,” are understood by the Jewish and many Christian expositors (among the moderns, also Keil and Fr. W. Schultz) of childlessness in general, so that if there was a daughter to be heiress, no Levirate marriage would be entered on; and for this the expressions Matt. xxii. 25 (μὴ ἔχων σπέρμα) and Luke xx. 28 (ἄτεκνος) seem to speak. On another view, the law of Levirate marriage takes precedence of the law of heiresses, so that a daughter did not inherit if there was still a marriageable widow. Vers. 7–10 of the law decree a public censure on the man who would not submit

to the Levirate law (but there existed no compulsion). Nothing appears to be decreed against the woman who would not submit to the duty of the Levirate law, if she did not wish to marry again at all. Childlessness was such a disgrace for a woman, that we may suppose that she would not withdraw without sufficient ground (2). If the dead man left no brother who could enter on the duty of marriage, the obligation passed to the nearest relation, who received by the marriage also the right of inheritance. It is true that the law makes no provision about this, but it is clear from the book of Ruth that such was the legal custom (3). That the Levirate law was still in force in the time of Jesus is shown by Matt. xxii. 24 ff. (and the parallel passages of Mark and Luke).

(1) Thus, *e.g.*, of five sons, the first-born received a third of the whole inheritance, and each of the others a sixth.

(2) On the contrary, according to the rabbinical tradition, if she drew back from the duty of the Levirate law because she wished to marry another, a punishment of forty stripes was imposed on her.—Gen. xxxviii. 24 can hardly be cited here. Tamar was to be punished for unchastity, not on account of a violation of the Levirate law.

(3) The story in the book of Ruth lies under considerable difficulties of an archæological kind, but these cannot be entered on here.

§ 107.

Provisions about the Preservation of the Family Possession.

As the law was concerned for the continued existence of families, so, too, provision was made for the preservation of the property on which the subsistence of the family depended. As far as possible, the inheritance was to be preserved entire. Here the theocratic principle came in in its full rigour, and its application to questions of proprietorship is expressed in the sentence, Lev. xxv. 23, "The land is mine; for ye are strangers and foreigners with me"—that is, God, the King of the people, is the real proprietor of the land, and He gives it to the people only as beneficiaries. Now, inasmuch as each family forms an integral part of the theocracy, an inheritance is given to it by Jehovah for its subsistence, which forms, as it were, an hereditary

feudal holding, and is therefore in itself inalienable. Hence Naboth's refusal, 1 Kings xxi. 3; and hence the strong language of the prophets against the efforts of the rich to enlarge their possessions by adding to their own lands the inheritance of others, Isa. v. 8 ff., and in other passages.—When an Israelite is compelled by poverty to alienate his inheritance, this is only for a time; the purchaser of the inheritance must, by Lev. xxv. 23–27, return it as soon as the former possessor, or his nearest relation, redeems it again (נָשָׂא); hence the general legal principle, ver. 23 f., “The land shall not be sold לְעִמְיֹתָהּ, to extinction,”—that is, in such a way that the possession is for ever forfeited by the original owner,—“but in all the land of your possession ye shall grant a redemption (פְּדוּתָא) for the land.” In virtue of this his duty to redeem the land, the nearest relation bears the name of נֶאֱמָלִי הַקָּרִיב. At the redeeming of the land, the value which the purchaser has had from the use of it year by year is to be taken from the purchase money—that is, the land itself is never to be actually sold, but only what it bore, and that for a certain time. In the year of jubilee, however, every possession is to return to the family to which it originally belonged, without redemption (1). With a consistent administration of this law, a class wholly without property would have been impossible in Israel (2), agreeably to the fact that it is proposed as the problem of the theocratic life, Deut. xv. 4, that there be no poor person in Israel; though, indeed, it is candidly acknowledged in ver. 11 that actual circumstances will continue to be inconsistent with the realization of this ideal. Since, as has already been mentioned (§ 33), at the settlement in the Holy Land, the several clans dwelt together in a definite place, the family became the basis of all social life; but because the clans had always to recognise that they were integral portions of the covenant people, the consciousness of national aims was kept up in a lively manner (3); and this pervasion of family life by the higher theocratico-national principle is represented particularly in the celebration of the Passover (4).

(1) See the particulars in the account of the year of jubilee, in § 151.

(2) This is why the Socialist Proudhon admires so greatly the Mosaic law of property. Compare his essay on the celebration of the Sabbath, in the German translation, p. 25.

(3) Baumgarten (*Die Geschichte Jesu*, p. 88 f.) has rightly remarked, that in the theocracy two forms of one-sidedness are overcome,—the one-sidedness of a tribal constitution, in which the tribes never attain national unity; and the one-sidedness of a constitution in which domestic life, and with it an essential part of human destiny, falls a sacrifice to the purposes of the state, as was the case in the ordinances of Lycurgus. “In Israel, the divine guidance proves itself thereby, that both forms, the house and the kingdom, are so planned from the beginning that they mutually penetrate and comprise each other.”

(4) Compare also the account of the Passover in § 153 f.

§ 108.

The Avenging of Blood (1).

The avenging of blood is connected with the laws last discussed, inasmuch as it falls, on the one side, under the point of view of the preservation of the entireness of families.—The avenging of blood, generally speaking, takes place where the members of a family or the next relative of a murdered man have the right and the duty to exercise retribution on the manslayer. In the Old Testament, the avenging of blood is taken for granted as a very ancient custom (2). After Gen. ix. 6 has expressed generally the precept that he who sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed, the first indication of the avenging of blood is found in xxvii. 45 (3). Where as yet there is no political life, or where, at least, such life is still in the first elements of development, the expiation of injury to personal right devolves, from the nature of the case, on the zeal of the family (4). Mosaic law retained this feature, but subordinated the execution of the avenging of blood to the theocratic principle. If, according to the most ancient Hellenic view, the murderer, as such, commits no crime against the divinity or against civil society (5), but injures merely the family sphere, Mosaism, on the contrary, in virtue of its idea of man as the divine image (comp. § 68), discerns in a murder, before all things, a transgression against the Creator and Lord of human life, Gen. ix. 5 f., which must be atoned for, Num. xxxv. 33, by the extermination of the guilty person from the theocracy, which is desecrated by the guilt of blood (6). God Himself is the proper avenger of blood (Gen. l.c.),

the דָּרַשׁ דָּמִים (Ps. ix 13, comp. 2 Chron. xxiv. 22), to whom the shed blood cries for vengeance, Gen. iv. 10. Thus the avenging of blood becomes a divine command; it is not merely a matter of honour, but a duty of religion. But because the family, the protection of the integrity of which is the business of theocratic justice, is injured at the same time by the death-blow, the execution of the avenging of blood is transferred to that relative on whom in general the restoration of injuries done to the integrity of the family is incumbent (comp. § 106 f.), and who thus has to *redeem* the blood taken from the family by the death-blow. Hence the name of the avenger of blood, נָאִל דָּם, Num. xxxv. 19, Deut. xix. 6, 12; also נָאִל absolutely, Num. xxxv. 12, Job xix. 25 (7). To take care that the avenging of blood was really executed was the business of the whole clan, as is clear from 2 Sam. xiv. 7 (8).—But further, with reference to the avenging of blood, the following provisions are given in Ex. xxi. 12–14, Num. xxxv. 9–34, Deut. xix. 1–13:—

1. In Num. xxxv. two kinds of murder are distinguished in reference to which the avenging of blood is commanded: (*a*) vers. 16–18, if one slays another with an instrument of iron, or a stone, or with wood, where-with a man when he takes it in his hand (others because it fills the hand) can kill another—that is, if any one strikes another in such a way that death may be seen to be the probable consequence; (*b*) ver. 20. f., if one has slain another out of hatred, or by intention, or out of enmity, in which case the means by which death was brought about is indifferent (9). On the other hand, in order to shelter from vengeance him who had slain a man undesignedly, בְּלֹא צָדִיקָה (ver. 22; Ex. xxi. 13), without intending to hurt his neighbour (comp. Num. xxxv. 23), and inadvertently, בְּבִלְיִדְעָתָהּ (Deut. xix. 4, etc.), the law commanded the selection of six free cities, three of which were apportioned on the east, and three on the west side of Jordan (Deut. iv. 41 ff.; Josh. xx. 1–9). The manslayer who fled into one of these had to be protected from the avenger of blood who pursued him by the elders of the free town (Josh. xx. 4), after a provisional cognition of the matter, until the community (עִירָהּ)—that is, the community of the place where the murder was committed, Num. xxxv. 24 f.—had examined the matter through their elders, Deut. xix. 12 f. (10). If the accused person was proved guilty of intentional murder, he had to be given over to the avenger of blood; even the

altar was not allowed to offer him a refuge (Ex. xxi. 14). In the opposite case, however, he had to remain in the city of refuge until the death of the high priest in whose time the murder had occurred, Num. xxxv. 28, Josh. xx. 6. If he quitted it earlier, the avenger of blood was permitted to kill him, Num. xxxv. 27, as was allowed before in his flight to the city of refuge, Deut. xix. 6.—The meaning of the banishment to the city of refuge was certainly not merely that of an ordinary punishment of banishment (11); but the manslayer was to be withdrawn from general communion with the people until the expiation of his crime was completed. Expiation was absolutely necessary, on the analogy of the sin-offering, Lev. iv. 1 ff., even for blood shed undesignedly (12). This expiation seems to lie in the death of the high priest, which does the same for his period of office as his function on the great day of atonement does for a single year (13).

2. For intentional murder, there was no other expiation than the blood of the manslayer, Num. xxxv. 31, 33 (14). The *jus talionis* is here maintained in the most stringent sense; every substitute for the punishment of death is refused (15). Even residence in the city of refuge in consequence of accidental murder cannot be bought off, ver. 32.—Herein is shown an essential difference from the usual custom of other ancient nations, which permitted the manslayer to satisfy the injured family in the way of agreement by payment of compensation (*ποινή* among the Greeks), of *Wergeld* (among the Germans) (16).—Nevertheless, the Mosaic law does not ordain anything against the relations who neglected the avenging of blood.

3. The avenging of blood falls upon the doer alone. Nowhere does the legislation of the middle books of the Pentateuch allow the avenger of blood to lay hands also on the family of the murderer (Ex. xx. 5 is not a case in point). That an opposite custom may often have prevailed is probable; and on the contrary, Deut. xxiv. 16 (comp. 2 Kings xiv. 6) may be judged to be a supplement, not (as some think) a mitigation, of the earlier legal provisions.—We cannot certainly determine how long blood-vengeance existed among the people. It is clear, from 2 Sam. xiv. 6–11, that it was still in existence and in full force in David's time (17).

(1) Compare my article "Blutrache," in Herzog's *R.E.* ii. p. 260 ff.

(2) Not yet Gen. iv. 14: "I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond, and every one that findeth me shall kill me." These words of Cain are only to be understood as an expression of anguish of conscience.

(3) The words of Rebekah (Gen. xxvii. 45), "Why should I be deprived also of you both in one day?" mean, that Jacob's being slain by the hand of Esau, Esau would be slain by the avenger of blood.

(4) Thus among the Arabians, the ancient Greeks, Romans, Germans, etc.—Compare, in general, Tobien on the avenging of blood according to the ancient Russian law, in comparison with the avenging of blood among the Israelites, Arabians, Greeks, Romans, and Germans—Dorpat, 1840. On the avenging of blood among the Arabs, see J. D. Michaelis, *mos. Recht*, ii. § 134. (With the Arabian notion that unavenged blood remains without sinking into the ground, etc., see Schultens on *exc. Hum.* pp. 416, 466; compare in the Old Testament, Isa. xxvi. 21, Ezek. xxiv. 7 f., Job xvi. 18.) On the avenging of blood among the Greeks of Homer's time, see Nägelsbach, *homer. Theol.* ed. i. p. 249 ff., ed. ii. p. 292 ff. On traces of the same in ancient Italy, see Rein, *Kriminalrecht der Römer*, p. 36 ff.; and on the difference between the Roman and German view, see Osenbrügge, in the *Kieler Philolog. Studien*, 1841, p. 234 ff. [in the above-cited article].

(5) Homer knows nothing of an atonement for murder due to the gods; see Nägelsbach, *l.c.*; comp. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, i. p. 301; and also at the same time, in limitation, the remarks of Schömann, *Æschylos Eumeniden*, p. 66 f. [in the article cited above].

(6) Human life is so sacred, that even the animal by which a man is killed is to be stoned, Ex. xxi. 28 ff.; comp. Gen. ix. 5 [in above-cited article].

(7) Compare Böttcher, *de inferis*, § 322.

(8) The law makes no particular provision as to the succession in which the duty of avenging blood devolved; doubtless it followed the right of inheritance, as did the duty of the Güel in general (compare § 106). With this the later tradition agrees, and at the same time adds, that when there was no heir, or the heir would not act, the judicial authorities stepped in; see Maimonides, *hilchoth rotseach*, i. 2 [in article above cited].

(9) On this point see Saalschütz, *mos. Recht*, p. 527 ff.

(10) These sentences state as concisely as possible how the three different passages are probably to be combined.—Comp. Hengstenberg, *Beitr. zur Einl. ins A. T.* iii. p. 442 f.; Ranke gives another combination, *Unters. über den Pentateuch*, ii. p. 314 f.

(11) So Michaelis, *l.c.* vi. § 279; compare the exile decreed according to Athenian law in a similar case.—See Hermann, *Griech. Staatsalterth.* § 104.

(12) On the later Hellenic view, see Schömann, *l.c.* p. 69, and others. See Osenbrügge, *l.c.*, on the Roman expiatory sacrifice of a ram for unintentional murder.

(13) This is the one view of the matter taken, for example, by Keil. Different is the view of Bähr (*Symbolik des mos. Kultus*, ii. p. 52), who, following the example of Maimonides (*more neboch.* iii. 40, ed. Buxt. p. 458), thinks that the death of the chief of the theocracy and representative of the whole people was regarded as so important, that every other death would be forgotten because of it, and thus be no more revenged.

(14) Num. xxxv. 33: "Blood defileth the land; and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it."

(15) A murder could not be redeemed with all the treasures in the world, even if the murdered man had forgiven the murderer before his death. Maimonides, *hilch. rots.* i. 4, *more neboch.* iii. 41.

(16) Compare Lobeck, *l.c.* p. 301. The Koran itself (*Sur.* ii. 173 ff.) admits a stipulated mitigation of the avenging of blood.

(17) On the contrary (2 Sam. iii. 27), Abner's murder by Joab is not to be viewed, as has often been done, as a case of the avenging of blood in the legal sense; for Joab's brother, Asahel, was killed by Abner in battle, and from necessity. Hence the judgment on Joab's deed, ver. 28 f., 1 Kings ii. 5.

4. THE RIGHT OF THE SERVANTS IN THE HOUSE (1).

§ 109.

Bondage in the time of the Patriarchs. The Principles of the Rights of Bondsmen.

The Old Testament, in instilling into man the dignity of God's image as the inalienable and fundamental character of his nature,—in asserting, further, the descent of all mankind from one blood, and so representing them as a race of brethren,—declares a condition without personal rights, such as is seen in slavery among the heathen, to be on principle inadmissible. It is designated a curse when a tribe falls directly under the lot of slavery, Gen. ix. 25, 27. Nevertheless, the

Old Testament presupposes that servitude in virtue of which domestics (עֲבָדִים) form a portion of property, like the herds (Gen. xxiv. 35, xxvi. 14). Abraham possesses a number of slaves. The slaves born in the house (בְּיָדֵי בֵּית, a term which refers at the same time to transmission of servitude), Gen. xiv. 14 (2), are distinguished from those bought by money (מִקְנֵת כֶּסֶף), xvii. 23 ff. (3). Nevertheless, how elevated the position of the slave is already, in the time of the patriarchs, is shown specially in the beautiful picture of Abraham's trusted servant, drawn in chap. xxiv. This servant is probably the same person as the Eliezer whom Abraham (xv. 2 f.) had appointed as his heir in want of a son (4). But it was of the greatest importance that, according to chap. xvii., at the introduction of circumcision, all the slaves—not simply those who stood nearer to the family as being born in the house, but also those who had been bought in foreign parts—received likewise this sign of covenant consecration, and thereby a share in the dignity of the chosen race, and the divine promise given to it (5).

The rights of the class of servants is more nearly defined by the law; and in this connection distinction is made between those servants who were Israelites by birth, and the slaves won by purchase or as booty from other nations. These regulations rest on a twofold principle: 1. Because Israel is the people of Jehovah's property, whom He redeemed from Egyptian bondage, all that belong to this people are Jehovah's servants, and are by this bondage freed from all human service. After their God had broken the yoke which burdened them, and led them out "upright," they were never more to bend under the yoke of slavery, nor be sold as slaves (Lev. xxv. 42, 55, xxvi. 13; comp. § 83). By this principle, bondage, in a strict sense, was for Israel completely done away with. But since the law leaves cases open in which one Israelite could fall into the service of another in a legal way, instructions are laid down by which a return to the independent position which alone corresponds to the dignity of a theocratic burgher is secured to those who have fallen into servitude. On the contrary, with reference to the whole profane mass of the Gojim, slavery is acknowledged to be allowable, Lev. xxv. 44 ff. (6). But apart from the fact that a certain share in the blessings of the covenant people is also secured to the heathen slaves, they have the

advantage, 2. of the principle which is inculcated in a multitude of passages as the standard for the treatment of servants—namely, that the Israelites, since they themselves were at one time slaves and strangers in Egypt, and know how such persons feel, are to treat servants and strangers in a humane way, and show by this means their thanks to God, who redeemed them from Egyptian oppression (Ex. xxii. 20, xxiii. 9; Deut. v. 14 f., x. 19, xv. 15, xvi. 11 f., xxiv. 18, 22) (7).

(1) *Die Verhältnisse der Sklaven bei den alten Hebräern nach bibl. und thalmudischen Quellen dargestellt*, Kopenhagen 1859, a work by Mielziner, is a good monograph on this subject. A survey of the relevant literature is also given in it, p. 4 f.; comp. also my article, "Sklaverei bei den Hebräern," in Herzog's *R.E.* xiv. p. 464 ff.—On this topic it is of special interest to compare the rights, or absence of rights, of slaves in other nations.

(2) In Gen. xiv. 14, Abraham, marching to battle, places himself at the head of 318 men, born in his house, and accustomed to the use of weapons.

(3) Patriarchal history further mentions female slaves (אִמָּהוֹת, שִׁפְחוֹת), as maids to the housewife, also to the daughters, and as concubines of their master, Gen. xvi. 1 (Hagar), xxii. 24, xxiv. 59, 61, xxix. 24 ff. (Zilpah and Bilhah), xxxv. 8, etc.—On the difference between אִמָּהוֹת and שִׁפְחוֹת, it can only be said with certainty that the latter term is the lower; compare, in especial, 1 Sam. xxv. 41, also Ex. xi. 5 (see Gusset's dictionary, under the word שִׁפְחוֹת). From this it is intelligible that the name אִמָּהוֹת seems to have been commonly used by preference for a married maid-servant (see Saalschütz, *Archäol.* ii. p. 244); but this difference cannot be rigorously carried out. [In the above-cited article.]

(4) The patriarchal form of life brings the slaves nearer to the family, and thus secures that the servile class be penetrated by the moral spirit of the family, in virtue of which the relation between masters and servants is shaped into a relationship of real respect and affection. [In the above-cited article.]—Compare what Nägelsbach has remarked, *homer. Theol.* ed. i. p. 232 ff., ed. ii. p. 271 ff., on the character of slavery with Homer.

(5) The full consequences of the anthropological presuppositions of the Old Testament were certainly not realized, even at a later time. But while in heathenism, and especially in cultivated heathenism, slavery sinks more and more to the deepest degradation of human

nature, Mosaism guards its humane character by at least limiting slavery, in as far as it permits it, by legal regulations. [In the above-cited article.]

(6) Lev. xxv. 44 ff. : "As for thy bondmen, and thy bondmaids, which thou shalt have ; of the heathen that are round about you shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids ; moreover, of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land : and they shall be your possession. And ye shall give them as an inheritance to your children after you as a possession ; they shall be your bondmen for ever."

(7) The various regulations with reference to the rights of servants form one of the most difficult parts of the legislation. It is on them in particular that the assertion is founded, that the legislation in Deuteronomy stands in absolute contradiction to that in Leviticus.

§ 110.

(a) *Regulations bearing on Hebrew Servants.*

An Israelite might in a legal way become a slave (1), either by selling himself on account of poverty, Lev. xxv. 39, 47, or by being sold by judicial decree on account of inability to make compensation for a theft committed, Ex. xxii. 2 (2). In the latter case, however, we must conclude from the context of the law that it was not lawful to sell him to strangers (3). On the usual view taken by almost all biblical archæologists (including Saalschütz and Keil), the creditor had a right to sell debtors or their children when they were unable to pay their debts. This view would in any case have to be restricted, in so far as an arbitrary interposition of the creditor against the person and children of the debtor can have no hold in the law, and would, indeed, be in decided contradiction to the laws of pledges in Deuteronomy (3*). The law (Deut. xxiv. 10) forbids the creditor to enter the house of the debtor in order to choose a pledge arbitrarily. It forbids him (Ex. xxii. 25 f. ; Deut. xxiv. 12) to keep the pledged garment of a poor man over night ; "for it is his only covering, his garment for his skin ; for what can he lie on ? and if he call on me, I will hear him, for I am gracious." It forbids the pledging of a debtor's mill, because that would be pledging the "soul" (that is,

something indispensably requisite for the maintenance of life), Deut. xxiv. 6. And could this humane law have given up the person of the impoverished debtor or his children to the caprice of the creditor?—There is less difficulty in admitting that the lawfulness of the judicial adjudication of an insolvent debtor is not excluded by Lev. xxv. 39, 47 (4). However, the passage probably only speaks of an Israelite who sells himself because he is no longer in a position to remain independent. From the other Old Testament books, too, we can deduce no sufficient proof of this common opinion. Prov. xxii. 7 does not relate to this, since the proverb expresses quite generally the dependence of the debtor on the creditor. 2 Kings iv. 1, Amos ii. 6, viii. 6, certainly prove the practice of the kingdom of the ten tribes; but the case mentioned in the first passage, that a widow's two sons were to be taken away from her by a creditor, certainly cannot be considered as agreeable to the meaning of the Mosaic law, while the passage in Amos calls it a gross offence to deliver up poor persons to slavery on account of small debts. Besides these passages, Job xxiv. 9, Neh. v. 5, Isa. l. 1, and Matt. xviii. 25 are wont to be quoted as proof-texts. The passage in Job rebukes the heartlessness which takes away as pledge a baby from the breast of its mother. With Neh. v. 5 is to be taken ver. 8, where Nehemiah condemns, in the strongest language, the mode of proceeding by which the poor were compelled to give up their children to be slaves to cover their debts. And the two last-named passages, also, are proofs only of the common practice, not of its lawfulness (5).

There are two different ordinances in the Pentateuch about the way in which an Israelite who had fallen into slavery was to be treated,—one in the Book of the Covenant, Ex. xxi. 1–11, and in Deut. xv. 12–18; and another in Lev. xxv. 39–55.

1. The first two laws make the following provisions:—(a) If an Israelite has bought one of his fellow country-folk, whether of male or (see the passage in Deuteronomy, and Jer. xxxiv. 9 ff.) female sex, the time of service shall last only six years (6). This definition of time, which reminds us of Jacob's seven years' service (Gen. xxix. 18), rested probably on ancient custom; in the law, however, it is formed mainly in imitation of the period of the Sabbath, and this is indicated in the connection of the passage in Deuteronomy. As a day of rest

follows six days of labour, and a festival year follows six years of cultivation of land, so, in like manner, the seventh year shall bring to the servant freedom from bondage. Only the year of emancipation did not fall exactly at the same time as the Sabbath year; although, according to Jer. xxxiv. 8 ff., the Sabbatic year once gave occasion for the emancipation of Hebrew servants in the time of Zedekiah.—(b) If the servant entered alone into service, he becomes free alone; but if he entered married, his wife became free with him. If, on the contrary, his master gave him a wife, and she bear him children, the wife and children remain the master's, and he goes out free alone (7). The law in Deuteronomy commands the master to encourage the freed man with gifts of produce (from the flock, the barn-floor, and the winepress) (8).—(c) If the servant will not go free, because he loves his master or his wife and children, the master shall bring him before the court; probably for the purpose, in particular, of putting the complete spontaneousness of the servant's determination out of all doubt. On this the master is to bring the servant to the door or the door-post, and pierce (פָּרַח) his ear (probably the right one) with an awl, by which ceremony the servant is now bound to permanent service (9). The connection in the passage in Deuteronomy shows that the door of the house in which the servant is to serve is meant, although that passage does not mention appearing before the court at all (10). As the meaning of the ceremony in general is obligation to permanent obedience, the symbolic act is applied to the organ of hearing, and that by a sign which remains for ever (11). The affixing the ear to the door-post, caused by piercing, denotes that the servant is bound permanently to the house (12). Although a moral motive is given as the basis of this proceeding, there is undeniably something degrading in it (13).—The meaning of the פָּרַח, in Ex. xxi. 6, Deut. xv. 17, is disputed. The expression evidently refers properly to lifelong servitude (because the symbolic action ordained imprinted on the servant an indelible sign). The limitation of the time of service by the year of jubilee (14) results only from the comparison of the law in Leviticus (15).—(d) In the Book of the Covenant, Ex. xxi. 7–11, a law follows which is to meet the case of an Israelite who sells his daughter to another on the presupposition that she is to become the wife or concubine of the purchaser or his son. Here something quite

different from Deut. xv. 12 ff. is spoken of; the latter law treats of the way in which a Hebrew woman is to be kept who does not enter the service of a man for the purpose of marriage (16).

Side by side with the two ordinances of the Book of the Covenant and of Deuteronomy already explained, there is one that runs quite differently, in connection with the law of the jubilee year, Lev. xxv., the contents of which are as follows:—(a) Vers. 39–43. Here the case is put of one Israelite selling himself to another, because, after parting with his possession of land, he cannot even gain a livelihood like a stranger (who earns a sustenance by working for hire). In this case the master is not to cause him to perform the work of a slave, but is rather to impose on him such work as one demands from a day-labourer, and to treat him generally as such (17). This relation is only to last until the year of jubilee, in which the servant and his children (18) are freed, and return to their own people and the inheritance of their fathers. (Therefore a portion from the master is in this case not necessary.) —(b) Vers. 47–55. If, on the other hand, the impoverished Israelite sells himself to a stranger dwelling in the land, he may likewise be treated only as a day-labourer, and in this case he may be redeemed at any time (19). The purchase-money is to be reckoned by the number of years which pass from the time of purchase to the year of jubilee (and the calculation is based on the amount of wages which a day-labourer can claim). In the case of redemption, the value of the service already given (calculated on the same principle) is deducted from the purchase-money. In the year of jubilee, however, the servant and his family go out quite free. This law in Leviticus stands quite disconnected side by side with the already-discussed regulations of the Book of the Covenant and of Deuteronomy. Very various views are brought forward on the relation in which these stand to each other. According to Ewald and many others, we have here legal provisions of different date. After the emancipation of slaves in the seventh year, as prescribed in the Book of the Covenant, fell out of use, a later legislation contented itself with prescribing their emancipation in the year of jubilee; which would indeed have been a very sorry surrogate, since numberless servants did not survive to the year of jubilee. At a later time, the writer of Deuteronomy again enjoined the old law. A general argument against this view is,

that the law of the jubilee cannot be understood as originating in later circumstances (as we shall see in detail in § 152). But in particular, this question arises: Why, according to that later legislation, is the attainment of freedom denied to a Hebrew servant who serves another Israelite during the whole period of fifty years from jubilee to jubilee? Was, then, in this respect, the servant of an Israelite at a disadvantage in comparison with the servant of an alien? On the other hand, the incompleteness of the command in ver. 39 ff. is sufficiently intelligible if the provisions of the Book of the Covenant were still in force along with it. The apparent contradiction between the two laws is to be solved, with J. D. Michaelis (*mos. Recht*, § 127), Hengstenberg (*Beiträge*, iii. p. 440 f.), and others, by supposing that during the first forty-four years of a period of jubilee, the emancipation of servants was entirely regulated by the mandate in the Book of the Covenant (and so took place after six years); whilst, on the contrary, the year of jubilee brought freedom to those who fell into servitude in the last years of the period of the jubilee, even if they had not served for six years. Hence the law in Leviticus proceeds on the presupposition that the servant will live till the time of liberation—till the year of jubilee.—Other attempts at reconciliation assume that, in the two sets of laws, different persons are treated of (20).

(1) Man-stealing was to be punished by death, whether the persons carried off were found with the thief (Ex. xxi. 16) or had been sold by him (Deut. xxiv. 7). [In the above-cited article.]

(2) In this case the thief was without doubt generally assigned to his victim (τοῖς καταδικασαμένοις δούλος ἔστω, Josephus, *Ant.* iv. 8. 27). [In the article cited above.]

(3) When Herod ordained that thieves were to be sold abroad, this was with right regarded as a heavy offence against the law of the Fathers (Josephus, *Ant.* xvi. 1. 1).—Besides the two cases in the text, only the power of the father to sell his daughter—the particulars below—is mentioned, Ex. xxi. 7; the father has not this power over his sons. [In the above-cited article.]

(3*) Comp. Mielziner, *l.c.* p. 18.

(4) Saalschütz, *mos. Recht*, p. 707, refers the passage to this.

(5) The legality of the practice is also denied by rabbinical tradition. Compare on this topic Alting, *acad. dissert. in Opp.* v. p. 223. [In the article cited.]

(6) On the application of this law to those sold on account of theft, see in the article above cited, p. 466.

(7) By the wife who does not become free is meant, of course, a slave who is not an Israelite (see the *Mechilta* on this passage); if she was a Hebrewess, she also had, according to Deut. v. 12, first to serve out her six years; but if she was not a Hebrewess, she had no claim whatever to be freed. [In the article cited.]

(8) This was a provision designed to lighten to the servant the beginning of an independent establishment. [In the article cited.]

(9) Deut. xv. 17 says that a maid was to be treated in just the same way. According to Jewish tradition, the ear of a maid was not pierced; still it is not natural to refer the closing words of ver. 17 only back to the contents of ver. 14.

(10) On the contrary, Aben-Esra and Abrabanel understand the gate of the town beneath which the court was held (see *Alting, l.c.* p. 225 f., where other rabbinic writings are adduced in illustration); Ewald (*Alterth. des Volkes Israels*, ed. 1, p. 195; ed. 3, p. 283 f.) refers Ex. xxi. 6 to the supreme court in the sanctuary, and thinks that the ear of the servant was held to the door or door-post of the sanctuary by the priest, and then pierced by the master. [In the article cited.]

(11) But it is hardly right to interpret the piercing as an opening of the ear, and consequently as a symbol of the awaking of attention; the expression quoted in Ps. xl. 7 (6), "mine ears hast Thou opened," is of another kind. [In the article cited.]

(12) It is not very apposite when Ewald, in illustration, compares the piercing of the nose of animals that were to be tamed. [In the article cited.]

(13) Thus, too, the rabbis have understood it, and have carried the exegesis of the ceremony further in the same sense. In the piercing they see a punishment of the ear; for, says Joehanan ben Zakkai, it heard from Mount Sinai, "Thou shalt have no other gods beside me," and has cast off the yoke of the heavenly kingdom, and taken the yoke of flesh and blood. The ear which heard at Sinai, "The children of Israel are my servants," went away and took another lord (see the *Gemara* on *Kiduschin* i. 2; *Ugolin. Thes.* xxx. 415). [In the article already cited.]

(14) Thus Josephus, *Ant.* iv. 8. 28, and the talmudico-rabbinic traditions. See the article already cited, p. 467 f.

(15) Deuteronomy gives the reason of the whole command, partly in a general way by reference to the redemption of the people from Egyptian bondage, and partly in particular by showing that in the six

years the servant has worked "the double of a day-labourer." The latter expression is obscure: it can hardly be understood to mean a double measure of work (twice as hard or twice as long), especially if Lev. xxv. 39 is compared; it is most naturally referred (see Fr. W. Schultz on this passage) to the fact that a day-labourer, to whom wages as well as food must be given, would have cost the master twice as much. [In above art.]

(16) See Hengstenberg, *Contributions to Introduction to the Old Testament*, ii. p. 439; Bertheau, *The Seven Groups of the Mosaic Laws*, p. 22 ff.—With reference to a woman sold for the purpose of marriage, the Book of the Covenant decrees that her liberation is not to be on the same principle as that of a man-servant. If the conditions of marriage are observed towards her, she naturally remains with her master for ever; if not, three cases are distinguished:—1. If she displease her master, who had designed her for himself (Keri 15), he is to permit her to be freed (either by her father, or by another Israelite who wishes to marry her), but he is not empowered to sell her to a strange people on account of his faithlessness to her; 2. If, on the contrary, he intends her for his son, she must be treated henceforth as a daughter; 3. If he takes another besides her, he must not diminish the food, raiment, and duty of marriage of the former. If he does not give her these three things, she is to be let go free without money [above art.].—For particulars on the meaning of this passage, see in the above-cited article, p. 468.

(17) See the more detailed rules according to tradition in the above-cited article, p. 469.

(18) See the talmudic view of this in the article cited above, p. 469, note. Comp. also Selden, *de jure nat. et gent.* vi. 7; and Mielziner, *l.c.* p. 34.

(19) Whether the redemption-money be paid for him by one of his relatives, or whether he pay it himself when he acquires the means. [Above art.]

(20) On the rabbinic view (see the Mechilta on Ex. xxi. 2), which makes the regulations of the Book of the Covenant refer to those sold by the court of justice on account of theft, and the regulations of the law of the jubilee to those who have entered into servitude out of poverty, compare the article cited above, p. 470.—More can be said in favour of the view which would understand by the Hebrew servants in the Book of the Covenant a particular class, occupying a middle position between the Israelites meant in the law of the jubilee, who were not to be treated as servants, but only as day-labourers, and the heathen slaves. Thus Saalschütz (*mos. Recht*, p. 703 ff.) According

to him, those were meant by Hebrew servants who had become Hebrews by naturalization, or who were born as servants in the family of an Israelite. These were to be let free after six years, if they were sold out of the house to which they originally belonged to another master. Afterwards Saalschütz (*Archäologie der Hebräer*, ii. p. 240) altered his view so far as to say, that by Hebrew servants men of cognate race are to be understood, who had come over from the real fatherland of the Hebrews; he supposes that mutual peaceful relations were formed with these by the concession of a seven years' term of service. But not only the constant use of עֶבֶר, which never occurs in its older and more extensive meaning after Gen. x. 21 (comp. xiv. 13), but also the עֲבָדָיו (added in Deut. xv. 12, which is evidently to be taken as Lev. xxv. 39, and is explained in Jer. xxxiv. 9 by יְהוּדֵי) speaks decidedly against both these hypotheses. [In above art.]

§ 111.

(b) *The Position of Servants not Israelites.*

Slaves in the strict sense were, as we have seen from the above-mentioned passage, Lev. xxv. 44–46 (§ 109, note 6), to be acquired in part from the surrounding nations, and in part from aliens within the land. The term “surrounding nations” excludes the Canaanite tribes who dwelt in the land (see Raschi on this passage); they were to be completely exterminated (Deut. xx. 16–19). Since, however, this was not executed, but rather considerable remnants of the Canaanites remained in the land, these, in as far as Israel obtained the mastery over them, were (Judg. i. 28, 30) subjected to compulsory service; as at a previous time that “mob” (Luther’s translation) which, according to Ex. xii. 38 (עָרֹב, a mixed multitude), Num. xi. 4 (קָדְמָנִי, a heterogeneous crowd), joined themselves to the Israelites when they were marching out of Egypt, were employed in the meaner offices in the camp (Deut. xxix. 10) (1).—For the future, also, it is ordained in the law of war (Deut. xx. 11 ff.), that the inhabitants of towns not belonging to the Canaanites who subjected themselves of free will to Israel should fall into serfdom; while, on the contrary, in towns which were taken by force, the men were to be killed, and only the women and children were to be led into slavery (comp. Num. xxxi. 16 f., 26 f.). Thus was formed in the Hebrew state a sort of Helot-class, mentioned especially under David (2 Chron. ii. 16, comp.

with 2 Sam. xx. 24) and Solomon (1 Kings ix. 20 ; 2 Chron. viii. 7). This class, which was bound to compulsory labour and employed on the public works, is estimated in 2 Chron. ii. 16 at 153,600 persons (2). Private slaves may have also in part been taken from this class of men. As the Old Testament never mentions the importation of slaves and slave-markets in the land, it is to be supposed that Israel, even in the times when it kept up a lively intercourse with other nations, drove no considerable slave-trade, and thus acquired comparatively few slaves by buying them in foreign lands. It hardly appears that Israelites came in contact with the Phœnician slave-trade otherwise than as sufferers (Jo. iv. 6, Ob. 20). How little the law favoured the multiplication of heathen slaves is shown by the remarkable regulation in Deut. xxiii. 16 f., in which it is said that a slave who has run away from his heathen master and fled to Israelitish land must not be delivered up nor treated with violence, but was rather to receive liberty to settle down where he pleased in an Israelitish town (3).—After what has been said, it cannot appear remarkable that the number of slaves was comparatively much smaller than among other civilised nations of antiquity (4).

The provisions contained in the law on the religious and legal position of slaves are as follows:—With regard to the receiving of slaves into the religious community of the covenant people by circumcision, the law of patriarchal times remained in force ; see Ex. xii. 44 (comp. § 82, 3). Rabbinic tradition says that it was not lawful to compel a heathen slave to be circumcised, but he was to be re-sold at the end of a year if he persevered in refusing the rite (5). Through circumcision, slaves received a right (by the passage cited) to partake of the Passover ; they are thus, in distinction from aliens and day-labourers (ver. 45), to be treated as members of the family (6). That the slaves took part in the sacrificial feasts follows from this as a matter of course (Deut. xii. 12, 18, xvi. 11, 14). It was not lawful (Deut. v. 14) to interfere with the Sabbath rest of the slaves (7).—With reference to the treatment of female slaves, the rule laid down in Deut. xxi. 10 ff. about those women who were taken in war is particularly characteristic of the humane spirit of the law (8).—The master has no right over the life of the slave. To this Ex. xxi. 20 f. refers (9). Here it is commanded that, “If a master strike his man-servant

or his maid-servant with a staff, so that he or she die under his hand, it shall be avenged." Jewish tradition says that in this case the master had to suffer death by the sword (10). This explanation is very improbable, since the connection shows that it is not intentional murder that is spoken of, but a misuse of the right of chastisement (comp. the expressions in Num. xxxv. 16–18). On the rabbinic view, too, the technical term מוֹת יָמָת would probably have been used; while the choice of the indefinite expression (מִנִּי) seems to show that the punishment might be differently measured according to circumstances (11). Nevertheless, if the slave outlived the punishment one or two days, there was to be no punishment, according to ver. 21 of the law, for "it is his money"—that is, the master is already sufficiently punished by the loss occasioned by the death of the servant. Besides, an intention to kill could not in this case be supposed. However, this provision is also made sharper by tradition (12). Lastly, ver. 26 f. commands that if any one strike out the eye or tooth of a slave, he must immediately give him freedom (13).

The humane treatment of slaves commanded by the law is also elsewhere inculcated in the Old Testament. How distinctly it enjoins the recognition of human dignity in a slave is especially shown by the passage Job xxxi. 13–15: "If I did despise the cause of my manservant or of my maid-servant, when they contended with me; what then shall I do when God riseth up? and when He visiteth, what shall I answer Him? Did not He that made me in the womb make him? and did not one fashion us in the womb?" (14).—The admonitions not to treat a slave too delicately (Prov. xxix. 19, 21) are to be regarded as parallel with those touching the upbringing of children (15).

(1) On the class of slaves for the sanctuary, which originated in a similar way, compare our account of David's time.

(2) On the relation of 2 Chron. ii. 16 to 1 Kings v. 27 ff., see the various views in Keil, *Komment. über die Bücher der Könige*, 1840, p. 68 f.; Ewald, *Gesch. Israels*, iii. ed. 1, p. 34; ed. 3, p. 312 f.; Bertheau, *Komment. zur Chronik*, p. 294 f. {2d ed. p. 240.}

(3) The fact that the heathen slaves in Israel came in great measure from the class which was liable to compulsory labour, and which, as has been already observed, was originally descended from

the remnant of the Canaanite tribes, supplies, in connection with a reference to Gen. ix. 25, the explanation of the rabbinic phrase, עֶבֶר וְנִזְעִי, as the general designation of non-Israelitish slaves (comp. *e.g.* the *Mishna Kiduschin* i. 3). [Above-cited art.]

(4) While, for example, in Athens (comp. Schömann, *griech. Alterthümer*, i. p. 349), during the prosperous times of the state, the proportion of slaves to citizens was as high as four to one, the proportion among the Israelites was rather the inverse of this. According to Ezra ii. 64 f., Neh. vii. 67, there were in the train of the 42,360 Jews who returned from Babylon only 7337 of both sexes; but here we must indeed remember that it was especially the poorer classes of the exiles that seem to have taken part in the return. [In the art. above cited.]

(5) Except when, on entering the service, he expressly reserved for himself the right of exemption from circumcision. A circumcised slave was not allowed to be sold again to a heathen (see Mielziner, *l.c.* p. 58). [*Ibid.*]

(6) As Lev. xxii. 11, the slaves of a priest might partake of the holy food, just like his family. [In above article.]

(7) That a master who had no male issue might marry a slave to his daughter, and adopt him in the place of a son, is shown by what is related in 1 Chron. ii. 34 ff. [*Ibid.*]

(8) An Israelite was not allowed at once and unconditionally to gratify a passion for such a prisoner; not till a month has passed, when the slave has got over her home-sickness, and has in a measure accustomed herself to the new relationships, could he enter into matrimonial connection with her; when once humbled, he could not, if she pleased him no more, sell her, but must let her go free (see the rabbinic provisions on this in Selden, *de jure nat. et gent.* v. 13). [*Ibid.*]

(9) Ex. xxi. 20 f. (see Raschi on this passage), as shown by the conclusion, treats of slaves who were not Hebrews; with regard to Israelitish slaves, the law of blood-revenge (Num. xxxv. 16 ff.) would doubtless have been observed. [*Ibid.*]

(10) See Hottinger, *juris hebr. leges*, p. 60.

(11) Comp. Saalschütz, *mos. Recht*, p. 540.—There is no doubt that intentional murder, even of a man's own slave, fell under the law of Ex. xxi. 12, Lev. xxiv. 17 (note the antithesis to ver. 18), and xxiv. 21 f. Even by Egyptian law (Diodor. i. 77), the murder of a slave was treated in the same way as the murder of a free man. [*Ibid.*]

(12) Tradition says that the punishment of death was to be decreed against the master, if, in chastising his slave, he made use of an instrument with which a mortal injury must obviously be inflicted,

even when the death of the slave did not occur for a length of time. [*Ibid.*]

(13) In this way the master suffers a loss of property, and the maltreated person is compensated by being set at liberty.—The law does not explain the provisions of criminal justice between a slave and a third party. See the tradition on this point in the above-cited article, p. 472.—Except the ordinances explained in the text, there is no provision in the law about the emancipation of non-Israelitish servants; as a matter of course, it could be effected by purchase or voluntary release. See the rabbinic provisions on this in Mielziner, *l.c.* p. 65 ff. [*Ibid.*]

(14) Comp. Aristotle, *Eth. Nik.* viii. 13 (11): *Φιλία οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος—ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμφυχον ὄργανον τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. Ἡ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος.*—Seneca, *Epist.* v. 6 (ep. 47): “Ne tamquam nominibus quidem, sed tamquam jumentis abutimur.”—In contrast: “Vis tu cogitare istum, quem servum tuum vocas, ex iisdem seminibus ortum, eodem frui cœlo, æque spirare, æque vivere, æque mori.”

(15) Comp., too, Sir. xxx. 33 ff. (xxxiii. 25 ff.).—Within the circle of Judaism, only the Essenes and Therapeutæ went so far as wholly to abolish slavery. They repudiate slavery as a thing unnatural, because inconsistent with the common brotherhood of mankind (see Philo, *quod omn. prob.* Mang. ii. p. 475; *de vit. contempl.* ii. p. 482). [*Ibid.*]

SECOND DOCTRINE.

THE MOSAIC CULTUS.

§ 112.

General Introductory Remarks. Essential Character of this Cultus.

Although, in virtue of the theocratic ordinance, all human relations and conditions have a religious quality, and so the whole life of the Israelite must be shaped as a service paid to God, yet there exists a special series of institutions, forming the *עֲבוֹדַת יְהוָה* or service of Jehovah in a narrower sense, in which special expression is given to the fundamental idea of the theocracy,—that Israel must present itself before the God who has chosen the people and brought them into fellowship with Himself as the community which He has hallowed (Ex. xix. 4):

that Israel must consecrate to God itself and all that it has. The grace shown and blessings given in connection with the acts of the cultus (Lev. ix. 22; Num. vi. 27) correspond on God's side to this devotion of the people, which rests on the divine election and institution of the covenant, and is completed in the ordinances defined by God. Note how these three elements—1. the divine election and institution in contrast to human ἐθελοθρησκεία; 2. the devotion in the acts of the cultus; 3. the grace connected therewith—are united in the words, Ex. xx. 24: "In all places where I cause my name to be remembered" (viz. by offerings, as is seen from the preceding context), "I will come unto thee and bless thee." Thus in the cultus a continual and lively intercourse takes place between the congregation, drawing near to God with prayer and sacrifice, and the God who makes His presence known to it by hearing prayer and administering the good things of His grace,—a relation of mutual communication and association of life, which is designated as the coming together {tryst} of God and the people, Ex. xxix. 42 f. (וְנוֹעַדְתִּי שָׁמָּה לְבָנִי וְיִזְרְאוּל) (1).

When the covenant communion subsisting between God and the people finds expression in the cultus, it falls under the notion of symbol; compare how *אֵת* is used for the Sabbath, Ex. xxxi. 13, 17 (*אֵת הוּא בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם*). The institutions of public worship must not be looked at in their bare outward form, but must be referred to the idea of the covenant, and interpreted from it. Since the aim of the covenant is just contained in the words, "I am holy, and ye also shall be holy," that which is the task of the whole theocracy holds good also and especially for the cultus, viz. that it is to be "the representation and exercise of the processes of sanctification" (2).—True, the Mosaic cultus is not a system of conscious symbol in the sense that the acts of worship were to be merely signs of internal things, which would thus go on in relative independence of the acts of cultus. For although a comprehension of the symbols of the Mosaic cultus could not be absolutely wanting to any pious Israelite, since, from the knowledge of God which was planted in Israel by revelation, a certain understanding of the meaning of the forms of the cultus must necessarily arise—all the more so because the ceremonial law itself everywhere shows the inner side of the demands of the law

shining through the veil of outward ordinances ;—though this was so, yet the outward acts of worship, as such, still remain on the standpoint of law the necessary vehicle for the actual realization of communion between God and man. For example, sacrifice does not symbolize a devotion to God taking place independently of the act of sacrifice ; it is not merely a symbol, or, as has also been said, a supplement to prayer, possessing a relative necessity, but it is just the devotion of oneself to God which is carried out in the act of sacrifice. The sacrifice is itself an embodied prayer ; to it is attached the attainment of divine pardon and divine blessing (of this there can be no doubt when the passages concerned are looked at without prejudice). It is the concern of the further progress of revelation to free the spiritual contents of the act of worship from its husk (3). For the stage of infancy, the ritual ordinance has the pedagogic value of a process working from the outside to the inside, and so awakening a God-fearing disposition, a consciousness of inward communion with God ; comp. *e.g.* Deut. xiv. 22 f. (4).

(1) The view which sees in cultus only an activity of man “for the awakening and enlivening of the pious consciousness” is precluded from reaching a full understanding of worship in general, and in particular of that of the Old Testament. See against this the remarks of Gaupp, *prakt. Theol.* i. p. 83 ff. The point involved in worship is always “to find a medium for some personal relation and communion with God,” not by any means simply to express some religious state in an artificial way for the self-satisfaction of the subject. Prayer requires a living, personal God, who answers prayer, and the offering of sacrifice demands its acceptance by God. Where man does not know that he has to deal with a living, personal God, every ordinance of worship has an end, or becomes a dead, lying form.—That the sacrificial side of cultus is predominant in the old covenant, and the sacramental in the new, is due to the relation of law to gospel ; in the latter, what God does for man stands first ; in the former, man’s acts. See Sartorius, *über den alt- und neutest. Kultus*, p. 40 f.

(2) Compare Bähr’s *Symbolik des mos. Kultus*, i. p. 8 ff., a work which opened up the way for the symbolic understanding of the Mosaic cultus.—The Mosaic cultus is taken up merely from the outside when, as has not seldom happened, to it is ascribed the idea that God is really to be fed by the offering, or when such profound interpretations are given as that of Clericus, that the incense at the sacrifice

was designed to drive away impertinent flies from the flesh of the sacrifice, etc.—The cultus must be understood from the idea of the covenant. K. J. Nitzsch has expressed himself particularly well on this topic in his academic lectures, *über die christl. Glaubenslehre*, 1858, which contain a series of excellent remarks on the Old Testament in opposition to current misunderstandings. He rightly says: “The whole Old Testament ought to be and must be a representation and exercise of the processes of sanctification.—The whole nature of the symbols and ceremonies of Moses is different from those of the heathen, although much in the outer forms in heathenism and the Old Testament seems to be quite similar. The heathen ceremonies effect material union with the divinity *ex opere operato*, and so work magically. There is not a single usage in the institutions of Moses in which a sensible act effects communion with God in a magical way, but all have a purely symbolical nature. This holds good of purifications, of offerings, of sacred buildings and their construction; it holds good of every utensil of the temple and every action.”

(3) In the Prophets and the Psalms, as we shall see afterwards, sacrifice is allowed a value only in as far as it goes along with inward transactions of the pious heart, and thus it appears as relatively indifferent. Mosaism says: Piety approves itself in sacrifice; prophecy says: Sacrifice is approved only by piety. The two propositions are mutually dependent, but the question is, Which stands foremost? This corresponds to the gradual process of the Old Testament revelation. But we must not think that, if it had not been the meaning of the Mosaic institutions to mirror the inner events of salvation, prophecy could have developed this thought from them.

(4) Deut. xiv. 22 f.: Bring the tithes, “that thou mayest learn to fear Jehovah thy God at all times” (comp. § 84).

§ 113.

The Place of the Word in Public Worship.

Connected with the matter of our last remarks is the peculiarity of the Mosaic cultus, that in it the word, speech, as an independent part of worship, has little prominence, and scarcely appears except as attached to some action and supported thereby. The proclamation of the divine word does not appear as an essential part of the Old Testament cultus; and though the teaching of Jehovah's law and statutes (Deut. xxxiii. 10) is specified among the priests' duties (comp.

§ 95), the reading of the law appears in connection with worship only in the regulation Deut. xxxi. 11 (every seventh year, at the Feast of Tabernacles). But to the place of worship was attached, without express teaching, the knowledge of the God who shows Himself here as a present God, Ex. xxix. 43-46, after which passages like Ps. xxvii. 4, etc., are to be understood; while with the acts of cultus was connected the lively transmission of the knowledge of the great deeds on which Israel rested its faith; see passages like Ex. xii. 26 f., xiii. 14, etc. (comp. § 105). The liturgic use of the Word is found, moreover, in the middle books of the Pentateuch, and this not merely (as we often find it said) in the high priest's blessing, Num. vi. 24-26. At the festival of the day of atonement a liturgic formula is obviously presupposed, Lev. xvi. 21; and it is especially important, that at the presentation of a sin-offering (Lev. v. 5; Num. v. 7) a definite confession of his sin is enjoined on the offerer. Vows must, as a matter of course, be uttered. Deuteronomy prescribes stated prayers, chap. xxvi., only for presenting the first-fruits and the tithes. Nevertheless, side by side with the stable forms of the cultus there ruled among the people a powerful spirit of prayer; and so all the examples set forth in the Pentateuch are also represented as praying men of strong faith (1). From this spirit of prayer arose sacred song, which, in connection with the festival dance, was introduced into the service of worship as early as Ex. xv. 20. f., comp. with Judg. xxi. 21, but which up to the time of David appears only in perfectly free and unregulated use (2).

Appendix: The Oath.

The oath is also regarded as a religious act. See, as the main passage, Deut. vi. 13: "Thou shalt fear Jehovah thy God; Him shalt thou serve, and shalt swear by His name;" comp. x. 20. Swearing is here an act of religious confession; comp. passages like Jer. iv. 2, Isa. lxv. 16.—The oath appears not merely as an asseveration,—as the assertion of the truth before the presence of God as the Living One (in the formula *יְהוָה חַי*, "Jehovah lives," see § 42), and thus as the omnipotent, omniscient, and holy Avenger of untruth—thus, *e.g.*, Judg. xi. 10 ("May Jehovah be judge between us"),—but it is a distinct appeal to His penal justice against him who knowingly speaks

falsehood. This conception of the oath is sufficiently evident even from the common form of swearing with אִם and לֹא אִם, which, fully expressed, demands a sentence of the sort which we find in 2 Sam. iii. 35: כֹּה יֵעָשֶׂה לִי אֱלֹהִים וְכֹה יִסִּיף (if this and that is or is not so); comp. 1 Sam. xiv. 14. But this character of the oath is particularly clear in the main passage Josh. xxii. 22: “אֱלֹהִים יִהְיֶה אֵל אֱלֹהִים יִהְיֶה” knows, and Israel shall know, if it be in rebellion, or in transgression against Jehovah, save us not this day;” and ver. 23: “Let Jehovah Himself require it.” The oath, viewed as such an appeal to God’s penal justice, bears the name אֶלֶּה, or more fully אֶלֶּה שְׁבַעַת אֶלֶּה, Num. v. 21, with which passage compare also Deut. xxix. 13, 18, Prov. xxix. 24, etc. Therefore Solomon, in his prayer at the dedication of the temple, 1 Kings viii. 31 f., prays that the effect of an אֶלֶּה presented at the altar may be, that God in heaven may hear, act, and judge, to condemn the godless, to bring his way on his head, and to justify the righteous, and to give him according to his righteousness.—The oath appears in private life from the most ancient times as a promissory oath, Gen. xxiv. 2 f., l. 5, 25; in particular, as an oath of covenant, xxi. 23 ff., xxxi. 53 f. The law speaks of promissory oaths, particularly in the form of vows (3). However, the law further acknowledges the assertory oath as an oath of purgation before the court of justice, Ex. xxii. 10, and as an adjuration by the judge to those who were present and in a position to bear witness, Lev. v. 1 (comp. § 99). To this head belongs also the adjuration of those accused of adultery, Num. v. 19 ff. (comp. § 104, 1).—The form in which an oath was taken was always that the oath was sworn by Jehovah (הִי יְהוָה). Protestations by the soul (הִי נַפְשִׁיךָ) and the like are matters of private caprice, and not of theocratic rules. Custom combined various signs with the taking of an oath; thus, in Gen. xxi. 28 ff., seven lambs were set up as pledges of the oath,—much as, according to Herodotus, iii. 8, the Arabians closed a bargain by smearing seven stones with the blood of the contracting parties. The word לִשְׁבַּע, to swear, properly to *be-seven* one another, points to the great age of such customs. The variously interpreted patriarchal ceremony in swearing, viz. laying the hand under the thigh of him who is sworn to, Gen. xxiv. 2, xlvii. 29, is probably to be explained from the fact that the thigh was regarded as the source of physical life. It was doubtless still

more common to raise the hand in invocation towards heaven (4), Gen. xiv. 22 f., comp. with Deut. xxxii. 40, Ex. vi. 8. The official and judicial form of oath among the Hebrews was, that he who took the other's oath conjured the man who was to swear, who then answered the adjuration with יָשָׁם (comp. Num. v. 22; Deut. xxvii. 16 ff.), or, "thou sayest it," Matt. xxvi. 63 f. (in the mouth of Jesus).

Perjury, as a profanation of Jehovah's name (Lev. xix. 12), as a vain use of it (Ex. xx. 7), is a heavy sin. How sacred swearing was counted is shown by Josh. ix. 19, where even an obligation by oath undertaken unlawfully is held to, in order that God's wrath (אֵפֶר) may not come on the community. Even when any one frivolously let an asseveration pass out of his mouth, this was to be atoned for by a sin-offering, Lev. v. 4 ff. When, in Lev. v. 21 ff. [E.V. vi. 2 ff.], a man who has denied upon oath the possession of a deposit, or otherwise has used an oath to conceal a breach of trust, is sentenced only to restore the amount of his breach of trust, with the addition of one-fifth more, and then to bring a trespass-offering, the apparent lightness of this punishment is probably to be explained by assuming that the law refers only to the case of spontaneous confession of perjury.—From the later books of the Old Testament, compare, with reference to the sacredness of the oath, Ps. xv. 4; 1 Kings viii. 31 f.; Ezek. xvii. 16 ff. (with reference to Zedekiah) (5).

(1) Formal directions for prayer are altogether omitted in the Pentateuch; examples of prayer are, however, given, and answers to prayer are recounted: Jacob's wrestling; Moses' uplifted hands at the battle with Amalek; his mediatorial intercession for the people before God—such types are presented from which every one can draw the knowledge of God's will: "Call on me in trouble," etc.

(2) Judg. xxi. 21 tells us that virgins went in such dances to the yearly festival in Shiloh.—See the way in which song and music were introduced as an integral portion of the cultus in the account of the time of David.

(3) A fuller treatment of *vows* will be given under the head of sacrifice, § 134 f.

(4) Hence in Arabic, بِیْمِینَ, the right hand, is used in the sense of an oath.

(5) Ps. xv. 4, "He sweareth to his hurt, and changeth not," must be

explained by referring the passage to Lev. v. 4.—On Ezek. xvii. 16 ff., compare the history of Zedekiah *infra*.—It is noteworthy how the rabbins combine rigour and laxity in the doctrine of oaths. Thus Moses (Maimonides, *hilehoth shebuoth* xi. 16, ed. Dithmar, p. 204) (comp. the passage out of the *Schulchan aruch* in Bodenschatz, *kirchl. Verfassung der heutigen Juden*, p. 364) teaches, on the one hand, that the Jew who swears ought to consider that the whole world quaked in the hour when God said to Moses, “Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain.” Perjury does not concern the transgressor alone, but his whole race—indeed all Israel, etc. But what wretched casuistry does Maimonides develope, on the other hand, in the same book! what lax usage do the provisions of the rabbis on compulsory oaths permit! Comp. my article, “Kol Nidre,” in Herzog’s *R.E.* viii. p. 24 f.

I. THE PLACE OF WORSHIP (1).

§ 114.

The Requisites for a Place of Worship.

The simplest place of worship is the altar, which is first mentioned, Gen. viii. 20; a height rising towards heaven, signifying the ascent of the devotion embodied in sacrifice (2). The common name for the altar, מזבח, designates it as the place of the sacrifice. The first condition for a place of worship is, that it has been chosen and sanctified by God, and has actually been witnessed to as the abode of His revelation. As already in the time of the patriarchs altars were set up chiefly in places consecrated by theophanies, Gen. xii. 7, xxvi. 24 f. (compared with xxviii. 18, xxxv. 1, 14), so, according to Mosaic law, only that place is permitted to be a place of worship where God has established the memory of His name, Ex. xx. 24; which He has chosen to cause His name to dwell there, Deut. xii. 5, 11 (xiv. 23) (comp. § 56); which He fills with His glory (Ex. xl. 34), and thereby sanctifies (xxix. 43 f.)—as it is afterwards said of the temple (1 Kings ix. 3; 2 Chron. vii. 16), that His eyes and His heart were there.

The sanctuary is only to be one, that the people may be kept together in theocratic unity. Later experience shows how a multiplicity of places for the ordinances of worship aided the growth of idol-worship. The exclusive unity of the national sanctuary is implied

(not only in Deuteronomy, but) already in what is said in the book of Exodus about the tabernacle as Jehovah's dwelling-place. The passage Ex. xx. 24 f., "In every place where I place a memorial of my name," etc., is not contradictory, for this passage does not give leave to worship Jehovah at the same time in many places; but the meaning is, that an altar of earth is to be reared up to God always in that place in which God has placed a memorial of His name. A number of places is only spoken of in so far as the seat of worship necessarily varied with the people's place of residence, so long as they were on their wanderings. The unity of the sanctuary is further presupposed in the prohibition, given for the wandering in the wilderness (Lev. xvii. 1 ff.), against killing an animal belonging to the class of sacrificial animals anywhere except in the sanctuary. But for the circumstances of residence in the Holy Land, Deut. xii. gives the most distinct command; permitting, indeed, the killing of animals for food in every place, but limiting every sacrifice to that place which Jehovah shall choose for the habitation of His name. Nevertheless, Deut. xii. 8 indicates that, even during the wandering in the wilderness, the prohibition of other places of worship was not fully carried into effect.

(1) Since the *personnel* of the Mosaic cultus has already been treated of, we have in particular only to treat of three other points:—1. Of the seat of the cultus; 2. of the acts of worship; and 3. of the times of worship.—Comp. Bähr, *Symbolik des mos. Kultus*.

(2) The Greek *βαμός* also primarily signifies a height = *בִּמְה*, but in the Old Testament this is the name for illegal high places for sacrifice.

§ 115.

The Arrangement of the Mosaic Sanctuary (1).

The Mosaic sanctuary is a tent, generally called *אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד*—that is, not, as many modern critics falsely interpret it, tent of the gathering of the people, but tent of the meeting of God with the people, as we see without ambiguity from the definite explanations, Ex. xxix. 42 f. (*אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד... אֲשֶׁר אֶעֱבֹד לָכֶם שָׁמָּה לְדֹר אֶלֶיךָ שָׁם*), Num. xvii. 19, comp. with Ex. xxv. 22, xxx. 6 (2). The other name for the sanctuary, *אֹהֶל*

הָעֵדוּת, or מִשְׁכַּן הָעֵדוּת—that is, tabernacle or abode of the testimony—denotes the sanctuary as the place of revelation. The LXX. render both expressions by *σκηνὴ τοῦ μαρτυρίου* or *τῆς μαρτυρίας*; the Vulgate generally gives *tabernaculum fœderis*, and from the latter arises Luther's *Stiftshütte*. The frame of the whole structure was formed by a construction of gilded boards or (probably more correctly) beams (קִרְשִׁים). The wood of the Arabic acacia (אֲשָׁף, probably different from ours) was selected for this purpose as well as for the sacred utensils, doubtless because, besides being very light, it is distinguished by unusual durability. Over the wooden frame there hung, Ex. xxvi. 1-14, a fourfold covering of curtains, the first of which was made of byssus (probably fine linen), embroidered with pictures of cherubs. The frame with this lowest covering is called מִשְׁכַּן, in the narrower sense. The entrance to the tent was turned towards the east, and hung with a costly covering (מָכָה) made of byssus. The whole tent—the length of which was thirty cubits, and its breadth ten—was divided into two rooms: in front, the Holy Place, הַקֹּדֶשׁ, twenty cubits long; and behind this the Most Holy Place, קֹדֶשׁ קֳדָשִׁים, in length ten cubits, and separated from the former by a curtain woven with pictures of cherubim, called the פְּרֻכָּה (division). The tabernacle was surrounded on all sides by a court, in length one hundred cubits and in breadth fifty, which was formed by pillars and curtains, and had, instead of a door, a curtain twenty cubits broad.—The utensils of the sanctuary were as follows:—In the court, in the open air, stood the altar for burnt-offerings (Ex. xxvii. 1 ff.), מִזְבֵּחַ הָעֹלָה, which is always meant when the altar is spoken of absolutely: it was a frame of acacia boards, overlaid with copper. As the command xx. 24 f., which said that the altar was to be made out of earth or unhewn stones, was not abrogated (comp. Deut. xxvii. 5 f.; Josh. viii. 31), we must doubtless suppose the altar to have been a mere frame without a top, which served simply to enclose the real altar, consisting of earth or unhewn stones. At the four corners of the altar were heights, called horns, on which a part of the blood was smeared at the sin-offerings, and which were seized by those who sought a refuge at the altar; comp. *e.g.* 1 Kings i. 50, etc. The height of the altar was three cubits; it was surrounded half-way up by a grating (בְּרֶכֶת), chiefly, perhaps, in order

to let the priest go round the altar on it. Between the altar and the sanctuary was a copper washing-basin, בִּיּוֹר, in which the priests washed hands and feet before going to the duties of their office, Ex. xxx. 17 ff. In the sanctuary itself, towards the north, stood the table with the twelve loaves of shewbread, לֶחֶם פָּנִים (Ex. xxv. 23-30), which were prepared from fine flour without leaven, and put there new every Sabbath. Opposite the table stood a golden candlestick with seven lamps, with bowls in the form of almonds and knops (בִּפְתִּירִים), probably in the form of a pomegranate, vers. 31-40. In the middle, before the curtain leading to the most holy place, was the altar of incense, מִזְבֵּחַ מִקְטָר, overlaid with gold plate. In the most holy place stood the ark of the covenant, אֲרוֹן הַבְּרִית, also called ark of the testimony, אֲרוֹן הָעֵדוּת, also simply עֲדוּת, the most sacred vessel of the sanctuary,—a chest overlaid within and without with fine gold, containing the tables of the law, and covered with a golden plate called כַּפֹּתֶת, the most important part of the ark of the covenant (see in particular, Lev. xvi. 13 ff.), from which, 1 Chron. xxviii. 11, the Holiest of all bore the name בֵּית הַכַּפֹּתֶת. The term does not, as many modern critics understand, signify a lid in general; but being a derivative from Piël, כָּפַר, it is to be understood to mean an instrument of atonement, as the LXX. already correctly translate *ἱλαστήριον*. Above the kapporeth stood two golden figures of cherubim, with outspread wings and faces turned towards each other; between them the shekinah of Jehovah was supposed to be (Ex. xxv. 22; Num. vii. 89). Hence Jehovah is called יְיָ בְּהַרְבֵּי (1 Sam. iv. 4; 2 Sam. vi. 2; Ps. xcix. 1). The poles for bearing the ark (בָּרִים) were always to remain in the rings which were on its sides, because it was not to be touched by the hand of man; neither was it to be seen, and therefore before it was carried farther it had to be covered with the curtain and rolled up, Num. iv. 5 f. Besides this, a vessel with manna (Ex. xvi. 33), Aaron's rod that budded (Num. xvii. 25), and lastly, by the side of the ark of the covenant, the book of the law (Deut. xxxi. 26), were kept in the most holy place.

(1) Old Testament theology may here limit itself to what is valuable for the symbolic signification of the sanctuary, and omit more special researches of archæology.—Comp. Bähr, *l.c.*; Kurtz,

“Beiträge zur Symbolik des alttest. Kultus, erster Beitrag: zur Symbolik der Kultusstätte” (*Zeitschr. für luth. Theol.* 1851, p. 1 ff.). The best essay on this point is that of Riggensbach, *Die mosaische Stiftshütte*, 1862 (ed. 2, 1867).

(2) The essential character of the Old Testament cultus is expressed in this designation (comp. § 112).

§ 116.

Meaning of the Sanctuary. Its Three Rooms.

The symbolic interpretation of the sanctuary cannot, as has frequently been done, proceed from a comparison with a common nomadic tent; because, of the three rooms of the latter, the central is the chief, while, on the contrary, in the three rooms of the tabernacle, we easily observe, along with a graduated relation of size, a graduated relation also in respect of importance. Into the first division, the court, only the covenant people can go; into the second, only the priesthood; into the third, the high priest alone, and that only once a year. The first division is under the open sky; the second is veiled, but still lighted; the third is quite veiled and dark.—The notion that the sanctuary is a picture of the universe is old, occurring even in Josephus (*Ant.* iii. 6. 4) and Philo. The same view has been again brought forward by Bähr (*Symbolik des mosaischen Kultus*, i.) in a peculiar form and an ingenious way: the most holy place and the holy place form a representation of heaven; the court, a representation of earth (1). But this conception is already contradicted by the circumstance that everything that is said about the sanctuary makes it to refer simply to the theocratic relationship into which Jehovah entered to His elect people, without the cosmical meaning being indicated anywhere; for such a conception certainly does not necessarily lie in the square form, which is that on which the building is planned. In what sense a relation between the sanctuary and heaven is to be conceded will appear below. The sanctuary is, as it is called, the tent of the meeting of God and the people; but this in the sense that here the people come to Jehovah in His dwelling-place, which He has set up in the midst of His people. Thus, in the sanctuary, the idea of God's dwelling among Israel is embodied. It is a tent, because Jehovah, who accompanies His

wandering people (comp. 2 Sam. vii. 6 f.), wishes, in respect to His dwelling-place, to place Himself in similar circumstances with them. But at the same time, the people are to be made conscious, that although the Holy God condescends to dwell among His people, this communion cannot be accomplished directly, on account of the people's sinfulness, but only through the mediation of the people's intercessor, who holds the office of reconciliation. The people are therefore limited to the court surrounding the sanctuary, and the sanctuary itself is only allowed to be entered by the priests. But even these priests are not in a position to establish a full communion with God (comp. Heb. ix. 8). For this reason Jehovah's dwelling-place is divided into two apartments: the veiled, holiest of all, in which Jehovah, the revealed, and yet hidden, and in a manner unapproachable God (comp. 1 Kings viii. 12), is enthroned in the darkness; and the holy place,—the place of the priests and their service, which just on this account is the symbol of the mediation of the covenant. There is a relationship between the sanctuary and heaven thus far—the shekinah in the one corresponds to the shekinah in the other (see § 62); indeed, it is not impossible that the distinction between the heaven (שָׁמַיִם) and the heaven of heavens (שָׁמַיִם הַשָּׁמַיִם), which occurs a few times in the Old Testament, corresponds to the difference between the holy place (קֹדֶשׁ) and the most holy place (קֹדֶשׁ קְדֹשִׁים). Ex. xxv. 9, 40, has also been referred to for this, comp. Heb. viii. 5; still the remark, that the model of the tabernacle and its vessels was shown to Moses on the mount, does not in itself imply that the sanctuary is to be a copy of a celestial original, but only that it serves to give expression to the ideas of revelation. There is, moreover, a contrast between the two divine dwelling-places; for in heaven God dwells in His majesty as Ruler of the world, in the earthly tabernacle He dwells in His condescending grace.

(1) Afterwards Bähr modified this view in his work on Solomon's temple, 1848. He no more regards the sanctuary as a picture of the creation, but as a picture of the theocracy. The dwelling-place is the representation of the centre or the soul of the theocracy.

§ 117.

Continuation: Sacred Vessels in the Court and in the Sanctuary.

The meaning of the various sacred vessels corresponds to the meaning of the three rooms in the sanctuary. The only piece of sacred furniture with reference to which an immediate activity of the people takes place, viz. the altar for burnt-offering, stands in the court. The fact that nothing but earth or unhewn stone was to be used to fill up the frame is not (as Bähr says) meant to remind us that man is a creature of the earth, and a sinner subject to death,—for how could the unhewn stones agree with this?—but the material is to be one which is as yet not desecrated by the hand of man.—The horns on the four corners of the altar are very variously interpreted. On one view (held, among others, by Riegenbach and Keil, *Archäologie*, i. pp. 104, 229), they are said to be symbols of the divine power of salvation and help, because, as is well known, the horns of a bull are the symbol of strength; and with this view it agrees well that to them especially the privilege of asylum is attached. According to another view, which agrees better with the use of the horns in the service of sacrifice, the general meaning of the altar, that worship ascends to God, culminates in the horns, so that thus the blood of atonement sprinkled on them is, as it were, brought a step nearer God (1). On account of the importance of the horns, the altar is destroyed by knocking them off, Amos iii. 14.—The washing-basin, *בִּיֹר*, marks the step from the general service of sacrifice to the specific priestly service. When the priests, Ex. xxx. 21, are commanded to purify hands and feet, with the warning that they must otherwise die, this is meant to signify that he who has to carry on the service of reconciliation for the congregation must sanctify his own walk and acts.

In the holy place stands the altar of incense, in front of the inner curtain, and so opposite the ark of the covenant, the place of the shekinah of God veiled by the curtain. The incense-offering, presented here every morning and evening by the hand of the priest, was (see Ps. cxli. 2; Rev. v. 8, viii. 3 f.) a symbol of the prayers of the people, because of which in the temple at a later time (comp. Luke i. 10), during the time of the priestly offering of incense, a praying congregation was gathered in the court. In Num. xvii. 11 (xvi. 46), the

burning of incense is an emblem of the intercession of the high priest.—It is more difficult to see the meaning of the table with the shewbread. The לֶחֶם פָּנִים is so called, Ex. xxv. 30, evidently because it was laid continually before Jehovah; and hence the table, Num. iv. 7, bore the name שֻׁלְחַן הַפָּנִים. This is unfavourable to Bähr's explanation (*l.c.* i. p. 425 ff.), which makes the "bread of the countenance" to signify bread by the use of which man obtains a view of God; so that in the shewbread the truth that he who gazes on God's countenance is spiritually satisfied thereby, and becomes partaker of the enjoyment of the highest joy and rapture, would be set forth. But in fact Bähr has not succeeded at all in proving that the shewbread in its primary significance is not something sacrificial,—a symbol of something presented by the congregation,—but something sacramental,—a symbol of something which God gives to the congregation. In this case, the circumstance that the shewbread was to be eaten by the priests in a holy place (Lev. xxiv. 9) must be the chief thing. But we see clearly that when the loaves of bread were eaten, their real function in worship was already fulfilled, and that they were consumed in a holy place only that they might be withdrawn from profane use. In Lev. xxiv. 8, the shewbread is called something given on the part of בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל the children of Israel as an "eternal covenant"—that is, a pledge of the eternal covenant to be given by Israel (2). In the same way, this whole oblation falls within the class of meat-offerings, in virtue of the incense which was sprinkled on the bread as אֵיֶזְרָה (ver. 7). That the shewbread is akin to the meat-offering becomes still more clear, because, according to Ex. xxv. 29 f., Num. iv. 7, to the utensils of the shewbread belonged also those vessels which were used for drink-offerings. The meaning of the shewbread rather is, that the people in its twelve tribes testified by the continual presentation of nourishing bread in the sanctuary that it owed to the blessing of its God the maintenance of life; thereby Israel dedicates to God the exercise of the calling by which it wins its daily bread in the use of God's gifts (3).—Since Philo's time, the candlestick with the seven golden lamps has often been referred to the seven planets of the ancients. But though the sanctity of the number seven may have had this reference in some other nations (4), there is no trace of this in the Mosaic cultus. The number seven is here always the sign of perfec-

tion and completion in all relations which are rooted in the divine economy of salvation. But while, in general, all holy things symbolize the communion between Jehovah and the people, the candlestick with its sevenfold light points to the perfect Light which shines in this covenant community; and in particular, the light does not refer merely to the communication of higher knowledge, but, as in the high priest's blessing, Num. vi. 25 ("Jehovah make His face shine upon thee"), to saving divine grace in general. This meaning of the symbol is specially confirmed by the visions Zech. iv. and Rev. i. ff. There the candlestick is the symbol of a congregation enlightened by God; and when, in the vision of Zechariah, the candlestick is filled with oil without the act of man, the idea expressed is, as is said in ver. 6, that all the success and all the splendour of the congregation is not effected by might or by power, but by the Spirit of God.—Almond blossom and pomegranates, the ornaments of the candlestick, are, in the heathenism of Western Asia, symbols of natural life (5). If, now, in Num. xvii. 16–24, the blossoming almond-rod is the symbol of the inexhaustible power of divine life in the priesthood of Aaron (comp. § 95), those ornamentations on the golden candlestick are also to be regarded as the symbol of the divine fulness of life, which the congregation shares in communion with God. Light and life are, to speak generally, essentially connected notions in Holy Writ; comp. in particular Ps. xxxvi. 10: "With Thee is the fountain of life, and in Thy light we shall see light." In the symbols of the holy place the truth is expressed, that the people presents itself before its God in the light and life which it receives in virtue of covenant communion with God.

(1) Thus Hofmann, who regards the horns as "the peaks of the sacred height" (*Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, ed. 1, p. 163; ed. 2, p. 257), etc. I hold the latter explanation to be the more probable.

(2) Comp. how the same term is used of circumcision, § 87.

(3) This interpretation is carried further by Hengstenberg and others, who make the shewbread a symbol of spiritual nourishment, which the people has produced and now presents to its God as a service in accordance with the covenant—in other words, a symbol of good works; an interpretation which is reached by bringing in John vi. 27 ("labour not for the meat which perisheth," etc.), comp. with iv. 32 ff., but has no support in the Old Testament.

(4) Compare hereafter the doctrine of the Sabbath, § 148, with notes 3 and 4.

(5) Especially the almond blossom, because it wakes into bloom while all nature is still asleep.

§ 118.

Continuation: The Ark of the Covenant, with the Kapporeth and the Tables of the Law.

In the most holy place, the ark of the covenant is symbol and vehicle of the presence of the revelation of Jehovah among His people. Hence it is called the throne of God, Jer. iii. 16 f.; God's footstool, 1 Chron. xxviii. 2, Ps. xcix. 5, cxxxii. 7. But its meaning is more nearly defined by the three parts—the kapporeth on the ark, the tables of the law in it, and the cherubim over it.

1. The kapporeth is the most important part of the ark of the covenant. To it specially is attached the manifestation of the divine presence; "there," it is said in Ex. xxv. 22, "will I meet with thee, and will commune with thee from above the mercy-seat," etc. In the circumstance that it is the implement of atonement (comp. § 115), and that it is at the kapporeth that the highest act of atonement is executed, it is expressed that the God who dwells in the midst of His people can only commune with them in virtue of an atonement offered to Him, but that He is also a God who can be reconciled. This throne of God is veiled in deep darkness, 1 Kings viii. 12 ("Jehovah hath said that He will dwell in darkness"); the manifestation of God over the kapporeth takes place in a cloud, which veils His glory, Lev. xvi. 2,—in the same cloud which guided Israel's march through the wilderness, Ex. xiii. 21, and which, Ex. xl. 34–38, lowered itself on the tabernacle when it was set up. Notwithstanding this, on the day of atonement, the priest who approaches with the blood of atonement must envelope himself in a cloud of incense (Lev. xvi. 13) when he raises the curtain (1). This expresses the fact that full communion between God and man is not to be realized, even through the medium of the atonement to be attained by the Old Testament sacrificial institutions—that, as is said in Heb. ix. 8, as yet the way to the

(heavenly) sanctuary was not made manifest (μήπω πεφανερῶσθαι τὴν τῶν ἁγίων ὁδόν).

2. The kapporeth rests on the ark, in which are the tables of the law, the testimony, תְּעוּדָה. This means that God sits enthroned in Israel on the ground of the covenant of law which He has made with Israel. The testimony is preserved in the ark as a treasure, a jewel (2). But with this goes a second consideration (3); while the law is certainly, in the first place, a testimony to the will of God towards the people, it is also (comp. what is said in Deut. xxxi. 26 f. of the roll of the law deposited beside the ark of the covenant) a testimony against the sinful people, —a continual record of accusation, so to speak, against their sins in the sight of the holy God. And now, when the kapporeth is over the tables, it is declared that God's grace, which provides an atonement or covering for the iniquity of the people, stands above His penal justice.

(1) The passage Lev. xvi. 2, so variously interpreted, runs thus: "And the Lord said unto Moses, Speak unto Aaron thy brother, that he come not at all times into the holy place within the veil before the mercy-seat, which is upon the ark; that he die not: for I appear in the cloud" (and so veiled) "upon the mercy-seat." For a long time it was the current exegesis (Vitranga, *Observ. sacr.* i. p. 168 ff.; Bähr; Ewald) to identify the עֲנַן in ver. 2 with the cloud of incense in ver. 13 (comp. § 140), so that ver. 2b should be explained: "that he may not die; for only in the cloud"—produced by the incense—"do I appear over the kapporeth." The unnaturalness of this paraphrase is manifest. I hold that view to be the right one which regards the two clouds (עֲנַן) as different. But this leaves it a disputed point what the first עֲנַן is to be supposed to be. The Rabbis postulate a cloud which continually hung over the cherubim; Luther, on the contrary, on Ps. xviii. (xvii.) 11, notes: "Super propitiatorium et cherubim nihil erat positum, quod videretur, sed sola fide credebatur illic sedere Deus" (*Exeget. opera lat.* xvi. p. 73). Hofmann's explanation is the most probable (*Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, ed. 1, p. 361 f.; ed 2, p. 507 f.), and identifies the cloud (correctly pointed with the article) with that mentioned in Ex. xl. It was to appear over the kapporeth whenever the high priest came before it.

(2) This is the primary meaning, as to which I hold that Bähr and Kurtz are right.

(3) Hengstenberg has wrongly given this out as the only meaning of the symbol.

§ 119.

Continuation : The Cherubim (1).

3. The cherubim are the most important symbols of the Mosaic cultus. Figures of them appear also on the tapestry of the tabernacle, and, at a later time, on the walls of Solomon's temple, and in the vision of the new temple, Ezek. xli. They are mentioned first in Gen. iii. 24,—a trait which, as Hengstenberg and others have rightly remarked, indicates that they belonged to a symbolism earlier than that of Mosaism (2). In Ps. xviii. 11 they appear as bearers of the cloudy chariot on which Jehovah rides; they are, besides, mentioned in the vision of Ezekiel, x. 1 ff. comp. with i. 4 ff., in which latter passage they are called חַיִּים, *i.e.* living creatures, as in Rev. iv. 6 ff. the ζῶα (3). They nowhere appear developed into independent personality, like the מַלְאָכִים; they are not sent out like these, but are constantly confined to the seat of the divine habitation and the manifestation of the Divine Being; this also holds good of Gen. iii. (comp. § 62). In Ezekiel, where their form is the most complicated (comp. Rev. iv.), they appear with a fourfold face,—that of a man, a lion, a bull, and an eagle,—with four wings, two of which are used in flying while the other two cover the body, and with arms and feet; their whole body is covered with eyes. This description of Ezekiel's is not to be transferred to the cherubim of the sanctuary; in fact, there would not (as Riehm rightly remarks) have been room on the ark of the covenant for a form so complicated. Neither can the cherubim of the temple have been so complicated. For since, according to 1 Kings vii. 29, 36, there were pictures of lions and bulls beside the cherubim on the brazen bases in the temple of Solomon, these cannot have been already contained in the pictures of the cherubim; nevertheless, the addition of the former shows that they stand in some relation to the cherubim. But we must further note (as Hengstenberg has rightly indicated), that in 1 Kings vi. 29 palms and open flowers, and palms again in Ezek. xli. 18 ff., appear in connection with the cherubim. But if, even in Ezek. i. 5, the human form is to be regarded as predominant, this is still more the case with the cherubim in the Pentateuch, to whom hands (Gen. iii. 24) and faces

(Ex. xxv. 20) are ascribed. The cited Pentateuchal passages lead, indeed (as Riehm and Keil rightly assert), to nothing further than to winged human forms (4). But it is not at all probable that Ezekiel was the first to add all the other features; some form or other akin to the later composition, although simpler, is probably to be assumed for the ancient symbols (5). According to Hengstenberg (*die Bücher Mose's und Aegypten*) and others, the cherubim of the Pentateuch are to be regarded as imitations of the Egyptian sphinxes, which are composed of the form of a human being (not merely a virgin, but oftener still a man) combined with that of a lion, to which Ezekiel, in whose portraiture a relation to the Assyrian composite figures of animals cannot be mistaken, has added also the bull and the eagle. The cherubim are in any case to be so interpreted, that the latest form in Ezekiel be taken only as a development of what originally was involved in the symbol.

Our inquiry into the meaning of the cherubim must start from the fact that, as has been already remarked, they designate a place as the abode of the habitation of God (Paradise, the tabernacle, and later the temple), and are thus the bearers of the manifestation of God when He manifests Himself to the world in His glory; on which account they are called God's chariot (1 Chron. xxviii. 18, comp. Ps. xviii. 11). Since, now, in Gen. iii. 24 they bar the entrance to Paradise, and since in Ex. xxv. 20 they protect and shade the ark, the first element in their function is to express to man's consciousness the inaccessibility of the Divine Being. They reflect the glory of the unapproachable God in a form which is accessible for human eyes, but at the same time is so constructed (as Riehm rightly urges) that they could give no support to the worship of images. But in admitting this, we have not yet done full justice to the symbol, especially in its most developed form. By uniting in itself the noblest earthly living creatures,—man, the eagle, the lion, the bull,—and connecting with them also flowers and palms as representatives of the vigour of life that displays itself in the vegetable kingdom, the symbol is evidently meant more particularly to set forth the divine glory as it is manifested in the world, and thereby to teach men to know the vital powers which work in the world as the efflux of the divine glory. It is the cherubim, as Schultz (*Alttest. Theologie*, i. p.

343) well expresses it, "which at one and the same time proclaim and veil His presence." The lion and the bull are, as is well known, symbols of power and strength; man and the eagle are symbols of wisdom and omniscience; the latter attribute is also expressed in the later form of the symbol by the multitude of eyes. The continual mobility of the ζῶα, Rev. iv. 8, signifies the never-resting vivacity of the divine operations; this is probably symbolized also by the wheels which are given to the cherubim in Ezek. i., in which, as is there said, "the Spirit of the Living One" is. The number four, connected with the cherubim in the later form of the symbol, is the signature of all-sidedness (towards the four quarters of heaven). Thus Jehovah, when He is honoured as He who is enthroned above the cherubim, is acknowledged as the God who rules the world on all sides in power, wisdom, and omniscience. In the room of natural powers working unconsciously, is placed the all-embracing, conscious activity of the Living God, the God of the spirits of all flesh, and hereby the whole view of nature in the Old Testament is defined; comp., for example, the view of the thunderstorm in Ps. xviii. 11. By this exposition of the cherubim we are to judge of the meaning of the invocation in Ps. lxxx. 2: "Thou Shepherd of Israel, who art enthroned upon the cherubim, shine forth!" (6).

The philological explanation of the term is altogether uncertain. The rabbinical interpretation, which Hengstenberg has renewed, and which looks on the word as made up from the כּ of comparison and רב, and gives it the meaning "equal to many," "like a multitude," *i.e.* the union of plurality, assumes a far too monstrous etymological formation. The view of Umbreit and others, who hold that כְּרֻבִים is formed by a transposition from כְּרִיב, and denotes the divine chariot, is more plausible; and in fact the cherubim are called כְּרֻבִיָּה in 1 Chron. xxviii. 18, comp. again Ps. xviii. 11. If we derive the word from כּרַב, various explanations are possible, on account of the ambiguity of the stem. In Syriac, the stem means to carve; hence some explain כְּרֻבִים by γλυπτόν, carved work = imagery, from which Keil gets the word to mean "figments of the imagination," and Hävernicks (*Alttest. Theologie*, ed. 1, p. 80; ed. 2, p. 95), creatures of the ideal world. In Arabic, the stem *karaba* means to lace, and then to straiten, to distress; so others give the word the meaning—alarming, horrible creatures. Others, again,

have got at the signification *nobilis princeps*, by the combination of כרוב and כרם. Others still give to the stem כרוב the meaning ἀρπάζειν, to snatch, so that the cherubim would be designated by their sweeping power, which makes them, so to speak, a sort of harpies. Frequently the word כרוב has been compared with the Greek γκρύψ, the griffin, that fabulous animal of the East which watched over hidden treasures; and for this view special reference is made to Ezek. xxviii. 14 ff., where the king of Tyre, who walked in Eden on the mount of God between stones of fire, and covered and protected them with his outspread wings, is compared to a cherub. The sense of the passage, however, is clear from what we have already learned. The king of Tyre, who deifies himself, is called a cherub because he looks on himself as the guardian of the divine dwelling-place, in whom is reflected the majesty of God.

(1) Literature: Riehm, *de natura et ratione symbolica Cheruborum* (Programm), 1864; Hengstenberg, *die Bücher Mose's und Aegypten*, p. 157 ff.; as also his essay in answer to Riehm, in the *Evangel. Kirchenzeitung*, 1866 (May and June), reprinted in his *Commentary to Ezekiel* at the end of the first part, p. 252 ff., in which is defended the earlier conception of Bähr, Hengstenberg, and others. {Riehm's view is restated, with modifications and additions, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* for 1871.}

(2) Hengstenberg says: "Thus we see that originally they did not belong to the sphere of revelation, but to the sphere of natural religion" (*Komment. zu Ezech.* i. p. 254).

(3) Hengstenberg finds that this symbol occurs no less than eighty-five times in the Old Testament (*l.c.* p. 252).

(4) Riehm: just on this account it was not found necessary to describe them more in detail.

(5) Comp. Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.* i. p. 340 ff.

(6) {"Who inhabitest the cherubim." Riehm, *Stud. und Krit.* 1871, p. 419.}

II. THE ACTIONS OF THE MOSAIC CULTUS (1).

§ 120.

Introductory Remarks: 1. On the Notion of Offerings in General.

The actions of worship fall under the general notion of offerings. The essential nature of an offering in general is the devotion of man

to God expressed in an outward act. Man feels impelled to express in actions which he directs exclusively to God partly his dependence on God in general (in virtue of which he knows that he is dependent on God in his being and his possessions, in his active and passive life), and partly the special relations in which he is placed towards God. True, the inward impulse which impels man to praise, thank, and supplicate God finds expression in words of devotion; but this impulse is not fully satisfied till this word is, as it were, embodied in a corresponding action, in which man deprives and denies himself of something, and thus by deeds testifies the earnestness of his devotion to God. Under the notion of offering, in the widest sense of the word, are also to be subsumed observances of sacred abstinence; to which belong, in the Mosaic cultus, fasting, the Nazarite vow, and the Levitical acts of purification,—forms of observances which in heathen religions sometimes rise to the most hideous self-torture and self-mutilation. In the narrower sense, however, the notion of offering (corresponding to its derivation from *offerre*) refers to positive acts, which consist in the presentation of a gift. In this sense it is designated in the Old Testament by the terms מִנְחָה (in the more general signification in which the word stands in Gen. iv. 3 ff., but never in the sacrificial laws), מִנְחֹת קֹדֶשׁ (Ex. xxviii. 38), but generally by קָרְבָּן, that is, presentation (Mark vii. 11: *Κορβάν ὃ ἐστὶ δῶρον*). The offering may be made in such a way that the object presented remains intact, but henceforth is placed exclusively at the disposition of the divinity (to this head belong the gifts of dedication,—for which in Num. vii. 3 ff., xxxi. 50, the word קָרְבָּן is likewise used,—those persons who were dedicated to the service of the sanctuary, etc.), or in such a way that what is offered is at once used up in honour of the divinity in some manner. In the latter case, the act of devotion is generally completed in the consumption of the gift, or at least a part of it, by the fire on the altar (מִזְבֵּחַ). This is what is meant by offering in the most limited sense, of which in the Old Testament the designation is נִשָּׂא, *i.e.* “firing,” a term used in speaking of all offerings which were brought to the altar, whether they were wholly or partially burnt (comp. Lev. i. 9, 17, ii. 3, iii. 3, 9, iv. 35, v. 12, etc.) (2).—An essential factor in the offering is substitution, which can take place in a twofold way,—first, when the person who brings the offering is represented by the

gift substituted in his room; and secondly, when something is substituted for the object to be offered. The latter case generally occurs in the shape of the representation of a whole class of things by a part of the class which is selected to be offered (as in the case of the first-born and of the firstlings of the harvest), but sometimes as strict substitution, so that what fell to be offered, but from some cause or other was not fit to be offered, was replaced by an object of a connected kind (comp. Ex. xiii. 13, xxxiv. 20), or some other surrogate (3). The idea of substitution is brought out most fully when another life is offered in the place of the life of the person who offers; but the idea of substitution reaches much further than this, inasmuch as there is self-renunciation in every real sacrifice,—the offerer putting, so to speak, a part of himself into his gift, whether impelled by love and thankfulness, or by fear of the vengeance of God, to which he knows himself or something he possesses to be exposed. With this it agrees that no real offering can be made of another man's possession (compare 2 Sam. xxiv. 24), but only of what is already one's property, or could at least (as in the case of booty) be held as such; and that it is just in the willingness to acknowledge God's higher right of property to one's own possession, and to give up to Him even what is dearest, that the genuine spirit of sacrifice is proved, as is expressed in the story in Gen. xxii.

(1) Literature: Outram, *de sacrificiis libri duo*, 1678; Saubert, *de sacrificiis veterum*, 1699; Sykes, *Versuch über die Natur, Absicht und den Ursprung der Opfer*, with notes and additions by Semler, 1778. In more modern times compare Scholl, on the sacrificial ideas of the ancients, especially the Jews, in the *Studien der evang. Geistlichkeit Württembergs*, i., iv., and v.; Bähr, *Symbolik des mos. Kultus*, ii.; Thalhofer, *die unblutigen Opfer des mos. Kultus*, 1848; Hengstenberg, "das Opfer," in the *Evang. Kirchenzeitung*, 1852, Nos. 12–16; Neumann, "die Opfer des A. Bundes," in the *deutschen Zeitschr. für christl. Wissenschaft und christl. Leben*, 1852, Nos. 30–33; 1853, Nos. 40–44; Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, ed. 1, p. 139 ff., ed. 2, p. 214 ff.; Keil, "die Opfer des A. Bundes," in the *luther. Zeitschr.* 1856 f.; Delitzsch, *Kommentar zum Hebräerbrief*, p. 736 ff.; my article, "Opferkultus des A. T.," in Herzog's *R.E.* x. p. 614 ff.; Kurtz, *der alttest. Opferkultus*, 1862; Kliefoth, "über den alttest. Kultus," in the 4th volume of his *liturg. Abhandlung*;

Wangemann, *das Opfer nach Lehre der h. Schrift*, 2 vols., 1866. Other books will be referred to in the following pages.

(2) אֵשׁ cannot be used of what is not to be burnt. That the incense which was laid cold upon the shewbread is so called (Lev. xxiv. 7) is explained by the fact that it was really burnt up when the shewbread was removed (see Josephus, *Ant.* iii. 10. 7). [Above article.]

(3) Among the Egyptians we find substitution of artificial figures of animals. Herodotus, ii. 47, says that the poor baked pigs of dough to offer. See other examples in Hermann, *die gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen*, ed. 1, p. 113, ed. 3, p. 146; compare also Hartung, *Religion der Römer*, i. p. 160 f.

§ 121.

Continuation: 2. Pre-Mosaic Sacrifice and the Mosaic Covenant Sacrifice as the Basis of the Mosaic Sacrificial Cultus.

Sacrifice was not newly introduced by the Mosaic law. Genesis not only speaks of sacrifice as observed by the patriarchs, but, in Gen. iv., carries back the presenting of offerings to the earliest age of mankind (comp. § 20). As has been shown above (§ 20 f.), the pre-Mosaic offerings had the signification of thank-offerings and offerings of supplication, though a propitiatory element is connected with the burnt-offering (first mentioned Gen. viii. 20) lying in the רִיחַ נִיחָם (properly, odour of satisfaction), through which the sacrifice has an appeasing effect, see ver. 21 (1). Offerings for atonement, in the strict sense, are not mentioned in the Old Testament before the introduction of the Mosaic sacrificial law (2). The book of Job, too, which introduces the customs of the age of the patriarchs, represents, in chap. i. 5, xlii. 8, the presenting of burnt-offerings for sin committed, and avoids the term כִּפָּר, which denotes expiation in the terminology of Mosaic sacrifice (giving, instead, the more general term קָרַב). Besides the burnt-offering, we find in patriarchal times "sacrifice" (זֶבַח) with the sacrificial feast (comp. Iken, *dissert.* ii. 1, p. 6 ff.) first mentioned in Gen. xxxi. 54, where it serves to ratify the covenant concluded between Jacob and Laban, and so ends in a meal of peace (further, xlv. 1, comp. Ex. x. 25, xviii. 12). Also, in xx. 24, xxiv. 5, only burnt-offerings and *shelamim* are mentioned. For an

expiatory offering, in the strict sense, presupposes the revelation of divine holiness in the law, and the entrance of the people into covenant relation with the holy God. The transition to this point, and at the same time the foundation of the whole system of Mosaic offerings, is formed by the covenant-offering in Ex. xxiv., especially in virtue of the meaning which here for the first time (apart from the institution of the Passover) attaches to the blood of the sacrifice. Moses set up an altar, which represented the presence of Jehovah, and (probably round it) twelve pillars as memorials of the twelve tribes. This preparation of a place of sacrifice already points to the communion between Jehovah and His people now to be established, in virtue of which He wishes to have His dwelling in the midst of the latter. After this, Moses causes burnt-offerings and *shelamim* to be presented by young men. These young men do not, as Kurtz (3) has understood the matter, represent "the sacrificing nation in its youth as a people, which, like a young man, is prepared to begin its course," for (comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, ed. 1, p. 151) it is not the people who here bring an offering for themselves; the covenant communion with God, in virtue of which the people approaches Him in the offering, is only now to be established; besides, the representatives of the congregation are, vers. 1 and 9, the seventy elders. It is Moses rather,—the instituted mediator of the covenant,—who, acting in the quality of priest, here brings the covenant-offering, and the young men are merely his servants (4). Moses now takes the half of the blood of the offering, and sprinkles it on the altar; then he reads the book of the covenant to the people; and after the people have again promised fidelity to the law, he sprinkles them with the other half of the blood, saying: "Behold, the blood of the covenant which Jehovah concludes with you over these words." The halving of the blood certainly refers to the two parties of the covenant, which now are brought together in a unity of life—not, however, in the sense in which two contracting parties mix their blood in the heathenish usages cited by Knobel on this passage; for the blood of the offered sacrifice belongs entirely to Jehovah, and the sprinkling of the people with a part of it rather signifies an appropriation of the people on God's part. According to the significance which from this time forth was to attach to the blood, and which falls to be discussed

more particularly afterwards (§ 127),—a significance which the people were already prepared to understand by the manipulation of the blood at the first Passover (Ex. xii. 22),—the act of sacrifice before us is to be understood as follows :—The mediator of the covenant first offers to God in the blood a pure life, which comes in between God and the people, covering and atoning for the latter. In this connection the sprinkling of the altar does not merely signify God's acceptance of the blood, but at the same time serves to consecrate the place in which Jehovah enters into intercourse with His people. But when a portion of the blood accepted by God is further applied to the people by an act of sprinkling, this is meant to signify that the same life which is offered up in atonement for the people is also intended to consecrate the people themselves to covenant fellowship with God. The act of consecration thus becomes an act of renewal of life,—a translation of Israel into the kingdom of God, in which it is filled with divine vital energy, and is sanctified to be a kingdom of priests, an holy people (5). The procedure at the dedication of the priests (Ex. xxix. 21; Lev. viii. 30) is quite analogous (comp. § 95). So the blood of the covenant, like the bloody token in Ex. xii. 22, separates the chosen people from the world, and hence its significance as a pledge, Zech. ix. 11 (which passage just refers to Ex. xxiv.). The sacrificial feast forms the close of the whole festival, at which the elders of Israel, who, ver. 2, before the sacrifice, durst not approach Jehovah, but are now atoned for, get a view of God, and eat and drink before Him as a pledge and testimony of the way in which, in the communion of the covenant, Jehovah's nearness is to be experienced and the richness of His benefits enjoyed.—In this first Mosaic act of offering (the Passover is an offering only in the wider sense, § 154) is already expressed the character of the ordinances of worship which arise on the basis of the covenant now concluded. The covenant is to subsist on offerings, under the condition of offerings to be presented (עֲלֵי זֶבֶח, Ps. l. 5), for the people are not to approach their God with empty hands (Ex. xxiii. 15; Deut. xvi. 16 f.). In order, however, to make such an approach possible to the sinful people, and to secure the duration of the covenant, which is continually endangered by the guilt of the congregation, God institutes an ordinance of atonement, which is principally carried out in acts of

worship specifically expiatory, but which also runs through the whole of the rest of the cultus; in all parts of which, but especially by the use which is from this time forward made of the blood of the sacrifice at the burnt- and thank-offerings, the idea is expressed that man dare not approach God without previous atonement,—that this must be accomplished before he may reckon that his gift will be favourably received by God. On the other hand, it is not correct to call atonement the leading idea of Mosaic sacrifice, in the sense that every offering is to be classed under this idea. It is rather the case that the gift or offering, in the strict sense,—that which really comes upon the altar,—follows on the completion of the atoning act. (The right understanding of sacrifice depends essentially on the distinction between these two elements.)

In speaking now of the ritual of Mosaic offerings, we begin with offerings in the narrower sense, which are brought upon the altar, and so immediately given over to Jehovah. As we treat of these, we shall bring in also, in their proper places, the remaining kinds of *korban* which were offered to Jehovah only indirectly—that is, by payment to the priests or Levites respectively (the first-born and tithes, also the shewbread, comp. § 117, may be reckoned with these) (6).

(1) The second offering mentioned in the Old Testament (Gen. viii. 20) is that which was offered by Noah after the Flood, taken from all clean cattle and all clean birds—that is, from those animals which were appointed for the food of man. It was offered as a burnt-sacrifice on an altar, from which the odour ascended to the God enthroned in heaven, and pleased Him (ver. 21). The motive of this offering is mainly thanksgiving for an experience of deliverance; of expiation for offences committed there is no mention, as, in fact, the judgment under which Noah was looked upon as righteous before God has run its course. And yet, as is shown by ver. 21, there is even here something more than a thank-offering. Man draws near to God in the offering, seeking at the same time grace for the future, after having seen the severity of God's penal justice (comp. the explanation of the passage by Josephus, *Ant.* i. 3. 7). And God graciously accepts this; He is willing, in answer to such a request for grace, to spare man, who would always draw down new judgments of extermination on himself by his sinfulness. Thus far it is correct

to say, that here we have a first elementary and symbolic expression of the necessity of an atonement before God (O. v. Gerlach on this passage).—From the passages Gen. iv. and viii. 20, there can be no doubt what answer the Old Testament gives to the long-disputed question, which is mainly connected with the first of these passages,—namely, whether the origin of sacrifice is to be traced back to a positive divine command, or to human invention and caprice (comp. on this controversy in particular, Deyling, “de sacrificiis Habelis atque Caini,” in the *Observ. sacræ*, ed. 3, ii. p. 53 ff.; Carpzov, *app. ant.* p. 699 ff.; Outram, *de sacrificiis*, i. 1, where the various views are compared in detail). In this way of putting the question the alternative is not correctly formulated. For if the first view is untenable, since there is no trace of a divine command to present offerings in the context of either passage, but, on the contrary, the whole character of the two narratives points to a deed which has no value apart from its spontaneousness (comp. Nägelsbach, *der Gottmensch*, i. p. 335 ff., where also the arguments of Deyling are examined), yet, on the other side, both passages acknowledge this free act as one thoroughly agreeable to the divine will; and there is in them no trace of a mere divine condescension, from which, as is well known, Spencer (*de leg. hebr. rit.* iii. diss. ii.) sought to explain the Old Testament sacrifices. Man is not first impelled to make offerings by the rudeness of his nature, to which God must make some indulgence lest something worse come instead (comp. Spencer, in Pfaff’s ed. p. 754); he does not offer by force of his natural badness, as we should be obliged to say on the deistic conception of sacrifice, which does indeed, in a manner, give a correct explanation of what sacrifice degenerated into;¹ but man offers in virtue of his inalienable divine image, which makes it impossible for him to abstain from seeking that communion with God, for which he was created, by such active self-devotion as takes place in offerings. Offerings are thus, as Neumann (in the above-cited essay, *deutsche Zeitschr. für christl. Wissensch.* 1852, p. 328) well says, “free expressions of the divinely fixed nature of man,” so that they are no more arbitrary inventions than prayer is, but spring in the same way as prayer from

¹ According to Blount, wicked men offer because they who do not like to do favours to one another for nothing judge the Divinity in the same way; according to Tindal, they sacrifice because they imagine that the cruel God delights in the slaughter of innocent creatures,—a delusion which was then made use of by the selfish corporation of priests in order to introduce the ritual ordinances established by themselves. See Lechler, *Geschichte des englischen Deismus*, pp. 119, 338. On Shuckford’s argument on the other side, see § 12, note 6.

an inward necessity, to which man freely yields. The passages in Genesis which treat of the sacrificial places of the patriarchs (xii. 8, xiii. 4, xxvi. 25, xxxiii. 20) also point to the close connection between the service of sacrifice and prayer, or invocation of God [above art.].—On the act described in Gen. xv., comp. § 80 ; on the history in Gen. xxii., comp. § 23, with note 9. The latter narrative is important for the development of the Old Testament idea of offering. In it is expressed, in the first place, the divine sanction of sacrifice in general as the proof of man's believing devotion to God ; and in the second place, the declaration that such devotion is to be proved by readiness to part with even the dearest possession out of obedience to God ; while, thirdly, human sacrifice is banished out of the region of the religion of revelation ; and fourthly, the acceptance of an animal victim as the substitute of man is ordained. In the whole story there is no mention of an atonement in behoof of which Isaac was to die ; and therefore the offering of the ram cannot have the meaning of a propitiatory sacrifice of a vicarious kind. [Above art.]

(2) Compare what Nügelbach, *homer. Theol.* ed. 1, p. 304, ed. 2, p. 352, remarks on sacrifice in the Homeric times. Man's willingness to honour the god with such enjoyment (the vapour of the fat) is what makes the offering pleasant to the latter ; and there is no difference in this respect between an offering of atonement and any other offering. That atonement in general depends only on the paying of honour to the deity, on the acknowledgment of its might and the expression in act of man's feeling of dependence, is plain from the fact that other prestations are also sufficient to conciliate the deity." [Above art.]

(3) See Kurtz, *Geschichte des A. Bundes*, ii. ed. 2, p. 304 ; also his *Alttest. Opferkultus*, p. 278.

(4) The indefinite mention of the young men, and the fact that nothing is said of their being twelve in number, or the like, is in favour of this view.

(5) Comp. Keil, *bibl. Archäol.* i. p. 260.

(6) In delineating the regulations about offerings, we treat, 1. of the material of the offering and the classification of offerings which is reached from this point of view ; 2. of the actions of which offerings are made up, or the ritual of offering ; 3. of the genera and species into which the offerings fall according to their destination.

1. THE MATERIAL OF THE OFFERINGS.

§ 122.

Bloody and Bloodless Offerings.

According to their material, offerings are partly bloody and partly bloodless. Bloody offerings are exclusively animal offerings. That human sacrifice (which the mad criticism of Ghillany, *Die Menschenopfer der alten Hebräer*, 1842, and other writers sought to represent as even an essential part of the Mosaic worship) was excluded from the legitimate worship of God follows, as we have already seen, from Gen. xxii. 11, and then from what is commanded in Ex. xiii. 13, xxxiv. 20, as to the redemption of the first-born of mankind (cf. § 105). To offer children as they were offered to Moloch (Lev. xviii. 21, xx. 2 ff.), and as was generally the custom among the Semitic nations (1), is called an abomination, Deut. xii. 31. Man has by the law no other power over human life than that of the execution of judgment (comp. §§ 99 and 108). Even the כְּרִמָּה, the exterminating curse or ban (§ 134), is intended to serve to glorify God's primitive justice. It may be classed in a sense under the head of offerings in the wider sense, as in Lev. xxvii. 28 it stands among sacred dedications (comp. also Isa. xxxiv. 5 f., Jer. xlvi. 10, where even the word זָבַח is used for it). But the cherem, by which a thing or person is swept away from before Jehovah (comp. *c.g.* 1 Sam. xv. 33), stands in direct antithesis to offerings in the narrower sense, to the gift offered on the altar. Thus, too, that act of revenge by the Gibeonites allowed by David, 2 Sam. xxi. 9, in which a bloody revenge, exceeding that demanded by the law, was executed, is not to be regarded as properly a human sacrifice. It is, however, clear from Ex. xx. 25 f., that the sacrifices of children which occurred in Israel were connected with a wrong application of the law of primogeniture (Ex. xiii. 2, 11 f., xxii. 29) (2).

There is no name in the sacrificial law of the Pentateuch which designates generally the bloody offering; Lev. i. 2 uses the circumlocution קָרְבַּן מִן־הַזֶּבֶחַ. The word זָבַח, to which in later usage the more general meaning (that it designates animal sacrifice generally) cannot be denied, is used in the Pentateuch only

of Shelamim (3). For a dry vegetable offering, the technical term is מִנְחָה (E. V., meat-offering); and the drink-offering which was added to the Mincha, and which consisted of wine, is called תִּשְׁבֵּץ. —Offerings of animals are most important, chiefly on account of the significance attaching to the blood. Meat-offerings certainly appear as independent gifts, Lev. v. 11 (as a substitute for an animal offering); vi. 12 ff. (as a priestly offering of dedication); Num. v. 15 ff. (as the jealousy-offering) (4). It is probable, too, that the meat-offerings described in Lev. ii. could be presented by themselves as free-will gifts (5). But for the most part, the meat-offerings, and the drink-offerings which went along with them, were connected with animal-offerings. Here, indeed, they form no mere supplementary gift; they are rather co-ordinate with that part of the animal which is laid as a gift on the altar. But since they also have as their presupposition the atonement completed by the manipulation of blood at the offering of an animal, so they are in fact dependent on the animal-offering. This dependence is seen also in this, that the quantity of the meat and drink-offerings had to be measured by the various kinds of animals to which they were annexed.

(1) See Lasaulx, *die Sühnopfer der Griechen und Römer*, p. 11.

(2) (Compare Umbreit on this passage.) A misunderstanding, such as might easily rise in the zeal for sacrifice depicted in Mic. vi. 7, even apart from the probability that, in the idolatrous minds of the people, the notion of the Holy One of Israel, whose zeal is a consuming fire, may often have been confounded with that of the fire-god Moloch [above art.]. When it is said, in Ezek. xx. 25 f., that Jehovah gave them statutes that were not good, on account of their falling away, to destroy them, the offering of children is not declared to be agreeable to the law; but the passage is to be understood like others in which men are said to be given over to what is sinful as a punishment (comp. § 76).

(3) See a more minute explanation of this in the discussion of Shelamim, § 132, with notes 7–9.

(4) We may also look on the first ripe sheaf presented on the first day of the Passover; and on the Pentecostal and shewbread, as special kinds of the Mincha; -comp. Maimonides's Pref. to *Menachoth*, in *Mischna ed. Surenhus*. v. p. 63. [Above art.]

(5) Thus the Jewish tradition ; comp. Maimonides, *l.c.* p. 64 ; also Winer, *Reallex.* ed. 3, ii. p. 494 ; and Thalhofer, *l.c.* p. 51 ff.

§ 123.

The Material of Animal Offerings.

In reference to the materials of animal offerings, it is laid down as law :

1. That they must be taken from among the clean animals, cf. Lev. xxvii. 9, 11. In Lev. xi. and Deut. xiv. the Mosaic law distinguishes clean and unclean animals in the following way (1) :—Of the larger land animals (בְּהֵמָה), all those are clean which have cloven hoofs (that is, divided quite through) and which chew the cud ; those which have not these two characteristics, or have only one of them, as the camel, the hare, the pig, etc., are unclean. Of water animals, those are clean that have fins and scales. With respect to birds (עוֹף), no general distinctive characteristic is given ; there are only twenty (in Leviticus) or twenty-one sorts (in Deuteronomy), including the bat (עֹטָלוֹת), enumerated by name as unclean, and these are for the most part birds of prey and waders, also the stork (הַסִּידָה). In the whole realm of small animals (שָׂרָץ), the use of grasshoppers is alone allowed among those that have wings (שָׂרָץ הָעוֹף) ; while of those that crawl and creep on the earth (הַשָּׂרָץ הַשָּׂרֵץ עַל-הָאָרֶץ) none are allowed, but eight kinds are expressly forbidden (weasel, mouse, lizard, etc.).—On what ground does this distinction rest ? The view that the flesh of certain creatures is injurious to the soul of man, that is, to his understanding (2), is only supported by a false explanation of Lev. xi. 44 (3), and cannot possibly be applied to the case before us, even were it not certain that doctrines of this kind are quite alien to Mosaism. With reference to some animals (as swine), it may certainly be taken as possible that the law is fixed by dietetic considerations ; but this principle is nowhere stated. Nor can the distinction between clean and unclean animals be traced to a dualistic view of creation, such as prevails in the Zend religion. That the one class of animals belongs to Jehovah, and not the other, is certainly not the Mosaic view. Uncleaness of certain animals is spoken of only in so far as they are

thereby excluded from being used as food; but even unclean animals might be dedicated to Jehovah, only they had to be redeemed, Lev. xxvii. 11 ff. The ground of the matter lies generally in the principle of the whole law (§ 84), that the people of Israel should impress on every sphere of life the stamp by which it acknowledges itself to be a people separated by Jehovah and dedicated to Him. So even in their food there must be a separation in which this reference to Jehovah is expressed, comp. Lev. xx. 24-26: "I am Jehovah your God, who have separated you from other nations; ye shall therefore put a difference between clean beasts and unclean," etc. But in the definition of those animals which are separated as unclean, it appears that, on the one hand, the principle was laid down that all flesh-eating animals were necessarily to be accounted unclean, because to partake of blood is an abomination. So, too, the birds enumerated are partly birds of prey, and partly such as feed on worms and the like. To these are added all animals that had anything repulsive and hideous (4). But now, in order to arrive at a fixed rule of separation among the larger land animals, it was natural to select certain common properties in those animals the flesh of which had always been looked on as the most excellent nourishment, and by these to define the clean animals. In consequence of the principle thus derived, the camel, the hare, and also (Ex. xiii. 13, xxxiv. 20) the ass ("quia neque ruminat, neque fissam habet ungulam"), etc., were excluded; any other ground than that given in Lev. xi. 4-6 could hardly have existed here.

2. Of clean animals, those were fit for offering which formed the proper stock of domesticated animals,—cattle, sheep, and goats; both sexes might be offered, but for offerings of a higher character males alone were employed. Of fowl, turtle-doves and young pigeons were offered (5). The former are to be met with so often in Palestine as birds of passage that it was not necessary to rear them specially; they formed in particular the animal food of the poor, and this explains their use in offerings. Pigeons and turtle-doves might, with the exception of a few offerings of purification, be presented only by the poor, as a substitute for the larger animals of sacrifice (Lev. v. 7, xii. 8) (6).—No part of the produce of the chase or of fishing was fit to be offered (7). The animals of sacrifice were to be without blemish (תָּמִים), free from bodily imperfections (קָלָמוֹם לֹא יִהְיֶה בוֹ); see especially Lev.

xxii. 21–24, comp. also Mal. i. 13 (8); an exception was allowed only with the נִדְבֹת (on this hereafter, § 132, with note 3). With respect to the age of the animals offered, the law commanded that they should at least be eight days old (Lev. xxii. 27, comp. with Ex. xxii. 29), because in the first eight days every new-born creature was accounted unclean (comp. § 87); this is not prescribed for doves. On the other side, the animals presented were also to be in the vigour of youth (9). The age is more precisely defined only in a few cases: for cattle, in Lev. ix. 3, where a one-year-old עֵגֶל is demanded; more frequently in the case of small cattle, viz. ix. 3, xii. 6; comp. Num. xxviii. 3, 9, 11, where a ram of the first year (בֶּבֶטֶט or בֶּבֶטֶב), Lev. xiv. 10, where a female of the first year (בִּבְשָׁה), Num. xv. 27, where a one-year-old goat (עֵז בֶּת-שָׁנָה) is prescribed. The older animals among the cattle are designated פֶּר and פָּרָה (on the contrary, שׁוֹר is used without respect to difference of age), the ram by אֵיל, the he-goat by עֲתִיד or שְׂעִיר שְׂעִיר (more fully, שְׂעִיר עִזִּים). The two last-named expressions are sharply distinguished (comp. Num. vii. 16 and 17, vers. 22 and 23, etc.); it is probable that שְׂעִיר signifies the older and עֲתִיד the younger he-goat (10). That, as the Rabbis declare, animals for sacrifice were, as a rule, not chosen more than three years old, does not rest on an express command of the law, and is concluded, perhaps, only from Gen. xv. 9 (11); but the provision is quite reasonable, because at this age the beasts of sacrifice have attained their full growth, and are in their full strength.

(1) Comp. on the following, Sommer, *Bibl. Abhandl.* i. pp. 183–360.

(2) This view is brought forward in the book ascribed to Josephus, but probably not really his, which is called the fourth book of the Maccabees, *de Maccabæis*, v. 25, and is found also among some Rabbis.

(3) Lev. xi. 44: “Ye shall not defile your souls;” נַפְשְׁכֶם here, as so frequently, means the whole person (comp. § 70).

(4) According to Ælian, *de nat. animal.* x. 16, swine were counted unclean by the Egyptians chiefly because they do not spare their own young, and even seize on human corpses; on another view, see Movers, *Phönicië*, i. p. 218 ff., they were unclean because consecrated to an infernal power.

(5) The latter are mentioned in the Old Testament as house-pigeons, Isa. lx. 8, and field-pigeons, Ezek. vii. 16, Jer. xlviii. 28.

(6) Other birds were not offered; the ceremony at the cleansing

of lepers, at which, Lev. xiv. 4 ff., עֲרֵבְיִם were used (by which, however, the Vulgate and Rabbis are hardly right in understanding sparrows), was no act of offering; at the subsequent offering of purification, ver. 30, only turtle-doves and young pigeons were permitted. Why the law excluded wading birds, and geese in particular, which were favourite offerings in the Egyptian cultus (see Movers, *das Opferwesen der Karthager*, p. 55), cannot be easily guessed. Still more remarkable is the exclusion of gallinaceous fowls; but the rearing of these fowls is nowhere mentioned in the Old Testament (with the exception of Job xxxviii. 36, where at least Delitzsch has renewed the rabbinic explanation, according to which עֲרֵבְיִם designates the cock). The Mishna *Baba kama*, vii. 7, maintains, though in decided contradiction to the New Testament, that it was not lawful to keep fowls at all in Jerusalem, and that priests at least were not allowed to keep them in the land of Israel; the reason of this is said to be that (see Surenhus on this passage) these creatures are often polluted by reptiles when scraping on a dunghill (comp. Lev. xi. 31). [Above article.]

(7) In the heathen religions of anterior Asia, on the contrary, offerings of wild animals, and especially of deer, were common; see Movers, *l.c.* p. 53.

(8) With reference to the individual bodily imperfections, the number of which amounted, according to Jewish tradition, to seventy-three, see Bähr, *l.c.* ii. p. 297 ff.

(9) This, in the case of cattle, is especially expressed by the addition of עֲרֵבְיִם; see Knobel on Lev. i. 5.

(10) Kimchi holds the opposite view. We cannot here go into detailed discussion on the point; comp. Bochart's learned work on biblical zoology, *Hieroicon*, new edition by Rosenmüller, ii. 53; and Knobel, in his *Commentary to Lev.* iv. 23.

(11) The relation which Hofmann and Delitzsch find in Gen. xv. 9 between the choice of animals three years old and the duration of the stay in Egypt, prophesied in ver. 16, may seem to be favoured by the fact that, in Judg. vi. 25, the oxen seven years old seem to be chosen with reference to the seven years of Midianitish bondage; but it does not agree with ver. 13, according to which the whole four generations are to be reckoned in the time of service. [Above art.]

§ 124.

The Ingredients of the Vegetable Offerings. Salt in the Offerings.

The ingredients of the vegetable-offering, and particularly of the Mincha, or meat-offering, were, according to the law in Lev. ii.,—

1. Ears roasted by fire, rough meal or groats from the fruitful field, fruit, פֶּרֶמֶל (1), ver. 14 ;
2. Flour, סֹלֶת (2), ver. 1,—to both of these olive oil and incense were added (3), vers. 1, 15 f. ;
3. Unleavened loaves or cakes, prepared from סֹלֶת of three sorts (4), ver. 4 ff. Thus the meat-offering was made of that which served as the common nourishment of man, and at the same time was produced by human toil. Orchard fruits, such as almonds and pomegranates, which require either no human care or only very little, are excluded ; and with this reason is perhaps combined the consideration that offerings were to be no dainties, in contrast to the raisin-cakes {not, as E. V., flagons of wine} in the service of idols ; comp. Hos. iii. 1. With reference to every Mincha, it is rigidly enjoined (Lev. ii. 11) that the offering may not be prepared with leaven, but must (compare ver. 4 f.) be offered as מֵצָה. This requisite of vegetable offerings seems to correspond to the faultlessness of animal sacrifices. Indeed, two kinds of fermentation (חֲמֵץ) are forbidden,—firstly, with leaven ; and secondly, with honey. The former certainly was used in the loaves of the first-fruits (ii. 12, xxiii. 17), which represented the common nourishment of the people, and likewise in the cakes of bread accompanying thank-offerings (vii. 13) ; but none of these were offered on the altar—the former fell to the share of the priests ; the latter were used at the sacrificial feast (5). As to honey, it is disputed whether we are by it to understand (according to the Rabbis, whom Bähr follows) grape and date honey and fruit syrups in general, or (according to Philo, *de vict. offer.* § 6,—where the prohibition is deduced from the uncleanness of bees,—and most modern theologians) the honey of bees. Probably the last-named is primarily meant, but there is no doubt that both were excluded (6). The reason why leaven, although it was not unclean, had a profaning effect (it was forbidden also among the Greeks and Romans in sacrificial cakes, and among the latter to the *Flamen Dialis*), is probably that the process of fermentation brought about

by means of leaven was looked on as akin to corruption (7). The effect of honey is similar to that of leaven, since it easily changes into acid (8). Others (9) trace the prohibition of leaven to the fact that it imparts to the bread a certain pleasantness of taste, while all seasoning which is delightful to man is to be avoided in offerings; from similar reasons, viz. as a symbol of the delights of the world, honey would be forbidden. Others, again, thought they saw a symbol of arrogance and the like in leaven, because it raised the bread.

Salt was, according to Lev. ii. 13, essential to every meat-offering (according to the LXX. on Lev. xxiv. 7 for the shewbread also). It does not follow with certainty from the passage cited that salt was prescribed also as an accompaniment to animal offerings, for the closing words, "On every *קָרְבָּן* thou shalt offer salt," may from the context be limited to the *Mincha*. At any rate, however, later usage made use of salt in animal sacrifices (comp. Mark ix. 49, *πᾶσα θυσία ἀλλ' ἁλισθήσεται*) at the burnt-offering (Ezek. xliii. 24; Josephus, *Ant.* iii. 9. 1) (10); doubtless also at thank-offerings, which were combined with meat-offerings. On the contrary, the use of salt at offerings of atonement has not been hitherto distinctly proved (11).—The point of view under which the use of salt with offerings is to be regarded is not mainly that it makes the offering palatable. Salt, in virtue of its power of seasoning and preventing putrefaction, is the symbol of cleansing and purification as well as of durability. The latter meaning is intended when it is said in Lev. ii. 13, "The salt of the covenant of thy God," referring to the indestructible endurance of the covenant; and therefore a covenant regulation of God, which is for ever valid, is called a covenant of salt (Num. xviii. 19; 2 Chron. xiii. 5). On the other hand, Christ's words, Mark ix. 49, "Every one is salted with fire, and every offering is salted with salt," refer to the former meaning, for here the salt of the offering is paralleled with the purifying fire of self-denial and trials necessary to every man (12).

(1) According to rabbinic tradition, *קָרְבָּן* is here meant to signify fresh, juicy ears.

(2) *סֵלֶת* is probably the finest wheaten flour. Barley meal appears only in the offering of jealousy, Num. v. 15.

(3) Incense was not sprinkled on the flour or groats, but was

added entire, to be burnt along with the handful taken from the offering (comp. Bartenora on *Mishna Menachoth* i. 2). [Above art.]

(4) Viz. (a) Bread baked in the oven (תנייר),—either תליות, perforated cakes kneaded with oil, or רִקְקִים, thin flat cakes smeared with oil; (b) Bread prepared on a plate or shallow pan (מַחֲבֵת),—a kind of cake kneaded with oil, which was turned out hard and crisp (see Rashi on this passage), and was then broken in pieces, over which oil was poured; (c) Wheaten flour prepared with oil in the skillet, מִרְקִיעֵת (a deep vessel, say the Rabbis), namely (see Rashi on this passage) *per ebullitionem*—that is, cakes sodden in oil. [Above art.]

(5) So in 2 Chron. xxxi. 5 gifts of the first-fruits of honey are mentioned.

(6) A delineation of the Jewish cultus of offering was given by Theophrastus in his work *περὶ ἐνσεβειας*. This work, as a whole, is lost, but considerable fragments of it are preserved in the work of Porphyrius, *de abstinentia*; these were published by Bernays, 1866. There, among other things, it is maintained (comp. Bernays, p. 112) that the Jews poured honey over the pieces which were to be burnt on the altar. We do not know how Theophrastus fell into this and other mistakes.

(7) Comp. Plutarch, *quest. rom.* 109.—Leaven is therefore the symbol of what is impure, of what corrupts morally (Luke xii. 1; 1 Cor. v. 6-8).

(8) Pliny notes this, *hist. nat.* xi. 15 (45). In rabbinic usage, חֲרִיץ has on this account the meaning *fermentescere*, and then *corrumpi*.

(9) Thus Baur, in the *Tübinger Zeitschr.* 1832, Num. 1, p. 68 f.; and Neumann, in the *deutschen Zeitschr. für christl. Wissenschaft*, 1853, p. 334.

(10) *Mishna Sebachim* mentions salt only at the burnt-offerings of birds, vii. 5, but remarks, § 6, that the offering still held good even if the rubbing with salt was omitted.

(11) To the supplies in kind, which in later times fell to the share of the temple, belonged especially salt (Ezra vi. 9, vii. 22), which, as is clear from Josephus, *Ant.* xii. 3. 3, was used in large quantities, and, among other purposes, to salt the skins of the beasts sacrificed. See *Mishna Middoth* v. 2, in which passage a special chamber for salt is mentioned, which was in the front court of the temple [above art.]. See Carpzov, *app. ant.* p. 718, and the above-cited article, p. 624, on the מֶלַח סְדוּמִית, to be used according to the Talmud for the offerings.

(12) Nothing but wine was used for the drink-offering that went

with the meat-offering. (The libation of water (1 Sam. vii. 6) is probably to be interpreted as a ceremony of purification; see O. v. Gerlach on this passage, and another view in the commentary of Thenius. On the libation of water at the feast of tabernacles, see § 156.) With reference to the wine, the law fixes nothing more than the quantity to be used. *Mishna Menachoth* viii. 6, 7, on the contrary, contains exact rules about the kinds to be chosen, about what is to be observed with regard to the cultivation of the vineyard concerned, and about the age and preservation of the wine. [Above art.]

§ 125.

The Principle on which the Material of Offerings was fixed.

What is now the principle which lies at the root of these rules as to the material of offerings? The following are the principal views (1):—

1. A first view holds that these rules were fixed with an eye to the people's property. Thus Bähr (*Symbolik*, ii. p. 317): "The entire circle of all that was offered in Israel was to be the entire circle of that which is Israel's own—Israel's means of existence." In fact (as was already indicated in § 120), if self-denial is an essential feature in offerings, a real offering can be presented only of property; to offer another's property, as Bähr rightly notes, is a *contradictio in adjecto* (as in the case of St. Crispin). It is no argument against this that, for example, the people, in their needy circumstances after the exile, brought offerings from the largess which the Persian king bestowed on them (Ezra vi. 9, comp. vii. 17, 22, etc.). From the ordinances of Nehemiah (Neh. x. 33 ff.) it is nevertheless clear that the people were well aware that it was their duty themselves to provide what the ritual demanded. However, the notion of the people's property is far too extensive to explain the material of offerings; and even Bähr limits the point of view of property by calling attention to the reference of the two main constituents of the offerings to the two material bases of the Hebrew state,—cattle-breeding and agriculture,—a reference the meaning of which will appear below.

2. According to a second view, the defining principle is that of nourishment. Offerings are frequently called the bread of God; and

this name is applied to offerings in general (Lev. xxi. 6, 8, 17; Num. xxviii. 2, 24; comp. Ezek. xlv. 7; Mal. i. 7), to the burnt-offering and thank-offering together (Lev. xxii. 25), to the thank-offering alone (Lev. iii. 11, 16), but the expression is never used of sin-offerings in particular. According to the Mosaic idea of God, it is not possible to understand this phrase of food offered for God's nourishment (comp. § 112, with note 2), but only of a giving to God of the people's nourishment (2). Even this point of view, however, taken generally, goes too far, because not all the clean animals which are allowed for food, and not nearly all that is eaten of the vegetable kingdom, can be made use of as material for offering. The material of offerings is, as already remarked, taken only from those clean animals which have been got by rearing and cultivation, and which form the ordinary stock of cattle, and from such produce of manual labour in field and vineyard as serves as the common nourishment of man. From this it is clear that the offerings are chosen with regard to the ordinary nourishment earned by the people in their calling (3). The people bring an offering to God of the food which they have produced in the vocation ordained for them by God; and thus they sanctify their calling (4), and bring a testimony of the blessing which God has given on the labour of their hands, Deut. xvi. 17.

3. On this conception, now, in the third place, that point of view gets its due which Kurtz has asserted with good reason, and which only must not, as Kurtz formerly did (*das mosaische Opfer*, 1842, p. 60), be taken as the actual principle of choice, viz. the *psychicobiotic rapport* in which the offerer stands to the gift presented. The feature of self-denial essential to a real offering is particularly prominent in those gifts which are taken from what is produced by man's regular daily toil, and at the same time from the best and most precious part of such produce; and it is quite specially an act of self-denial to give the first-fruits of the herd and of the field, to which the heart is wont to cling particularly. But what Philo points out (*de viet.* § 1) has also a place in these considerations, viz. that those animals are dedicated as sacrifices which are the most tame, the best accustomed to man's hand, or, if you will, the most innocent—which surrender themselves most patiently to slaughter. Consider the patient lamb in Isa. liii. 7.

After the foregoing remarks, the provisions about the material of offerings, in reference to what they include and exclude, require no further elucidation. There is just one more question, viz. What meaning attaches to the oil and the incense along with the meat-offerings? As to the latter, there is no doubt that, as the offering of incense is not merely to serve to produce a sweet odour, but is the symbol of prayer ascending to God, and well-pleasing in His sight (comp. Ps. cxli. 2) (5), so also the incense along with the Mincha is to serve to imprint more definitely on the offering the character of a vehicle of prayer. It is disputed, on the contrary, whether the oil, like the incense and the salt, is simply a supplement to the Mincha (thus Kurtz in particular),—namely, an unction indicating (because oil in the Old Testament appears as the symbol of the communication of the Spirit) that only such labour is well-pleasing to God as is consecrated by the Divine Spirit, that only those gifts should be brought to Him which are produced by such toil,—or whether (so Bähr) the oil in the offering is co-ordinate with the grain and the wine, and thus is not a mere accompaniment, but an independent constituent of the gift—as indeed oil is frequently specified in the Old Testament, along with corn and wine, among the chief productions of Palestine (6). The co-ordination of the oil and the incense in Lev. ii. 1, 15, as well as the circumstance that the oil, with the incense, was omitted in the meat-offering for sin and jealousy (Lev. v. 11 and Num. v. 15), seem to speak for Kurtz's view. On the other hand, the law in Num. xv., where the provisions as to the quantity of oil to be used are quite co-ordinate with the quantities of wine in the drink-offering, speaks for the second view. The omission of the oil, which makes food savoury, in the offerings of sin and jealousy is also explicable on the second view: these offerings were to be of a gloomy character, and therefore in them the libation of wine was also omitted; and in the offering of jealousy a less valuable kind of flour was used (7).

(1) The rabbinic views, as collected by Surenhusius in his preface to *Mishna Sebachim*, deserve no consideration (comp. also the article cited above, p. 625).

(2) Hence, as Neumann, *l.c.* p. 332, rightly reminds us, we may not reject this principle from fear of anthropopathic misuse of it.

(3) Because Israel is not to be a people of hunters, no offering of game is commanded.

(4) Compare Keil, *Handb. der bibl. Archäologie*, i. p. 198 ff.

(5) Ps. cxli. 2: "Let my prayer come before Thee as incense; and the lifting up of my hands as the evening Mincha."

(6) See Kurtz, *das mos. Opfer*, p. 101, and *alttest. Opferkultus*, p. 246 f.; Bähr, *l.c.* pp. 302, 316.

(7) On the contrary, the parallel drawn by Bähr between the oil of the meat-offering and the fat of animal sacrifices has been rejected by Kurtz with good reason (*das mos. Opfer*, p. 94). [Above art.]

2. THE RITUAL OF SACRIFICE.

§ 126.

The Ritual of Animal Sacrifice: Presentation at the Altar; Laying on of Hands; Slaughter.

The parts that make up the action of offering, and first of animal sacrifice, are in general—1. The presentation of the animal to be sacrificed before the altar; 2. The laying on of hands; 3. Killing; 4. Sprinkling of the blood; 5. Burning on the altar (1).

1. The consecration of the offerer, accomplished by avoiding all Levitical defilement, and by washing, preceded the sacrificial festival (see 1 Sam. xvi. 5, comp. Philo, *de vict. off.* § 1). On this the offerer had in person to bring the animal selected to the entrance of the tabernacle, Lev. i. 3, iv. 4, where stood the altar of burnt sacrifice (Ex. xl. 6). The term for this is, in Lev. iv. 4 and other passages, *הִקְדִּישׁ*, distinguished from *הִקְדִּישׁ*, which designates the proper presentation of offerings on the altar, i. 3; comp. especially xvii. 4 f., 9 (2).

2. Then the offerer (if there was more than one, comp. *e.g.* Ex. xxix. 10, one after the other) laid, or more correctly pressed firmly, his hand on the head of the sacrificial animal (Lev. i. 4, iii. 2, iv. 4, etc.) (3). The term *וַיָּדָהּ* here used properly means to prop or lean the hand; according to the Rabbis, the hands were to be laid on with the whole bodily strength (*בְּכָל כֹּחַ*, Maimonides). Doubtless the utterance of some declaration as to the destination of the offering presented (petition, confession, thanks, etc.) was connected with the laying on of hands, or *Semikha* (4). The signification of the laying

on of hands is not merely (as has often been said, see Knobel on Lev. i. 4) to express in general that thereby the beast to be sacrificed is removed from the power and possession of him who makes the offering, and devoted to God; but (comp. Hofmann in the *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, ed. 1, p. 155; ed. 2, p. 246) the laying on of hands, occurring also at the dedication of the Levites, Num. viii. 10 (comp. § 94), is, as is expressed by letting the hand down on the head, the dedication of that which the acting person awards to the other in virtue of the fulness of power that he possesses over it. The offerer, by the laying on of his hands, appoints the animal to be for him a medium and vehicle for atonement, thanks, or supplication, according to the designation of the offering with which at the time he now wishes to appear before God. The laying on of hands must not be limited to the imputation of sin (as is frequently done) (5).

3. The slaughtering of the beast of sacrifice (זָבַח, the term "to kill," is never used) follows immediately on the laying on of hands, and, as the law presupposes throughout, is executed at private offerings by the offerer himself. True, it lay in the nature of the case that at this act the assistance of another had to be called in; but the slaughtering of private offerings was in no case a specific business of the priests, as has often been assumed (already by Philo, *de vict.* § 5). (The reason of the exception in offerings of doves will be mentioned below.) But at those sacrifices which formed the standing service at the offerings for the cleansing of lepers (Lev. xiv. 13, 25), as well as at the sacrifices offered for the whole nation (comp. 2 Chron. xxix. 22, 24), the slaughtering was the business of the priests, who were probably assisted by the Levites (comp. ver. 34) (6).

For burnt sacrifices, sin-offerings, and trespass-offerings, the place of slaughtering was on the north side of the altar (Lev. i. 11, iv. 24, 29, 33, vi. 18, xiv. 13) (7). A thank-offering might, it appears, be slaughtered at other places in the court (8). Ewald (*Alterthümer*, ed. 1, p. 46; ed. 2, p. 59) would see in the choice of the north side a remnant of the ancient belief that the Divinity dwelt either in the east or the north, and came from thence; but that the slaughtering of the sacrifice has also the meaning of a presentation before God has yet to be proved. We might rather say, with Tholuck (*Das Alte Testament in Neuen*, ed. 3, p. 91), that the north side is chosen for slaughtering.

ing the offering because it is dark, and therefore cheerless. The law makes no provisions for the manner of slaughtering; tradition, however, is all the more explicit on this account, and aims mainly at the speediest and most complete way of obtaining the blood (9). On this principle, too (as Bähr, *l.c.* p. 343, has rightly discerned), we are to explain the manner of procedure prescribed for the offering of pigeons, Lev. i. 15—namely, that the priest himself must wring off the head of the bird, in order to be able to press out the blood on the spot (10).—In the Mosaic ritual, the slaughtering of the offering has apparently no independent significance; it only serves as a means of obtaining the blood. It is at least not indicated in the law of offering that what the offerer deserved as a sinner is executed on the animal when it is slaughtered, and that thus the death of the sacrifice satisfies the divine punitive justice. Though much that is beautiful can be said about the connection of the idea of a *pœna vicaria* with the offering (as the later Jewish theology lays great emphasis on this idea), nothing can be adduced for it from the sacrificial laws. Certainly the act of slaughter, if it was to represent the punishment of death deserved by the offerer—if the shedding of the blood under the sacrificial knife was an act of real expiation, must have been more prominently set forth, and the act of slaughter must unquestionably have been assigned not to the offerer of the sacrifice, but to the priest, as the representative of the punishing God. Or shall God appear as a judge, who commands the transgressor to execute himself with the sword? (11). Besides, if the slaughter were really an act of atonement, it would probably take place on the altar itself, and not by its side. The act of atonement at the offering, with which the specific priestly functions begin, commences not with the shedding of blood, but with the use of the shed blood.

(1) Those ceremonies which are peculiar to some kinds of offerings are most suitably spoken of in the discussion of these.

(2) At this presentation, doubtless, the priest examined whether the condition of the animal corresponded to the sacrificial regulations.

(3) According to *Mishna Menachoth* ix. 8, both hands, for which the Rabbis refer to Lev. xvi. 21.

(4) The formulæ handed down by the Rabbis (comp. Outram, *de sacrificiis*, p. 156 ff.) are nevertheless, without doubt, of a later origin.

Jewish tradition says (see Outram, p. 152) that the laying on of hands took place at all private offerings, with exception of the first-fruits, the tithes, and the paschal lamb, but it is declared to be unnecessary at the sacrifice of birds. When the law in Lev. vii. omits to mention the laying on of hands at trespass-offerings, this is probably only because the description is curtailed, ver. 7 referring back to the sin-offering. Of the sacrifices offered for the congregation, the laying on of hands is mentioned only at the sin-offering, iv. 15, according to which it was to be accomplished by the elders; and in xvi. 21, with which comp. 2 Chron. xxix. 23. Tradition (comp. *Menachoth* ix. 7) says that the practice was actually limited to these cases. The provisions of the law, according to which the person who offered, and not the priest, except when the offerer was the priest, had to undertake the act of laying on of hands, is, with right, emphatically urged by Jewish tradition. No one could cause his servant, or his wife, or any one else, to take his place here; only, when a dead person had vowed to give an offering, the heir was allowed to be his substitute (Outram, *l.c.* p. 153). Women, children, blind, deaf, and insane persons are designated in *Menachoth* ix. 8 as incapacitated from performing this function [above art.].—These traditional provisions show that it is a point in this laying on of the hand that the act be performed with full consciousness of its meaning.

(5) When Ewald (*Alterthümer des Volkes Israel*, ed. 1, p. 45; ed. 3, p. 58) represents the laying on of hands, this dedicatory sign “of highest power and exertion,” at the offering as characterizing the sacred moment when the offerer, “on the point of beginning the sacred act, himself laid down all the feelings which must now rush on him in full fervour on the head of the creature, the blood of which was presently to flow for him, and as it were to appear before God for him,” he has certainly rightly caught the meaning of the ancient ceremony. [Above art.]

(6) On this point see especially Lund, *jüdische Heiligthümer*, p. 579 f.

(7) See the Jewish views on the compass of this region in Ugolino, *altare exterius*, in *Thesaur.* x. 518.

(8) See the statements of the Mishna in the above-cited article, p. 628.

(9) See Outram, *l.c.* p. 162.—The difference still subsisting between Jewish butchery and the mode of procedure generally practised in slaughtering animals refers to this.

(10) On the word פֶּה, see Knobel on Lev. i. 15; according to *Mishna Sebachim* iv. § 4, the head was not to be separated from the

body of the pigeon in the sin-offering, which is, on the contrary, prescribed (§ 5) for burnt-offerings of doves. [Above art.]

(11) Comp. Keil's judicious remarks, *luth. Zeitschr.* 1857, p. 57.

§ 127.

Continuation : The Use made of the Shed Blood.

4. The streaming blood of the slaughtered animal was caught at once by a priest (1) in a basin, and—see Sheringham on *Mishna Joma* iv. 3—was stirred incessantly to prevent it from clotting (2). The manipulation of the blood which followed differed according to the various kinds of offerings, that is, according to the degree in which the element of atonement was connected with the sacrifice. The lowest grade, in the case of burnt-offerings, trespass-offerings, and thank-offerings (Lev. i. 5, vii. 2, iii. 13, etc.), consisted in sprinkling, or rather swinging, the blood round the altar (עַל-הַמִּזְבֵּחַ קָבַיִב) (whilst, at least according to Philo, *de vict.* § 5, the priest walked round it). The term זָרַק, used for this operation, is different from הִזָּה; only the latter was done with the finger; the זָרַקָה, on the contrary, was done directly out of the basin (3). The law seems to demand that at the זָרַקָה the whole supply of blood be used (4).—On the contrary, at sin-offerings a higher grade of manipulation of the blood took place, consisting in bringing the blood to special sanctified places, according to the dignity of the sin-offering. In the first grade of sin-offering, part of the blood had to be put on the horns of the altar of burnt-offering (זָרַק, Lev. iv. 30, 34); in the second, the blood was brought into the holy place, and part of it was sprinkled or squirted (הִזָּה, iv. 6, 17) seven times towards the inner curtain, and put on the horns of the altar of incense. In both cases the remaining quantity of blood was to be poured out (שָׁפַךְ) at the foot of the altar of burnt-offerings. But in the highest grade of sin-offering, the blood was brought into the holiest of all, and the Kapporeth was sprinkled with it (5).—The interpretation of this use of the blood must proceed from the passage Lev. xvii. 11, where the prohibition to use blood is based on the following declaration :—“For the soul of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you on the altar to atone for (properly to cover)

your souls (לְכַפֵּר עַל-נַפְשֵׁיכֶם); for the blood expiates by the soul (בְּנַפְשׁוֹ)—that is, by means of, in virtue of this, that the soul is in it" (6). The main sense is not changed if we take the other possible view of the construction, and assuming a use of *Beth essentia*, interpret, "in the quality of the soul;" but in this case נַפְשׁוֹ (without the article) must be read. On the contrary, the explanation "the blood atones for the soul," or "is an atonement for the soul" (LXX.: ἀντὶ ψυχῆς ἐξιλάσεται; so E. V. and Luther), is to be rejected; for, not to speak of the tautology thus introduced into the passage, the thing to be atoned for, or more literally to be covered, is always connected with כַּפֵּר by the prepositions עַל or בְּעַד, or rarely in the accusative (7). This connection of the soul and the blood is in ver. 14 expressed thus: "The soul of all flesh is דָּמִי בְּנַפְשׁוֹ," that is, "its blood in its soul,"—its blood in as far as it has the property of the נַפֶּשׁ, its animated blood. (נַפְשׁוֹ is to be taken as in Gen. ix. 4.) Knobel is probably right when he says: "The addition of נַפְשׁוֹ serves to define דָּם more distinctly, in order that we may not hold the matter of the blood in itself to be the life, *e.g.* not also clotted and dried blood, from which the נַפֶּשׁ has disappeared." For the manipulation of the blood must not be understood as the employment of what *once was* the life of the animal to sprinkle the holy places,—a view by which an altogether foreign idea would be imported into the passage. As in the Old Testament living water and living flesh (in contrast to boiled, 1 Sam. ii. 15) are spoken of, so, and even more correctly, can fresh, reeking blood, still in the act of flowing, be regarded as blood which still has life in itself, is still linked with the soul. The passage means to say, that in the still fresh blood of the sacrifice which is put on the altar the soul of the animal is presented for the soul of man, to atone for, more exactly to cover, the latter. The terms כַּפֵּר, with the substantives כַּפָּר, כַּפָּרִים, used to express the notion of atonement, denote expiation as a covering; the guilt is to be covered—withdrawn, so to speak—from the gaze of Him who is reconciled by the atonement, so that the guilty one can now approach Him without danger. In explanation of this, comp. especially passages such as Ex. xxx. 12 (Num. viii. 19), but in particular Num. xvii. 11 (8), etc. On the same view rests the converse expression—to cover the face of the adversary who is to be conciliated by a gift, Gen. xxxii. 21 (כַּפֵּר

בְּפָרִי; comp., in xx. 16, the corresponding expression בְּסוּת עֵינַיִם (see other cognate terms adduced by Knobel on this passage). Thus, too, a bribe given to a judge by an accused person is called בְּפָר, a covering, because (1 Sam. xii. 3) the eyes of the judge were thereby veiled. To the sinful people God appears as the covering One, Deut. xxi. 8; Jer. xviii. 23; Mic. vii. 19 (9). In the language of sacrifice, the priest, as the mediator between God and the people, is in general designated as he who covers or expiates, Lev. v. 26 (וּבִפְר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן לְפָנַי יְהוָה), x. 17, xv. 15 and 30. That by which a trespass is covered can only be something by which he against whom man has offended is satisfied. Thus בְּפָר passes over into the meaning of λύτρον, the payment which buys a debtor free; thus Ex. xxi. 30 (where נִפְאוֹ corresponds to it); Num. xxxv. 31; comp. also Prov. vi. 35, xiii. 8 (10). The λύτρον paid must naturally stand in a suitable proportion to the guilt to be redeemed; still the notion of equivalency does not necessarily lie in בְּפָר. The gift by which a man covers himself must only be of such a sort as to be fit to appease the person to whom compensation is due. בְּפָר forms a contrast to punishment, but in some cases not an absolute contrast. Lighter punishment may be a covering against heavier, as in the case of the money-fine, Ex. xxi. 30; to this Isa. xxvii. 9 also belongs, where the lighter punishment, which has a purifying effect, serves to cover or atone, in contrast to the heavy punishment of extermination; comp. also the בְּפָר in Job xxxiii. 24. Further, the punishment which falls on one man may benefit another as his בְּפָר, and that in various ways. The punishment of death executed on a manslayer furnishes a covering for the land which has been desecrated by the crime of blood, Num. xxxv. 33; and the example of punishment executed on a guilty person covers the people who are involved in connection with this crime and suffer thereby, xxv. 13 (comp. Josh. vii. for a case in point). In a manner, Prov. xxi. 18 also belongs to this: "The wicked shall be a covering (בְּפָר) for the righteous, and the transgressor comes in the place of the upright;" by the divine judgment falling on the wicked man, that is (comp. xi. 8), by God's judgment being spent on the wicked man, the righteous man is freed and saved. But even the thought that perhaps a righteous man may purchase forgiveness for the people by taking their punishment is not unknown to the Pentateuch; see Ex.

xxxii. 32, and what has already (§ 29, with note 3) been said about this passage ; only that Jehovah (ver. 33) does not accept this atonement for which Moses offers himself.

Now in what sense shall the soul of the animal presented in the blood in the sacrifice serve as a covering for the soul of man ? Generally speaking, by man placing the soul of the pure, innocent sacrificial animal between himself and God, because he is unable to approach God immediately on account of his sinfulness and impurity ; as Jacob, wishing to reconcile his heavily-injured brother Esau, sends the בָּקָר before him. More particularly, however, the question arises, Is the way in which the beast sacrificed comes in for the guilty person to be regarded as vicarious punishment ?—in other words, Can the soul of the animal become a substitute for the soul of sinful man, because it has first by death paid the penalty which the latter should have borne, so that here the *jus talionis*, “soul for soul,” Ex. xxi. 33, comes into play ?—In the ritual law of the Old Testament there is, apart from sacrifice, a ceremony in which certainly the idea of the *pœna vicaria* is expressed—namely, Deut. xxi. 1-9, the ceremony which was ordained in the case of a manslayer remaining unknown. Evidently the punishment of death incurred by the manslayer is executed symbolically on the heifer, the neck of which is broken in a brook (11). With reference to sacrifice, the notion of vicarious punishment certainly does not admit of being confuted by the common objection, that the soul of the sacrificial animal, laden with the curse of the sinner, might not be laid upon the altar, upon which nothing may be laid but what is clean and well-pleasing to God. For to this objection we may reply, with Kurtz, that after the guilt of sin is wiped off by death, the wages of sin, a *restitutio in integrum* ensues, in virtue whereof the blood, which has passed through death, is to be viewed as pure and free from guilt (12). But if, in conformity with this view, the offering of the blood on the altar is only to signify the divine acceptance of the atonement completed in the death of the sacrifice, it still remains unexplained why, in the ritual of sacrifice, it is not the act of slaughter by which the guilt is carried away, but the act of presenting the blood on the altar that is designated the act of atonement (comp. the remarks in § 126). The law, in giving no special meaning at all to the slaughtering, certainly leaves room for reflections, like those of

Bähr (*l.c.* p. 211) and others, that every gift to God presupposes the offering up of the natural life; or for the common view, which recommends itself by its easy intelligibility, that a punishment is symbolically executed in the slaughtering (13). But the law nowhere indicates that in sacrifice, as in the *Cherem*, an act of punitive punishment is executed; it in no way asks us to look on the altar as a place of execution. He who has malevolently committed trespass against the covenant God and His laws falls without mercy under the divine punitive justice; but on this account there is no more sacrifice for him. The Mosaic cultus is a divine ordinance of grace for the congregation, which, though it does indeed sin in its weakness, yet seeks the divine countenance. For this congregation the approach to God is to be made possible by God giving it in the cultus means of covering sin which are well-pleasing to Him, the Holy One, לְרִצּוֹן (as the expression so often runs). Thus the sanctuary itself, for which the כֶּפֶר, paid by the people at their numbering, is used, is, Ex. xxx. 16, a זִכָּרוֹן before Jehovah, serving as a covering for the souls of the people (לְכִפָּר עַל-נַפְשֵׁיהֶם). Where, then, is there room in this case for a *pœna vicaria*? So, as already shown (§ 92), the priesthood with its ordinances steps in between the people and Jehovah as a covering; though both the places of worship and the *personnel* of worship, it is true, require in turn to be themselves continually cleansed and atoned for, as it is the peculiarity of the institutions of the Mosaic cultus generally that the great number of ordinances, each requiring to be supplemented by the others, points to the inadequacy of the whole, and makes the need of a complete and true atonement to be felt (comp. § 96). But it can only be the soul which really covers and atones for the soul. Man can embody his thanks and requests in a gift; but this gift, as the gift of an impure and sinful person, is itself impure—it can please God only as the gift of one who has given himself up to Him. God has therefore ordained something in the ritual which represents this self-surrender; he has put the soul of the clean and guiltless animal which is presented to Him in the blood of the offering in the place of the impure and sinful soul of the offerer, and this pure soul, coming between the offerer and the Holy God, lets Him see at His altar a pure life, through which the impure life of the offerer is covered (14); and in the same way this pure element serves to cover the pollutions

clinging to the sanctuary, and to do away with them. That is the Old Testament type for the word, Heb. ix. 14 (ὁς διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου προσήνεγκεν ἑαυτὸν ἁμωμον τῷ Θεῷ).—The blood of sacrifice has thus a quite specific meaning. It is not, with Schultz, to be looked upon merely as the most noble gift dedicated to God, but it is that which alone makes God's acceptance of all gifts possible, since in it the self-sacrifice of the offerer is vicariously accomplished. Because man's incapability to enter immediately into communion with God appears afresh at every offering, therefore every complete offering must be preceded by the covering of the atonement of blood, and therefore this is *conditio sine qua non* of the presentation of a gift even in the thank-offering. Where, on the contrary, the whole act of sacrifice aims at atonement, the manipulation of blood takes place in a higher degree (15).

(1) Executed by another, the operation did not hold good, *Mishna Sebachim* ii. 1.

(2) Tradition ordained that the basin should be pointed below, so that the priest could not set it down anywhere.—There is no other mention made of mixing the blood of the sacrifice with water, as Heb. ix. 19 assumes to have been done in the covenant sacrifice; see Delitzsch on this passage. [Above art.]

(3) See more particulars as to Jewish tradition in the above-cited article, p. 629.

(4) Later tradition commanded that what of the blood remained over should be poured out at the foot of the altar, into one of the two pipes which were at its south-west corner, through which it then ran off into the Kedron. [Above art.]

(5) Comp. the laws Lev. iv. and xvi. Particulars on this point in the doctrine of the sin-offering, § 139 ff.

(6) Thus כִּפָּר stands with the *Beth instrumenti*, Lev. vii. 7; Ex. xxix. 33; Num. v. 8; 2 Sam. xxi. 3.

(7) In כִּפָּרְתָּ, Lev. vi. 23, xvi. 27, כִּפָּר is to be taken locally.

(8) According to Ex. xxx. 12, the Israelite, when the people were numbered, had to cover himself by means of a sum of money, in order that no plague might come upon him when he presented himself before the Holy God.—In Num. xvii. 11 it is the incensing, which symbolizes the priestly intercession, that comes between the divine wrath (קִצְוֹ) and the people, and by covering the latter arrests the progress of the plague. [Above art.]

(9) In Mic. vii. 19, forgiveness of sins on the part of God is called a casting of sin into the depths of the sea.—Elsewhere it is also expressed by כָּפַר.

(10) In Prov. xiii. 8, it is said that to the rich man his wealth is כֶּכָּר לְנַפְשׁוֹ, a covering for his soul, because with its help he is able to redeem himself from danger.

(11) Comp. Delitzsch, *Komment. zum Hebräerbrief*, p. 742 f.; and see § 143, 2.

(12) What Keil, *bibl. Archäol.* i. p. 213, adduces against this argument can hardly be regarded as decisive. [Above art.]

(13) This is already indicated in Isa. liii., and is set forth definitely in the later Jewish ritual; comp. Outram, p. 159. See, too, Delitzsch, *l.c.* p. 738 f. [Above art.]

(14) We cannot reasonably say that in this case the divine punitive justice terminates in nothing; on the contrary, that justice is honoured when he who makes the offering declares that he is in want of a covering before the Holy God, and thereby acknowledges himself as one who, though sinning in weakness, is exposed to the divine judgment. [Article, “*Versöhnungstag*.”]

(15) What is here discussed in a general way will find its special application when we speak of the sin-offering, and, in particular, of the day of atonement (§ 139 ff.).

§ 128.

Continuation: Burning the Offering.

5. When the manipulation of the blood was completed, the burning of the offering followed (1). In the burnt-offering, all the flesh and the fat pieces were consumed after those parts had been washed which required cleansing (Lev. i. 7–9); in the other offerings, only the fat pieces (2).—As to the meaning of the burning, there is neither in the ritual of sacrifice nor otherwise in the Old Testament, any support whatever for the view, still defended, especially by Hengstenberg, according to which this ceremony shows that sin is not expiated by death, but that there is still a punishment impending after death—namely, that of hell-fire, the symbol whereof is the fire of the altar. The true point of the burning on the altar is already clear from the fact that not the term הָרָה, which designates destructive burning, is used for it (comp. on the contrary, Lev. iv. 12,

xvi. 27), but always הֶקְטִיר (Lev. i. 9, 13, 17; also of the sin-offering, iv. 10, 19, etc.), which literally means “to cause to smoke or steam”—that is, to cause to ascend in smoke and vapour. The burning of the offering does certainly complete the surrender of it on the part of the offerer, and for him the gift is destroyed, but only in such a way that at the same time the acceptance of the gift on the part of God ensues—an odour, which is well-pleasing to God, being produced as the smoke and vapour of the burnt-offering, “the real essence” of the offering (as Kurtz, *das mosaische Opfer*, p. 91, well expresses himself), rises upwards, so that He is thus made to enjoy the offering, which is what is meant by the regularly-recurring formula, אִשָּׁה יְיָ נִתַּח לִיהוָה (Lev. i. 9, 13, 17). How could the vapour of the offering be so called if the fire of the altar were a fire of punishment, and the burning offering the symbol of those burning in hell? (This view is truly hideous.) A symbolic interpretation of the expression is required by the Mosaic idea of God, in accordance with which a sensuous enjoyment on the part of God cannot be spoken of (3). But the fire which consumes the offering is originally one that comes from God, because by it God appropriates the offering (Lev. ix. 24; comp. from later times, Judg. vi. 21; 1 Kings xiii. 38; 1 Chron. xxi. 26; 2 Chron. vii. 1). It is never to go out on the altar, but must be continually nourished by the burnt-offering and the fat of the peace-offering, Lev. vi. 5 f. (12 f.); and this regulation does not simply mean that the fire of the offering must always be ready, but is meant to preserve the identity of the fire on the altar with the original heavenly fire, and represent at the same time the unbroken course of the adoration of Jehovah carried on in sacrifice. All fire for the offerings of incense had to be taken from this sacred fire on the altar of burnt-offerings,—a thing which is not, indeed, expressly commanded in the law, but was set forth practically by the heavy punishment inflicted on the sons of Aaron, who approached the Lord in the offering of incense with strange fire (Lev. x.). This heaven-born fire is the symbol of the divine holiness which reveals itself in Israel. That God accepts every offered gift only by means of the element which proceeds directly from Him, is intended to teach that every sacrifice which man makes to God is made perfect only by being taken up into the purifying, sanctifying element of divine life

(comp. Mark ix. 49). The latter, indeed, becomes (Lev. x. 2) a consuming fire for those who approach the Holy One in a profane spirit. Thus it is clear how the hearth of God (Isa. xxxi. 9; Ariel, Ezek. xliii. 15 f.) is not merely symbolic of the way in which God sanctifies His people, but also of His punitive justice, which annihilates all that resists Him. In this sense Isa. xxxiii. 14 says: "The sinners in Zion are afraid; fearfulness hath surprised the hypocrites. Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?" (Comp., too, Isa. x. 17, and § 48 on this passage; Mal. iii. 19.)

(1) But first the offerer had to take off the skin of the animal, and to divide it "into its pieces" (Lev. i. 6, viii. 20); that is, not to hack it into rude lumps, but to dissect it properly. The inspection of the intestines, which constituted an essential part of the sacrificial transaction among many ancient nations, especially the Phœnicians (comp. Movers, *das Opferwesen der Karthager*, p. 65), is entirely banished from the Mosaic cultus. [Article, "*Opferkultus des A. T.*"]

(2) The way in which the rest of the flesh of these was used, see *infra*, under the various kinds of offerings, § 132 ff.

(3) Even on the Homeric view, it is not the pleasure of enjoying the vapour of the offering in itself, but the readiness of man to honour God with this enjoyment, which makes the offering acceptable; comp. Nägelsbach, *homer. Theol.* ed. 1, p. 304; ed. 2, p. 352.

§ 129.

Ritual of the Meat-Offering.

The ritual of the meat-offering was very simple. At those meat-offerings which accompanied the burnt-offerings presented for the congregation, it is probable—there is no certain command—that the whole quantity of flour, oil, and incense was burnt on the altar (1). At free-will meat-offerings (comp. Lev. ii. and vi. 7 ff.), the offerer brought the material to the priest, who took a handful of the flour and oil (כֹּלֵל קִמְצוֹ, ii. 2, comp. vi. 8), together with the whole of the incense, and burned it on the altar (2). The name for the portion of the meat-offering which was placed on the altar, as well as for the incense laid on the shewbread (Lev. xxiv. 7), is אֵין־קָרֶחֶת, which is inter-

puted most plausibly by the LXX. *μνημόσυνον* (Vulgate, *memoriale*), and thus expresses that the odour of the meat-offering, when burnt, was to bring the offerer into God's gracious remembrance; as, on the contrary, the offering of jealousy, Num. v. 15, is called *מִנְחַת זָכָרֹן מִן־בָּקָרָה* *עֵץ*, which brings sin to remembrance (3). The meat-offerings accompanying peace-offerings will be treated of along with these.—The law makes no provisions about the manner of procedure in the drink-offering. According to Sir. l. 15 (17), the wine was poured out at the foot of the altar; according to Josephus, *Ant.* iii. 9. 4, round the altar (and this, say the Rabbis, after it had first been salted). The libation, as is probable *a priori*, is said to have been the last act of the offering (4).

(1) See Keil, *Archäologie*, i. p. 255 f.; Winer, *Reallexikon*, ed. 3, ii. p. 494. The latter assumes that the meat-offerings mentioned in Lev. xiv. 20 f., Num. vi. 15 ff., viii. 8 ff., were also completely consumed on the altar. In the law, on the contrary, this is expressly prescribed only for the priestly Mincha, Lev. vi. 16 (comp. § 95), which was a matter of course, since the person who made the offering was not to partake of his own Mincha.

(2) The term *קֶמֶץ* does not at all denote, as the Rabbis understood it, a very small portion (viz. such a handful that the extremities of the fingers lay on the palm of the hand; see Hottinger, *jus hebr.* p. 182), but means a good handful (comp. *לֶקְמָצִים*, Gen. xli. 47).—How great a part was taken from what was baked or roasted is not said. [Above art.]

(3) Bähr's explanation of the *זִכָּרָה* (*l.c.* i. p. 411, ii. p. 328) by "praise" is supported by the phrase *הַזִּכָּר יִשָּׂם יְהוָה*, but does not agree well with Lev. v. 12, Num. v. 26; Knobel's rendering—remembrance = gift, tribute—cannot adduce proof for the use of *זָכָר* which it assumes; Ewald's interpretation—odour—is quite destitute of linguistic proof.—The remainder of the Mincha fell to the priests, and was to be consumed in the front court as a thing most holy—of course after the flour mingled with oil had been baked without leaven (Lev. ii. 3, 10, vi. 9 f., vii. 6 f.). [Above art.]

(4) See Lund, *l.c.* p. 596, where there are more particulars.

3. ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF OFFERINGS WITH REFERENCE TO THEIR PURPOSE.

§ 130.

Various Kinds of Offerings as thus distinguished.

The law of offering distinguishes, with reference to their destination and purpose, four kinds of offerings,—*burnt, peace, sin, and trespass* offerings. The laws in Lev. i.–iii. refer to the two first kinds, which are traced to one divine direction, i. 1 (“and Jehovah called to Moses, and said to him,” etc.); between the two the directions for meat-offerings are inserted, because these stood in connection with the animal-offerings in question (comp. Num. xv. 3 ff.). They stand, however, in closer connection with the burnt-offering, and therefore follow immediately on it. In chap. iv. f. (again in close connection, but traced to various divine disclosures, iv. 1, v. 14, 20) follow those species of offerings newly introduced by the Mosaic ritual, the sin-offering (up to v. 13) and the trespass-offering.—By this grouping we are led to refer the four kinds of offerings to two higher classes,—those which assume that the covenant relation is on the whole undisturbed, and those that are meant to do away with a disturbance which has entered into this relation, and again to restore the right relation (of the people or of separate individuals) to God. The latter are offerings of atonement, under which name we may comprehend both sin- and trespass-offerings. If several offerings were to be presented at the same time, the offerings of atonement generally preceded the burnt-offerings, and on the latter the peace-offerings followed. In respect of rank (1), the offering of atonement, as קָרִיִּשׁ, קָרִיִּשׁ, a thing most holy (vi. 18, 22, vii. 1, 6, etc.), stands higher than the peace-offering, which, like presented first-fruits, is expressly called simply קָדֶשׁ, a holy thing. But since the meat-offerings also are called most holy (ii. 3, 10, vi. 10, x. 12), the designation קָרִיִּשׁ is probably omitted only by accident in speaking of the burnt-offering, which certainly was an offering of high rank. The distinction is clearly connected with the use of the offering. Offerings at which the man who brings the offering obtains a part to partake of himself are merely holy, and so offerings of the second grade; while,

on the contrary, those entirely withdrawn from man's use, or such that the priests alone were allowed to enjoy them, were most holy (therefore this designation is used also of the shewbread). It is explained by what has been said, that in the enumeration of the kinds of offerings in Lev. vii. 37 (2), the thank-offering stands last. The תִּשְׁלֵחַ there mentioned, the offering at the dedication of the priests, which has already been treated of under the consecration of the priests (§ 95), was a modified thank-offering.

(1) The ritual (§ 127) already points to a difference of rank among the offerings, by the differences in the manipulation of the blood.

(2) Lev. vii. 37 : לְעֹלָה לְמִנְחָה וְלִחְמֵת וְלִאֲשֵׁם וְלִמְלִאִים וְלִזְבַּח הַשְּׁלָמִים.

(a) THE BURNT-OFFERING.

§ 131.

The common name of the burnt-offering, עֹלָה, is not, with Ewald, to be derived from a stem, על, which he supposes to signify *to glow*, *to burn* (Arabic, عَالَ) (in which case the name would come from long burning) (1), but from עלה, as is shown by the continual conjunction of the word with הָעֹלָה; while, on the contrary, זֶבַח, הַקָּרִיב, הַנִּיחֵשׁ, are used of the other kinds of offerings. It means that which ascends,—namely, on the altar,—in distinction from the offerings of which only a portion come on the altar (2). The interpretation of Bähr, Keil, and Delitzsch—"that which rises upwards to God in the fire"—is less probable. The other name of this offering, בָּלִיל, that is, the complete whole burnt-offering, occurs only in poetical passages (Deut. xxxiii. 10; Ps. li. 21) (3). The animal sacrificed must (Lev. i.), in accordance with the high rank of the offering, be a faultless male, taken from among the most perfect of the beasts of sacrifice (from the cattle, sheep, or goats) (4). After the skin had been taken off (which was the perquisite of the priest, vii. 8), and the offal removed, the animal was wholly burnt (הַבִּיל, i. 9) on the altar, and the blood was sprinkled round it. On the meat and drink-offerings connected with the burnt-offerings, see the law in Num. xv. 8 ff.

In this offering the people or the individual expressed in a general way adoration of Jehovah and devotion to Him. It is, as it has been suitably named, the *sacrificium latreuticum* (5). In virtue of the presentation of blood connected with it, and as a fire-offering of pleasant odour (רִיחַ נִיחָה), it is also propitiatory (appeasing) in general; it serves, Lev. i. 3, to make him who offers acceptable before Jehovah (לְרִצּוֹנוֹ לִפְנֵי יְהוָה)—indeed, in virtue of this acceptableness, it serves as a covering or atonement for the offerer (לְכַפֵּר, ver. 4; comp. xiv. 20, xvi. 24). The law knows nothing of a special destination of the burnt-offering to atone for a special sort of sins (6).—As the *sacrificium latreuticum*, it was the morning and evening sacrifice presented daily in the name of the people (the embodiment of morning and evening prayer), for which a yearling lamb was always used. This is called the continual burnt-offering (עֹלֹת תָּמִיד). The law touching it is given as early as the organization of the sanctuary itself (Ex. xxix. 38–42), and then repeated (Num. xxviii. 3–8). Every day was dedicated to God by the עֹלֹת תָּמִיד, and, as the Rabbis emphatically set forth, was thus atoned for; with its cessation the cultus itself is suspended (and so this is regarded as a great calamity, see Dan. viii. 11). No time is set for the morning sacrifice (according to *Mishna Tannid* iii. 2, as soon as it became light); the evening sacrifice is to be presented בֵּין הָעֶרְבַּיִם (between the two evenings), Ex. xxix. 39, 41. This expression, which occurs frequently in the Pentateuch (also in the Paschal law), has long been variously interpreted by the Jews. According to the Karaites (who rest on Deut. xvi. 6) and the Samaritans (likewise Aben Esra), it means the time between sunset and total darkness; according to the Pharisees, between the hour when the sun declines (three o'clock in the afternoon) and sunset (7); while Kimchi and Rashi (and, in modern times, Hitzig) say that sunset was the boundary-line between the two evenings (8). The evening sacrifice was intended, Lev. vi. 2, to burn through the whole night till the morning. Probably at the same time as the עֹלֹת תָּמִיד was presented, the offering of incense, also presented twice daily, was kindled on the inner altar (already spoken of in § 117). The time for presenting the offering was also the hour of prayer (Dan. ix. 21; Acts iii. 1), as, generally speaking, it is likely that an act of prayer was combined with the burnt-offering (comp. 2 Chron. xxix. 27–30).

With the morning and evening sacrifice were also combined a meat- and drink-offering (9); between these two, tradition makes the high priest's meat-offering to have been presented, for which reference is made to the law in Lev. vi. 12–16 (19–23) (10); comp. Sir. xlv. 14 (17).—The Sabbath, the new moon, and the feasts were marked by an augmented burnt-offering, Num. xxviii. 9 ff. (11). See in 2 Chron. xxix. 27–30 a description of the form of the festal burnt-offerings in the temple at a later time (12).—Even strangers who wished to honour Jehovah might (Lev. xvii. 8, xxii. 18, 25) offer burnt-offerings and sacrifices (13).

(1) See Ewald, *Alterthümer*, ed. 1, p. 50; ed. 3, p. 64.—By the LXX., $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma$ is generally translated $\acute{o}\lambda o\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\mu\alpha$, sometimes also $\acute{o}\lambda o\kappa\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\omega\mu\alpha$.

(2) Comp. Ps. li. 21. Knobel, on Lev. i. 3, seeks to explain the name $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma$ by supposing that it originated at a time when this was the only offering, and was retained by the same ancient offering after others arose. However, the name designates literally what is characteristic of the burnt-offering, in distinction from those offerings which could not absolutely be called “ascending.”

(3) The term $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\gamma$ refers to the complete burning; compare the use of the word for the priestly Mincha, which was also to be completely burnt (Lev. vi. 15 f., and also Deut. xiii. 17). The word has a more comprehensive meaning in the Phœnician ritual; there it is a designation of sacrifice in general, as is to be concluded from the Punic sacrificial tablet found in Marseilles. See Movers, *l.c.* p. 59 ff.; Ewald, *bibl. Jahrb.* i. p. 211.

(4) So, also, for the sin-offerings of higher rank, male animals are commanded to be used.—Only for turtle-doves and young pigeons offered by the poor was the sex not prescribed. [Above art.]

(5) Its significance is more particularly defined by what has been said about the meaning of sacrificial gifts in the Mosaic cultus in discussing the materials of offerings. [Above art.]

(6) The burnt-offering has a general atoning efficacy as regards him who presents the offering; comp. *e.g.* 1 Sam. xxvi. 19.—Outram, *l.c.* p. 103, gives the fancies of the Rabbins about the kinds of sin for which they suppose the burnt-offering to atone, in distinction from the sin-offering and trespass-offering; in particular (comp. Rashi on Lev. i. 4), the burnt-offering was thought to expiate the transgression of such commandments as are found negatively and positively ex-

pressed in the Thora, as Deut. xxii. 6 f. (the command against taking birds' nests). [Above art.]

(7) This was the practice in the temple; according to *Mishna Pesachim* v. 1, the evening offering was slaughtered half an hour after the eighth hour of the day (that is, about half-past two o'clock), and offered half an hour after the ninth hour (half-past three). [Above art.]

(8) As the evening comprehends the whole time immediately before and after sunset, it may be reckoned partly to the past day as its close (comp. Lev. xxiii. 32), and partly to the next day as its beginning; by the latter usage, for example, לַמֶּחֶרֶת, in 1 Sam. xxx. 17, finds its explanation (see Thenius on this passage). The expression עֶרְבִים is probably to be primarily traced to this division of the evening, just as צִהָרִים, properly "the pair of lights," denotes mid-day as the time before and after the highest position of the sun (see Ewald, *Ausf. Lehrb. der hebr. Sprache*, ed. 8, p. 475 f.). Comp. also Gesenius, *Thesaur.* ii. p. 1064 f. [article, "Tag bei den Hebräern"].

(9) To each of the two lambs a tenth deal of an ephah of flour as a meat-offering, and a fourth part of a hin of wine as a drink-offering. —Other observances of later tradition in the morning and evening sacrifice are collected in the tract *Tamid*, which is given in Ugolino, *Thes.* xix. p. 1467, with copious notes [article, "Opferkultus des A. T."].

(10) See Lund, *l.c.* pp. 921 and 928.—The high priest had to offer it for the first time on the day of his anointing (מִנְחַת חֲנוּךְ) (comp. § 95, note 22), and then to offer the same for himself every day (מִנְחַת כֹּהֵן, that is, meat-offering in the pan), half in the morning and half in the evening; and this he did (Josephus, *Ant.* iii. 10. 7) out of his own means, presenting it either himself or by a substitute. Against the view, still defended by Keil (*Archäol.* i. p. 174 f.) and others, which entirely denies the existence of this daily Mincha of the high priest, see the exact discussion of this point by Thalhofer, *l.c.* p. 139 ff.; comp. Delitzsch, *Komment. zum Hebräerbrief*, p. 315 ff. [Above art.]


(11) The later designation of these festal burnt-offerings is עֹלֹת רִצְיָה. On special festive occasions, burnt-offerings were sometimes brought of free-will in great numbers, as many as a thousand at a time; comp. 1 Kings iii. 4, 1 Chron. xxix. 21, etc. [Above art.]

(12) As soon as the act of offering began, the choir of Levites struck up a psalm, in which they were joined by the trumpets of the priests. During the whole service the assembled congregation stood praying; at the close, they threw themselves upon their knees, and


then most likely received the priestly blessing. It followed from the fact that the meaning of the burnt-offering is of a general kind, that it was sometimes united with special offerings. In acts of atonement it generally followed the sin-offering, and at public thanksgivings and other festivities formed a basis for the thank-offering, etc.; see the collection by Knobel on Lev. i. 3. [Above art.]

(13) Comp. *Mishna Shekalim* vii. 6.—Especially since the time of Alexander the Great, the heathen rulers of the Jews caused burnt-offerings to be offered for them; and Augustus actually instituted a daily burnt-offering of two lambs and a bullock for himself (Philo, *leg. ad Caj.* § 40). This offering was a sign of acknowledgment of his imperial majesty (comp. Josephus, *c. Ap.* ii. 6); and therefore when, at the beginning of the Jewish war, the acceptance of any offering from a Gentile was declined at the instigation of Eliezer, the rejection of the emperor's offering came to be regarded as an open breach with the Roman Government (Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* ii. 17. 2). Comp. on this point especially Lund, *l.c.* p. 634 f. [Above art.]

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